LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001000010020-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2006
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: March 8, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

r fee' or Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01000010 Secret
U-b
Assessment T
Center
Latin America
Review
Secret
RP LAR 79-007
8 March 1979
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LATIN AMERICA REVIEW
8 March 1979
CONTENTS
Brazil: Challenges for the New President
President-elect Figueiredo, who will be in-
augurated next week, is expected to continue
the process of political liberalization, pos-
sibly even giving way to an elected civilian
when his own term ends in 1985.
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El Salvador: An Analysis of the Central
Electoral Council . . . . . . . . . . 16
Many of El Salvador's problems are an out-
growth of the military government's suppres-
sion of legitimate political opposition and
its subversion of the nation's democratic
electoral process.
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Columbia: Problems Threaten Success of Druc
Cleanup . . . . . - . . . . . . 27
The Turbay administration's war on drug traf-
fickers is producing impressive results, but
the momentum of the effort is likely to falter
without outside help for the severely handi-
capped local enforcement agencies.
Cuban Chronology
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Brazil: Challenges for the New President
Next week's inauguration
of Joao Baptista Figueiredo,
fifth in a line of generals to
lead Brazil since 1964, could
mark the beginning of the end
of military rule. F:igueiredo
j is widely expected to continue
the political _liberalization
:begun by outgoing President
Geisel, possibly even giving
way to an elected. civilian
when his own terms ends in
1985. The coming period would
be difficult under any circum-
stances, but it is likely to
be further complicated by
mounting economic problems,
which pose increasingly tough
policy choices and afford a
diminishing margin for error.
Political Liberalization
The overriding political question facing the new
President is how to manage the liberalization process,
which to date has resulted in the virtual cessation of
press censorship, a dramatic reduction in security ex-
cesses, and major steps to curb the regime's arbitrary,
highly authoritarian decree powers. Because of changing
circumstances and the government's own actions, there is
a generalized expectation that the role of civilians in
national decis:iormnaking will increase substantially and
that the armed forces' dominance will correspondingly
recede. The new President, Geisel's personally chosen
successor, has been billed from the start as the man who
will consolidate Geisel's reforms. Figueiredo promises,
though with few specifics, that he will "make Brazil a
democracy" and some of his county en believe he will be
the last military president.
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For a number of reasons, the generals appear willing
to give up the active exercise of power:
-- By tradition the military does not thirst
for power, and the length and scope of its
current intervention are unprecedented.
-- They would like to divest themselves of full
responsibility.for governing an increasingly
complex society with a host of intractable
social and economic problems.
4-1 -- Important civilian sectors, including those
that originally supported the takeover in
1964, have clearly withdrawn their support;
they are tired of stringent controls on na-
tional life, and, the regime's recent economic
performance falls well below the accomplish-
ments of the boom years of 1968-1973. 25X1
The new government will define the nature--and
limits--of liberalization as it goes along. The proc-
ess is certain to be complicated because:
-- It is, in effect, experimental, and both
civilians and military men will continually
be testing and groping for ways to relate
to each other in a changed environment.
- There is still a significant, though smallsmall
minority within the military hierarchy that
will eagerly seize on any excuse to argue
forcefully against the liberalization of the
political system.
3 -- The regime, having rescinded its most sweeping
decree powers, will have somewhat diminished
authority with which to handle political chal-
lenges from increasingly vocal politicians,
human rights groups, labor unions, students,
and liberal churchmen. I 25X1
Challenges
Figueiredo's first serious challenge will come from
labor, which in the last year or two has expressed its
grievances more actively than at any other time since
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the military takeover.
Already, metalworkers,. bank-
workers, doctors, and teachers, among others, have
defied the ban on strikes to demand higher salaries,
.Largely but by no means exclusively in the economic
heartland of Sao Paulo. Some, like the influential
metalworkers, have won their demands.
Labor is not only seeking to regain lost purchasing
power. In effect, the unions, long the docile subordi-
nates of the Labor Ministry, are seeking a more equi-
table relationship with the central government. This
challenge to the regime's political authority and to
its power to curb inflation through wage restraint is
bound to be disturbing to the generals, whatever their
thoughts on liberalization. Nonetheless, the government
has so far taken a conciliatory line toward labor
and seems determined to continue in this vein, if at all
possible.
Politicians also present a special kind of preoc-
cupation. In last fall's congressional balloting, as
in other, previous elections, opposition candidates
fared very well, especially in the urbanized, economi-
cally more advanced sections of the country. The last
election produced gains for the nationalist and leftist
wing of the opposition party. Many ambitious congress-
men will want. to make a personal impact on certain
issues, and many questions lend themselves to exploi-
tation--inequitable income distribution, the role of
foreign investment, inflation, jobs, and liberalization
itself.
Both the newly invigorated congress and the regime
will be entering essentially untested waters. For the
bureaucracy's part, defining a new relationship with
the legislature?--until now a rubberstamp--will be dif-
ficult. Moreover, given the changed makeup of the
Congress, there is the potential for serious civil-
military antagonism. I
Whatever the regime chooses--or feels obliged--to
do politically will. be greatly affected by steadily
more difficult choices facing a country beset by re-
surging inflation, a large foreign debt, and critical
dependence on foreign oil. Figueiredo has formally
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unaffected goods.
outlined his program, which, aside from a restated pledge
to continue liberalization, is heavily economic. Among
his priorities are:
-- A serious effort to reduce inflation, now
running at over 40 percent, to about 30 per-
cent, chiefly by cutting government spending
"substantially."
-- Returning to private hands those public sector
companies and services in which "state owner-
ship is not essential to correct market im-
perfections or protect national security."
-- Measures to revitalize agriculture, bring
down or at least stabilize food prices, and
produce exportable surpluses.
-- Changes in the tax structure, along with other
credit and fiscal devices to reduce "signifi-
cantly" income and regional disparities.
-- A concerted effort to deal with foreign debt
by increasing domestic savin s in both the
private and public sectors. 25X1
Even before he takes office, the economic policies
of Figueiredo have been dealt a serious blow by simul-
taneous flooding and drought conditions now affecting
large parts of the country. Though the damage has not
been fully evaluated, it is clear that large amounts of
produce and cropland have been destroyed, reducing sig-
nificantly what is available to export, reducing badly
needed sources of foreign exchange, and putting upward
pressure on domestic prices. Moreover, transportation
networks and storage facilities have been hard hit,
making it even more difficult--and costly--to market
Once Figueiredo takes office there may be somewhat
more cordiality in Brazil's relations with the United
States. He is replacing the testy, nationalistic For-
eign Minister Silveira with another career diplomat
known for his evenhanded views and low-key manner. More-
over, during last year's visit by President Carter, Figu-
eiredo went out of his way to praise him as a man with
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whom he looked forward to "doing business." Nonethe-
less, it is certain that the President. and his advisers
share the concern of their predecessors over US poli-
cies in the areas of tirade, nuclear nonproliferation,
and human rights. They will be on the lookout for signs
of renewed pressure in these areas.
Outlook
The effects of Figueiredo's presidency will be felt
long after he leaves office. If the next few years pro-
duce serious tensions, the military will be tempted to
dig in rather than let go. Such a decision would not
merely dash the raised hopes of civilians; it could
produce a violent popular reaction with lasting and
serious consequences. If the Figueiredo years go well,
however, national confidence will be buoyed and the
likelihood of stability greatly increased.
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El Salvador: An Analysis of the Central Electoral
the nation's democratic electoral process.
It is difficult--perhaps impossible--to isolate a
specific cause for the complex and interrelated social,
economic, and political problems currently challenging
El Salvador. Many of these problems, however, are an
outgrowth of the military government's suppression of
legitimate political opposition and its subversion of
Council*
The ruling 'National Conciliation Party--composed of
the politically conservative armed forces and the wealthy
elite--has retained and even increased its power since
1961 by manipulating and distorting a constitutionally
sound electoral law and by corrupting the powers of the
Central Election Council, the regulatory body charged
with governing national and municipal elections. Fraudu-
lent practices have increased during each subsequent
national and local election and were particularly conspic-
uous in the 1972 presidential race. 'Phis resulted in a
decision by the National Opposition Union--a coalition
of opposition parties led by the Christian Democrats--to
abstain from the 19,78 legislative and municipal elections.
I I
The ruling party's systematic, and generally blatant,
electoral fraud has created a political vacuum that is
increasingly being filled by leftist and terrorist groups.
The activities of these groups, in turn, have added to
the country's prevalent problems of overcrowding, unem-
ployment, and uneven income distribution. If unchecked,
the growing forces of frustration, desperation, and vii?-
lence could lead to an insurgent-sparked rebellion or
rightist coup.
S March 1979
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Many observers believe that the only solution to
these problems lies in fostering a "political opening"
and allowing the legal opposition to participate freely
in honest elections. Opposition leaders contend, however,
that such elections are impossible as long as the Central
Electoral Council is a political tool of the military
government rather than the impartial regulatory entity
it was intended to be. The role that the controversial
Council plays in the next round of elections may well
determine the fate of participator democracy in El
Salvador.
How the Council Works in Theory: Electoral Process
Article 35 of the constitution stipulates that:
"The Central Electoral Council shall consist of
three members* elected by the Legislative
Assembly, one of whom shall be chosen from each
of the lists (of three names) submitted by the
executive power and the Supreme Court of Jus-
tice. There shall be three alternate members
elected in the same manner. Their term of
office shall be three years."
As the principal overseer of elections, the Council
is responsible for registering candidates and monitoring
the voting for the Presidency and the 54-seat National
Assembly.
There are three lower echelons within the Council:
-- Junta Electoral Departmental--responsible
for the 14 department-level elections.
-- Junta Electoral Municipal--responsible for
the 261 municipal-level elections.
--Junta Receptora de Votos--responsible for 25X1
the polling places throughout the country,
where hand-marked ballots are cast.
*Current membership is: Council President Carlos Alberto Aguilar
Chavarria, Carlos Araujo Aleman, and Miguel Angel Mejia Aviles.
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The Council names three members to each of these
"subsidiary juntas,." Theoretically, the Council as well
as the "juntas" are to include representatives from the
various political parties and "distinguished" impartial
observers.
The Junta Receptora de Votos tabulates the ballots
and passes the results to the next appropriate municipal
or departmental junta. Eventually all. "score cards" are
reviewed by the Council and winners are announced. Munic-
ipal slates are determined by simple majority vote, but
a proportional representation system is used to elect
deputies to the National Assembly.
How the Council Works in Practice: Electoral Fraud
Most members of the political opposition agree that
the electoral laws and the concept of the Council are
basically sound. What they object to, however, is the
way in which the ruling party has deliberately misinter-
preted the law and blatantly used the Council to prolon
the military's control of the government.
According to the opposition, fraud and corruption
begin at the very top of the electoral process within
the Council's hierarchy and its substructure. Rather
than being selected from a:list of names representing
the various political factions, the three Council members
are appointed directly by the President. The Council
panel, which is politically indentured to the ruling
party and protective of its interests, in turn appoints
only party loyalists to the subordinate juntas.
Although it has stacked the deck in terms of over-
seeing the election, the ruling party employs further
measures to ensure victory. For example, the government
fabricates "legal roadblocks" to hamper the opposition
and exerts its influence on the media to stifle the oppo-
sition's political views. Campaign speeches at public
gatherings are banned, and opposition groups often find
they cannot get paid announcements in the press or on
radio and television. In addition, rules concerning the
registration of candidates and the eligibility of voters
are so strictly--in some cases, absurdly---enforced that
fielding a slate of prospective officeholders or casting
an individual's ballot can be made virtually impossible.
8 March 1979
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Even if a candidate manages to get through the tedious
and complex registration process, the slightest irregu-
larity can result in disqualification. 25X1
After the list of opposition candidates has been
narrowed, the Council goes to work on the list of voters.
In some instances, voter sheets consist of bogus names--
individuals who are later recorded by the Council as
having cast a ballot for the ruling party. In other
cases, particularly in the cantons, a campesino whose
name is actually on the voter registration list for that
district will be told by the Council representatives
that he is ineligible. Such ineligibilities are based
on "legal technicalities"--e.g., the name on the voting
list has been misspelled and does not match the name as
it appears on his cedule. These campesinos, who are often
ovel?awed by officials to begin with, seldom question the
authority of the Council panel, especially when there
are scores of armed members of the Nationalist Democratic
Organization (ORDEN)--a 70,000-strong civilian paramili-
tary force loyal to the ruling art --encircling the
polling place.
The mere presence of ORDEN members is an implicit
message that undoubtedly serves to "encourage" many of
the locals to back ruling party candidates. Opposition
leaders maintain that the ORDEN forces often employ ex-
plicit measures--such as harassment and physical abuse--
F guarantee that votes are cast for the ruling party.
Even if a voter makes it past all of the obstacles,
the Council can usually find some pretext--e.g., the pen-
cil mark designating the voter's choice does not fill the
entire box, or conversely, it extends beyond the box--to
declare the ballot invalid.
The final outcome, according to the opposition, is
a perfectly controlled election that excludes serious
political rivalry and at the same time regulates the
amount of token opposition needed to characterize the
election as free and competitive. By failing to publish
any statistics on the results of the election, the Council
prevents its fraudulent methods from becoming public
record.
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The Question of Reform
Led by the Christian Democrats, leaders of the
political opposition have stated that before they will
participate in future elections, the members of the
Council must be replaced by representatives of contending
parties or by reputable individuals enjoying the confi-
dence of all parties. They also announced that a "quota
system" or token representation is unacceptable. More-
over, they have agreed that emphasis must be placed on
the spirit, not just the letter, of the law. According
to one opposition leader, revision of the electoral laws
and reformation of the Council will only be effective if
the government judiciously interprets and applies the
laws.
Members of the Catholic Church. as well as many promi-
nent businessmen affiliated with the National Association
of Private Enterprise (ANEP) have expressed their support
for the opposition, stating that a "political opening,"
reform of the Council, and a return. to electoral integrity
are imperative if the country's rapidly growing political
and economic deterioration is to be halted.
25X1=?
F 1-
This coalition of concerned individuals has engaged
in sporadic dialogue with President. Romero and other cabi-
net members over the question of reform and the prospects
for meaningful participation in the 1980 legislative-
municipal and 1982 national elections. Perhaps some mili-
tary leaders, who undoubtedly recognize that nonpartici-
pation by the established opposition in last year's
election adversely affected the government's mandate and
credibility, may be in favor of continuing that dialogue.
Time, however, is becoming a crucial factor. If the
opposition is to participate in the next election, it
must begin preparing well in advance. Large numbers of
rank-and-file opposition party members have already
abandoned what they believe to be the moribund democratic
system and are lending their support to the more radical,
illegal groups such as the extreme leftist Popular Revo-
lutionary Block, a front organization for one of the
nation's leading terrorist groups.
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If the Christian Democrats and others, either inde-
pendently or as part of the opposition coalition, fail
to proffer a slate of candidates in 1980, the government
could strip the parties of their legal standing, since
the constitution provides for such action if a party ab-
stains in two elections. Some within the government
believe that the 1976 disqualification of candidates was
a brilliant "legal move." They would undoubtedly like
to see the dialogue fail, thereby paving the way for the
ruling National Conciliation Party to become the only
consequential legal-political organization in El Salvador.
seeming willingness to participate in talks about elec-
toral reform has been merely a ploy to placate Washing-
ton's concern over the repressive and authoritarian tend-
Prospects
Some opposition leaders have been privately pessi-
mistic all along about the dialogue and chances for a
"political opening." They contend that President Romero's
encies of the military government.
will be reached.
Recent events--particularly the incident at San
Antonio Abad on 20 January 1979 in which government
security forces are alleged to have brutally murdered a
priest and three members of a religious study group sus-
pected of being revolutionaries--have intensified the
distrust and disdain that a growing number of Salvadorans
feel toward the Romero regime. This poisoned atmosphere
has seriously imperiled the dialogue's chances and has
clearly lessened the likelihood that an early settlement
The military's inherent distrust of civilian politi-
cians and its intransigence over the past 40 years further
dim prospects for a settlement. The select core of mili-
tary leaders who wield political power has become the
ruling elite and is not anxious to lose the various priv-
ileges and profits associated with its position. More-
over, there are large numbers from among the traditional
oligarchy and conservative' upper middle class who, because
they see the armed forces as guardians of the status quo,
want the militar to retain and even tighten its govern-
mental control.
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Colombia: Major Drug Production and Smuggling Area
CANAL
Z(
NETHERLANDS
AN IS
Castilletas
META
B I A
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Colombia: Problems Threaten Success of Drug Cleanup
poor coordination, interservice rivalry, and retaliatory
strikes from the drug network. 25X1
The Turbay administration's war on drug traffickers
is producing impressive results, especially considering
the monumental Colombian drug problem and the handicaps
under which enforcement agencies work. The momentum of
the effort, however, is likely to falter without outside
help. As of early March, Colombia's ability to sustain
the campaign appears doubtful. Funds are running out,
and the operations are taking a toll on the antiquated
equipment and technical resources at hand. Some seeming
successes are unraveling because of legal loopholes,
President Turbay, encouraged by the disruption to
the drug traffic that has already been accomplished,
seems determined to keep the effort alive. He now has
Venezuela's agreement to cooperate in the border area,
and he probably expects that Washington will see its own
interests served by providing the material and technical
help required to continue the campaign. The traffickers
seem to believe the threat will pass, however, and are 25X1
merely rerouting or delaying their operations. Since
their assets are plentiful and diffuse, they can easily
absorb the damages occasioned by a temporary assault.
The Guajira Campaign - Phase One
Four months after the Turbay government opened its
attack on the cultivation and smuggling of drugs in the
Guajira Peninsula, "Operation Fulminante" still holds
promise of being an effective drug control exercise.
Evidence of the government's will to suppress the traffic
and to impose the law in traditionally renegade regions
is abundant in the many arrests and seizures of drugs
and transport equipment. A less quantifiable but equally
important achievement lies in the operational lessons
learned. In several cases where recurrent problems have
developed, corrective action is being taken. A decree
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issued on 24 February, for example, orders the destruc-
tion of airstrips used for drug trafficking. It also
closes some loopholes in the judicial process that al-
lowed easy release of accused offenders.
25X
3
Further evidence of the campaign's effectiveness
comes from the traceable alteration in the traffickers'
shipping routes and from the unrest reported throughout
the illicit organizations. Disruption appears to have
occurred mostly at the middle and lower levels, but the
protected upper group--many of whom were large contribu-
tors to Turbay's presidential hid--reportedlyfeel be-
trayed and in a retaliatory mood.
An additional ;positive aspect of the campaign is
Venezuela's growing disposition to assist. The Perez
government recognizes that Venezuelan territory and air-
space are being increasingly used by the traffickers,
particularly as Colombia increases the risk along tradi-
tional routes. The new Herrera administration, which
takes office on 12 March, will continue to cooperate
closely with Colombian drug control efforts.
The Obstacles
The handicaps which the Guajira effort has overcome
are imposing, making it all the more remarkable that
Operation Fulminante has scored the victories it has.
The rate of success in subsequent phases of the Operation
seems likely to decline, however, unless Colombia's re-
sources are improved. Across the board, equipment and
training for the campaign are poor or worse, the trucks,
ships, and aircraft needed to execute plans are often
out of commission or simply not available, and communica-
tion between units frequently breaks down. Moreover,
the troops used in the campaign seem ill prepared for the
physical hardships they have encountered in the field--
lack of fresh water ests una eal.ing food, and lack
of recreation.
Colombian officials must also cope with all the ad-
verse conditions confronting harbingers; of law in a tra-
ditionally autonomous--virtually outlaw--region. Local
inhabitants are accustomed to official neglect, and the
ambitious among them have turned this to their advantage.
Social and economic conditions in this backwater of
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Colombia have developed in a manner hospitable to the
illegal drug trade and dangerous to the lawman. The
trafficker is often experienced, wily, and extremely
adaptable to changing situations. His elusiveness and
resiliency have created morale problems for the security
forces. Beyond these regional problems, the enforcers
must contend with the corruption that pervades the entire
Colombian system, including the military and police.
State and local politicians, judges, and security person-
nel suborned by the drug trade manage to undercut much
Turbay's Expectations
President Turbay probably assumes that Washington
fully understands the uphill battle the Colombian Govern-
ment has undertaken, and that appreciation for the hard
work--whose ultimate result is interdiction of drugs des-
ically important areas of the country.
tined for the United States--will show up as an assist-
ance package. Without US support, it seems unlikely
that Turbay can continue to justify a high priority for
drug enforcement in the hinter-land when Colombia has so
many pressing social and economic problems in more polit-
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FOR THE RECORD
tation of the military and to minimize the possibility
that Jarrin will implicate other government leaders.
Because of such considerations, the military proceedings
ECUADOR: Former Government Minister General Bolivar
Jarrin.will be tried by a military court for complicity
in the assassination of national political leader Abdon
Calderon last November. Jarrin was dropped from the cabi-
net the following month when it was learned that Calderon
was killed by thugs working for the Government Ministry.
By trying Jarrin in a military rather than a civilian
court--where his codefendants have been arraigned--the
government probably is seeking both to protect the repu-
could be held in camera.
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CUBAN CHRONOLOGY
(UNCLASSIFIED)
For February 1979
2 February Cuban vice minister of Foreign Trade
German Amado Blanco signs 1979 trade
protocol with the Soviet Union amount-
ing to more than $6 billion.
Mozambican President Machel meets
with Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca
in Maputo.
2-6 February Communications experts from 10 coun-
tries meet in Havana to discuss broad-
casting and news reporting facilities
to be used at the Nonaligned Summit in
September.
3 February Ramon Castro meets with the director
of the Balbona agricultural project
in Hungary.
3-10 February Cuban delegation representing the
State Committee for Economic Cooper-
ation visits Panama to discuss an
exchange of technical assistance be-
tween the two countries.
5 February Manuel Pineiro, chief of the PCC Amer-
ica department, meets with Gilberto
Vieira, Secretary General of the Co-
lombian Communist Party, in Havana.
Vieira meets with Carlos Rafael
Rodriguez on 6 February.
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Fidel Castro attends fourth boxing
tournament between the US and Cuban
teams in Havana's Sports City coliseum.
8 March 1979
2gX1
I
5 February President of the People's National
Assembly Blas Roca explains electoral
process in televised interview. He
says the process of nominations will
continue until 25 February. The di-
rect election will be held on 8 and
15 April.
6 February Fidel Castro sends congratulatory mes-
sage to Chadly Bendjedid on his elec-
tion to head the Algerian National
Liberation Front replacing Boumediene,
7 February In a press interview, Chairman of the
South Yemen Supreme Council and party
chief Isma'il denies existence of So-
viet bases and troops and Cuban forces
in his country.
8 February Fidel Castro addresses Party Central
Committee meeting in Havana. He re-
ports status of principal economic
development tasks and resolutions
adopted at the seventh plenum. Havana
press reports that this meeting was
attended by 4,700 party members.
Lionel Soto, chief of the party's
foreign relations department, meets
with Colombian Communist Party Secre-
tary General Vieira in Havana.
Forty-three Jamaican youths graduate
from construction skills course in
Cuba. This is the second group of
Jamaicans trained in Cuba.
11 February New York Times reports that the Cuban
Navy has received its first submarine
and two hydrofoil torpedo boats from
the Soviet Union.
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12 February Israeli Prime Minister Begin warns in
an interview that it is possible that
soldiers from Cuba will enter South
Yemen and endanger Saudi Arabia.
Politburo member Pedro Miret meets
with delegation from Lebanese National
Movement visiting Cuba at the invita-
tion of the PCC. Fidel Castro meets
with delegation on 20 February.
14 February Cuban Construction Minister Levi
Farah meets with Libyan counterpart
in Tripoli. Construction cooperation
protocol between the two countries
signed on 15 February.
14-16 February Fifth meeting of Latin American re-
gional commission of World Tourism
organization held in Havana.
15 February PCC Secretariat member Jorge Risquet
meets first group of Che Guevara
teaching detachment returning from
one-year tours in Angola. Risquet
says entire group has taught 30,000
people in Angola.
Cuban Vice Minister of Foreign Trade
Ricardo Cabrizas speaks to Group of 77
meeting in Arusha, Tanzania. Cabrizas
says, "The US economic blockade of
Cuba is how imperialism treats coun-
tries that are trying to develop."
17 February Fidel Castro chairs closing session of
JUCEPLAN-sponsored economic planning
meeting in Havana.
Cuban Foreign Ministry issues state-
ment denouncing the Chinese buildup
on Vietnam's border.
Prensa Latina calls President Carter's
visit to Mexico "a serious failure."
33
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18 February Cuban press ruins feature "China:' The
Escalation of Treason."
18-28 February
19 February
Cuban Minister of Construction Levi
Farah visits Iraq. Tours several
provinces and meets with members of
the Revolution Command Council.
Construction agreement is signed.
GRANMA editorial condemns Chinese at-
tack on Vietnam. Compares Chinese
maneuver to Hitler's moves against
Poland. "We are willing to even give
our own blood to Vietnam."
20 February In.a report submitted to Congress, the
Carter administration demands that
Cuba curtail its military activities
in Africa and plan to pay $2 billion
for seized US properties before there
can be any consideration of resuming
diplomatic relations.
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez addresses na-
tional radio festival in Havana and
stresses solidarity with Vietnam.
National Assembly President Blas Roca
meets with Soviet Ambassador Nikita
Tolubeyev, who is paying a farewell
call.
GRANMA prints Fidel Castro's message
to the Ayatollah Khomeini. Castro
calls Iranian struggle a "reaffirma-
tion of Iranian independence and a
stimulus for developing countries and
the nonaligned movement."
21 February Fidel Castro addresses a mass rally of
solidarity with the Vietnamese people
in Havana.
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21 February - Army General Raul Castro and military
1 March delegation visit the Soviet Union.
Castro receives the order of Lenin
from Brezhnev. Meets with Defense
Minister Ustinov. Castro presents
the Jose Marti Order to Chairman
Kosygin.
23 February PCC Secretariat member Raul Valdes
Vivo and delegation meet with Premier
Pham Van Dong in Hanoi.
26 February The Construction Ministry conducts its
annual review meeting in Havana.
Politburo member Ramiro Valdes chairs
the meeting. The training plan for
the coming year was discussed. It
calls for the incorporation in schools
of 25,000 persons demobilized from
military service so that they can be
trained as qualified workers and mid-
level technicians.
Cuban UN Representative Raul Roa says
that "Chinese aggression against Viet-
nam is a betrayal of the cause of
socialism and communism."
Havana Domestic Service carries com-
ment on Secretary Blumenthal's trip
to China as showing "US support for
China's invasion of Vietnam."
35
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Secret
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