WESTERN EUROPE REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001600010001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 6, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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Assessment
Western Europe
Review
State Department review completed
Secret
RP WER 78-006
6 September 1978
Copy ro ,~
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WESTERN EUROPE REVIEW
6 September 1978
CONTENTS
Italy: The Summer Maneuvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Recent meetings held by the Communists and
Christian Democrats seem to indicate that
cooperation will continue between the two
parties, but both sides have been careful
to preserve their option to break this off
should a clear conflict on issues develop.
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West Berlin: The Status of the Narcotics
Black Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Practical and political obstacles rooted
in the special status of Berlin make it
unlikely that effective and comprehensive
controls over the smuggling of narcotics
into the city will be developed.
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Italy: The Summer Maneuvers
Italy's two major parties, the Communists and the
Christian Democrats, held meetings in late July to re-
view party strategy after one of the most turbulent
social and political periods in recent memory--the
January-March government crisis, the abduction and murder
of Aldo Moro, the resignation of President Leone, and the
subsequent election of Sandro Pertini as Leone's suc-
cessor. In a sense, these two party meetings marked an
end to this turbulence and could also serve as harbingers
of a contentious and uncertain autumn.
The Communist Meeting
The mood at the Communists' Central Committee meet-
ing was sober. Party Secretary Berlinguer made a special
point--somewhat defensively--of emphasizing that the
Communist Party had finally overcome the forces within
the Christian Democratic Party opposed to the formation
of a governmental majority including the Communist Party.
Berlinguer went on to admit that there is still a strong
element within the Christian Democratic Party opposed to
Communist participation in government, and indeed, that
the entire Christian Democratic Party is still resistant
to real economic and social renewal or a reduction of its
power in government. Berlinguer nevertheless restated
his basic policy; to remain within the majority and to
demand full and rapid implementation of the agreed pro-
gram.
Berlinguer acknowledged the Communist defeat in the
20 May local elections, but noted that most of the voting
took place in the south, an area where the Communist
Party historically has not done well, and was conditioned
by sympathy for the Christian Democrats after the death
of Aldo Moro. He admitted, somewhat plaintively, that
the Communist Party had intentionally refrained from
criticizing the Andreotti government during the Moro
crisis in the interest of national unity; the Christian
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Democrats had then taken the opportunity to conduct a
"slanderous and provocative" election campaign against
the Communists. Berlinguer said the Communists had
failed to explain properly the content and implications
of their social and economic austerity programs, while
rival parties and trade unions have not been candid
about the problems raised by the need for austerity pro-
grams. He called for redoubled efforts within parlia-
ment and outside to make sure that the government attacks
these problems.
While Berlinguer's speech was critical of the leg-
islative performance of the Christian Democrats, none-
theless, he reaffirmed support for communist participa-
tion in the present majority government. He concluded
by calling for a revitalization of Communist Party iden-
tity and a new commitment to alerting the electorate to
the severe problems facing Italy and the need for quick
implementation of austerity programs.
The Christian Democratic Meeting
The meeting of the National Council of the Christian
Democrats was highlighted by the election of Flaminio
Piccoli as Moro's successor to the party presidency and
the address of Benigno Zaccagnini to the Council.
Zaccagnini's address and Piccoli's comments after his
election indicate that the Christian Democrats will con-
tinue to work with the Communists in parliament. Al-
though the Christian Democrats were encouraged by the
regional election results of 20 May, they are as yet un-
willing either to risk an alliance with the Socialists
or alienate the Communists to the point of having them
withdraw from the government.
In his speech to the National Council, Zaccagnini
began by saying that he did not regard the current work-
ing relationship with the Communist Party as definitive,
terming it necessary because of Italy's political and
economic situation but also exceptional and transitional.
The majority government formed between the Communists and
the Christian Democrats earlier this year did not, in the
Secretary's opinion, represent a final solution for the
Christian Democratic Party. He proceeded to note the
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recent electoral gains of the Socialist Party under the
leadership of Bettino Craxi. Before the National Council
meeting some conservative Christian Democrats, including
Defense Minister Ruffini, had called for a revival of the
alliance between the Socialists and the Christian Demo-
crats, thus eliminating the need for Communist support
within parliament.
Zaccagnini's speech revealed that the majority of
the leadership within the Christian Democratic Party is
still wary of the new-found strength of the Socialists,
especially the autonomous line advocated by Socialist
leader Craxi. Zaccagnini and his followers have inter-
preted the Socialist idea of autonomy to mean that Craxi
wants to increase the electoral strength of his party at
the expense of both the Communists and the Christian
Democrats. It is inconceivable to Zaccagnini that the
Socialists would be willing to return to the government
as part of the majority unless the Communist Party was
also included, in spite of the recent Socialist rhetoric
decrying Communist Party positions and policies.
According to Zaccagnini, the Christian Democrats
and the Communists will continue to engage in active and
spirited debate in the coming months. While he may not
be happy with the prospect of continued cooperation with
the Communists, Zaccagnini saw no prospect of a return
to the time that saw the Communists in the opposition.
Recent comments by Christian Democratic Party Chair-
man Flaminio Piccoli reinforced Zaccagnini's statements,
stressing Christian Democratic and Communist cooperation.
Piccoli has been well known in the past as a leader of a
faction of the Christian Democratic Party that resisted
the efforts of the late Aldo Moro and his "historic
compromise" with the Communist Party.
Piccoli's remarks since being elected chairman re-
veal a considerable change of tone on Christian Demo-
cratic and communist cooperation in parliament. In an
interview on 22 August, he noted that for the first time
since 1947 there is a working relationship between the
two major parties; he praised the efforts of Aldo Moro
in forming a constructive relationship between the
Christian Democrats and the Communists.
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Outlook
In the coming months, the Christian Democrats and
the Communists will continue to work together in parlia-
ment, although there are elements within both parties
that would prefer an end to this relationship. The Com-
munists will press for social and economic programs that
they believe must be dealt with by the Andreotti govern-
ment. Berlinguer has clearly identified economic aus-
terity as necessary for the preservation of Italian
democratic government, and stated in a recent interview
that he is willing to go into the opposition if the
Christian Democrats fail to take action.
The Christian Democrats, on the other hand, do not
see their relationship with the Communists as necessarily
permanent or stable, but consider it at present more
workable and plausible than an alliance with the reemerg-
ing Socialist Party. The defensive mood of both major
parties has increased the probability of increased par-
liamentary confrontation, with the very real possibility
that the Communists may return to the opposition if they
believe the Andreotti government is acting in bad faith
or is too insensitive to issues that need immediate
attention. But as yet this return to opposition remains
a vague threat, unsupported ar conflict on
issues. 17 1
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West Berlin: The Status of the Narcotics Black Market
Practical and political obstacles to effective cus-
toms controls serve to protect West Berlin as a market for
narcotics to the extent that it is now replacing Amster-
dam as the "drug capital of Europe." These obstacles are
rooted in the special status of Berlin, most firmly in
the West German and Western Allied refusal to treat the
boundaries of West Berlin as international borders. There
is currently no prospect that an effective and comprehen-
sive control over the smuggling of narcotics into the city
will be developed.
The East Germans have in the past treated the Berlin
drug problem as purely Western, and the laxity of their
controls over foreigners, especially Turks, who enter
West Berlin via the East German Schoenefeld airport near
the city is advantageous to smugglers. Recently the East
Germans have hinted at a willingness to cooperate more
in controlling international narcotics movements. The
practical results of this, however, are not predictable.
Furthermore, the portion of the narcotics supply for the
illicit West Berlin market that comes through Schoenefeld
airport is estimated at only 20 percent.
More public focus on Berlin's narcotics problem,
especially as it affects the US forces there, can be an-
ticipated this fall, when a Congressional committee look-
ing into drug abuse among US military personnel plans to
hold public hearings in West Berlin.
Berlin as Narcotics Center
Recognition that West Berlin's rate of drug abuse is
serious and rising dates from late 1977, when the West
Berlin Government declared the narcotics "epidemic" to
be the greatest danger to the city, surpassing even ter-
rorism. The West German Minister of Health proclaimed
West Berlin the center of West Germany's drug problem and
stated that Turkish workers were supplying the addicts.
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PRINCIPAL ACCESS ROUTES
TO WEST BERLIN
tewieseA
nngnmd
SCALE 1:186,000
Road
Autobahn
Q Crossing points
Invalidjenstrasse
ornholmer
Strasse'-.-
BERLIN
Frle Ichetrasse Station
,/ "' Ostbahnhol
tso
t rlnzen- per6aumbrUcke
U-Rahn (subway)
S-Bahn
- ~-- Railroad
SchSnefeld
Airfield
Military controlled
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The number of deaths from drug overdoses in West
Berlin--rising since 1970--reached 87 in 1977, up from
54 in the previous year. The 1977 figure is much higher
than the total of such deaths in the West German cities
of Hamburg (16), Munich (16), Hannover (8), and Stutt-
gart (5). The West Berlin figure is said to represent a
mortality of about 20 per thousand. addicts.
Although West German officials a year ago believed
that West Berlin was not yet supplying West Germany with
substantial quantities of heroin, they feared such a de-
velopment because the street price in West Berlin was
lower and heroin was more easily and more safely obtainable.
In the first quarter of 1978, the West Berlin police and
customs seized more than five times as much heroin and
arrested over three times as many persons on drug charges
as during the same period last year. There was a decline,
however, in the number of deaths from drug overdoses to
25 in the first five months of 1978.
The special status of Berlin impedes West German ef-
forts to come to grips with the city's narcotic problem.
Coordination of drug law enforcement in West Germany is
done by the Permanent Working Group on Narcotics, in
which West Berlin is not represented. Although there is
cooperation with Berlin police on criminal cases, West
German officials are well aware that no federal law en-
forcement agency has jurisdiction in West Berlin. The
special status of the city, furthermore, prevents its
government from erecting customs barriers against nar-
cotics smuggling activity at the many entry points to
West Berlin.
Holes in the Wall
West Berlin is an island that depends on its links
to the outside world. Its interest is to facilitate ac-
cess to the city and to minimize controls through which
visitors must pass. Any new obstacle to passage in or out
of West Berlin is seen as deepening the division of Ger-
many and strengthening the East German claim to separate-
ness.
The Western Allies insist, along with the West Ger-
man and West Berlin Governments, that the boundaries of
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West Berlin are not an international border. This is a
fundamental political and legal position. It applies
with special force to the East-West Berlin boundary that
runs through the middle of the city. Thus political ob-
jections to additional customs controls are formidable.
So are the practical problems such controls would face,
because there are many holes in the Wall where experi-
enced travelers can enter West Berlin without undergoing
more than routine identification. For example, after
passing through East German controls--which are cursory,
especially for exiting foreigners--in the main East Ber-
lin railroad station on Fr:iedrichstrasse, travelers can
then board one of several subway or rapid transit lines
and step off at any one of hundreds of stations in West
Berlin without further encounters with controls. Very
great resources would be required to apply a customs
barrier on this system in the area under Western juris-
diction.
The problems of customs control on the western pe-
riphery of the city are equally staggering. The main
entry points are highways that carry both international
vehicular traffic and a very large volume of transit
traffic between West Berlin and West Germany. After
years of negotiation, the delays at these important en-
try points have been reduced to an acceptable minimum.
To apply on the West Berlin side anything more than oc-
casional customs inspections would entail delays and
arouse political reactions. As many as a thousand trucks
a day supply West Berlin with over half of its goods and
materials: the thorough inspection of a trailer truck
takes four or five hours.
Allied and Soviet Reservations
The French and the British share some of the US con-
cern over the problem of drug abuse in West Berlin and
have expressed a desire to be helpful, as long as damage
is not done to important Western political interests.
They are especially determined to maintain the position
that the East-West Berlin :Line is not an international
border. The French and British recently joined the US
in approving a request by the West Berlin Senator for
Interior for increased authority to control persons using
the rapid transit lines run by East Germany in West Ber-
lin. This action has so far resulted only in reopening
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a dormant dispute between the Western Allies and the So-
viets, who usually feel compelled to back the East German
claim to sovereignty over railroad property it owns in
West Berlin. The Western Allies must insist that East
German property in West Berlin is subject to their juris-
diction and control.
The political sensitivity of this issue assures that
the additional authority granted the West Berlin police
will be limited. Controls are to be occasional. They
are not to be carried out on a large scale or close to
the East-West Berlin line unless Western Allied permis-
sion is obtained beforehand. The prospect that these
measures will decrease supplies to the West Berlin il-
licit narcotics market is small.
Turkish Connection
The assertion of Bonn's Minister of Health that
Turkish workers supply the addicts and that West Berlin
is the center of the drug problem, while perhaps over-
simplified, reflected German understanding of develop-
ments since 1976. In that year, a joint West German -
Dutch crackdown on traffic in "brown" heroin from South-
east Asia through Amsterdam effectively ended that prod-
uct's dominance of the West German illicit drug market.
The void has been filled by "white" heroin from the Mid-
dle East, which is also the source of hashish and cannabis.
These traffickers, hidden in the large Turkish im-
migrant communities of West Germany and West Berlin, are
in a relatively strong position, and West German authori-
ties expect the predominance of Middle East heroin on the
market to continue. West Germany has over a million Turk-
ish workers, thousands of whom vacation in Turkey each
year and hundreds of whom then return bearing small (1 to
3 kilograms) amounts of heroin for distribution in West
Germany. This pattern also appears in West Berlin.
The colony of Turkish workers in West Berlin numbers
about 75,000, and there are an estimated 5,000 illegal
Turkish residents as well. The sources of heroin for
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the West Berlin market are, typically, individual Turks
selling small quantities. They travel to and from Turkey
mainly by air or by vehicle. Of the latter, many, if not
most, drive vehicles with West Berlin or West German tags,
so that determination of who comes from Turkey in the
heavy transit traffic to West Berlin requires time for a
thorough passport examination. Air travelers can choose
between the western route that passes through West Ger-
many or the eastern route that uses the East German air-
port at Schoenefeld.
West Berlin authorities state that much of the
heroin reaching the city from Turkey and the Middle East
seems to pass through West Germany and that the couriers
are indistinguishable from legitimate travelers. It is
estimated that about 80 percent reaches West Berlin via
the western route, especially in trucks, while only about
20 percent comes through Schoenefeld.
East Germany's Role
The East German regime tends to identify crime with
capitalism and has strong political views about juris-
dictional proprieties in the Berlin area. Both impede
the regime's readiness to act against traffic in illicit
drugs entering West Berlin. When a Bonn Health Ministry
official raised the West Berlin narcotics problem with
his East German colleague in late 1977, the latter ex-
pressed "astonishment" that a West German would presume
to speak officially on a "purely Berlin matter." At
about the same time, the Governing Mayor of West Berlin
sent the East German Government a letter proposing co-
operation in combating drug abuse, to which no answer
has so far been reported.
Nonetheless, it is too early to write off the possi-
bility that East Germany will be more helpful on the drug
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abuse problem. On 24 August, a Foreign Ministry official
in East Berlin told the US Embassy that his government
would like to receive the names of suspected couriers
of narcotics. The offer of such information had been
made six months earlier. Furthermore, there are factors
that should argue for more East German cooperation.
They include evident concern of the regime about the
number of foreigners, especially Turks from West Berlin,
who have been coming to East Berlin in search of an even-
ing's entertainment. Inevitably they encounter the dis-
enchanted youth of East Germany, and the potential for an
expansion of the drug market is there.
Perhaps a more promising lever is the desperate East
German need for hard currency, which could be somewhat
alleviated by pay for services in an agreed East-West
program to control drug abuse. Should the East Germans
display an inclination to cooperate, West Berlin interest
would presumably focus on the desirability of more strin-
gent controls at Schoenefeld airport, or at the Fried-
richstrasse railroad station and the southern crossing
point on Waltersdorfer Chaussee used by buses from Schoene-
feld to West Berlin. These two places are the logical
chokepoints for control of travelers from the airport.
Effective controls could have a perceptible impact on the
illicit narcotics supply, but only on the estimated 20
percent that comes by the eastern route.
Outlook
There are signs, according to the US Mission in West
Berlin and the US Embassy in East Berlin, that East Ger-
many may gradually seek to project a more responsible
image by displaying interest in international coopera-
tion against narcotics traffickers. This is conceivable,
but it is unlikely that cooperation would come about be-
fore the question of hard currency payment is addressed.
In weighing the benefits of such cooperation, the
East Germans will be influenced by their assessment of the
effect on the drug situation in East Berlin. Their ideo-
logical refusal to admit the existence of a drug problem,
however, means there is almost no information on which
to base an assessment of this factor.
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The West Berlin market in illicit drugs seems more
dependent on Middle Eastern, notably Turkish supply than
that of West Germany, where recent heroin seizures indi-
cate that the Southeast Asian suppliers are back in busi-
ness. A control program focused on the Turkish community
of West Berlin, however, would be politically unacceptable.
Partial measures that could reduce the narcotics
supply are possible. New controls at Waltersdorfer
Chaussee, which handles limited traffic, largely of for-
eigners, would not greatly disturb Berlin political sensi-
tivities. Such measures, however, offer only limited
improvements. Special controls on passengers from Schoene-
feld at Waltersdorfer Chaussee and Freidrichstrasse rail-
road station would, in time, drive smugglers to make use
of other crossing points along the Wall, specifically
Checkpoint Charlie. This would pose new political prob-
lems.
Any new control program comprehensive enough to
bring about a major and lasting reduction of the traffic
in narcotics to West Berlin risks blocking traffic in a
manner that would irritate the Berliners. It also could
not be brought into force without extensive inter-Allied
coordination.
West Berlin's drug abuse problem will be highlighted
by Congressional committee hearings now planned there in
November. Although focused on the problem of US forces,
the hearings will arouse public concern about drug abuse
in West Berlin. Whatever might be stimulated thereby
resolve to deal with the problem will not be forceful
enough to override the local and international political
considerations that militate against a comprehensive
program. The French and British have insisted that there
is no noticeable drug impact on their military forces in
West Berlin. And the Berliners by history and experience
are conditioned to resent all forms of control.
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