WESTERN EUROPE REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001700010008-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: February 21, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

/jEtLIG N L~ t, 1
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Center
Western Europe
Review
State Department review completed
Secret
RP WER 79-008
21 February 1979
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WESTERN EUROPE REVIEW
21 February 1979
CONTENTS
West German : Defense Minister A el's First
Year I I- . . . . . . . . . .
Defense Minister Apel has impressed a skep-
tical military establishment with his capac-
ity for hard work and decision, but he has
had little success in broadening his social
Democratic colleagues' understanding of
defense policy.
Belgium: Two Months and Still No Government 8
The effort to put together a new government
seems likely to drag on for several more
months following the resignation of Social
Christian leader Martens who has been trying
to form a government for five weeks.
Spain: Government Acts To Protect Arms Sales
Recent revelations of covert arms transac-
tions involving Spanish dealers has thrown
an unwanted spotlight on the Spanish arms
industry. The government is moving to head
off criticism from its opponents in parliament.
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West Germany: Defense Minister Apel's First Year
The SPD and Defense
SPD politicians generally are wary of the German
military establishment, an attitude reciprocated by many
German military figures, who have historically sided with,
if not actively advanced, the position of the conserva-
tive parties. The military distrust stems in part from
the 1950s, when the SPD opposed West German rearmament
and questioned then Chancellor Adenauer's policy of mili-
tary alignment with the West. F_ I
There have been three SPD ministers of defense in
the Federal Republic. The first (1969-72) was Helmut
Schmidt, an ex-officer proud of his service who already
had a record as a writer, thinker, and Bundestag debater
on military themes and who was a demanding and skeptical
manager. Next came Georg Leber (1972-78), whose personal
dedication to existing defense policies and--relatively
uncritical and loyal for an SPD politician--attitude to-
ward the military establishment made him a political
asset to the Defense Ministry. SPD leaders believe that
Leber's loyalty to the military was not reciprocated by
Ministry conservatives and that this was a factor in his
resignation last year.
Apel, Bonn's third SPD Defense Minister, has neither
Schmidt's credentials for the job nor Leber's talent for
accommodation. On the contrary, Apel is from a pacifist
family, was personally opposed to Adenauer's rearmament
policy in the 1950s, has no military background, and is
on record as stating that he did not want his current
job. That the Chancellor persuaded him to accept the
task implies a closeness to Schmidt that has strength-
ened his position. Apel's other advantages are exten-
sive experience in Bonn's foreign policy, and managerial
skill acquired in the Foreign Ministry and as Minister
of Finance. He is known as a blunt and pragmatic pol-
icy chief, who is fond of questioning assumptions. His
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reformist impulses during the past year have been bal-
anced by reassurances that he acce is and relies on the
establishment.
Challenge from the Inspector General
In his first months, Apel reviewed long-pending
proposals for structural reform of the Bundeswehr and
the Army, canceled the overall reform, and revised the
Army proposal. This readiness to make tough decisions
earned Apel considerable credit among the military,
somewhat to his surprise. The general approval was not
shared by Bonn's highest military officer, the Inspector
General, who had an equity in the reform proposals; he
also had failed to hit it off with the new minister in
other respects. Apel found methods of doing business
without involving the Inspector General, whose sudden
resignation in November was interpreted by some Bonn de-
fense specialists as a challenge the Minister's au-
thority. I
Such an action might have caused a political crisis
under Leber, but under Apel it ceased to be an issue
within days. The opposition, usually eager to challenge
the SPD's neglect of West German security, failed to
take up the case. A new IG, Juergen Brandt, whose broad
political support includes the SPD, was selected by Apel
and routinely approved. E_ I
Apel has renewed the call for a politically aware
citizens' army, in part hoping to gain popular support
by effecting a rapprochement between conservatives and
SPD members who still regard the military with skepti-
cism. Apel has repeatedly sought to engage the SPD lead-
ership, the Bundestag caucus and his own local party
organization in Hamburg in defense policy talks. He
acknowledges that results are disappointing. General
SPD policy pronouncements almost never mention the
Bundeswehr; historical distrust of the military is not
dead in the party; its most influential advocates of
Ostpolitik--parliamentary leader Herbert Wehner and SPD
General anager Egon Bahr--stand guard against military
decisions they judge threatening to the Soviet Union.
And the SPD itself, historically and in current inter-
national politics, is broadly committed to s limita-
tions and disarmament.
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Questioning of NATO
Critics have questioned Apel's brusque handling of
alliance relationships. Apel's determination to gain
maximum return from the United States for the West German
participation in an airborne early warning system (AWACS)
was criticized initially as unnecessarily risking the
possibility of a serious internal NATO dispute. In the
end Apel obtained approval for the deal, and there was
never much doubt that he had the support of Bonn's de-
fense politicians, including the opposition. Bonn's
more aggressive attempts to achieve a "two-way street"
in military procurement between the United States and
Europe will continue under Apel or his successor, re-
gardless of party. F__ I
In October, the conservative German press seemed
by implication to be criticizing Apel after he ques-
tioned the size and location of NATO autumn maneuvers
in West Germany. The criticism took the form of lauda-
tory commentaries on General Haig, whose judgment the
novice Defense Minister was seen to have challenged.
Apel then got into a sharp personal exchange at a Nuclear
Planning Group meeting with NATO Secretary General Luns.
Luns' subsequent meeting with Schmidt to smooth over the
misunderstanding was widely reported, again with the im-
plication that Apel's role was being questioned. But a
critical front against Apel failed to develop in the con-
servative press, and progovernment publications noted
his assertiveness with favor.
Defense Debate of 1979
Apel's formidable task is to propound West Germany's
external security policy so as to:
-- Satisfy the prevailing public concern about
the Soviet military force and aggressiveness.
-- Avoid the appearance of too much reliance on
US military power or direction.
-- Preserve the generally approved Ostpolitik,
and its promise of all-German reconciliation,
from a loss of credibility that could undercut
the Schmidt government.
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-- Conciliate the Ostpolitik zealots and basically
antimilitary elements of the SPD and hardliners
in the SPD's coalition party--the Free Demo-
crats--who are skeptical of Soviet intentions,
as well as counter the emotional arguments of
a vigorous opposition.
In early March, the government will engage in a de-
bate on defense policy in the Bundestag. Preliminary
skirmishing on this issue--especially remarks by Wehner
questioning accepted views of the USSR--has aroused the
opposition and stirred national interest. The Bundestag
debate could illuminate West Germany's position between
East and West more clearly than at any time since the
1950s. In any case, the skirmishing has already caused
enough political friction to ensure that the Bundestag
exchange will be the major public attempt so far to rec-
oncile the Ostpolitik of this decade with the Westpolitik
of Adenauer's era.
Wehner's public comments on defense issues not only
provoked the opposition but also highlighted the internal
SPD dispute between traditional supporters of a strong
defense and advocates of a new emphasis on disarmament.
Policy differences between the SPD and the FDP became
apparent. Wehner criticized Foreign Minister Genscher,
the FDP leader, for inflexibility at the MBFR negotia-
tions in Vienna. The disarray evident in the government
camp, however, will not block agreement on formulation
of a government defense policy. With Apel providing
the forward defense against the SPD disarmament advo-
cates, Schmidt's basic views will eventually prevail.
Chancellor's Arm and Spokesman
Schmidt has allowed Apel to assert a fundamental
interest in disarmament, thereby challenging Foreign Min-
istry primacy in this field. Although the challenge
creates bureaucratic strains, it does not portend a rift
with Genscher, with whom Apel is on good terms. But
Apel's attention to disarmament is a political necessity
if he and Schmidt are to deal effectively with pressures
from within their party for progress in arms limitation
and disarmament.
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Desire for harmony with SPD critics of the military
presumably was a factor in Apel's efforts during the past
year to stress the primacy of political authority over
military decisions. Schmidt probably encouraged Apel
both to assert this principle and to use every possible
opportunity to allay concerns of party members who fear
a disruption of detente.
These efforts by Schmidt and Apel to placate the
SPD left do not imply that disarmament supporters in the
party caucus seriously challenge Bonn's defense policy.
In a caucus vote, they would be overwhelmed by the SPD
moderates. What is at stake is the long-term unity of
the SPD, a party with a history of ambiguity and divi-
sion on national defense issues. At this point, dis-
armament happens to be an issue of maximum resonance for
SPD leftists who regularly oppose Schmidt: it affects
the cherished Ostpolitik and is a favorite theme of SPD
Chairman Brandt and o Wehner, whose heart more than his
tactical head is engaged in this struggle. Because
Wehner is a party regular, he will do his utmost for
disarmament and then support the government.
International Dimensions
In recent years, Bonn politicians have become in-
creasingly aware that the apparent contradiction between
West Germany's desire for detente and its role as NATO's
forward defense conscience can be exploited to Bonn's
disadvantage. The Soviets portray this contradiction
as fundamental, often in heavy-handed propaganda aimed
at the SPD left but also in more sophisticated private
exchanges with key SPD promoters of Ostpolitik. So far
the Soviets have made only minimal inroads through this
carefully organized campaign.
Both Schmidt and Apel--and Bahr as well--see no con-
tradiction between detente and defense. Bahr has often
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argued that Ostpolitik would not be possible without ef-
Thus, Bonn's Ost olitik explains the Schmidt gov-
ernment's desire to work ~'or a European consensus on de-
fense decisions. Such a stance implies that West Germany
must also consider more carefully than before whether
its eastern neighbors see joint military ventures with
the United States as threatening, especially when US-USSR
relations are cool. Excessive West German dependence on
the military tie to the United States can also raise
eyebrows in Paris, London, Brussels, or Rome, yet Bonn
probably believes most West European governments would
not object if this tie were to offend Moscow enough to
disrupt its courtship of the Schmidt government. 25X1
Seeking a balance between western and eastern pol-
icies, Schmidt and Apel want to be more precise about
the extent and nature of the Warsaw Pact military threat
than were past Bonn governments. They probably believe
that earlier NATO estimates overplayed the imminence of
that threat, although neither would accept Wehner's re-
cent characterization of Soviet military posture as de-
That Schmidt and Apel do not underestimate the War-
saw Pact threat to Europe is apparent from their concern
about theater imbalances, the Pact advantage in conven-
tional forces, and the Soviet medium-range missile capa-
bility. The government defense declaration will acknowl-
edge that the alliance must find a way to offset or
eliminate these imbalances, probably with reference to
the agreement with Brezhnev announced during the Soviet
leader's visit to Bonn last May that "approximate parity"
is adequate for defense.
The West German opposition has also taken up the
problem of theater imbalance and there is public pres-
sure for resolution of the political problem. Initially,
Schmidt and Apel addressed the issue, in part to outflank
opposition attempts to flog the military security issue,
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but also to slow down what was perceived as a US rush to
a strategic arms agreement with the USSR that might be
disadvantageous for Europe and that might 'Jeopardize the
future of Ostpolitik.
In the past year, although consultations and under-
standing between Bonn and Washington have expanded--
notably on military and arms limitation themes--the West
German Government perceives a US loss of international
authority and feels a corresponding need for more care-
ful bilateral planning. Moreover, it still has reserva-
tions about US leadership. Apel seemed to imply this
when, following the April 1978 contretemps over the
neutron weapon, he posed the question of how the United
States proposed to use the weapon as a bargaining chip
in arms limitation talks. In recent weeks, Apel said
that time may have passed over "possibilities" for using
the weapon as an object of barter with the USSR. 25X1
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Belgium: Two Months and Still No Government
The resignation of Flemish Social Christian (CVP)
President Wilfried Martens, who has been trying to form
a government for five weeks, suggests that the process
will drag on for several more months. The intense nego-
tiations during Martens' effort seem to have pushed the
already quarrelsome party leaders even further from com-
promise. In the meantime, the Vanden Boeynants govern-
ment will continue as caretaker, with the new Parliament
convening soon.
Background: Inconclusive Election Results
Because the 17 December elections produced no mo-
mentous shifts in party strength and gave no candidate
a national mandate, any successor to Martens will have
generally the same cast of characters with whom to work.
The voters in Flanders tended to support candidates who
came out against the Egmont community pact. CVP candi-
dates did well, although former Prime Minister Tindemans
received less support than he had anticipated. The party
gained only one of the six seats it needed to hold a ma-
jority in Flanders. The Volksunie (VU) paid dearly for
its support of the Egmont. pact; party president Schiltz
lost nearly half of his preferential votes, and the party
lost six of its 20 seats. The Flemish Liberals did well,
probably more as a result of their call for fiscal aus-
terity than their constructive opposition to the Egmont
pact. The party increased its seats by five for a total
of 22. The Flemish Socialist party held its own.
Voting in the francophone areas produced some not-
able changes. Socialist Party President Andre Cools,
outspoken opponent of Tindemans and Martens, took a nose
dive in his native Liege, and his party lost three seats.
Cools had been criticized for his abrasive handling of
local and parliamentary matters and for establishing
close ties with the economically conservative French
Democratic Front (FDF) in Brussels. FDF president
Antoinette Spaak made an impressive gain as a result of
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her steadfast support for the rights of Brussels' French
speakers as set forth in the Egmont pact. But although
her own vote total rose, the party gained no additional
seats. The francophone Liberal party lost one seat,
while the Social Christians gained one.
Forming a Coalition
There are several combinations of parties that would
give the majority a government would need to tackle the
complex regional, linguistic, and economic issues facing
the country. But all of the possibilities that Martens
suggested were unacceptable.
The most plausible coalition would be one of either
the Social Christians and the Liberals or the Social
Christians and the Socialists. A coalition with the
Liberals would give the government 119 out of 212 seats
in the Chamber. Both parties are basically conservative,
and they agree that economic and social issues are the
gravest problems facing the nation. This arrangement
has its drawbacks, however, because the Socialists in
opposition would create havoc for such a government and
the Liberals are indifferent to the communities issue.
A more likely bipartite coalition would bring the
Social Christians together with the Socialists. This
would give the government 140 seats--just two short of
the two-thirds majority needed to make the constitutional
changes necessary for a community settlement. So far
Cools has rejected this arrangement. He fears that the
CVP's insistence on tackling the socio-economic problems
would delay enactment of a regionalization plan. He
also is eager to preserve the solidarity of the pre-
election francophone front--which he was instrumental in
creating--and will not consider goi into the government
without the FDF.
A return to the four-party coalition of Tindemans'
second government--Social Christians, Socialists, FDF
and VU--would satisfy Cools and some CVP leaders who in-
sist on the linguistic scales being balanced in the Cham-
ber. But to include the FDF and the VU in the government
is an invitation to trouble. They have opposite views
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on the thorny problem of the role of Brussels in a de-
volved Belgium: whether it should be a region with powers
equal to Flanders and Wallonia, what rights the Flemish-
and French-speaking residents should have, and which
suburbs should be included in the boundaries of Brussels
if it is to become a region.
Chances of reforming the four-party coalition
dimmed last week when the VU decided to withdraw from
negotiations, claiming insufficient understanding on the
French-speaking side for certain Flemish concerns. With
Cools insisting on the presence of the FDF, and with
hardline CVP leaders refusing to consider the FDF without
the VU, Martens felt he had no choice but to try to give
someone else, preferably a French-speaker, an opportun-
ity to form a coalition.
The Supporting Cast
King Baudouin recently has shown himself to be an
astute and sensitive sovereign. Following Martens' res-
ignation the King rewrote the script of Belgian govern-
ment-building and appointed two mediators: Charles-
Ferdinand Nothomb, president of the minority francophone
wing of the Social Christian party, and Willy Claes,
former informateur and leader of the minority Flemish
wing of the Socialist party. Their mission is to build
bridges between the communities and among parties, calm-
ing the tense political situation and allowing the even-
tual designation of another formateur. Martens could be
recalled, or Foreign Minister Simonet or Vanden Boeynants
could be chosen. Martens may still be the best bet to
form a government, but his chances would improve if
someone else tries unsuccessfully first. 25X1
In the meantime, Vanden Boeynants continues to pro-
vide strong leadership of the caretaker government.
Without this solid foundation the current crisis would be
much more serious. His limited mandate notwithstanding,
he has tackled difficult problems and has put two diffi-
cult decisions through his Cabinet: the rationalization
of the steel industry and the limited improvement pro-
gram for the Hawk surface-to-air missile. He is widely
respected for his hard work and his political skills.
Even if Vanden Boeynants is not chosen to form a new
government, it is likely that his caretaker government
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will continue for several more months, and may even be
given a limited mandate to govern the country until the
European Parliament elections in June. 25X1
Tindemans has been out of the limelight since his
resignation last October. His hope to return to center
stage on a wave of popular support was dashed by his weak
election showing. Officials in and out of his party
agree that he would be an unacceptable candidate for
prime minister now. He may be Belgium's most popular
politician, but his ability to lead party and government
for the third time is questionable. He is now looking
to the European Parliament elections for a national man-
date that would be difficult to ignore. 25X1
Outlook
The Kind's appointment of dual mediators, while
novel, has little chance of success because of the un-
willingness of Cools and the CVP hardliners to compromise.
And future efforts to form a new government will also
face obstacles as one party or another will oppose what-
ever proposals are made on the communities issue.
Some political observers, including Tindemans, be-
lieve that no government will be formed until after the
European Parliamentary elections in June, which they see
as another occasion for the country's politicians to
test their electoral strength. Waiting for several months,
however, will not make the task any easier. The essential
ingredient is compromise, a concept to which party leaders
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Secret arms deals by Spanish firms have recently
come under press scrutiny in Spain, and as a result the
opposition parties are demanding that supervision of arms
sales be brought under parliamentary review. The revela-
tion last fall that Spain was involved in the shipment of
automatic rifles and armored cars from Belgium to South
Africa and that Spanish armaments were being sold to
Chile, Argentina, and Nicaragua has led to widespread
criticism. The government has tried to stave off parlia-
mentary action by setting up a new interministerial arms
control board, but it may still have trouble with the
Parliament, particularly if the opposition parties do
well in the national election on 1 March. 25X1
Several labor unions have called for ship crews to
boycott any shipment of arms headed for a dictatorial
country in which human rights are violated, and the So-
cialist Party has proposed the creation of a permanent
parliamentary subcommittee to assist the government in
regulating arms exports. The dissolution of Parliament
when Prime Minister Suarez called the national election
left this issue pending, but further action is likely in
the new parliament, especially if the Socialists do well
in the election.
The government's new interministerial board is de-
signed to work through a combination of government-
controlled foreign exchange allotments and vouchers for
deliveries to foreign ports. Either mechanism should
theoretically reveal covert arms shipments. The small
cartel of arms exporting corporations, however, has dem-
onstrated great ingenuity in the past in circumventing
controls and seems likely to continue to do so. In fact,
the new control board is headed by some of the same of-
ficials who ran the previous lax control mechanism.
Spanish armaments producers and traders, however, are
concerned that parliamentary control could lead to unwanted
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publicity about their sales, fearing that some client
governments will turn to other sellers if the confiden-
tiality of Spanish arms sales cannot be guaranteed.
They also are concerned that leftists in Parliament
block sales to many current clients.
with the Third World countries, to which Spain looks to
either as sources of oil and other natural resources or
as targets of Madrid's general effort to increase its in-
Spain's foreign arms sales program is critical to
the continued production of weapons for the Spanish Army
and serves as an important adjunct to Madrid's foreign
policy. The arms trade is a way for Madrid to win points
fluence and international stature.
The government is attempting to keep a lid on the
secret aspects of the arms trade, not only to prevent
their becoming an issue in next week's election, but also
to avoid negative publicity that could affect future arms
sales. The government is also interested in preventing
disclosures in order not to compromise the left-of-center
image being cultivated by Suarez's part in the current
electoral campaign.
Foreign arms sales, moreover, are essential to the
survival of Spain's weapons industry because domestic
sales are not sufficient to keep factories and shipyards
operating. About 25 percent of total Spanish arms pro-
duction is for export. Export sales, which were valued
at $96 million in 1976, rose to $166 million in 1978.
Counting all sectors, the Spanish arms industry employs
65,000 workers--a significant number in a country with
a serious unemployment problem. 25X1
Spain ranks 10th among the world's arms exporting
nations and a sizable portion of the market for the
less costly, less sophisticated weapons of the type used
by many developing nations. Spanish armories produce
excellent small arms and automatic weapons, plus ammuni-
tion and ordnance such as mines, hand grenades, rockets,
bombs, and torpedoes. Higher technology items such as
missile-armed patrol boats, small submarines, tanks,
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rapid-fire guns, and tactical missiles also are in de-
mand. Most of these systems, such as the French-designed
A-class submarines and the Italian Aspide air defense
missiles, are built in Spain under coproduction arrange-
ments. Clients are attracted b the_low cost, simplicity
Despite rising criticism, the prospects for the
Spanish arms industry are good. The secret arms deals
have not yet become an election issue, and the duality
of Spanish arms continues to improve. The Spanish re-
cently agreed to coproduce the BO-105 helicopter with
Germany.
In the future the Spaniards may find it in their
interest to concentrate on this type of open arms trade,
broadening the market for its more popular weapons sys-
tems, and avoiding the secret arms deals that have gener-
ated the recent criticism. Several nations are currently
negotiatin with Madrid for corvettes, tanks and tracked
vehicles.
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