LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001000010011-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 19, 2008
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: December 7, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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21. _a r . ~~.. et
Assessment
Center
Latin America
Review
DIA review(s) completed.
Secret
RP LAR 78-015
7 December 1978
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5L' I:KL''1
LATIN AMERICA REVIEW
7 December 1978
CONTENTS
December.
Argentina's armed forces are reportedly plan-
ning a military move in mid-December if Chile
does not make a substantial territorial con-
cession in the Beagle Channel area at the
Foreign Ministers' meeting scheduled for 12
Argentina-Chile: Plans for Military Action
Nicaragua: Factors Affecting Sandinista Military
Strategy ? ? ? ? ? ? 3
The principal FSLN faction is strong enough
to launch major attacks against the govern-
ment at any time, but a variety of con-
straints suggest that guerrilla leaders will
follow a hit-and-run policy at leas lona
as the mediation effort continues.
Venezuela: Implications of Herrera's Election
Victory . . . . .
The Social Christian Party's new President-
elect has promised an "austere" administra-
tion, but he is not likely to embark on any
major shifts in domestic or foreign policy.
The recent public airing of British-Guatemalan
differences over the future of Belize has
made the negotiating process even more dif-
ficult, but the Guatemalans are still unlikely
Guatemala-UK: Stalemate over Belize 9 25X1
to move toward a major confrontation. 25X1
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Colombia: Narcotics Control in the Guajira 11
The government has stepped up its efforts
to restrict narcotics trafficking, but ul-
timate success depends on :Bogota's willing-
ness and ability to implement an overall
program to solve Colombia's complex socio-
economic problems.
FOR THE RECO:RI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
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Argentina-Chile: Plans for Military Action
Argentina's
armed forces plan to initiate a military confrontation
in mid-December if Chile does not make a substantial
territorial concession in the Beagle Channel area at the
Foreign ministers' meeting scheduled for 12 December.
Argentine President Videla, who has been making efforts
to reach a peaceful settlement, could lose control of
the situation if the Foreign Ministers' meeting breaks
down.
The Argentine high command reportedly has ordered
all operational units of the armed forces to be fully
deployed and ready for combat by 15 December. The US
defense attache in Buenos Aires reports that all warships
in Puerto Belgrano--the main Argentine naval base--are
already in a 24-hour readiness posture and that their
hull numbers have been painted out--generally regarded
as an indicator of preparation for battle.
Both Argentina and Chile are continuing to purchase
more arms and materiel. Since late 1977, Argentina has
contracted for an estimated $550 million to $750 million
worth of military equipment and ammunition. During the
same period, Chile has probably spent about $25 million.
The difference suggests that Chile still does not believe
it will have to engage in a protracted conflict. For
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its part, Argentina is not only preparing for any con-
tingency in the current dispute, but also apparently in-
tends to upgrade its military inventory for more general
defense purposes. C
Although Argentina and Chile have agreed to the
Foreign Ministers' meeting, they still differ on the
purpose of the talks. Argentina apparently intends to
press for continued substantive bilateral discussions as
a prerequisite to third party mediation. Chile has
agreed only "to review the diplomatic record" and wants
immediate mediation. These differences over how to pro-
ceed could cause the talks to break down before a media-
tor can be selected.
Both nations seem to attach more importance to
their jurisdictional claims than they do to a peaceful
settlement. Fundamentally, Argentina wants Chile's
oceanic control limited to the Pacific, with no "minor"
intrusions into the South Atlantic that might later be
expanded. To defend its unencumbered control in the
South Atlantic, Argentina insists on ownership of a spe-
cific landmark as a boundary point. Chile, on the other
hand, refuses to give up its proprietary rights to islets
located in the South Atlantic--which are not part of the
juridical dispute--and insists that mediation be limited
to fixing a maritime boundary determined by meridians
instead of territory.
Videla's failure to obtain any significant conces-
sions from the Chileans has further weakened his posi-
tion, especially with several influential military com-
manders who seem increasingly disposed to force a reso-
lution of the channel issue through armed confrontation.
Videla's government in recent months has been ineffective
in handlincr a broad range of policy matters,
if hostili-
ties ensue, Videla's apparent inability to take command
could result in his being pushed aside by more aggressive
military leaders.
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continues.
The principal Sandinista National Liberation Front
(FSLN) guerrilla faction, the Terciario, is strong
enough to launch major attacks by itself against the
Somoza regime and, given the flow of new armament and
( other preparations, a new guerrilla offensive could
still come at any time. Guerrilla leaders, however,
are evidently weighing potential constraints, several
of which appear to recommend only hit-and-run attacks,
at least as long as the international mediation effort
Strategy
Nicaragua: Factors Affecting Sandinista Military
The guerrillas' major offensive has been expected,
and in fact repeatedly announced, for weeks. The Ter-
/ ciario faction in particular has the advantages of sub-
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stantial foreign backing
It has also had success in recrui ing--
in Costa Rica alone may number 700 or more.
Sandinista guerrillas during fighting in Esteli lost September
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3
7
counseling against a major attack.
A number of factors, however,, currently seem to
favor an FSLN policy of hit-and-run attacks rather than
an all-out offensive. The principal Terciario faction
reportedly has denounced the mediation effort and the
proposal for a national plebiscite, but the bulk of
Terciario leader Pastorals rank-and-file followers--
newer recruits presumed to be motivated more by anti-
Somoza sentiment than by revolutionary ideology--may
prefer giving the plebiscite a chance. Pastora cer-
tainly needs active popular backing inside Nicaragua,
which would be less likely if his offensive were per-
ceived to be undermining a promising and peaceful alter-
native way to oust Somoza. Moreover, among the Sandi-
nistas' international backers, Fidel Castro and perhaps
Venezuelan President Perez, for different reasons, are
The guerrillas also are certainly weighing military
factors. They have more men and better arms than ever
before, but so does the National Guard. The FSLN may
have 2,000 armed followers, while the Guard probably has
over 10,000 men. Moreover, the Guard, has reinforced the
Costa Rican border area, and within the next few weeks
the Organization, of American States could post observers
along the border as well. The Terciarios, who operate
largely out of Costa Rica, are generally not fanatics,
and they recognize that another defeat like the one suf-
fered in September could demoralize all of the anti-
Somoza forces and strengthen the government's overall
The military balance is unlikely to change signifi-
cantly, unless the guerrillas acquire aircraft or receive
much greater, d:Lrect, foreign military support. Several
.vague reports have suggested that the FSLN has acquired
some planes, but. we have no details or corroboration.
Tomas Borge, the Popular Prolonged War (GPP) faction
leader, opposes Pastorals strategy of uniting various
anti-Somoza forces to promote immediate popular insurrec-
tion, because he believes it would be a premature and
"nonideological" move. The GPP favors an authentic rev-
olution achieved[ through prolonged guerrilla action be-
ginning in the mountains and culminating in a general
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insurrection to establish a socialist state.
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Venezuela: Implications of Herrera's Election Victory
President-elect Luis Herrera Campins' victory in
the general election on 3 December brings his Social
Christian Party to power for only the second time in
its 32-year existence. He has promised an austere ad-
ministration, and his election will not result in an
y
major shifts in domestic or foreign policy. Unofficial
returns in one of the largest voter turnouts in Venezu-
elan history give Herrera a 100,000 vote margin, but
this is not large enough to ensure his party's control
of the concurrently elected bicameral congress. The
results of the congressional elections will not be
known until late this week, when seats are assigned
to the contending parties through a system of propor-
ti
onal representation.
Together, the Social Christians and the governing
Democratic Action Party won approximately 85 percent
of the vote, a fact that continues the trend toward-an
institutionalized two party system in the country--a
h
ealthy sign of political and democratic stability.
Leaders of a number of badly trounced leftist
parties are again calling for the formation of a
postelection united front. This tactic has been tried
many times during the past 20 years, but has failed
because the parties and leaders were unable to resolve
personal and ideological differences.
7 December 1978
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The New Government
During the election campaign, Herrera relied on a
number of close advisers who are now expected to play
influential roles in his administration. Gonzalo Garcia
Bustillo, former Ambassador to the Organization of
American States, is expected to become foreign minister;
and Humberto Calderon Berti, an expert on oil technology
is likely to take over the Ministry of Energy and Mines.
Until the party's legislative lineup is settled,
Herrera will defer action on whether to initiate talks
with smaller political parties, or even with the de-
feated Democratic Action Party, on a coalition that
could ensure passage of needed economic and social
legislation. During the campaign, Herrera turned down
suggestions by his Democratic Action opponent that
both parties agree beforehand to a legislative coalition
in the event neither won a majority in the new congress.
Former Social Christian President Rafael Caldera's re-
fusal to agree to a coalition after his narrow win in
1968 resulted in a legislative stalemate that lasted
nearly two years and that was broken only when military
leaders began to voice their concern over the situation.
7 December 1978
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Prospects
The somewhat enigmatic figure of former President
Rafael Caldera hovers over the Herrera presidency.
Caldera's hold on the Social Christian Party is stronger
than that of Romulo Betancourt on the governing Demo-
cratic Action Party, if only because Caldera is re-
garded as his party's presidential candidate for 1983
when the required :L0-year period after his former
presidency will have elapsed. Until Herrera won his
party's nomination.--against the strenuous efforts of
Caldera to install his own choice--the two have been
political antagonists. Their differences were papered
over during the hard-fought campaign, but they may
break out again if the President-elect sets his Social
Christian government on a course that disregards
Unlike Caldera, Herrera is unlikely to govern by
committee. He will have a greater temptation to strike
out on his own, since he has fewer political debts to
pay to his party. Herrera's candidacy was the result of
his hard work outside of the party organization; indeed,
he won the nomination despite the opposition of the party
machine. As an outsider to party politics, Herrera may
thus have better credentials for resisting the demands
of special interest groups, but his lack of experience
in the machinery of government is likely to make the
vital process of coordination between a president and
his legislative followers a difficult one.
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Guatemala-UK: Stalemate Over Belize
The recent public airing of British-Guatemalan dif-
ferences over the future of Belize has made the negoti-
ating process even more difficult.
On 28 November, the British revealed their proposals--
initially made in secret last September--to demonstrate
to the UN General Assembly's committee on decolonization
that the UK had kept its promise to work for the "early
independence" of Belize. The UK is offering the Guate-
malans an economic development package and a modest re-
configuring of territorial waters but no cession of
Belizean territory--far short of Guatemala's expectations.
The move reflects London's determination to resolve the
issue as soon as possible and its view that Commonwealth
nations and most nonaligned states would not oppose the
Guatemalan Foreign Minister Castillo Valdez re-
sponded to the British disclosure in a vitriolic speech
on 30 November that included a direct attack on UK For-
eign Secretary Owen. Although Castillo Valdez categori-
cally rejected the British proposals, he noted that his
government is willing to continue negotiations with the
UK and--in a new gambit--to have direct talks "with the
people of Belize."
The Guatemalan Foreign Ministry is now reported to
be reviewing policy options. President Lucas and
Castillo Valdez have discussed reinforcing garrisons
near the border with Belize, but the Foreign Minister
continues to favor drawing out the negotiating process
in the hope that--in time--both the UK and Belize will
have more accommodating governments. Short of a precipi-
tate, unilateral British move to grant independence to
Belize, the Guatemalans--in part because of their pre-
occupation with events in Nicaragua--are likely to avoid
taking steps toward any major confrontation.
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Colombia: Major Drug Production and Smuggling Area
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Colombia: Narcotics Control in the Guajira
The Colombian Government is stepping up its drug
enforcement efforts, particularly in the cultivation and
smuggling center of the Guajira Peninsula. Enforcement,
however, is only one aspect of the overall program needed
to solve Colombia's complex narcotics problem.
"Operation Fulminante"--an intensive, albeit tem-
porary, campaign begun last month by military and police
units against marijuana and cocaine traffickers--is pro-
ducing positive results in the Guajira area. Air patrols,
roadblocks, and news reports of arrests, seizures, and
stiff penalties have already diminished narcotics traf-
resent
The o
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a
eas
or
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ation is scheduled to end in two to three months, how-
ever, and when the restrictions are eased many of the
traffickers will undoubtedly resume their operations.
Ultimate success in the Guajira Peninsula will de-
pend on Bogota's willingness and ability to implement a
socioeconomic program that provides incentives to abandon
the illicit but profitable drug industry. This will not
be an easy task, however, in view of the poverty and dis-
trust of the central government that prevail among the
people of the Guajira.
Background on the Region
The Guajira Peninsula's geographic isolation is re-
flected in its historic separation from the economic and
political mainstream of Colombian life. The sparsely
populated region is characterized by arid, largely barren
plains and scattered high hills. Narrow unsurfaced roads
and tracks provide virtually the only transportation
links between the small towns, although there are also
numerous clandestine airstrips used for drug smuggling.
Conditions in the Guajira have imbued the people with an
independent, separatist mentality that combines resent-
ment toward Bogota for having neglected the region and
pride for having survived despite this neglect.
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Opportunities for economic improvement are linked
to the region's emergence as a major source of marijuana
and, to a lesser extent, as a transshipment point for
cocaine. "Operation Fulminante" not only threatens that
prosperity, but also fosters the local peoples' aliena-
tion from and resentment of the central government be-
cause of what they regard as Bogota's heavyhanded tactics
in the antidrug enforcement program.
The citizens of Riohacha--the capital of Guajira
Department--are reportedly carrying out civil strikes
and demonstrations against the allegedly repressive
measures employed in the enforcement action. Notices
are also said to be circulating in the region that de-
scribe the central government as the Guajira's "principal
enemy." Some persons in the Guajira reportedly believe
that Bogota's antinarcotics drive is no more than a self-
serving move by President Turbay to improve his public
image and cleanse his name of rumors that he is involved
in drug traffic.
The Problem for Turbay--and the US
President Turbay recognizes the deeper socioeconomic
causes behind the proliferation of drug trafficking in
Colombia. He is aware that while stringent enforcement
may temporarily curtail the flow of narcotics, what is
needed over the long term is an economic development
program to provide people in the Guajira with a legiti-
mate means of earning a living. His administration is
currently studying programs that will provide sufficient
infrastructure in the Guajira and other less-developed
areas to support industrial activity and to increase
legitimate agricultural output. Actual construction of
new roads and development of labor-intensive.manufactur-
ing, however, are years away. Meanwhile, the drug-oriented
illicit economy could become so entrenched in the area--
if this is not. already the case--.as to be essentially
impervious to control measures. Indeed, at least some of
the population will perhaps never become part of a pro-
Significant reduction of marijuana cultivation in
the Guajira will result only when Colombia embarks on an
eradication program similar to the one undertaken in
Mexico. Even current levels of drug control in Colombia
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FOR THE RECORD
EL SALVADOR: Guerrilla organizations are focusing
greater attention on multinational corporations in El
Salvador. On 25 November, bombs placed by the guerril-
las caused extensive damage to one of the principal lab-
oratories of the West German Bayer conglomerate. The
preceding day, the director of the Dutch Philips corpora--
tion was kidnaped by guerrillas, and Philips is likely
to have to pay a large ransom to secure his release.
The corporation has already published the guerrillas'
statement of grievances in some 40 newspapers in 32 coun-
tries. On 30 November, two British citizens employed
by the Bank of London and South America were kidnaped.
The Armed Forces of National Resistance has claimed
credit for all three kidnapings.
Church-state relations, already at what may be an
all-time low, may deteriorate further in the wake of the
killing of a priest at his home during a five-hour shoot-
out between security forces and alleged guerrillas on
28 November. The military maintains that the priest was
3 s 7 identified by "a fellow guerrilla" as the head of some
32 cells of the Popular Liberation Forces, the country's
largest guerrilla organization. Archbishop Romero, a
persistent critic of the regime, has formed an investi-
gatory commission that seems likely to challenge the
official version of these events. Romero's activism has
been regarded by some as going beyond what the Vatican
3 would favor, but his recent ouster of Vicar General
Revelo--widely viewed as a conservative imposed on Ro-
mero by the Holy See--implies that no diminution in the
archbishop's criticism of the government can be expected.
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can be maintained only if such intensive enforcement
campaigns as "Operation Fulminante" are institutionalized
and conducted full time. Either approach would require
a substantial commitment of money and material from the
US and would, particularly in the case of an eradication
i
es
program, invariably lead to diplomatic difficult
between Washington and Bogota similar to those that have
Colombia appears to be at the same stage in its de-
cisionmaking process regarding drug control as Mexico
was in the early 1970s, that is, whether or not to launch
a costly and concerted effort. Unlike Mexico, however,
Colombia probably will not be able to pay its share of
the bill. As seen from Bogota, therefore, the issue for
l
affected US-Mexican drug-control efforts.
rn Co-
the US is that. the more it promotes drug contro
lombia, the more it will be expected to pay.
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