WESTERN EUROPE REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001700010015-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: April 11, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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Assessment
Center
Western Europe
Review
State Department review completed
Secret
PA WER 79-015
11 April 1979
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WESTERN EUROPE REVIEW
11 April 1979
CONTENTS
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France: The Socialist Party Congress
Unlike the Giscardian Union for French
Democracy (UDF), Chirac's Gaullists, and the
Communist Party, all of whose presidential
candidates are already known, the French So-
cialist Party will choose its candidate for
the 1981 presidential election by a vote of
part members, rob ably in the fall of 1980.
Turkey: The Kurdish Problem
The resurgence of Kurdish separatist senti-
ment in Iran and continued Kurdish unrest
in Iraq have evoked fears among Turkey's
leaders that Turkish Kurds may follow suit.
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Norway: Political Stirrings
Norway's nonsocialist parties, which criti-
cized the minority Labor government last
summer for what they consider its inept
handling of relations with the USSR, now
are attacking its industrial. policy.
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Belgium: Who's in Charge?
The problems that led to the resignation
of Prime Minister Tindemanns and the
longest period of government formation
in Belgium's history are no nearer a solu-
tion than they were six months ago.F
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France: The Socialist Party Congress
Unlike the Giscardian Union for French Democracy
(UDF), Chirac's Gaullists, and the Communist Party, all
of whose presidential candidates are already known, the
French Socialist Party will choose its candidate for the
1981 presidential election by a vote of party members,
probably in the fall of 1980. The first act in this drama
was played out at the party congress last weekend in Metz,
where Francois Mitterrand's leadership was confirmed by
a plurality of 47 percent.
Mitterrand had been sagging badly in the polls, at
one point coming in third :behind his principal rivals
Michel Rocard and Pierre Mauroy, and the congress' vote
of confidence, added to the party's good showing in the
recent cantonal elections, should boost his stock. The
failure of rival factions to resolve their differences
at the congress, however, means that the party is deeply
divided as it enters the campaign fo he European elec-
tion in June.
But this probably will not have much effect on the
party's showing in the election. The Socialists should
be aided by the special nature of the contest and their
pro-European image, but also by indications that voters
will above all be judging the social and economic pol-
icies of the government. Socialist voters have in the
past proved tolerant of intraparty quarrels, and polls
taken in early April before the Socialist congress showed
the Giscardian UDF and the Socialists running neck.and
k
i
h
nec
w
t
26 percent and 2'5 percent, respectively.
Eventually, however, the divisiveness displayed at
the congress is likely to take its toll on the party.
In fact, what may be at stake is the long-range credi-
bility of the Socialist Party as an alternative on the
national level to the present center-right coalition.
The congress demonstrated overwhelming support among the
rank and file for the political objective the party has
sought since 1971--a Communist-Socialist alliance pledged
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to break definitively with the capitalist system. None-
theless, supporters of Michel Rocard and Pierre Mauroy
racked up 38 percent of the delegates' votes. To get a
majority in the party's governing bodies without Mauroy
and Rocard with whom he refused to compromise, Mitterrand
had no choice but to look to the left for votes, and he
announced at Metz that he favored an alliance with the
leftwing CERES faction, with whom he has been feuding for
four years. This blatantly opportunistic alliance is
apparently now under negotiation and the horse trading
could conceivably be stretched out beyond 10 June in
order to mute any effects that CERES' anti-European
image might have on the Socialists' score in the Euro-
pean election. The US Embassy in Paris says that Mit-
terrand appears to be operating on the theory that 50
percent of France is already in the left camp and will
stay there as long as the economy continues to falter:
any change in the socialist strategy, as defined in 1971,
is therefore both dangerous and unnecessary, because
that strategy has twice carried the Socialists to the
edge of victory. Whether or not this is actually Mit-
terrand's analysis, he has little choice, since Michel
Rocard has coopted the moderate "updated" approach to
Socialist strategy.
An alliance with CERES risks making Mitterrand
prisoner of an extreme left whose proposals he has in the
past found untimely and excessive. Banished from the
national leadership, Michel Rocard announced that he and
his supporters will establish a formal opposition group
within the party but that he will not contest the presi-
dential nomination if Mitterrand wants it. This does
not mean that the battle for the nomination is over,
although Rocard probably has only a slim chance of taking
it from Mitterrand if the latter wants it. But Rocard
has greater strength in the party as a whole than he has
among the delegates at the recent congress.
Rocard supporters are present in every federation,
ranging from an absolute majority in Finistere and Maine
et Loire to a minimum representation elsewhere that
rarely falls below 15 percent. This is a base from which
Rocard can stake out policy positions that will undoubt-
edly be closer than Mitterrand's to the views of the es-
sentially moderate Socialist electorate.
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In addition, many Socialist militants at the recent
congress apparently voted for Mitterrand out of sheer
loyalty and might be tempted to vote otherwise when it
becomes a matter of actually designating a presidential
candidate. Polls show that Michel Rocard would be a
stronger presidential candidate than Mitterrand, and
some Socialists say it would be better to go down to
defeat in 1981 with him than with Mitterrand, who would
at that point be a three-time loser in the presidential
sweepstakes.
In reality, Rocard and Mitterrand agree on basic
strategy, but it is useful for each to point up the nu-
ances of their differences. If Mitterrand is the "prince
of ambiguity," in Prime Minister Barre's famous phrase,
Rocard is certainly a high priest of equivocation.
Rocard argues, for example, that the break with capital-
ism must be gradual and take into account the role of
the market place. For Mitterrand supporters and the
CERES faction, this policy is tantamount to "reformism"
and eventually an alliance with the Giscardian forces.
The precipitous drop in CERES strength at the congress
(from almost 25 percent to 15 percent) and the relatively
strong combined showing by Rocard and number-two man
Pierre Mauroy (21 percent and 17 percent) may indicate
that the strength of the far left party is di-
minishing. I tll
CERES losses worked almost exclusively to Rocard's
advantage. The shadow of the presidential elections ap-
parently fostered a bipolarization of the party that
favored the two most likely presidential candidates--
Mitterrand and Rocard--and worked to the disadvantage
of Pierre Mauroy and CERES 1Bader Jean-Pierre Cheuene-
ment.
A basic question is whether Mitterrand's projected
alliance with CERES and his stiff defense of the more
doctrinaire aspects of socialist doctrine will alienate
uncommitted moderate voters who have been flirting with
socialism. If it does, and if it turns out that Rocard's
vision of the future Socialist Party is closer to the
voters', Mitterrand's victory at the congress may eventu-
ally be seen as pyrric. Mitterrand is France's most
famous political Lazarus, but not even he can hope to
go on rising from the dead forever.
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Turkey: The Kurdish Problem
The resurgence of Kurdish separatist sentiment in
Iran and continued Kurdish unrest in Iraq have evoked
fears among Turkey's leaders that Turkish Kurds may
follow suit. Important social and political factors
militate against a mass uprising of Turkish Kurds.
Nonetheless, Turkey is already beset by deepening eco-
nomic and internal security crises, and even limited
Kurdish unrest might pose a severe test for the Ecevit
government and even for Turke 's democratic institu-
tions.
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Kurdish Areas in Turkey
50% or more Kurdish population
10-50% Kurdish population
a zoo
rcde>eters
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Profile of a People: Resistance and Reaction
Some 10-15 million Kurds inhabit the rugged high-
lands cutting across Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and So-
viet Armenia; the largest percentage--roughly 5 million--
resides in Turkey. The Kurds' distinct language and
culture, seminomadic life, and tribal loyalties have
endowed them with a sense of national identity. Their
allegiance to the host states is often tenuous, and
there have been frequent Kurdish rebellions.
Turkey's Kurds, driven not just by a general desire
for self-rule but by unhappiness over Ataturk's modern-
izing and centralizing reforms, staged large-scale up-
risings on four occasions earlier in this century. Turk-
ish authorities ruthlessly suppressed these revolts and
subsequently sought--unsuccessfully--to eliminate all
manifestations of Kurdish culture and nationalism. The
Kurdish language was proscribed, cultural activities
were limited, and Kurds thereafter were characterized
officially as "eastern Turks."
More recently, with the advent of Turkish democracy
in the late 1940s, government policy has been to favor
cooptation over suppression. Significant numbers of
Kurds have been recruited into the ruling elite--albeit
probably not at a rate commensurate with their percent-
age of the population; Kurds are particularly underrep-
resented in the military. One Deputy Prime Minister in
the Ecevit government, Hikmet Cetin, is a Kurd, as is
Kamran Ivan, the number-two man in the opposition Jus-
tice Party. Most party delegations in Parliament in-
clude at least some Kurds. This is especially true of
Ecevit's Republican People's Party, which contains a
group of about 35 deputies led by Minister of Public
Works Serafettin Elci.
Socioeconomic Underdevelopment and Government Neglect
Ankara's efforts to coopt individual Kurds has not
been matched by any comparable effort to develop the
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Kurdish regions, which remain backward in comparison to
western Turkey. There is little industry, unemployment
is very high, illiteracy approaches 80 percent, and such
amenities as electricity, piped water, and passable
roads are lacking in more than half of the villages.
Although statistical data on the Kurdish regions are
sketchy, one Turkish publication claims that these areas
contain only 10 percent of state industrial investment
and 2.7 percent of all commercial investments. This
neglect can be explained by the remoteness of the Kurd-
ish regions as much as by the mutual suspicions between
Turks and Kurds. Educated Turks are reluctant to live
and work in such "alien" rural areas, and neither public
nor private investment has been substantial.
In addition, local Kurdish leaders, fearing that
development would upset the prevailing highly tradi-
tional social structure and their own positions, have
often been unreceptive to even the limited efforts made
by Ankara to develop the Kurdish regions. Indeed, Kurd-
ish tribal chiefs and notables have been known to "de-
liver" the votes of their followers to politicians for
pledges of noninterference in local affairs. Urbaniza-
tion has weakened the hold of such leaders as Kurdish
youth in the cities, however, and it is among these
young people, many of them educated, that nationalist
Kurdish sentiment is strongest.
Persistence of Kurdish Nationalism
Neither the twin forces of government suppression
and cooptation nor the conservative influence of local
Kurdish chieftains has been able to quash the Kurdish
urge for autonomy or independence. The Kurdish language
flourishes, and indeed most Kurds are not fluent in
Turkish. Clandestinely published Kurdish literature is
available under-the-counter in Kurdish areas. And many
overt "cultural associations" and covert "liberation
rou s" propagate the idea of autonomy and independence.
The reemergence of these groups broadly parallels
the growth of the Turkish radical leftist student groups
that appeared in the late 1960s. The radical groups
often included a call for greater Kurdish autonomy in
their programs, and Kurds were prominent in them for a
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time, although many Kurds eventually formed their own
associations. Mahir Cahan, the most prominent martyr
of the Turkish left, was a Kurd. The overt groups fea-
ture nonethnic names such as "Revolutionary Democratic
Cultural Association" and "Revolutionary Peoples Libera-
tion Association," since avowedly Kurdish organizations
are still illegal. They insist that they are interested
mainly in social progress and Turkish recognition of
long-denied Kurdish cultural rights. The clandestine
groups expound a mixture of leftist and nationalist
rhetoric, and call openly for autonomy or independence.
Through such names as "KAWA" (the name of a legendary
Kurdish hero) and "KUK" (Kurdish National Liberation)
they make no bones about their Kurdish identity. The
overt and clandestine groups undoubtedly interact to
some degree, and the may still cooperate with Turkish
extreme leftists.
Yet these driving forces of Kurdish nationalism
suffer from the same factionalism that has weakened
their Turkish counterparts. The cultural associations
have small memberships, and the illegal groups elicit
even less popular support. Although dominated by ur-
banized young Kurds, the illegal Kurdish groups do not
seem popular even in the larger eastern towns. This
fact probably stems from a generation and cultural gap
between youthful, educated Kurds and the more conserva-
tive and tradition-bound majority
The activist groups themselves, moreover, have
long quarreled over whether to remain separate from
other Turkish counterparts and seek independence, or to
cooperate with the Turkish proletariat in its "battle
against capitalism" as a way station to Kurdish autonomy
within a Turkish state.
:Foreign Connections
The Turkish imagination has always been stirred by
the thought that Turkish Kurds are being manipulated by
other powers. Iranian and Iraqi Kurds have in fact co-
operated with foreign powers in the past, usually to
their own disadvantage. The short-lived Kurdish Repub-
lic established in Iran with Soviet backing in 1945, as
well as the Iranian-backed Kurdish resistance in Iraq
during 1974-75, were defeated because the Soviets and
Iranians respectively withdrew their support.
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Scarce and sketchy information on Turkish Kurds
hinders any definitive statement of the nature of their
relations with Kurds outside of Turkey or with foreign
powers, but so far such ties seem to have been minimal.
Moscow has a greater stake in good relations with the
Turkish Government, and the warring Talabani and Barzani
Kurdish factions in northern Iraq--who speak a different
dialect--have abused Turkish Kurds as much as they have
Even so, the possible impact on Turkish Kurds of
an autonomous or independent Kurdistan in Iran, the fact
that ethnic differences already have contributed to the
raging political violence in the county
have been enou to
ma e the government and the military nervous. 25X1
Outlook
Despite Ankara's fears, the chances for another
outbreak of mass Kurdish unrest in Turkey along the
lines of earlier rebellions are not great._/ 25X6
The Kurds themselves are ivi e
along tribal lines, and they disagree over ends (autonomy
or independence) and means (violence or nonviolence).
These differences and suspicions extend to the relations
between Turkish Kurds and those in neighboring countries.
And there seems to be no single Turkish Kurd capable of
uniting these disparate tendencies and groups under a
single banner. Perhaps even more important, the Kurds
are aware of the large contingent of Army and security
forces either stationed in. Kurdish areas or ca able of
being transferred there at. a moment's notice. 25X1
Nonetheless, the potential for extensive Kurdish
unrest is likely to persist and could grow if Iranian
Kurds secure a greater degree of autonomy from the new
Iranian regime. Isolated acts of violence, moreover,
will continue. The Kurds are well-armed and will re-
main susceptible to separatist and pan-Kurdish senti-
ment, especially if Ankara. continues to ignore their
social and economic plight.. They may see further oppor-
tunities if the government. in Ankara is weakened by fail-
ure to come to grips with Turkey's staggering economic
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problems or with the spiral of political violence. And
heightened Kurdish unrest would in turn weaken the gov-
ernment even further.
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Norway: Political Stirrings
Norway's nonsocialist parties, which criticized
the minority Labor government last summer for what they
consider its inept handling of relations with the USSR,
now are attacking its industrial policy. Thus far, they
have focused on the government's proposed arrangement
with Volvo of Sweden--a complex package that was to be
the keystone of Prime Minister Nordli's oil-for-technol-
ogy policy--and the severe financial problems of Tandberg,
a government-owned corporation. The nonsocialists probably
have enough support to force a vote of confidence on
the latter issues later this month, but they may prefer
to allow the Laborites to remain in office, saddled with
the lagging economy. Although opinion polls show strong
support for the nonsocialists, they may have difficulty
in developing sufficient cohesion to form a coalition.
The rightist parties in January were prepared to
vote against the Volvo deal on the grounds that it em-
bodied overwhelming government interference in Norway's
industrial future. If Volvo's Swedish stockholders had
not turned the deal down just days before the Storting
was to begin ratification debate, the nonsocialists,
using party discipline because they saw the outcome de-
pended on one or two votes, would have killed it. Iron-
ically, they expected to have the support of the two
Left Socialist Party parliamentary representatives who
generally back the minority government. This small party
opposed the Volvo deal because it would have brought
foreign capitalists into Norwegian industry. 25X1
In the Storting debate on Volvo, the opposition
had planned to point to the bankruptcy of the government-
owned Tandberg enterprise as an illustration of the g~v-
ernment's inability to manage industry. Tandberg, a
multiproduct electronics producer employing about 2,200
people, was taken over by the government in December
1977 after a period in which it had increasing diffi-
culty competing in international markets. After a year
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of government ownership the firm is bankrupt and in
need of further support. In a report on the corpora-
tion to the Storting last month, Prime Minister Nordli
claimed that the government's investment saved 600 jobs
and a high technology product line with export markets.
But he could not deny the high cost. To the government's
chagrin, the Storting elected to do a thorough investiga-
tion of the company before debating the issue later this
month. Moreover, the rightist charge of mismanagement
has been taken up by the Left Socialists--they sa more
jobs should have been saved.
Nordli could decide to make -the vote on the Tandberg
report a question of confidence, but he probably will opt
not to take such a chance, despite the fact that the Left
Socialists probably would vote with the government.
Elections do not have to be called until 1981.
February opinion polls that the nonsocialist parties
continue to gain; over 50 percent of those polled now
declare they would vote for one of the center-right
parties. But Norwegian polls have been wrong--in the
elections in 1977 they showed significant support for
the right, but the left managed to win by one seat.
Another worry for the nonsocialists is the ambiv-
alence of the small Liberal Party, which, although non-
socialist, frequently backs the Labor Party. The right
could win an election, only to be prevented from forming
a government through the defection of the Liberals. 25X1
Opposition leaders, in choosing their time to chal-
lenge the government, want to be sure they will win by
a comfortable margin. Furthermore, some of them believe
they should let Nordli carry the :burden of a lagging
economy a little longer before they step in, perhaps
during an upswing. 25X1
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Belgium: Who's in Charge?
The swearing in last week of Wilfried Martens as
Belgium's new Prime Minister and head of the country's
five-party coalition marks the end of the longest period
of government formation in Belgium's history: 16 weeks
since the elections, 25 weeks since former Prime Minister
Tindemans resigned. What is perhaps most frustrating
about the political crisis--for participants and ob-
servers alike--is that the problems that precipitated
the crisis and caused it to drag on so long are no
nearer a solution now than. they were six months ago.
In fact, the choice of prime minister seems to have been
determined less from agreement among party leaders on
the future government's program than from their weariness
and shame over popular exasperation.
Debate over the formulation of the budget and over
the timetable and content of a state reform program will
test the political skills of the 43-year-old Martens,
who has never held a Cabinet post. Indications are that
the party presidents who finally accepted Martens' nom-
ination as prime minister may make life difficult for
him now that he has the job. Even Tindemans, who has
just replaced Martens as president of the Flemish Social
Christian Party (CVP), may prove to be a stumbling block.
State Reform Plans
Many proposals for constitutional revision to give
greater autonomy to Belgiu.m's linguistic communities
have been discussed during the past three months. Mar-
tens will probably use the plan he proposed when he was
formateur in January as the basis for the new govern-
ment's negotiations. He suggested that the Brussels
region should not have the same status as the Flemish
and Walloon regions--a goal long advocated by a hardline
faction in the CVP and opposed by the Brussels-based
Francophone Democratic Front (FDF)--and that regionali-
zation should take place in several stages. 25X1
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The Martens plan calls for the establishment of a
single Flemish assembly to exercise jurisdiction over
Flemish regional affairs and over the cultural affairs
of Flemish residents of Brussels and Flanders. A Wal-
loon assembly would handle Walloon regional affairs and
a Brussels assembly would manage Brussels regional af-
fairs, but a separate francophone cultural assembly
would be responsible for the cultural affairs of franco-
phone residents of Brussels and Wallonia. In each of
the three regions a regional executive, responsible to
the regional assembly, would be created. Complicated
though it sounds, this structure would be more stream-
lined than that proposed in the E ont-Stuyvenberg ac-
cords of 1977.
Another problem that will loom large is the delinea-
tion of the Brussels region. The CVP maintains that the
region should be confined to the present capital of 19
communes. The six suburban communes on the periphery,
where many francophones reside, would remain under Flem-
ish control. Existing facilities for francophones in
the six communes would be retained, with similar privi-
leges guaranteed for the Flemish minority in Brussels.
Flemish and francophone hardliners, however, fear that
such proposals do not sufficiently advance the rights of
the respective minorities, and Martens will be hard
pressed to find a compromise acceptable to both linguis-
tic groups.
Coping With the Economy
Both Martens and Paul Vanden Boeynants, his prede-
cessor as formateur, stressed the need to form a strong
government quickly so that action could finally be taken
on the ailing economy. The Socialists, however, main-
tain that a regionalization plan must precede decisions
on the economy, because the regions will tackle their
economic problems differently and the powers of the cen-
tral government over economic affairs in a re ionalized
Belgium will take a long time to determine. 25X1
Taking matters into their own hands, trade unionists
in Wallonia have come together in a front that cuts
across traditional political loyalties. The front--
drawn from francophone groups in the Socialist and
Christian trade unions--issued its own proclamation in
mid-March. Claiming that employers in Wallonia had
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failed to face up to their responsibilities, the proc-
lamation called for devolution of economic and political
power to Walloni, more public investment, sharing of
work--a 36-hour work week--and other measures to stimu-
late the economy and protect workers' benefits.
Vanden Boeynants as formateur quickly picked up
the ball and ran with his own economic package. He en-
dorsed the 36-hour work week but included other points
favorable to management: reduction in social security
payments and a wage freeze. A subsequent rally by the
trade union front drew 70,000 militants who summarily
rejected Vanden Boeynants' proposals as too promanage-
ment. Vanden Boeynants, eager not to jeopardize Martens'
prospects, diluted his program to a bare outline on
which all parties could readily agree. Martens clearly
will have trouble enacting a strong economic program
with the trade union federations pledged to resist an
austerity program that demands too many sacrifices of
labor.
Popular Unrest
The recent developments in the labor front are but
one manifestation of increasing popular frustration with
the slow-moving government. A poll published last month
found that all of the dominant parties would have lost
significant support in their respective regions had
legislative elections been held then. Frustration ap-
peared deepest in Wallonia, but throughout the country
the electorate showed it is fed up with the community
issue--or at least government handling of it--and that
social and economic issues should be given priority.
Communal tensions will continue to demand the gov-
ernment's attention, however, as several incidents during
the last few months make clear. Near the Dutch border,
for example, lie the Fourons, a group of francophone
villages technically located in Liege Province but ad-
ministered by Flanders. A demonstration in the Fourons
after a Flemish police dog bit a resident could have es-
calated into a bitter confrontation. But heavy rains,
an effective police presence, and the discretion of FDF
Cabinet ministers defused the tense atmosphere. Else-
where, the Flemish Socialist Minister of Education, ap-
plying a strict interpretation of the language law, cut
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off government subsidies to a francophone school in the
Flemish commune of Linkebeek in the Brussels periphery.
Outlook
Martens will have to display extraordinary leader-
ship powers to achieve results on the many problems that
await him. Though lacking charisma, he is highly re-
spected for his organizational and political skills. In
fact, he may be the only prime minister who can formu-
late the constitutional revisions which would enable the
Parliament to take advantage of its mandate as a con-
stituent assembly.
Yet, although no one wants to be held responsible
for the failure of the government or its plans, it would
be unrealistic to hope for a sudden outbreak of states-
manship among Martens' many interlocutors. Decisive
movement in any direction may elicit equally decisive
negative reactions from among the Cabinet, the party
presidents, the Parliament, the unions, or other power-
ful groups. There is still a better than even chance
that the European Parliament elections on 10 June will
cause new shifts in party strengths and alignments uiring the formation of yet another government.
11 April 1979
19
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