WESTERN EUROPE REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001700010003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 17, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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poreT
Center
Western Europe
Review
State Department review completed
Secret
RP WER 79-003
17 January 1979
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WESTERN EUROPE REVIEW
17 January 1979
CONTENTS
Spain: Military Under Pressure
Mounting anger and frustration in the
Spanish military is a source of grow-
ing concern to political and mi itary
leaders alike.
Italy: Mounting Political Tensions
The political atmosphere in Italy re-
mains tense as party and labor leaders
begin serious consideration of the gov-
ernment's o posed economic recovery
plan.
West German : Statute of Limitations on Third
Reich Mur ers , , , , , , 10
A decision by the West German Government
later this year on whether to abolish the
statute of limitations on murder will de-
termine whether Bonn will preserve the au-
thority to prosecute newly d' vered Nazi-
era criminals.
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Spain: Military Under Pressure
Mounting anger and frustration in the Spanish mili-
tary is a source of growing concern to political and
military leaders alike. Deep divisions within the mili-
tary have come to light as officers of the far ri ht
fulminate against the government and democracy.
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asque
terrorists, sensing that this could be the government's
weak spot, have launched a direct attack on the Army in
hopes of provoking a harsh retaliation that would fur-
ther polarize the Basques. Key military leaders, how-
ever, are aware that overreactions would play into the
terrorists' hands and still seem determined to restrain
military activities within the bounds of the constitu-
tion. Although there clearly are limits on the mili-
tary's ability to absorb further assassinations of senior
officers, many actions remain open to the military short
of physically overthrowing the government and the con-
stitution. Armed insurrection seems unlikely unless
these other alternatives have failed. 25X1
Military restiveness derives from a wide variety
of factors and has been building for some time. The
military officer class, which is inherently conservative,
is:
-- Distressed by the development of democracy in
Spain, which they see as encouraging political
irresponsibility and extremism, moral laxity,
indifference to the Church, labor unrest, and
most of the other ills troubling Spain today.
-- Frustrated by the military's general loss of
stature in society.
-- Threatened by the government's moves to shunt
known rightists off into noncommand posts and
to formulate sweeping military reforms.
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-- Deeply disturbed by the legalization of the
Communist Party, by the electoral success and
potential role in government of the Socialists
and by the government's concessions to re ional
demands for autonomy.
Last year the military was agitated by Basque ter-
rorist depredations against fellow officers in the Armed
Police and the Civil Guard--the paramilitary national
security forces. Military leaders probably share the
conviction of police officials that the government is
not supporting police efforts fully because it does not
want to alienate regional political groups.
ETA Offensive
In late December the Basque terrorist organization,
ETA, fanned military reactions by declaring an "offen-
sive" against Spanish Army leaders. Although ETA had
killed two Army officers in Madrid last summer and a
Navy officer in the Basque region in October, the ter-
rorists have until recently appeared unable to make up
their minds about whether to launch an all-out campaign
against the military. In a desperate bid to prevent
agreement between Madrid and Basque moderates on regional
autonomy statutes, however, ETA has apparently decided
to gamble on provoking direct military intervention, or
at least a harsh crackdown by the security forces that
would compel Basques to choose government
and the separatists. F_ I
On 2 January ETA assassinated an Army major in the
Basque region and the next day killed the military gov-
ernor of Madrid. Tensions reportedly ran high in the
military during the days immediately following the as-
saults. At the funeral services for the military gov-
ernor, some military officers insulted Defense Minister
Gutierrez Mellado--who has long been unpopular with the
military for his role in supporting the government's
liberalization program--and participated in an unsched-
uled (and apparently unauthorized) funeral march to the
cemetery where they were joined by vociferous civilian
ultrarightists. Nevertheless, the funeral service it-
self was disciplined and senior officers stifled the few
antigovernment shouts.
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Rightist demonstration at the funeral of Madrid's military governor
17 January 1979
Cooler Heads Still Prevail
Rightist hotheads in the military denounce the gov-
ernment as too weak on law and order, and call for the
imposition of martial law. More respected military
leaders, however, are clearly aware that this would play
into ETA's hands. They are not anxious to thrust the
military directly into the strife-torn Basque region
where they probably would have no more success against
the terrorists than the security forces have had.
pledged to uphold.
The promulgation of Spain's new constitution on
29 December, moreover, reduced the possibility of direct
military intervention. Under the old laws the King had
the power to replace the government, and the generals
could have applied pressure on him to do so. Now any
change of government must be approved by Parliament;
although the majority of military leaders would doubtless
prefer a more rightist government, most of them remain
extremely reluctant to break the law that they are
The Range of Military Options
It is unclear how the armed forces would bear up to
a concerted terrorist campaign, however, especially if
popular troop commanders were attacked. At a minimum,
the military would be likely to exert intense pressure
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on the government to crack down on the Basques, using
the extraordinary police powers granted last year. In
the absence of specific intelligence about ETA members,
this would of necessity involve random operations in
which innocent people would be hurt. Ultimately, such a
course of action seems likely to serve the terrorists'
aims by further polarizing the Basque o ulation and
driving moderates into the ETA camp.
Martial law in the Basque region would be undertaken
only as a last resort--a prelude to complete military
occupation there along the lines of Franco's harsh sub-
jugation of the region after the Civil War. The Govern-
ment and military are both well aware that this would
be an admission of defeat and that it would raise an
international outcry that could spell an end to Spain's
bid t
"
i
"
o
rejo
n Europe
after 40 years of isolation.
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On a more directly political level, the military
could press for the removal of Gutierrez Mellado and the
equally unpopular Minister of the Interior, Martin Villa.
The government would be extremely reluctant to yield,
since doing so would be widely interpreted as a cave-in
to the military and a sign that Suarez was losing control
of the situation. Furthermore, Gutierrez Mellado serves
a valuable purpose and would be difficult to replace. If
the situation got bad eno.gh, however, both men might be
replaced by Army officers who d command the respect
of the military.
Finally, if the situation deteriorated to the extent
that senior military leaders and politicians were being
killed with impunity by ETA and military units were
openly demonstrating against the government, the generals
could attempt to force the King to convince Parliament
that the state of emergency required extreme action:
postponement of the elections and formation of a strong
national coalition for a designated period of time. 25X1
These alternatives seem more likely, if worst comes
to worst, than the traditional ronunciamento--the officer
revolts by proclamation of the 19th century--or other
forms of open rebellion.
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Italy: Mounting Political Tensions
The political atmosphere in Italy remains tense as
party and labor leaders begin serious consideration of
the government's proposed economic recovery plan, which
Prime Minister Andreotti submitted to Parliament this
week. There are signs that the Andreotti government and
the Communist Party leadership are willing to work out
compromises and avoid a confrontation over the issue.
But the "crisis atmosphere" produced by inter-party
polemics over the past several weeks could still trigger
th '
A number of recent events--not directly related to
the anticipated parliamentary showdown--have interrupted
the political truce usually marking the Christmas season
in Italy:
e government s collapse.
Mounting Tensions
Bitter controversy has surrounded the nomina-
tion of new directors for the most important
public corporations. Andreotti rejected his
State Industries Minister's suggestion to ap-
point "technicians" to the posts in favor of
an earlier agreement on candidates approved
by the Socialists and Social Democrats. Both
the Communists and Republicans can be expected
to oppose this agreement on the grounds that
they were not consulted.
The polemic over Pope John Paul's strong pro-
nouncements on two sensitive issues--divorce
and abortion--threatens to disrupt an emerging
consensus among both Catholics and non-
Catholics on the need for improved Church-
State relations in Italy. Anticlerical poli-
ticians view the Pope's statements as an at-
tack on Italy's liberalized divorce and
abortion laws, and are calling for a halt in
the current negotiations for the revision of
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the Concordat governing relations between
Rome and the Vatican. Major party leaders
have thus far avoided involvement in the dis-
pute, but if the problem persists they may be
forced to take positions that would further
weaken the government's majority.
-- There has been an upsurge in rightwing terror-
ism recently, apparently to protest the gov-
ernment's inability to solve the murders last
year of several members of the neo-fascist
Italian Social Movement. The victims of this
terrorism have been primarily leftists and,
while the response by the left has been rela-
tively peaceful, a cycle of attacks and re-
prisals could emerge. Such a cycle would
probably heighten recriminations among the
parties, making it even more difficult
them to agree on government policies.
Evidence of Flexibility
Communist chief, Berlinguer, has called the present
government inadequate to deal with such tensions and has
declared his support for a "government of national
unity"--including the Communists--if the current arrange-
ment collapses. But he has also denied rumors that his
party intends to use the economic plan to bring about
the dissolution of the Andreotti majority. In exchange
for their continued support the Communists apparently
want a series of government pledges:
-- To increase the amount of investment in the
depressed Italian south.
-- To avoid substap.ial modifications of the wage
indexation mec fLnism, thus protecting the
workers' real wages.
-- To increase revenues through improved tax col-
I rather than reduced spending.
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There is also evidence that Prime Minister Andreotti
is trying to avoid a confrontation over the economic plan.
Early reports on the final draft's contents indicate a
concerted effort by the government to close the gap be-
tween its initial proposals and the Communist Party'
recommended changes.
Factors Working Against a Compromise
A convergence of government and Communist aims may
be blocked, however, by the demands of the labor unions.
Wage restraint by the unions in the impending renegotia-
tion of collective labor contracts is an important ele-
ment in the government's plan to cut inflation. But key
labor leaders have demanded precise government commit-
ments for developmental and job-creating investment as
the quid pro quo necessary for moderate union wage de-
mands in t e coming contract negotiations. Following
labor's negative reaction to the plan in its initial
consultations with the government, it appears unlikely
that an adequate trade-off can be achieved.
It is particularly doubtful whether the unions are
prepared to accept the government's target of zero
growth in real wages over the next three years. The
labor leadership has already committed itself to support
the contract demands of the trend-setting metalworkers,
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who have called for substantial wage increases, reduc-
tions in working hours, and a role for labor in the
determination of their employers' investment and employ-
ment policies.
The leadership of Italy's industrial employers'
association, Confindustria, is on record against such
labor demands. T Here are also indications of increased
skepticism among Confindustria leaders about the "his-
toric compromise." Business may now be less inclined
to work out a labor compromise that would strengthen
the Communists' political position. Under these cir-
cumstances, inflexibility by both the unions and employ-
ers on the wage issue may force the Communists to adopt
a tougher line in the parliamentary debate over the
economic plan and increase the risk of a stalemate that
would bring down the government.
A Communist spokesman has already criticized the
final draft of the plan as containing nothing new. This
comes in the wake of a Communist charge that the Chris-
tian Democrats are not living up to the agreement on
which Communist support of the government is based.
In addition to these essentially economic problems,
prospects for parliamentary approval of the recovery
plan are clouded by the intention of the Socialists and
Social Democrats to make the debate a test of the gov-
ernment's adequacy. Both parties have declared that
Andreotti's Christian Democratic government is incapable
of dealing effectively with the many problems facing
contemporary Italy. They have already stated their
preference for a more broadly based government--a hybrid
cabinet--half of which would be Christian Democrats and
the other half "exports" acceptable to the other parties
comprising the majority.
Outlook
The intertwining of economic and political issues
in the dispute over the plan is clearly making it diffi-
cult for the parties to sort out their priorities.
There appears to be sufficient opportunity--and even
willingness--on the part of the government and the Com-
munists to come to terms over the economic and technical
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aspects of the plan. But the Communists would be taking
a serious political risk if they agreed to a program
unacceptable to labor. Thus, the negotiations between
labor and the employers' associations over wage policy
may hold the key to whether a broader compromise is
possible. This, however, is the area over which the
parties have the least control.
Even if this difficult problem can be resolved, the
apparent desire of smaller parties such as the Socialists
and Social Democrats to force a showdown over the economic
plan may seal the fate of the Andreotti government. The
attitudes of these parties also contain an element of
ambivalence, however; while they would like to bring
down Andreotti, they are uncomfortable with at least
one of the possible outcomes--the renewal of stiff Com-
munist opposition to the government. All of these com-
plexities probably account for the protracted nature of
the consultations on the economic plan--the outline of
the program was first presented in August. The process
appears to be nearing an end, however, and a crucial
series of consultations now underway--among and within
the political parties this week and the labor unions
next week--will probably give a clearer picture of the
future of the economic plan and the Andreotti govern-
ment.
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West Germany: Statute of Limitations on Third Reich
Murders
Later this year the West German Bundestag, for the
third tme since World War II, will address the question
of when the statute of limitations for murder expires.
A large international audience will be watching and seek-
ing to influence the decision, which will determine
whether the West German Government preserves authority
to prosecute newly discovered Nazi-era criminals. Debate
will be lively and a decision promises to be difficult.
Extension of the authority to prosecute, approved by the
Bundestag twice in the 1960s, is not assured, but pros-
pects are good that this will be accomplished by aboli-
tion of the statute of limitations on murder. The action
would have little practical effect because it is unlikely
that many previously unidentified Third Reich murderers
will be found, but the political problem is large and it
is complicated by the lack of a solution consistent with
German legal tradition.
Background on Statute of Limitation
Originally part of the Prussian penal code, the
principle of a statute of limitations was incorporated
into the imperial penal code when the Second Reich was
founded in 1871 and it has been on the books ever since.
The statute of limitations for murder was 20 years until
1969 when the Bundestag voted to extend it to 30 years
in order to assure that Nazi-era murderers found between
1970 and 1980 would not go unpunished. This was the
second extension of legal authority by the Bundestag to
make possible the prosecution of Third Reich crimes.
The German legal system regards the Third Reich
(1933-1945) as a period during which existing law was
not applied and, therefore, the clock of the statute of
limitations did not run. In addition, the Bundestag de-
cided in 1965--the first extension of legal authority
for prosecution of Third Reich crimes--that a vacuum
existed between 8 May 1945 and 31 December 1949, a period
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in which German courts were being reestablished and were
not fully able to assume jurisdiction. Thus, the 30 year
interval decided in 1969 actually began on 1 January
1950 and will expire on 31 December 1979. Bundestag
action to extend the possibility of prosecution is not
expected before early summer, or possibly autumn, and
the months leading up to what is foreseen as a very
close vote will be marked by lively discussion within
West Germany as well as by considerable international
commentary.
Other Legal Considerations
West German law provides that crimes on which in-
vestigations have begun or preliminary hearings have been
held are not affected by the statute of limitations.
Therefore, known Third Reich criminals against whom
actions have been initiated would not be spared.* Expi-
ration of the 30-year interval would benefit only newly
apprehended or incriminated Nazi murderers against whom
no trial or investigation will have commenced by the end
of 1979. The number of such persons is believed to be
small.
Since the statute of limitations on other Nazi-era
crimes has already run out, murder and directly. related
actions such as complicity in murder are the only Third
Reich crimes still liable for prosecution in West Germany.
There is an article in Bonn's penal code covering geno-
cide, for which there is no statute of limitations, but
it is irrelevant to the present debate because it was
adopted in 1954 and cannot be applied retroactively.
Thus, the political question of what to do about alleged
Nazi murderers who may be caught or against whom new
evidence may be produced after the end of this year boils
down to the legal question of whether to change once
again the statute of limitations on murder.
*The number currently under investigation is estimated at 37,000.
At present, there are 12 trials of Third Reich functionaries ac-
cused of murder or complicity in murder taking place in West Ger-
many. The only one that attracts more than regional press coverage
is the Maidanek trial in Duesseldorf where 13 former SS staff mem-
bers of the concentration camp at Maidanek, near Lublin, Poland,
are accused of killing 250,000 Soviet prisoners of war, Jews, and
internees from other camps. Official investigations of 84,400 ac-
cused Nazi criminals have been initiated by West German justice
authorities since the war; there have been 6,432 convictions.
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Four Legislative Options
A careful assessment by the US Embassy in Bonn of
the legislative problem facing the Bundestag describes
four options currently being considered by West German
politicians. They are:
-- Option I. Do nothing to change the law and
permit the authority to prosecute newly appre-
hend.ed or incriminated Nazi murderers to expire
on 31 Dece ber. Many Bundestag conservatives,
but not all, favor this option, arguing that
it would be wrong to tamper once again with a
basic principle of German law; that few new
Nazi criminals are likely to be caught or in-
criminated after this year; that it is increas-
ingly difficult to obtain convictions because
of the difficulties of investigation and the
infirmity of prosecution witnesses as well as
of the accused; and that prolonged and incon-
clusive trials of Third Reich defendants are
more damaging to justice than the possibility
a few such persons might escape punishment.
-- Option II. Amend the Bonn penal code to abolish
the statute of limitations for prosecution of
murder. This approach is favored by many, es-
pecially in the government parties, who argue
that abolition is a matter of basic justice and
exorcising the Nazi past; that West. Germany
should follow the example of other Western
countries that do not have a statute of limi-
tations on murder; that failure to abolish the
statute would cause an adverse foreign reac-
tion; and that there is danger that Third Reich
criminals who deserve to be prosecuted will go
free.
-- Option III. Amend the penal code to extend the
time limit for prosecution of murder. This is,
in effect, the approach taken by the Bundestag
twice during the 1960s. The arguments are basi-
cally the same as for Option II, but most West
German politicians oppose a third extension,
favoring instead a choice between Options I
and II.
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-- Option IV. Amend the penal code to create a
new category of offenses, specifically capital
crimes of 1933-1945, which would not be subject
to a statute of limitations. Although this
option would have the merit of singling out
Nazi murderers, which could be politically
beneficial abroad, it has almost no support at
present. Bundestag members rejected it during
the debates of 1965 and 1969 on grounds it
quite possibly would be found by the Federal
Constitutional Court to violate the basic
principle of equality before the law and that
it would pose problems of distinguishing be-
tween Nazi crime and ordinary crime.
Issue of Conscience
Although this Bundestag debate will attract wide-
spread domestic and foreign attention, the issue is not
one that promises gain to any party or to any West German
politician. For that reason, and in view of the higher
moral and political considerations involved, the vote in
the Bundestag this year will in all likelihood be a vote
of conscience with members released from party discipline.
This was the case with tI}e earlier Bundestag delibera-
tions on this queston. Tq stress the non-partisan nature
of the issue, the government of Helmut Schmidt has indi-
cated it will not submit a legislative proposal, thus
leaving the initiative to amend the penal code to indi-
vidual Bundestag deputies.
The opposition parties, the conservative Bavarian
Christian Social Union (CSU) and most of the Christian
Democratic Union (CDU), favor permitting the statute of
limitations on murder to run out and expect to be joined
by the conservative majority of the Free Democratic Party
(FDP), the smaller coalit on partner. The conservative
position has hardened in the past year. Partisan disputes
over Third Reich actions of leading politicians with good
postwar records have stirred resentment and posed to Ger-
man conservatives the question of when "overcoming the
past"--as reconciliation with Nazi history is known--will
finally be concluded. Pleading for extension of author-
ity to prosecute will be the great majority of Schmidt's
Social Democratc Party, aligned with younger FDP members
and a sizable group of liberals from the CDU. The legal
arguments favor the conservatives, the political argu-
ments the liberals.
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Foreign opinion will influence the eventual deci-
sion. Were it not a factor, the Bundestag could be ex-
pected to let the statute of limitations on murder lapse
without providing for further prosecution of Third Reich
crimes. West German public opinion would probably favor
this if it were a purely domestic decision and might even
favor letting the statute lapse in full recognition that
their country's reputation would suffer. These feelings
only marginally reflect sympathy for ex-Nazis; it is
generally believed that the settlement of accounts with
the Nazi past has gone about as far as it can go.
At the same time, most West Germans realize that
this decision will have international repercussions and
that their reputation is at stake. Bonn politicians as-
sume that if they are perceived as indifferent to the
need for atonement, this will be interpreted by some
European neighbors as sympathy for ex-Nazis or perhaps
even as a manifestation of nostalgia for fascism. There
will be little appreciation abroad for legal complexi-
ties of this decision. Foreign parliaments, politicians,
groups representing victims of Nazism, and editors will
focus public interest only on the political problem.
German readiness to make amends for the Hitler era is
still expected, and the West Germans are aware of this
international sentiment.
This awareness does not mean that foreign advice,
in all cases will contribute usefully to the Bundestag
decision. The view that there cannot be a statute of
limitations on war crimes or crimes against humanity,
presented recently by a leading Soviet jurist as a prin-
ciple of international law, seems to have made no impact
in Bonn. That Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence does not apply a
statute of limitations for murder will probably be cited
in arguments for Option II, probably with mixed results:
this could favorably affect a Bundestag vote to abolish
the statute, but would also be opposed as a departure
from German legal tradition. Too much emphasis on foreign
advice might encourage a stronger reaffirmation of German
legal tradition.
Outlook
Abolition of the statute of limitations on murder ap-
pears, at this point, to be the most likely outcome of the
debate. The vote, however, will almost certainly be close,
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unless there is a change in the conservative position. Be-
cause of international involvement in this question, the
debate will almost certainly stir national feelings. The
opposition may find that popular desire to conclude the
exercise of "overcoming the past" is stronger than antic-
ipated. If so, the CDU-CSU position in the upper house
(Bundesrat) is strong enough to lodge an objection to a
Bundestag decision to end the statue of limitations on
murder. Such a move by the Bundesrat could only be
overridden by an absolute majority (249 of the full 496
members) in the Bundestag. It will probably not come
to this, but if it does the Bundestag would face a
second decision even more aware that it is the focus
of international interest. In this situation, concern
for West Germany's reputation would probably be the
decisive factor.
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