LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001000010023-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2006
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: March 29, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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Assessment
Center
Latin America
Review
Secret
RP LAR 79-009
29 March 1979
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LATIN AMERICA REVIEW
29 March 1979
CONTENTS
Argentina: Government Strengthened, but Beset
by Problems
President Videla and the junta have been
aided by recent military command changes
and by the Vatican's agreement to mediate
the Beagle Channel dispute, but uncertainty
over the outcome of the mediation as well
as unchecked inflation could still create
serious stresses.
Cuba: Raul Castro's Extended Sojourn
Second only to Fidel in the Cuban hierarchy,
Raul is now in the sixth week of an enigmatic
trip to the USSR, and to Bulgaria where he
went unreported for nearly two weeks; he has
now dropped out of sight entirely, raising
further speculation as to the purpose of the
visits.
Cuba: Diplomatic Blitz I . . . . . . . 11
Since the beginning of the year, the Cubans
have undertaken yet another massive diplo-
matic campaign--especially in Africa--to
line up support for the nonaligned summit
meeting scheduled for Havana in September.
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Peru: Strikes Create Government-Assembly
Friction I I . . . . . . . . . 15
If government leaders become convinced that
the assembly's involvement in domestic poli-
tics is preventing it from making acceptable
progress toward completion of the new consti-
tution, the military could decide to postpone
its plans for restoring civilian rule by 1980.
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Venezuela: Labor Unrest Ahead I I. . . . 18
Increasing militancy among workers in both
the public and private sectors, together
with a variety of political and economic
pressures, could precipitate a period of
serious labor unrest.
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Argentina: Government Strengthened, but Beset by
Problems
The government headed by President Videla and a
three-man military junta has been strengthened by recent
high-level Army command changes and by the Vatican's
agreement in late January to mediate the Beagle Channel
dispute with Chile. Even so, uncertainty over the out-
come of the mediation effort, as well as unchecked in-
flation--which may provoke labor unrest--could create
serious stresses within the overnment in the next few
months.
In December, when Argentina and Chile seemed close
to hostilities over the Beagle Channel, Videla's han-
dling of the situation set off a spate of coup rumors.
Since then, Army Commander Viola has neutralized some
of the government's harshest critics in the armed
forces. First Corps Commander General Suarez Mason, an
outspoken critic of the government, was named Army
Chief of Staff--thus depriving him of a sensitive field
command and placing him under the close scrutiny of
General Viola. Two of the four corps commanders are
now considered Videla-Viola loyalists. Another critic,
Major General Santiago Omar Rivero, was reassigned to
the Inter-American Defense Board. Further appointments
have tightened Viola's control of key operational units.
Although the changes strengthen Viola's hand as
well as Videla's, the Army Commander apparently is not
a rival for power. He has privately announced his in-
tention to retire from public life at the end of this
year and in recent months has been the President's
strongest supporter.
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For the time being, at least, Videla's approach
has been vindicated. It averted a war with a usually
friendly neighbor that could have poisoned bilateral
relations for generations. On the other hand, the
mediation process, which will probably begin formally
next month in Rome, is likely to be protracted, and a
breakdown in the talks or an unsatisfactory outcome for
the Argentines could pose dangers for Videla.
A compromise of some sort is the only realistic
solution, but it would be likely to fall far short of
the Argentine Government's inflated. assurances. Should
the mediation results be unacceptable to the military,
or should the talks break down, Videla will come under
severe criticism for not having taken military action
in December. His failure to order the seizure of some
of the disputed islands could still cost him his job.
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officers may be encouraging these efforts.
to force changes in economic policies. Some military
Another and perhaps more immediate problem for
Videla is the economy. For the past three years,
Argentina has had the world's highest rate of infla-
tion--170 percent in 1978 and 21.1 percent for the
first two months of this year. The depressed level of
real wages has made organized labor increasingly restive.
Low consumer demand and concern that tariff reductions
enacted earlier this year will disrupt. Argentina's indus-
trial growth and cause unemployment. are prompting some
business leaders to cooperate with labor in an attempt
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Videla's continued support of controversial Economy
Minister Martinez de Hoz could trigger a general strike
in the next month or so. General Viola is confident
that the government can contain any labor unrest, but
strong repressive measures against union activists would
worsen Argentina's reputation as one of the foremost
/ violators of human rights in South America and further
mobilize world opinion against the government.
Although Videla seems inclined to grant Martinez
de Hoz more time to curb inflation, the combined pres-
sure of labor and industry could force the Economy Min-
ister's resignation in the next few months. Such a
change could do more harm than good because the absence
0 Uof any well-thought-out alternative to present policies
would exacerbate economic uncertainty and probably fur-
ther retard recovery.
A new trade union law now in preparation may help
the government ride out the storm. The law, which may
be promulgated within 90 days, could add a further meas-
ure of stability by granting greater trade union freedom
12 //and promoting collective bargaining.
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Cuba: Raul Castro's Extended Sojourn
Cuba's Raul Castro, second only to Fidel in the
party, government, and military establishment, is now
into the sixth week of an enigmatic trip abroad. He left
Cuba on 20 February and arrived in Moscow early the fol-
lowing morning for an "official and friendly visit" at
the invitation of Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov. He
flew to Bulgaria on 1 March and remained in that coun-
try until 19 March, an unusually long stay for such an
important official. Neither the press nor official an-
nouncements gave any accounting of his activities during
almost two weeks of his visit. Moreover, since departing
Bulgaria, he has dropped out of sight entirely, raising
speculation that he may be visiting Angola, Ethiopia,
South Yemen, or even Vietnam. Although official announce-
ments acknowledge that he is heading a military delega-
tion, only one person--his wife, Vilma Espin--has been
identified by name as accompanying him.
Despite the air of mystery surrounding Raul's trip,
it is safe to make several assumptions about at least
part of his mission:
-- His side visit to a Soviet. space center lends
credence to speculation that a Cuban "cosmo-
naut" will soon be involved in a joint space
flight, most likely scheduled to coincide with
the nonaligned summit in Havana in September,
which is an occasion Havana probably believes
to be propitious for bolstering Cuban prestige
and underscoring the benefits of cooperating
with Moscow.
-- Judging from photographs of Raul and his party
at various ceremonies in Moscow, his delega-
tion included: Division General Abelardo
Colome Ibarra, who oversees Cuban military
operations abroad; Division General Arnaldo
Ochoa Sanchez, who supervises Cuba's military
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presence in Ethiopia; Brigadier General Sixto
Batista Santana, who played a major role in
ousting the Somali armed forces from the Ogaden
in Ethiopia; and Brigadier General Leopoldo
Cintra Frias, who drew special honors at this
year's 2 January military parade in Havana
for his outstanding combat service in both
Angola and Ethiopia. All four are members of
the party Central Committee and two are deputy
armed forces ministers. Their presence indi-
cates that Cuba's long-term military commit-
ments to Angola and Ethiopia--and possibly
other areas--and Moscow's continuing support
for these commitments were major points of
discussion with the Soviets.
-- Raul no doubt also made a pitch for more and
newer Soviet military equipment. The display
of Cuban armed might at this year's 2 January
parade in Havana obviously pleased Raul and
probably served to whet his appetite. He would
be keen to get the Soviets to resume deliveries
of the MIG-23, suspended after US protests
last fall.
-- Raul's disappearance from public view in Bulgaria
may have been merely a short vacation. It fol-
lows a precedent set in early 1977 when, after
arriving in Sofia, he dropped out of sight for
about a week.
-- Although Raul had arrived in Moscow only four
days after China's thrust into Vietnam, that
seems to be coincidental. While the subject
was undoubtedly discussed, his visit appears
to have been laid on some time ago.
In the USSR
Raul's visit to the USSR was full of camaraderie.
The Soviets announced that he had been awarded the USSR's
highest decoration, the Order of Lenin, "for his great
merits in promoting and strengthening friendly relations
between the armed forces of the USSR and the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba." On the first day
of his visit, he met with Marshal Ustinov and other top
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Soviet military officials "to examine questions of recip-
rocal interest"; attended a luncheon Ustinov gave in his
honor; presented flowers at Lenin's mausoleum; and placed
a wreath at the -tomb of the unknown soldier.
The following day, Raul was given the grand tour
of Star City, outside Moscow, where he saw models of
the Salyut and Soyuz space vehicles and chatted with
two Cuban "cosmonauts" in training for a space flight.
Raul regaled his audience with the story of how, in the
dark days of 1957 when he and Fidel were waging the
guerrilla war in the Sierra Maestra, the guerrillas saw
the first Sputnik passing overhead. That evening, he
and his delegation returned to Moscow to attend the
ceremony marking the 61st anniversary of the founding
of the Soviet armed forces.
On 23 February, Raul presented Premier Aleksey
Kosygin with Cuba's Order of Jose Marti at a ceremony
in the Kremlin. On the 24th he visited the Frunze Mili-
tary Academy in Moscow and on the 27th he was presented
with the Order of Lenin by party General Secretary Leonid
Brezhnev. After the presentation, he conferred with
Brezhnev and Ustinov about "current international events
and the development and strengthening of cooperation
between Cuba and the USSR."
Raul's visit to Star City drew prominent news cov-
erage in Cuba. The Cuban press has long been generous
in the attention it devotes to Soviet space activities,
presumably anticipating the day when a Cuban would take
part in a joint mission. Last summer, for example, the
leading Cuban weekly news journal carried an eight-page
article on Salyut with a detailed cutaway illustration
of the vehicle as a centerfold. Raul intimated that a
joint Cuban-Soviet space flight was in the offing, echo-
ing a similar statement made recently by Dr. Jose
Altschuler, head of Cuba's Intercosmos Commission. The
Cuban leadership seems to have succumbed to the ego-
boosting potential of such a joint venture, apparently
deciding that the international prestige accruing to
Cuba and the domestic shot in the arm that is sure to
follow outweigh the possible embarrassment of having
Havana's close alignment with Moscow literally written
in the sky for all the world to see.
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In Bulgaria
Shortly after arriving in Sofia on 1 March at the
invitation of Bulgarian party First Secretary Todor
Zhivkov, Raul met with Zhivkov and Defense Minister
Army General Dobri Dzhurov to discuss "current interna-
tional problems" and improving bilateral ties. Accord-
ing to Cuba's weekly journal, one of. the main topics of
Raul's talks with Dzhurov was an "increase in coopera-
tion" between the Bulgarian and Cuban armed forces.
Whatever cooperation currently exists on the bilateral
plane between the two military establishments is minimal.
The Cubans' visit probably did little to change that.
On the other hand, cooperation between the two governments
on their assistance to African countries may have been
worked out. Zhivkov's trip to Latin America next month
was undoubtedly also a subject of discussion.
On 2 March, Raul and his delegation attended cere-
monies in Pleven where the Cuban leader, after laying
wreaths in appropriate places, was made an honorary
citizen of the city. He later visited the "Georgi
Benkovski" Air Force Academy at Gorna Mitropoliya and
met with local party and government leaders. The fol-
lowing day, he presented a battle flag to a ground
forces armored unit, thus repaying the honor that
Dzhurov bestowed on a Cuban combat unit during a visit
to the Caribbean several years ago. Each country now
has a fighting detachment titled "Cuban-Bulgarian
Friendship Unit." The Cubans then moved south to Plovdiv
where they toured several military units and places of
interest before dropping from public view.
Cuba's military journal indicated that the "offi-
cial" visit to Bulgaria lasted only four days and indeed
some of the Cuban military officers in the delegation
may have left Bulgaria at that point, leaving Raul and
his wife to vacation privately. One of the officers
photographed with the delegation in Moscow has since
been located in Havana. Raul, however, has surfaced in
the press only twice since 4 March, once on the 16th,
when he was again received by Zhivkov, and once on the
19th, when he was given a sendoff at Sofia's airport.
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Cuban Diplomatic Relations With African Countries
Upper
Volta
Ivory; t T
Corsi 1
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Cuba: Diplomatic Blitz
Since the beginning of the year, Cuba has undertaken
yet another massive person-to-person diplomatic campaign
using "roving ambassadors" from the Ministry of Foreign
Relations and the Ministry of Foreign Trade. For in-
stance, prior to the Nonaligned Coordinating Bureau
meeting in Maputo in late January at least seven Cuban
delegations were traveling in Africa--the main focus of
the effort--and in the Middle East.
of the Third World.
Cuba's diplomatic presence in Africa has increased
dramatically since the early 1970s, especially over the
last four years. In 1970 Cuba had diplomatic relations
with only seven countries on the continent; today it has
relations with 36. The Foreign Ministry's budget for
1979 includes plans to open 17 new embassies, even though
this requires cutting back on funds for existing embassies
and commercial offices. Cuba already has diplomatic
relations with 66 of the 88 nonaligned nations, but some
of the remaining 22 countries would be good candidates
for new embassies. Several have probably been "written
off," however, as too conservative or pro-Western, such
as those that have spoken out against Cuban military
adventurism in Africa.
The Cuban representatives arrive--sometimes without
invitation--carrying a personal invitation from Fidel
Castro to the chief of state to attend the nonaligned
summit meeting in Havana. The representatives generally
bring up the prospect of opening or reopening a Cuban
Embassy and ask about exchanging ambassadors. The final
item of business is usually an offer of technical assis-
tance or aid projects as well as other benign forms of
cooperation that Cuba has instituted with many countries
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All these activities have shown mixed results--but
not for lack of effort. The following three cases il-
lustrate Cuba's willingness to expend time and energy
(though not always with finesse) in order to gain dip-
lomatic relations with as man countries as possible by
summit time.
Ghana: A Turndown
The Cuban Embassy in Accra has been closed since the
1966 coup that ousted Nkrumah. In January, a visiting
7 Cuban delegation met with the Ghanaian Commissioner of
Foreign Affairs and subsequently announced that the Em-
bassy would be reopened. A Cuban Foreign Ministry of-
ficial arrived in Accra in March to lease office space
and locate housing for the Embassy staff.
These activities were noticed by Ghanaian officials,
who apparently were expecting a more modest representa-
tion than the :36-man staff the Cubans planned. The
matter finally reached the attention of Chief of State
General Akuffo, who was astounded by both the news of
the Cubans' imminent return and the intended size of
their mission. Approval for the Cubans' return had
apparently been c riven only by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
General Akuffo ordered a halt to further Cuban
preparations, stating that there would be "no expansion
of Cuba-Ghana relations" and that "no Cuban Embassy will
open in Accra while the military is in power." Akuffo's
position reflects the decidedly pro-Western orientation
of his regime, which badly needs Western economic assis-
tance.
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Togo: A Beginning
The head of the African Directorate of the Cuban
C Forei n Ministr
visa e Togo's Pres-
ident ya ema in mi - anuary to 1scuss the nonaligned
summit meeting and "the development of relations between
16 our two countries." A few days later, the Havana press
/ reported that Cuba and Togo had decided to establish
diplomatic relations and to exchange ambassadors. Al-
though the two countries reportedly signed communique,
the text was not released.
This development was unexpected because Eyadema
had often expressed agitation over the Cuban and Soviet
presence in neighboring Benin. The relationship with
Cuba will no doubt be a cautious one, although Eyadema
7 probably hopes that Havana will provide much needed
economic and technical assistance. Eyadema's inability
to make any real progress in solving Togo's serious
economic problems has resulted in growing civilian and
military dissatisfaction. Press reports suggest that
U Cuba will offer assistance with fishing and construc-
tion, and might also send teachers. Havana may also
provide the Togolese leader with a personal security
unit, as it has done in such countries as Algeria and
Sierra Leone.
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Outlook
The Cubans hope to achieve several objectives from
their diplomatic hustling:
-- To lend support to Cuba's nonaligned
credentials and leadership role as
well, as to assure a large attendance
at the summit..
-- To dilute criticism of Cuba's military
presence in Africa by having at least
some Cuban representation in many
African nations of varying political
persuasions.
-- To demonstrate the "independence" of
Cuba's foreign policy.
-- To show the United States the futility
of its demand for Cuban withdrawal from
Angola and Ethiopia as a precondition
for normalization of relations because
of the many African countries that allow
a Cuban presence, albeit a nonmilitary
one agreed to by the Africans, for the
sake of the various economic and technical
benefits they receive.
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Peru: Strikes Create Government-Assembly Friction
A walkout by workers in the vital copper mining in-
dustry and a hunger strike by journalists protesting re-
strictions on free speech have created strains between
Peru's military rulers and the Constituent Assembly.
The situation is exacerbated by the absence of Victor
Raul Haya de la Torre--the Assembly's president and
leader of APRA, the country's largest political party
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I the government lea ers become convinced
that the assembly's involvement in domestic politics is
preventing it from making acceptable progress toward
completion of the new constitution, the military could
decide to postpone plans for restoring civilian rule by
1980.
Mining Strike
Some 6,000 workers in the Toquepala and Cuajone
mines and at the Ilo foundry--all installations of the
US-owned Southern Peru Copper Corporation--went on strike
for higher wages two weeks ago. The government has de-
clared the strike illegal but the miners, whose trade
union is dominated by leftists, have refused to return
to work. No violence has been reported, but the situa-
tion could get worse if other workers respond to a mine
union official's call for a nationwide general strike on
29 March in support of the mine workers.
The shutdown of the two mines, which produce three-
fourths of Peru's copper, is costing the country almost
$2 million daily in foreign exchange. Such costly strikes
are not infrequent because Peru's dependence on copper
production--which accounts for 25 to 30 percent of total
export earnings--makes the industry vulnerable to aggres-
sive labor tactics. F77 I
The current strike, however, has an added dimension
J in that Victor Cuadros, both a leader of the mining union
and a member of the Constituent Assembly, was arrested
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for his part in the strike. Although the government
turned Cuadros over to the Assembly--which released him
and formally protested his arrest---the move raised the
issue of the limits of authority of the Assembly; a sec-
ond Assembly member was detained a week later and the
Assembly is expected to release him as well. Whether or
not the arrest of an Assembly member is a violation of
parliamentary immunity has not been resolved.
Before the election of Assembly delegates last year,
President Morales Bermudez stated publicly that the mili-
tary did not :regard the Assembly as sacrosanct. By con-
trast, Assembly President Haya has specifically insisted
that parliamentary immunity must be unlimited. Cuadros
has long been a thorn in the military's side, but his ar-
rest has now placed APRA--and especially acting Assembly
President Luis Sanchez--in the uncomfortable position of
either risking regime displeasure or coming under fire
from leftists for yielding to government pressure. For
the moment, Sanchez and APRA appear to have chosen the
former course.
Journalists' Protest
Parliamentary prerogatives also figure in the three-
day hunger strike that four leading Peruvian journalists--
soon joined by four others--began on 19 March to protest
the continued closure of magazines that had been shut down
in January. After their initial arrest and subsequent re-
lease, the journalists appealed to the Assembly for asylum
while they continued their protest. Acting Assembly Pres-
ident Sanchez finally persuaded them to end their fast
and assured government leaders that. the journalists would
leave the Assembly on 22 March, but. some of them appar-
ently are still taking refuge there.
The Assembly is establishing a. commission to negoti-
ate with the government on reopening the magazines, but
it is not clear whether such efforts will be successful;
earlier attempts by Sanchez to mediate between the govern-
ment and the journalists failed once the news became pub-
lic. If progress is not made on restoration of freedom
of the press, leftist delegates have threatened to boycott
the Assembly and thus delay further debate on the consti-
tution.
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Prospects
Peru's military leaders are angry over the recent
developments in the Assembly and are said to be especially
dissatisfied with the performance of Sanchez. Although
a longtime supporter and party colleague of Haya, Sanchez
is an elderly man who is almost blind, and he obviously
lacks Haya's fine touch for compromise. During the past
week, the government-controlled press has sharply criti-
cized the Assembly, pointing out that its actions t
the democratization process.
Given the military's strong inclination to turn over
the government to civilians by 1980, it is unlikely that
the regime-Assembly relationship will crack under the
present strains. But if the military leaders decide
that the Assembly is unable to make reasonable progress
toward the new constitution--either because of involve-
ment in side issues or because a leftist boycott prevents
the formation of a quorum--the regime may decide to post-
pone the transfer of power and remain in office for an-
other two or three years.
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Venezuela: Labor Unrest Ahead
Increasing militancy among workers in both the
3 public and private sectors, together with Ya^variety of
period of serious labor unrest.
The Venezuelan Workers Confederation (CTV), to
which a majority of Venezuela's approximately 5,000
legally recognized unions belong, has traditionally
been allied with the opposition Democratic Action Party
(AD) and nine out of 15 CTV board members belong to the
AD. During the Perez administration, there appeared to
be a tacit agreement that the confederation would hold
down labor's demands to avoid embarrassing the ruling
party. In return, the party supported such labor ini-
tiatives as the controversial "unjustified dismissals
laws," which provided for double severance and longev-
ity pay to a worker unjustifiably fired. The law was
bitterly opposed by the Venezuelan Association of
S Chambers of Commerce and Industry, which believed it to
bean unwarranted intrusion into the wa companies con-
ducted their business.
Now that the Social Christian Party (COPEI) has
become the ruling party, the prevailing view is that
the CTV may increase its wage and benefit demands.
This expectation is tentative, however, since COPEI's
l r,.2 3 influence over the labor movement is admittedly weak.
/ Soon after the election, in fact, a leading COPEI offi-
cial is said to have asked the AD "not to use its unions
as political tools." The response, formulated at a high-
level strategy meeting of AD labor and political leaders
in January, was that the AD-dominated unions would be
"vigilant but not obstructionist." This probably means
that for the time being at least, the CTV would be will-
ing to bargain with COPEI as it did with the AD govern-
ment.
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If such bargaining proves unsatisfactory, however,
there could well be increased support for AD Deputy Sec-
retary General Humberto Celli's earlier call for a rad-
ical policy of trade union confrontation with the Herrera
administration. The AD's planning meeting in January,
while agreeing to initial cooperation with the COPEI
government, also left room for militant trade union ac-
tion when required. Most AD trade unionists privately
admit that there will be considerably more industrial
unrest in the coming months than was the case in the
past five years of the Perez administration.
statistics show inflation ranging from 7 percent in
Caracas to 25 percent in the economic boom region of
Guayana. Real wages for blue collar workers apparently
have declined in recent years, while there has been an
Venezuela's rising cost of living is another factor
that could jeopardize the country's labor peace and spur
demands for higher wage hikes. Despite a tight cap on
prices and increased imports of consumer goods, official
overall increase in white collar wages.
To ward off pressure from the militant left, which
has already made inroads in some important labor federa-
tions, union leaders who belong to the AD will have to
press harder for such radical demands as wages indexed
to cost of living increases. About 8,000 union elec-
tions will be held this year, and leftist leaders could
make significant additional gains if the AD leaves its
followers dissatisfied. The interunion rivalry could
also spill over into labor-management relations, since
over 1,600 labor contracts will expire this year. Vene-
zuelan businessmen are concerned that they may be caught
between labor's traditional negotiating demands and the
fierce competition among the country's political parties
and their trade union affiliates. 25X1
19
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001000010023-3
SECRET
 Secret Approved For Release 2006/03/17: CIA-RDP79T00912AO01000010023-3
Secret
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01000010023-3