INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS STAFF NOTES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001800010004-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2009
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 2, 1977
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
International Narcotics
DOJ Review
Completed.
State Department
review completed
Secret
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DOJ Review
Completed.
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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
2 February 1977
BURMA-THAILAND: Mutual Suspicions Make Joint
Anti-Narcotics Effort Unlikely . . . . . . . . .
BOLIVIA: Obstacles to Coca 7
Crop Substitutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
FINLAND: Drug Problem Becoming 9
More Serious . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
GOLDEN TRIANGLE: An Appraisal of 11
the 1976 Narcotics Traffic . . . . . . . . . .
BRIEFS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
25X1
This publication is prepared by analysts in the Directorate of Intelligence for
specialists in the Washington community who are interested in international
narcotics matters. It will be published on an ad hoc basis, but not more
frequently than once each week. Comments and queries are welcome and
should be directed to the author of the individual article.
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Burma-Thailand: Mutual Suspicions Make Joint Anti-
Narcotics Effort Unlikely
Thai annoyance over the incursion into Thailand
last month of Burmese troops engaged in an anti-narcot-
ics operation reflects the mutual suspicions that have
prevented any joint Thai-Burmese suppression efforts.
Five companies of Burmese army troops penetrated
about five miles into Thailand's northernmost province
during an operation against Shan United Army (SUA) re-
fineries along the border. Twelve Burmese were killed
and four wounded in a Shan ambush. The SUA was in a
position to prevent a Burmese withdrawal and inflict
greater casualties, but the Thai Border Patrol Police
interceded to persuade the SUA to break contact, thus
clearing the way for the Burmese to leave Thai terri-
tory.
further aroused by the fact that the Burmese flew two
US-supplied helicopters into Thai territory to evacuate
their dead and wounded.
In the light of Rangoon's now-established commit-
ment to suppression efforts and recent more vigorous
Thai action against traffickers, regular liaison between
the two countries could conceivably seriously disrupt
major narcotics-running routes across the Thai-Burmese
border. Such cooperation continues to be blocked b
mutual suspicions, however.
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Although the recent visit to Rangoon of the Thai
foreign minister and a senior military official was
cordial, agreement was reached only "in principle" that
solutions should be found for long-standing differences.
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Bolivia: Obstacles to Coca Crop Substitution
In an effort to curtail the production of coca and
the flow of cocaine, the Bolivian government, with as-
sistance from the US, is attempting to implement a large-
scale crop substitution program. Still in the embryonic
stage, the program faces serious, and perhaps insurmount-
able, obstacles.
Coca production has been an integral part of the
cultural and economic life of Bolivia for hundreds of
years; it is ideally suited to the harsh environment
and rugged terrain of the country. The plant requires
virtually no cultivation and can be harvested up to four
times a year. Although middlemen receive most of the
profits from coca production, the campesinos nonetheless
are financially dependent on their earnings from the
crop.
Another aspect of the problem concerns the suit-
ability of alternative crops. Sugar, coffee, cotton,
certain fruits, and other products have been tentatively
suggested, but none are as inexpensive and easy to grow
as coca. Assuming an ideal replacement is found, there
is no guaranteed international market.
There is concern that the proposed substitutes are
subject to wide price fluctuations. Bolivia's minister
of interior, General Pereda, admits that without price
guarantees and price stability the government's crop
substitution efforts are likely to fail. The resultant
alienation and loss of political support from the
campesinos, in turn, could adversely affect governmental
stability.
One group of campesinos has already voiced open op-
position to the program and intends to resist the gov-
ernment's plan. Nevertheless, Minister Pereda believes
the campesinos' cooperation can be secured provided that
machinery, irrigation, cooperatives, and other forms of
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assistance are supplied. He is also seeking an accord
with the US which would assure a stable market with
equitable prices for the replacement crops.
It is unlikely, however, that any price agreement
can be reached. If the Bolivians are to continue the
program, they will have to endure a certain amount of
economic risk, social disruption, and political dissatis-
faction. At best, crop substitution will be a long time
coming. In the interim, coca production is likely to
continue to increase.
If crop substitution efforts should fail, the pros-
pects for coca regulation are slim. In many cases, the
significant, large-scale coca fields are under the aegis
of the same Bolivian "intocables" (untouchables) or
mafia figures who control the country's cocaine smuggling
networks. These individuals have substantial political
and financial resources and are, in effect, beyond the
law.
Moreover, neither the amount of coca under cultiva-
tion nor the exact location of the fields is presently
known, and aerial surveillance methods have not yet been
developed. Unlike Mexico and Turkey, helicopters cannot
be used effectively in Bolivia for monitoring or eradica-
tion programs because of the high altitudes involved.
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Finland: Drug Problem Becoming More Serious
A sharp increase in drug-related crime is causing
Finnish political leaders to focus on measures to con-
trol a problem that was non-existent in the country 10
years ago. Representatives of nearly all Finnish par-
ties presented written questions in parliament on Janu-
ary 20 requesting the government to report on efforts
to suppress drug traffic and increase sentences for
drug-related crimes. Some advocated that trafficking
in particularly dangerous drugs be considered equivalent
to murder.
Finland's current epidemic in drugs is slightly
behind most of the country's Scandinavian neighbors,
whose drug abuse problems seem to be decreasing. Drug
violations reached a peak in Denmark and Sweden in 1973
and in Norway in 1974 but declined in those countries
as law enforcement methods and the judiciary came to
grips with the problem. Sweden, which had nearly 20,000
known drug-related violations in 1973, reduced the num-
ber nearly 25 percent in 1974, and Denmark's nearly
6,000 cases were reduced by almost a thousand during
the same period. Norway, with a much smaller problem,
peaked in 1974 at nearly 2,000 cases, but dramatically
reduced the number the next year.
Finland, on the other hand, experienced an enor-
mous increase during 1973-74, going from 13,624 cases
to 21,173. More current statistics were not available,
but the recent parliamentary attention suggests that
drug abuse is still on the rise there. Finnish leaders
are aware of the need to concentrate more resources on
the problem, and the legislators who questioned the
government last month pointed to the lack of law en-
forcement personnel experienced in drug problems.
In addition to directing more resources to the
problem, Finland also might seek help from the other
countries in the Nordic Council. The Council, which
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includes the five Nordic states, is responsible for the
establishment of a common customs area, labor exchange,
welfare pooling, and a number of other cooperative pol-
icies limited to the Nordic area. The international as-
pect of drug trafficking adds to the need for close,
joint action to curb the problem and Finland might ben-
efit through advise and training from its neighbors,
who seem to have at least turned the corner on their
domestic drug problems.
The seizure of 20 kilograms of heroin at the Hel-
sinki airport during one week in December has sharpened
the focus of official attention in Finland on the domes-
tic drug situation.
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Golden Triangle: An Appraisal of the 1976,
Narcotics Traffic
The year 1976 can be described as a turning point
in the struggle against narcotics trafficking in the
Golden Triangle. Anti-narcotics operations by the Bur-
mese and Thai governments has significantly reduced the
amount of narcotics reaching the border area and placed
severe financial strains on many traffickers. Neverthe-
less, sufficient stocks of raw and refined opiates ap-
pear to be available in the Burma-Thailand border area
to meet current local and international requirements.
The raw opium harvest in the Golden Triangle during
1976 declined by about 4 percent below the level of 1975.
Much of this decline was due to poppy destruction ef-
forts by the Burmese government which reduced potential
output by 60 tons in that country. Of greater signifi-
cance, however, is the fact that total raw opium ship-
ments to the Burma-Thailand border from the producing
areas of Burma declined sharply during 1976. Through
the first nine months of the year, a total of 127 tons
had arrived at the border compared to 190 tons during
the same period of 1975.
Anti-narcotics operations by the Burmese army have
been a factor in the decline. Heavy losses were in-
flicted on several large caravans and opium staging areas.
Traffic by the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) has been
practically curtailed, while that of the 3rd Chinese
Irregular Force (CIF) has been severely restricted. The
Shan United Army (SUA) has also sustained considerable
losses in their operations out of the northern Shan
State.
The SUA has displaced the 3rd CIF as the top traf-
ficking organization in the Golden Triangle, accounting
for about 30 percent of the traffic in 1976. However,
the 3rd and 5th CIF organizations still accounted for a
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combined 25 percent of the raw opium traffic. Interest-
ingly enough, the 5th CIF, which primarily operates
over the old traditional Kengtung to Tachilek, Burma,
smuggling route, purchases a very large portion of its
raw opium from agents and/or traders representing the
Burmese Communist Party (BCP). During the first nine
months of 1976 at least 13 tons of BCP-produced raw
opium had been shipped to the border by elements of the
5th CIF.
Most of the raw opium shipped to the Burma-Thailand
border area is now converted into finished narcotics,
primarily No. 3 and No. 4 heroin by numerous refineries
located in the area. At least 36 percent of 1976 raw
opium shipments were delivered directly to heroin re-
fineries. Although total heroin production statistics
are not readily available, indications of a significant
increase in production during 1976 were apparent. Re-
ported shipments of No. 4 heroin from border refineries
totaled 1,700 kilograms during the first nine months of
1976 as compared with 700 kilograms during the same pe-
riod in 1975 and a total of 1,500 kilograms for the en-
tire year 1975. Of the No. 4 heroin reportedly shipped
from the border area, 36 percent was destined for con-
sumer markets in Burma. Bangkok was the major market
for at least 20 percent of the shipments.
The quantity of No. 4 heroin entering the inter-
national market is difficult to determine. However,
seizures are being reported with much greater frequency
than in previous years. This increase in seizures
indicates that a larger share of No. 4 heroin is enter-
ing the world market. In the US, for example, between
mid-August and early October 1976, about 24 kilograms
of No. 4 heroin of Southeast Asian origin was seized.
Nevertheless, it now appears that a large share of the
No. 4 heroin produced in the Golden Triangle is actually
being consumed within Southeast Asia. For example,
recent reports indicate that No. 4 heroin requirements
for addicts in Bangkok totaled about 4,600 kilograms
annually. Although the total requirements for No. 4
heroin in Southeast Asia are not known, reported export
totals thus far in 1976 appear to understate signifi-
cantly the actual quantities involved.
Europe is being deluged with large quantities of
No. 3 heroin of Southeast Asian origin. Production
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estimates for this type of heroin are also unavailable.
However, reports of large seizures throughout Europe
would indicate a very high level of output in 1976. A
new type of No. 3 heroin, called Pai Lung Chu or White
Dragon Pearl, has been developed for the European mar-
ket. This heroin has a purity of between 50 and 75 per-
cent as compared to the 95 to 99 percent purity of No.
4 heroin. Pai Lung Chu can be either smoked or injected.
A general downturn in the narcotics traffic had
been noted during the last quarter of 1976. There were
no large-scale narcotics transactions reported in the
border area as most traffickers appeared to be assessing
the intentions of the new Thai government with respect
suited in the accumulation of large stocks of raw opium
and refined narcotics in the border area and further
depressed prices, resulting in severe financial hard-
ships for many traffickers. The prices of most narcotics
are selling well below the levels of the previous year.
The success of Thai anti-narcotics efforts will
depend in the long run upon the determination of that
government to eliminate the bases used by the major
trafficking organizations within Thailand. Efforts are
reportedly being made to force the SUA from Thai soil.
However, unless the Thai government also moves against
the CIF and coordinates its anti-narcotics efforts with
those of the Burmese government, only a temporary re-
spite can be expected.
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IRAN: Iranian officials have become increasingly aware
of the problem of illicit drug trafficking both in-
ternally and from external sources. During the past
year, Iranian authorities have estimated that 20 to
30 percent of the legal opium production in Iran--
about 244 tons per year--is being diverted to illicit
domestic markets. Some Iranians claim this figure
may run as high as 50 percent. During the past year,
heroin processing plants have extended eastward from
the Turkish border to the Pakistan and Afghanistan
borders, signaling a shift in illegal drug supplies
from Turkish sources to Pakistani and Afghan sources.
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tributed through the Netherlands. The Director
General of Police who accompanied Van Agt on his
recent trip emphasized that the 20,000 kilo figure
NETHERLANDS: Deputy Prime Minister Van Agt stated re-
cently in an airport press conference following his
two-week trip to Hong Kong and Bangkok that he would
try to obtain Dutch development aid funds to en-
courage opium poppy growers in northern Thailand and
Burma to plant alternative crops. American repre-
sentatives at The Hague doubt that he will succeed.
Van Agt also announced that agreement had been
reached with Hong Kong authorities for the return
of Hong Kong Chinese illegally resident in the
Netherlands; that a conspiracy act is under prepara-
tion in The Hague; that he had made a number of
technical agreements while in Hong Kong and Thai-
land; and that a major share of the "20,000 kilos"
of heroin brought into Europe annually is being dis-
was "no misquote" by the reporters.
GREECE: A law passed by the Greek Parliament in Decem-
ber provides that narcotics offenders will no longer
be tried before mixed criminal courts but before
five-member courts of appeals. The new procedure
is intended to shorten pre-trial proceedings.
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