WESTERN EUROPE REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001600010008-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 29, 2004
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: October 25, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

Na6ional
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Assessment ecret
Center
Western Europe
Review
Secret
RP WER 78-013
25 October 1978
Copy. n.
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WESTERN EUROPE REVIEW
25 October 1978
CONTENTS
The Italian Communists and the
Soviets--More Diversity than Unity . . . . . . . .
Italian Communist leader Berlinguer's trip
in early October to the USSR, France, and
Yugoslavia produced an upbeat communique in
Moscow that hid deep disagreements with the
Soviets on Italian domestic and international
problems.
Canadian Byelections: Setback for Trudeau . . . . . 4
Prime Minister Trudeau's ruling Liberal
Party, trounced in last week's byelections,
faces an uphill fight in next year's
national election as it tries to meet
voter concerns about the economy and
antipathy toward Trudeau.
Greece: Results and Ramifications of
Local Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The recently concluded local elections
produced no clear indication of national
trends. Leftist opposition candidates
won in most of the larger cities; the
results elsewhere were mixed.
UN Economic Commission for Europe: Update on
Status of Brezhnev's Proposals . . . . . . . . . . 9
The UN Economic Commission for Europe
continues to have problems with Soviet
President Brezhnev's call for pan-Euro-
pean conferences on energy, transportation,
and the environment.
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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The Italian Communists and the Soviets--More Diversity
than Unity
Italian Communist leader Berlinguer's trip in early
October to the USSR, France, and Yugoslavia produced an
upbeat communique in Moscow that hid deep disagreements
with the Soviets on Italian domestic and international
problems. In Paris, Berlinguer and French Communist
leader Marchais agreed not to disagree too much on issues
related to the first direct elections for the European
Parliament in June. Berlinguer apparently used his stop
in Yugoslavia to review his Moscow experience with Tito
and to explore the chances of opening party relations
with the Chinese Communists.
Much remains unclear about the Italian leader's
unusual trip--in recent years Berlin uer has gone to
Moscow only for ceremonial occasions
While the Italians intend to redefine Leninism to suit
themselves, Berlinguer wanted to reassure the Soviets
and especially Ponomarev that his party would not go so
far as to discard democratic centralism or break with
Leninism.
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The Moscow meeting was, at best, a modest success
for Berlinguer. The communique, which appeared to back
Berlinguer's domestic course, was only possible because
Vadim Zagladin, deputy chief of the Central Committee's
International Department, did not want to indicate the
Berlinguer told the press afterward that "divergen-
cies persist on certain essential aspects of the concept
of socialism . . . . We were able to illustrate to our
comrades not only our concept of an original Italian road
to socialism, but also our viewpoint on the problems of
socialism in the world." One of these problems is China.
The Italians would like to establish party-to-party re-
lations, if the Chinese agree. Berlinguer wanted to
assure Moscow this would not be an anti-Soviet act, but
the Soviets refused to dis-
cuss the matter.
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Berlinguer's meeting with Tito at the old leader's
retreat at Igalo produced a communique warmly applauding
Berlinguer's "third way." Tito will presumably seek to
broker Italian Communist relations with the Chinese
party.
Berlinguer's trip appears to represent another step
in the slow deterioration of Italian Communist relations
with Moscow. The contradictory policy pursued by the
Italians--autonomy from the Soviets mixed with a strong
desire for polite and diplomatic relations--has again
collided with Moscow's suspicion of a policy that is
slowly but increasingly diverging from the aging Soviet
leadership's ideas of orthodoxy. In this relationship,
Soviet appreciation for Italian tact and desire for cor-
rect relations sometimes takes the upper hand, but sus-
picion is never far behind.
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Canadian Byelections: Setback for Trudeau
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's ruling Liberal Party,
trounced in last week's byelections, faces the prospect
of an uphill fight in next year's national election. The
results of the byelections reflect voter concern over the
continuing poor state of the economy, antipathy toward
Trudeau, and the low priority accorded national unity--
the issue that is Trudeau's strong point. Trudeau, whose
party continues to hold a majority in parliament, has
acknowledged the setback but insists his leadership of
the Liberals is not in jeopardy.
The Liberals won two of the three seats contested in
Quebec, their traditional stronghold, but lost all 12 by-
elections in English Canada. The Liberal Party machine
suffered from infighting over nominations and slow starts
in several Ontario districts. Even so, the loss of all
seven seats contested in this key province--largely in-
terpreted as "Trudeauphobia" on the part of the voters--
shocked the Liberals. It both strengthened voices in the
party calling for Trudeau to step down and fueled media
speculation that he might do so. Such speculation ap-
peared regularly through the summer as Trudeau continued
to delay national elections in the face of poor Liberal
showings in the polls.
Trudeau, however, has repeatedly denied that he will
resign. Following last week's byelection losses, he
reaffirmed his determination to stay on and said he would
work to regain public confidence before the general elec-
tion, which must be held next year. So far, the hierarchy
of the party backs him. This support could diminish, how-
ever, if there is little or no improvement in Liberal
popularity in Ontario in the next few months.
The Prime Minister is counting on two factors to
bolster Liberal fortunes before general elections. He
expects the economic package introduced this fall to
provide an image of fiscal restraint and budgetary re-
sponsibility--an image that will bring the Liberals in
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line with the conservative mood now prevalent across
Canada. So far it has elicited little enthusiasm from
the public, but Trudeau thinks that may change by the
end of the year.
Trudeau also hopes the beginning of the separatist
Parti Quebecois referendum campaign will significantly
heighten voter concern about national unity. National
unity is Trudeau's strong suit, and he is widely believed
to be the man best able to hold Canada together. The
Prime Minister has heavily stressed the need for consti-
tutional reform, arguing that economic uncertainty flows
from political uncertainty and that the Canadian economy
cannot achieve its highest level until the problem of
national unity is solved. Trudeau's popularity soared
following the separatist victory in Quebec two years ago,
which raised fears over the future of Canada. A Gallup
poll taken in September, however, showed only 6 percent
of those queried were most concerned about national unity,
while 76 percent were primarily concerned about unemploy-
ment and other economic problems.
Trudeau feels strongly that he should remain in of-
fice until he resolves the problem of Quebec separatism.
He has rebounded from low popularity ratings several times
during his 10 years in office and is unlikely to resign
before general elections unless his Liberal Party col-
leagues overwhelmingly demand it.
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Greece: Results and Ramifications of Local Elections
The recently concluded two-stage local elections
in Greece produced no clear indication of national
trends. Leftist opposition candidates won in most of
the larger cities and towns; the results elsewhere
were mixed, as local issues and personalities prevailed
over national political slogans.
Background and Results
Greek local elections involve the mayorships and
municipal council seats of 264 cities and towns and
some 5,800 villages. Because the political system is
highly centralized, opposition parties tend to portray
these elections as a plebiscite on the performance of
the government in Athens. In addition, the majority
voting system used at the local level compels them to
work out alliances and pre-electoral agreements on
candidate slates. The effect of this is a kind of
"ganging up" on the party in power. The latter generally
limits itself to containing the damage, often by mini-
mizing the political character of the elections.
This combination of factors enabled the opposition
parties to sweep the 1975 elections, but the opposition
did not fare so well this time, largely because of
bickering between the pro-Soviet Communist Party and
Andreas Papandreou's Panhellenic Socialist Movement
(PASOK). Thus, while the opposition won in such large
cities as Athens, Piraeus, and Salonika, government-
supported candidates and even some on the far right
did well in many of the smaller towns and villages.
Athens a Test Case
The most heated contest was in Athens, where the
government-backed candidate won a 42-percent plurality
in the first round on 15 October. In the runoff on
22 October, however, he was defeated when the pro-Soviet
Communists--whose candidate, the composer and erstwhile
Eurocommunist Mikis Theodorakis, had received 16 percent
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of the vote in the first round--reluctantly lined up
behind the candidate backed by a Papandreou-led coali-
tion of Socialists, Eurocommunists, and some centrists.
The coalition's man wound up with 57 percent of the
vote.
The Athens contest was important not only because
it is the capital and largest city, but because the
parties' showing there in the 1977 national election
approximated their performance countrywide. It was
thought that the race in the capital would reveal shifts
in voter preference. In particular, the breakup of the
Union of the Democratic Center, PASOK's predecessor
as the main opposition party, had raised the question
whether that party's supporters would shift toward
Papandreou or toward Prime Minister Karamanlis'
moderately conservative New Democracy Party.
Karamanlis and Papandreou Vie for Centrist Vote
As it turned out, support for Karamanlis' party
remained stable in the Athens voting. Its candidate
finished with 43 percent of the vote in the second
round, just one percentage point more than the party
received in last year's parliamentary election. Else-
where the results were similar. This could mean that
Karamanlis, who has brought centrists into his govern-
ment in an effort to preempt Papandreou and compensate
for rightist defections from his own party, has not
succeeded in attracting significant numbers of centrist
voters. It is, however, too early to say this with
certainty. For example, some centrists may have lined
up behind the government, but their vote may have
been offset by abstentions among the government's
traditional supporters who are unhappy with recently
enacted austerity and antitax evasion measures.
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Karamanlis' apparent lack of success does not
necessarily mean that large numbers of centrists swung
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behind Papandreou. The aggregate first round tally of
his coalition in Athens--40 percent--was only three
percentage points more than the vote received by the
same four parties in 1977. And while it is difficult
to determine whether PASOK's own vote increased over
the 23 percent it garnered last year, it seems unlikely
that Papandreou gained more than a few percentage points.
In any event he, like Karamanlis, is said to be unhappy
with the election results.
The election made clear that, while Papandreou is
willing to talk about cooperation with the pro-Soviet
Communists--if only to appear supportive of opposition
unity--he continues to believe that actual cooperation
would further antagonize the military and would hamper
his quest for power. For Papandreou, as for Karamanlis,
the center continues to hold the greatest attraction as
a source of new support. Recent stirrings by some
prominent centrist personalities, however, suggest that
the center, or at least a good part of it, may yet re-
emerge in a political party, strong enough to deprive
Papandreou or Karamanlis of a clear-cut victory in the
next general election.
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UN Economic Commission for Europe: Update on Status of
Brezhnev's Proposals
The UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) con-
tinues to have problems with Soviet President Brezhnev's
call made in late 1975--not long after the signature of
the Helsinki agreement--for pan-European conferences on
energy, transportation, and the environment. The Soviets
have not gotten as much propaganda mileage from this
effort as they had anticipated, but there has been a clash
within the Western camp on tackling the problem of trans-
boundary air pollution. At the ECE plenary in April that
subject was cited along with low-waste/nonwaste technology
as a likely item for the agenda of a high-level meeting;
the ECE's senior advisers on environmental problems were
instructed to make "every effort" to complete preparations
for holding such a conference next year.
ECE Executive Secretary Stanovnik, a Yugoslav citi-
zen, is in Washington today for consultations. He is a
firm proponent of action leading to an East-West environ-
mental conference under the auspices of the ECE, regard-
ing its convocation as an indicator of support for the
Helsinki accords. Stanovnik opposes Western delaying
tactics but seems equally unhappy with Soviet efforts to
make propaganda points.
The Nordic states are promoting a draft framework
agreement on transboundary air pollution that includes
a call for controls on, and eventual reduction of, sul-
phur emissions. Several members of the EC Nine have em-
ployed delaying tactics at meetings of the senior advi-
sers, citing a need to await a review of current efforts
to establish an air pollution monitoring system for Eu-
rope. The French, in opposing the Nordic proposal as
"premature," have privately noted the high sulphur con-
tent of their imported oil.
Soviet domestic media and propaganda outlets have
claimed that the West European industrialized states are
reluctant to clean up the continent's environment. The
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Soviets, aware of the disarray in the Western camp, ap-
pear prepared to push air pollution as an agenda topic
at a high-level meeting. Not unexpectedly, the proposal
of the Soviets and their allies for action is much less
far-reaching than the Nordic one; it would have the ECE
merely store, collate, and report country-originated
data.
After some prodding by the US, the Nordic States
have stressed to Moscow the need to make meaningful emis-
sions data available. Soviet officials may meet with
representatives of several Western states in Oslo late
next month to attempt to find a compromise. Dzherman
Gvishiani, Deputy Chairman of the Soviet State Committee
on science and Technology and Premier Kosygin's son-in-
law, has confided that the Soviet military must be in-
volved in deciding what information can be provided, al-
leging "indirect military considerations" in revealing
sources of pollution.
Brezhnev's other conference proposals, especially
that on transportation, have made little headway, and are
unlikely to do so at least until after the timing and
content of an East-West conference on the environment
have been resolved.
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Malta: In his latest speech Prime Minister Mintoff again
threatened that Malta will cooperate closely with Libya
if France, West Germany, and Italy do not provide direct
grants to help offset the $70-80 million Malta will lose
annuall following the British military withdrawal next
March.
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The Italians are now trying to work out an arrange-
ment in which the West Europeans would agree among them-
selves on an aid package, consult the Libyans, and then
approach Mintoff with a joint offer. The Italians have
found the French skeptical, and anticipate a wary response
from the West Germans. But Rome hopes to sell the idea
as a way of coping with Mintoff's practice of playing off
one side against the other. Now that the West Europeans
have a better understanding of Mintoff's "Libyan option,"
they will probably increase pressure on him to drop his
demand for budgetary aid and to negotiate instead a pack-
t loans and project assistance.
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