LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001000010015-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2006
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: January 11, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

National t
rfta*Eor Release 2006/03/17 CIA-RDP79T00912AO01000
Assessment
Center
Latin America
Review
11 January 1979
Secret
RP LAR 79-002
11 January 1979
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LATIN AMERICA REVIEW
11 January 1979
CONTENTS
Chile: Labor Movement Cltj_t0 Boycott
Decision . . . . . . . . . . . .
The military regime has announced another
new labor policy in an effort to avert the
threatened boycott, but union and govern-
ment leaders still differ over the proper
definition of labor freedom.
Colombia: Major Arms Theft by Guerrilla _T I Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
The arms theft last week by the 19th of
April Movement (M-19) is clearly an em-
barrassment to the military and poses po-
tentially serious consequences for the
Turbay administration.
. . . . . . . . . . . . L It
Cuban Chronology for December 1978 1 1. . 15
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Chile: Labor Movement Close to Boycott Decision
For the second time within the last 90 days, the
Chilean military regime has made a public move to avert
a threatened boycott by the Regional Inter-American
Labor Organization (GRIT), in which the AFL-CIO has the
strongest voice. The new labor policy, announced on
2 January, sets forth guidelines for the resumption of
trade union activities, which have been banned for the
last five years in Chile. These guidelines will be as-
sessed at an ORIT meeting on 15 January, but may not be
acceptable for a number of reasons, including differing
views over what are the proper limits of labor freedom.
If ORIT decides to go ahead with the boycott, it could
c~ hurt the export-oriented Chilean economy and cause some
loss to the US whose annual exports to Chile total about
$600 million. It may also further damage US-Chilean
relations and could widen the gap between the militar
regime and its domestic opposition.
Back round
During the last year, bargaining between ORIT,
whose principal negotiators have been AFL-CIO leaders,
and the military regime has been approaching a climax.
The AFL-CIO's allies in Chile are the so-called Group
of Ten, a body of non-Communist labor leaders who
favored the coup against Allende. They were also early
supporters of the Pinochet regime, which they expected
would move quickly to restore union freedoms, but their
3 enthusiasm waned as the regime continued to temporize.
Although the government finally agreed that a normaliza-
tion of labor relations would take place in 1979, ORIT
and the Group of Ten did not wait to see if the latest
promise would be fulfilled. Instead, they tried to force
the regime to take concrete action by threatening a
boycott. The Chilean Government responded last October
with hurriedly called and clumsily handled elections in
about 20 percent of the nation's local unions. These
elections, and the decree laws authorizing them were
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boycott.
sharply criticized by the Group of Ten and by ORIT,
which proceeded to 'vote in November to go ahead with the
Pinera, who soon advanced a new labor policy.
ministers, including a new Minister of Labor, Jose
In conflicts with foreign governments and interna-
tional bodies, the Chilean regime usually tries to win
popular support, weaken its domestic political enemies,
and gain the best negotiating stance against the outside
adversary. When ORIT voted the boycott of Chile (along
with Cuba and Nicaragua), the regime reacted charac-
teristically, protesting the action, vowing resistance,
and appealing for mass backing. At the same time, how-
ever, it commissioned studies to find ways to circumvent
the boycott and to calculate its potential costs. What-
ever the conclusions of the official studies--some re-
portedly found that a boycott would "inconvenience" but
not seriously damage the country--the regime evidently
decided that avoiding the boycott would be best and
moved to try to forestall it. After several informal
meetings with high-level intermediaries, the AFL-CIO
agreed to delay a December meeting at which ways to
carry out the boycott were to have been discussed.
Later that month, a cabinet shakeup brought in six new
The New Labor Plan
The new plan, and even its mode of presentation all
involved some obvious concessions to ORIT and to critics
on the domestic labor scene. The appointment of Pinera,
a Harvard-educated economist, signaled that the regime's
so-called "economic team" was now in charge of labor
policy. The new policy, moreover, was first outlined
before a gathering of businessmen and labor leaders, in-
cluding some members of the Group of 'Ten, an audience
that is usually off limits to government leaders.
The plan itself--"for the establishment of a free,
democratic, and financially strong labor movement"--
set a deadline of 30 June for the :return of collective
bargaining, trade union elections, and the complete nor-
malization of labor activity. It also provided that a
majority vote. of individual local unions could nullify
the earlier, regime-sponsored elections. In addition, it
eliminated a provision that had disqualified from union
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office anyone who had held political office in the last
ten years. Finally, as a "measure of good faith," it
gave all "legally recognized" unions the hitherto denied
right of assembly.
A week after the announcement, however, the Group of
Ten declared its opposition, showing that the conflict
was no longer one of timing but of substance. The mili-
tary regime and its economic advisers have long wanted to
depoliticize the labor movement to prevent the use of
unions as a base of political opposition. The regime
also does not want to grant labor any freedoms that
might disrupt the Productivity of Chile's present free-
market economy.
In this struggle for power and principle, differ-
ences seem to center on:
-- The right to strike. Although granted in prin-
ciple, it is so highly qualified that opposi-
tion leaders claim it can rarely, if ever be
realized in practice. 25X1
-- Collective bargaining . The new plan apparently
contains ample provisions for settlement of
disputes including arbitration and concilia-
tion, but the opposition fears that many small
unions, as well as federations and confedera-
tions, will be excluded from the process.
-- Dues Checkoffs. Although permitted for local
unions, dues checkoffs are denied to larger
labor groups, and without these checkoffs the
opposition believes the federations and con-
federations cannot survive.
-- Freedom of assembl . opposition leaders feel
this right will be circumscribed both by exist-
ing decrees and by interpretations of what
constitutes a "legally recognized" union.
-- Status of present unions and officeholders.
Labor leaders believe they will not be allowed
to be candidates for union offices, and that
some of their organizations will not be recog-
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These doubts, and others, led the Group of Ten,
which represents about a third of Chile's one million
previously organized workers, to oppose the new labor
plan.
Prospects
Without question, the ORIT :Leaders who meet next
week will be heavily influenced by opposition from the
Group of Ten. Before then, there is still some time
for further maneuvering and one more postponement of the
decision to implement: the boycott is possible though
doubtful. If, as seems more likely, the boycott is
actually carried out, it could well bring serious con-
sequences both inside and outside Chile.
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Colombia: Major Arms Theft by Guerrilla Group
A major arms theft last week by the 19th of April
movement (M-19)--perhaps the most volatile of Colombia's
numerous guerrilla groups--is clearly an embarrassment
for the military, enhances the prestige of M-19, in-
creases the climate of insecurity in the country, and
poses potentially serious consequences for the Turbay
administration. After tunneling under a street in
Bogota and into a military armory, the M-19 made off
with an estimated 5,000 weapons, possibly including
mortars and rocket launchers as well as machineguns
one of the guerrilla or communist organizations.
Background of M-19
M-19 takes its name from the date of the presiden-
tial election of 19 April 1970--which ex-dictator Rojas
Pinilla and his National Popular Alliance Party (ANAPO)
lost because of fraudulent balloting. The group emerged
in 1974 when ANAPO split between traditionalists who
wanted to remain a separate party, and young leftists
who wanted to radicalize by forming an alliance with
Espousing a Trotskyite pro-Cuban ideology, the
militant M-19 currently has some 200-300 members and is
one of the country's most active insurgent groups. In
an effort to confuse authorities, it has operated over
the years under a variety of different names, engaging
in urban guerrilla operations ranging from the highly
publicized stealing of the sword of Simon Bolivar to
raising funds through extortion, kidnapings, and rob-
beries.
The group is considered particularly dangerous be-
cause of its demonstrated ability to carry out political
assassinations such as the murder of a prominent Co-
lombian labor leader in 1976 and the machine-punning of
a high-ranking army general last year.
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Developments Since the Theft
Following the arms robbery, M?-19 issued a communique
that took responsibility for the operation and demanded
agrarian reform,, salary increases for workers, an end to
n ` the state of siege, and abrogation of the security
d' statute--a recently promulgated law that imposes more
severe sentences for civil unrest and places crimes
against state security under military jurisdiction.
In response, authorities launched an immediate
drive to recover the weapons and apprehend known M-19
members. In the course of their search, army and police
units chanced upon the M-19 "people's prison" where a
kidnaped Texaco executive had been held since last
May. During the ensuing clash, the Texaco representa-
tive was murdered by his captors, who in turn either
committed suicide or were killed by authorities. That 25X1
raid, however, coupled with the discovery of other sub-
versive hideouts, yielded a large volume of documents
that shed additional light on the M-19.
Part of M-19s
overall goal may be to unite the ideologically disparate
guerrillas into a national insurgent movement. To date,
however, there have been only sporadic and minor in-
stances of cooperation among the groups.
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Many M-19 members have exhibited a strong degree of
fanaticism. Rather than be captured, they have frequently
tried to commit suicide or have virtually forced the
authorities to kill them. While the guerrillas may fear
physical abuse and torture by the authorities, their
actions also reflect a determination and commitment
that could lead to carry out extraordinary kamikaze-type
missions.
Status of the Weapons
The exact type and present location of the stolen
armaments remain unknown. M-19 claims to have taken
relatively heavy weapons such as mortars and rocket
launchers. The military--perhaps to attenuate its own
humiliation--maintains that no Army weapons were lost
and that M-19 only got a collection of assorted--in
many cases obsolete--small arms confiscated from private
individuals. Clearly, however, a large number of weapons
were taken and it is likely that some military hardware
Since the number
of weapons taken by M-19 great y exceeds its membership,
it is probable that some of the equipment will either
be given or traded to other insurgent groups or will be
sold to criminals.
Implications for the Turbay Administration
In recent years, Colombian officials have become
3 increasingly concerned not only by the bombings, kid-
napings, and assassinations perpetrated by the country's
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order."
insurgents, but also by the general social unrest
exemplified by dissident students and striking workers.
These factors, coupled with inflation and other economic
problems, are viewed by military and civilian leaders
alike as a potential threat to Colombia's stability.
In order to control the escalating problems of common
crime, terrorism, rampant drug smuggling, and subversion,
the Turbay administration recently promulgated a stringent
security law providing not only stiffer prison sentences
for specific crimes such as kidnaping, but also regulat-
ing radio and television broadcasts "relative to public
The actions of M-19 obviously fly in the face of
President Turbay's law-and-order crackdown. Despite
the discovery of the "people's prison" and the arrest
of numerous suspected subversives, the M-19 operation
is nevertheless a significant victory--if only in terms
of publicity--for the guerrillas. The government in
general, and the military in particular, can still
minimize that victory if the stolen weapons actually
prove to be inconsequential and if the subversives thus
far arrested prove to be the ones directly involved in
the robbery.
3
It is more likely, however, that M-19 did get away
with some military weapons. It is also likely that
these weapons will be used in subsequent actions against
military and police units. This could set off a spiral
of assault and reprisal, with insurgents and security
forces taking increased toll on each other's ranks, and
probably on innocent bystanders as well. The greater
availability of guns and munitions could spawn not only
a proliferation of newly armed leftists, but also pro-
vide drug smugglers with a more forceful means of re-
sistance, especially against the military's antinarco-
tics campaign in the Guajira.
The Colombian Government--in years past a model in
terms of adhering to the principles of human rights--has
recently come under criticism for alleged torture of
prisoners by police and military and for the reputedly
heavyhanded nature of Turbay's law-and-order campaign.
Ironically, the greatest consequence of the arms theft
may not be on internal security per se, but on the way
the government's handling of the problem is perceived.
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If the government fails to respond forcefully, it
will be criticized by rightwing political factions, the
military establishment, wealthy businessmen and indus-
trialists, and other traditional targets of insurgent
actions. If the government reacts decisively and
strongly, unleashing the full force of the military and
police against M-19 and other guerrilla groups, it runs
2 the risk of precipitating a bloodbath and of engendering
harsh criticism from civil libertarians and those con-
cerned with human rights violations. Either way, th
burden will be on President Turbay. 25X1
Since taking office last August, Turbay has demon-
strated a resolve, as well as the ability, to meet his
campaign pledge to restore order to Colombia. The M-19
incident is a setback for him, but it probably will re-
inforce his determination to gain control over the in-
surgents. We believe, therefore, that Turbay will re-
act forcefully, albeit carefully, and that in the coming
weeks and months he will utilize all measures available
to him under the state of siege and security statute.
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ARGENTINA-CHILE: In exchange for Vatican mediation
of the Beagle Channel dispute, Cardinal Samore has ex-
tracted from Argentina and Chile a promise not to resort
to force, to return to the military deployment that ex-
isted at the beginning of 1977, and to abstain from any
provocative actions. Presumably these l.ed es will ob-
tain throughout the mediation effort. 25X1
Up to now the Argentines have iinsisted on a division
of the disputed islands as a precondition for mediation.
The dropping of this precondition is at least a momentary
political victory for Argentine President Videla, who has
argued vigorously for a diplomatic solution in spite of
FOR THE RECORD
D
i the strenuous objections by hardline military leaders.
The officers will closely follow the mediation to ensure
that Argentina's maritime claims in the disputed area
are respected. If they are not, Videla will be held
strictly accountable.
The Chileans may view the mediation as a further
opportunity for foot-dragging. Continued Chilean in-
transigence could cause the mediation to fail and
rekindle demands of Argentine hardliners for a military
solution. 25X1
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CUBAN CHRONOLOGY
(UNCLASSIFIED)
For December 1978
4 December Carlos Rafael Rodriguez is host at a
reception for visiting Iraqi trade
union delegation which attended CTC
Congress.
5 December Fidel Castro speaks at builders' day
ceremony in Cienfuegos.
6 December Army general Raul Castro meets with
Beninese Defense Force delegation
headed by Col. Richard Rodriguez.
7 December Iraqi military delegation headed by
Brig. Gen. Tareq Shukri meets with
Div. Gen. Senen Casas Regueiro.
8 December Fidel Castro presides over second
round of talks between Cuban exile
representatives and Cuban Government
officials.
9 December Carlos Rafael Rodriguez meets with
Carlos Victor De Carvalho, Governor
of the Angolan National Bank.
Fidel Castro holds lengthy news con-
ference with a group of exile news-
men. He says that Cuba has had the
MIG-23 for over a year.
The Cuban Government announces that
1,500 former political prisoners and
their families will go to Venezuela
before Christmas.
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9 December The Second Che Guevara Internationalist
Teaching Brigade bolds public meeting
to affirm its intention to serve in
Angola for two years.
11 December Cuban foreign trade delegation arrives
in Maputo, Mozambique to discuss ex-
panding trade.
11-13 December Carlos Rafael Rodriguez visits Moscow
and meets with Chairman Kosygin on
12 December.
Cuban Communist. Party delegation
visits Guyana. Ulises Estrada meets
with Prime Minister Burnham.
12 December French-Cuban mixed commission meets
in Paris. Hector Rodriguez Llompart
heads Cuban delegation.
In Moscow, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez
meets with Iraqi :Leader Saddam Husayn
A1-Tikriti.
12-15 December National seminar of Committees for
the Defense of the Revolution (CDR)
held in Havana..
12-18 December Costa Rican Legislative Assembly
delegation visits Cuba.
13 December Saddam Husayn A1-Tikriti, vice-
chairman of Iraq's Revolutionary Com-
mand Council arrives in Havana at the
invitation of Fidel Castro.
16 December A new group of 120 Cuban doctors and
specialists arrives in Ethiopia. They
are met by Raul Curbelo Morales, head
of Cuban civilians in Ethiopia.
16-20 December Annual meeting of National Revolution-
ary Police (PNR) chiefs takes place
in Havana.
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17 December Cuba and Iraq sign economic coopera-
tion agreement in Havana.
19-21 December Cuban Women's Federation (FMC) holds
national plenum in Havana chaired by
Vilma Espin.
20 December Fidel Castro meets with Lansana Diane,
representative of Guinean Democratic
Party Politburo, who brings message
from Guinean President Sekou Toure.
Agreement is signed with government
of Iraq that will provide Cuban
health technicians for service in
Iraq.
20-22 December Carlos Rafael Rodriguez visits Portu-
gal. Meets with President Eanes.
21 December Manuel Pineiro, head of PCC America
Department, meets with delegation
from Puerto Rican Socialist Party
headed by Juan Mari Bras.
22 December Fidel Castro chairs 7th plenum of
Cuban Communist Party Central Com-
mittee. Economic plan and national
budget for next year are submitted.
23 December Technical advisory board of the State
Committee for Science and Technology
is established by Council vice presi-
dent Jose Fernandez.
Cuba and Albania sign trade protocol
for 1979.
25 December Cuba and Vietnam sign economic,
scientific, and technical cooperation
agreement.
27 December The Council of State decrees official
three-day mourning period for death
of Algerian President Boumediene.
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28 December - Second session of Peoples Government
1 January National Assembly held in Havana.
National budget for 1979 is submitted
and approved..
29 December Soviet Deputy Defense Minister Marshal
Sokolov arrives in Cuba for 20th an-
niversary celebration. He is greeted
by Raul Castro.
Cuban Party and. Government delegation
headed by Vice President Juan Almeida
and Politburo member Armando Hart ar-
rive in Algiers for funeral of Presi-
dent Boumediene.
30 December In Algiers, Cuban Vice President
Juan Almeida meets with Guinea-Bissau
President Luis Cabral.
Venezuelan Foreign Minister Simon
Consalvi arrives in Cuba to attend
20th anniversary celebration.
Cuban Government announces release of
400 former political prisoners. This
is the first group out of 3,600 Cuba
has said it will free.
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