INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS STAFF NOTES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001800010011-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2009
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: May 11, 1977
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
International Narcotics
F NOTES
DOJ Review Completed.
Secret
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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
11 May 1977
GOLDEN TRIANGLE: Depressed Market
Continues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
LAOS: Attitude Toward International
Narcotics Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
ECUADOR: Cocaine Trafficking Routes
and Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
BOLIVIA: Continuing Interest in Drug Control. . . 9
*GOLDEN TRIANGLE: Gearing Up for Heroin
Production? . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
NATIONAL ASSESSMENT:
1. Netherlands . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . 13
BRIEFS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
*Late Item
This publication is prepared by analysts in the Directorate of Intelligence for
specialists in the Washington community who are interested in international nar-
cotics matters. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the
authors of the individual articles.
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GOLDEN TRIANGLE: Depressed Market Continues
The narcotics market in the Golden Triangle has
remained depressed through the first quarter of 1977.
Reported shipments of raw opium and pitzu (impure mor-
phine base), in terms of opium equivalents, totaled only
8 tons during the first three months of 1977 compared
with 72 tons during the same period of 1976.
Narcotics prices also continued to decline in most
areas of the Golden Triangle through March as stocks
continued to accumulate. The largest stockpile of nar-
cotics appears to be in the possession of the Shan United
Army (SUA), which is reportedly holding over 3 tons of
raw opium, 500 kilograms of pitzu and an unknown quantity
of No. 4 heroin in the border area. These stocks have
probably been augmented by the arrival during April of
a SUA caravan transporting 7 tons of raw opium and/or
pitzu.
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GOLDEN TRIANGLE: Poppy Growing Areas
, n d is
a Vietnam
ULI
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LAOS: Attitude Toward International Narcotics Control
Although international pres-
sures and the desire for foreign economic aid will en-
courage Lao leaders to take a public stand against nar-
cotics smuggling, they appear to view opium as a valid
object of international trade. Lao opium production is
relatively small scale; rather than making a strong ef-
fort to suppress it, the regime is apparently attempting
to establish a pharmaceutical industry, to legitimize
and exploit it.
Publicly, Laos is committed to eliminating opium pro-
duction. The regime has banned private transportation of
opium, closed large opium dens in Vientiane, and initiated
rehabilitation programs for addicts. There are practical
difficulties in controlling production, however
Much of the opium is grown by
hill tribes who resist government authority and would be
further antagonized by efforts to eliminate their most
valuable crop. Production is not apt to be cut sharply
in the near future.
Laos is attempting
to obtain Czech, Hungarian, and Bulgarian aid to create
a pharmaceutical industry which would make use of its
opium production. Lao leaders probably see this as a
legitimate means of dealing with their opium problem.
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Unless the approval of the International Narcotics Control
Board can be obtained, however, the production of opium-
based drugs in Laos or the shipment of raw opium to East-
ern Europe would be in violation of the 1961 Single Con-
vention on Narcotic Drugs.
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ECUADOR: Cocaine Trafficking Routes and Methods
Increasing volumes of cocaine base* are moving from
Ecuador to Colombia. A substantial amount of the drug
is still converted to cocaine hydrochloride in Ecuador,
especially in Guayaquil, but this is becoming less com-
mon as Colombia's dominance in cocaine manufacturing
grows.
Ecuador's strategic location and lax customs con-
trols make it a principal transit country for cocaine
base moving to Colombia for final refining. The drug
passes through Ecuador via land, sea, and air routes.
Most of the base material originates in Peru although
sizable amounts also come from Bolivia. Little of the
drug exiting Ecuador is prepared from coca grown there.
Cocaine base is smuggled into Ecuador in many ways.
Some traffickers in El Oro and Loja provinces conceal
cocaine base in shipments of agricultural products
brought across the border by horse or 4-wheel drive
vehicles. Public transport is often used. Up to 25
kilograms have been concealed in air-conditioning units
on buses of the "Turismo Expresso Pullman, S.A." company
that move between Lima, Peru, and Quito, Ecuador. The
couriers are generally Colombians who work as drivers on
short-term contracts, and company officials may not be
aware that their buses transport drugs. Cocaine base
also enters via the numerous rivers flowing between Peru
and Ecuador and on both commercial and private airplanes.
Much of the drug enters Ecuador through official ports-
of-entry, including the major seaport of Guayaquil,F
*Cocaine base, an intermediate product in the coca Zeaf
to cocaine hydrochloride refining process, is also caZZed
"cocaine sulfate" by traffickers. While the terms are
used interchangeably, the base material is a sulfate
only when sulfuric acid is used in the purifying and
bulk reducing stage.
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Cocaine Smuggling Routes
Land route sea route
Entry by Entry by
commercial aircraft private aircraft
0 100
Kilometers
lsla
La Plata
Colombia
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)Panama, 0 Trinidad and Tobago
Venezuela >t3uyana
S
Colombia nam
Fr ch Guiana
Fr,)
lMOSq~e,a t
Ecuado
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Once in Ecuador the cocaine base is moved overland
by both road and rail. The most frequently used route
is the Pan-American highway, which runs between Carchi
Province on the Colombian border and Loja Province on
the Peruvian border. The drug is also concealed on
trains of the railroad that parallels much of the Pan-
American highway before terminating in San Lorenzo,
Esmeraldas Province, on the northern border.
Guayas Province is still the center of cocaine base
smuggling in Ecuador, but the port of Esmeraldas is be-
coming an important point from which the drug is dispatched
to Colombia. Several ma'or Guayaquil-based traffickers,
now use the Esmeraldas
route. Small launches rented from fishermen and farmers
are used to transport the drug to minor Colombia
such as Tumaco, Mosquera, and to Buenaventura.
Large amounts of cocaine base are transported into
Colombia from Ecuador in stolen cars.
and San Miguel are the most popular lana entry points
in Colombia. Increased use of private aircraft to move
the drug to Colombia has been noted recently.
Buyers for the trafficking organizations maintain
contact with suppliers to ensure rapid access to the drug
when needed. Purcasing agents generally have legitimate
business ties which give them plausible reason to travel
frequently to supply areas. Dealers in cocaine base
realize a substantial profit without the trouble or risk
of refining the drug. In Peru or in Ecuador near the
Peru-Ecuador border, cocaine base cost about US$800 per
kilogram in early 1977. Sold in northern Ecuador or in
Colombia, the same amount brought an average price of
US$1,400. More recent transactions indicate rising
prices.
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BOLIVIA: Major Cocaine Producing Areas
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BOLIVIA: Continuing Interest in Drug Control
Senior Bolivian authorities recently held meetings
with campesino leaders to describe further the govern-
ment's embryonic coca crop substitution program. When
the program was first outlined last year, it was met with
voiced opposition by groups of campesinos who feared the
loss of their traditional and lucrative crop.
despite La Paz'
gradual efforts to implement a new agricultural diversi-
fication plan, campesinos are still suspicious and may
begin mounting additional resistance against the govern-
ment.
Coca has been an integral part of the cultural and
economic life of Bolivia for hundreds of years. It is
ideally suited to the harsh terrain of the country. The
plant requires virtually no cultivation and can be har-
vested up to four times a year.
The Yungas and Chapare regions are the principal
sources of Bolivian coca as well as the illicit extract,
cocaine. Wholesalers and drug traffickers receive most 25X1
of the profits from coca production and cocaine manu-
facture. The campesinos, however, are financially de-
pendent on their earnings from the crop.
at least 70 percent of 25X1
the approximately 20,000 farmers in the Yungas and
Chapare regions are coca producers. Their coca crops
reportedly account for over half of the total farm in-
come in the two areas.
Elaborating on some of the obstacles facing the
crop substitution program, Bolivia's Minister of Interior
Juan Pereda stated that without price guarantees and
international market stability for proposed substitutes
such as coffee and bananas, the government's agricultural
plan was likely to fail. The resultant alienation and
loss of political support from the campesinos, in turn,
could adversely affect governmental stability.
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In spite of potential political and economic reper-
cussions, La Paz is pressing ahead with a number of pilot
projects. These projects, which are largely supported by
financial and technical assistance from the US, entail
the planting and harvesting of several experimental crops,
the establishment of an agricultural commodities industry
(such as canneries), and the successful marketing of
finished products. The Bolivian government is motivated
in part by the prospects of receiving as much as $45 mil-
lion worth of agricultural assistance from the US. At
the same time, however, an increasing number of officials
are aware of Bolivia's growing indigenous drug abuse
problem.
Although the majority of Bolivian cocaine still goes
to the US, other drugs, such as amphetamines, barbiturates,
and tranquilizers, are abused by the country's adult pop-
ulation. Colonel Ovidio Aparicio, director of Bolivia's
Department of Narcotics and Dangerous Substances (DNSP),
announced that Bolivian traffickers now are seeking to
sell drugs to school children in order to establish a
viable, local market.
Perhaps one of the most pressing needs for effective
drug control in Bolivia, as well as other cocaine traf-
ficking countries in South America, is convincing those
countries that the problem of narcotics is not one for
the US to attempt to solve alone. Producer and consumer
countries alike have to share responsibilities, working
together to control the drugs that can have deleterious
effects on their societies.
It is encouraging that Bolivia, one of the two prin-
cipal suppliers of cocaine on the international market,
appears to be seriously pursuing a coca crop substitution
program. Furthermore, it is a positive sign that Bolivians
have begun to recognize their own abuse problem.
It will not be an easy task to cur-
tail coca production or the widespread trafficking of
cocaine. And it remains to be seen to what extent cam-
pesino groups, and indeed trafficking organizations
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themselves, will resist the government's efforts. It will
take nothing short of altering the centuries old socio-
economic patterns of the country's campesino Indian pop-
ulation for Bolivia to begin to be able to exercise mean-
ingful drug control. At least for the moment, however,
the government seems interested in doing just that.
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Late Item
GOLDEN TRIANGLE: Gearing Up for Heroin Production?
The extended lull in the Golden Triangle narcotics
market may be about over. Large-scale purchases of raw
opium and pitzu (impure morphine base) by refiners and
major international traffickers during the month of
April may signal the beginning of a new heroin produc-
tion season.
Since the beginning of April, 12 tons of raw opium
and 3 tons of pitzu have been purchased from sources
within Burma and shipped to the Thai border area. At
least 5 tons of raw opium and 500 kilograms of the pitzu
may already have been converted into heroin. Most of
the remaining imports in April have been placed in tem-
porary storage under the control of the Shan United Army
(SUA). These imports raise total stocks of narcotics
in the border area to at. least 25 tons of raw opium and
3 tons of pitzu--representing over 3 tons of heroin
equivalent.
The heavy emphasis on pitzu conversion appears to
be designed to lessen the risk of seizure by reducing
volume. The fact that major international traffickers
hold title to most of these narcotics suggests that
large-scale heroin production may soon be resumed in
the Thai-Burma border area after a lull of several
months and that we may soon face a substantial increase
in trafficking activity?
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NATIONAL ASSESSMENT 25X1
Significance: Narcotics are not produced in any signifi-
cant amount in the Netherlands, but Amsterdam is one of
the major transit points for the illegal narcotics
traffic in Western Europe. An estimated 80 percent of
the heroin seized in West Germany--where there is a
strong demand from US troops as well as the German
population--came through the Netherlands, and virtually
all of the heroin seized in transit in Western Europe
:Last year was destined for Amsterdam.
Most of the heroin in the Netherlands comes from
Southeast Asia. The amount involved has apparently in-
creased at a phenomenal rate since 1971 when only 50
grams were uncovered by Dutch police. Last year the
amount seized had jumped to 169.5 kilograms and, accord-
ing to some estimates, this represents as little as 5
percent of the total volume circulating in the country.
Most of the heroin is already fairly pure--primarily
number three, but some number four--when it arrives;
and there is no evidence of heroin laboratories or pro-
cessing facilities in the vicinity of Amsterdam.
The trafficking pattern for heroin has remained
largely unchanged during the past few years. Large
amounts are obtained in Southeast Asia--usually Thai-
land--by Thais, Malaysians, Singaporeans, Hong Kong
Chinese and others who use commercial air transportation
to Europe and travel by car or-rail to the Netherlands.
There have also been some efforts to ship heroin directly
into the country. The Netherlands could become a major
transshipment point to the US if Mexican opium production
were drastically curtailed. So far, however, there is
no evidence of an established connection.
There is no registration system for narcotics users
in the Netherlands, and no reliable figures are available,
but Dutch authorities estimate that there are 8,000 to
12,000 daily users of heroin of whom 3,000 to 5,000 are
in Amsterdam. The government believes that the number
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is increasing. The "risk group" is between the ages of
15 and 25--especially between 20 and 24--but there is
also a noticeable increase in the number of addicts be-
tween the ages of 12 and 13. There is no official treat-
ment program, although provincial and private institutions
receive government support. An estimated 50 percent of
the daily users of heroin or opiates are untreated.
Consumption of cannabis and cocaine is also rising,
although the latter's high price tends to limit its use
to the wealthier ranks of society. Cannabis is not con-
sidered a problem except when used with other drugs, or
when it impairs the driving ability of users.
There is no big demand for psychotropic drugs, but
amphetamine usage is significant in some areas, primarily
where there are large concentrations of students. Re-
cently a number of amphetamine labs were uncovered, but
the bulk of their output was destined for the Scandinavian
market.
Problem:
During the past few years, the
government has become increasingly concerned over the
central position Amsterdam plays in the illicit narcotics
market of Europe. Since 1972 the Dutch have taken a
series of steps to deal with the problem:
--In 1973 DEA assistance was accepted.
--In 1974 a DEA office was established in
The Hague.
--In 1975 a national narcotics law enforce-
ment unit was created.
--In 1976 stricter legislation against nar-
cotics trafficking was passed, police
narcotics squads were reinforced, and a
narcotics attache was posted in Bangkok.
The Netherlands signed the 1961 single convention
on narcotics, but so far has not become a party to the
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two other major international conventions.
In addition to its domestic efforts to curb narcotics
trafficking, the Dutch government participates in meetings
of the UN narcotic drugs committee, contributes (nominally)
to the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control, works through
Interpol and the Customs Cooperation Council, takes part
in the so-called "Pompidou Initiative," and has had tri-
partite meetings with the US and Canada.
The Dutch government also cooperates with a German
narcotics advisory committee and permits German and DEA
participation in a similar Dutch committee; works closely
with DEA; cooperates with and allows the stationing in
the Netherlands of members of the US 42nd Military Police
Detachment; exchange visits with the US and other
countries; accepts DEA and customs training; and is now
trying to persuade other European countries to assign
narcotics attaches to Bangkok.
Last summer, legislation was passed reducing the
penalties for the possession and consumption of narcotics,
but substantially increasing the penalties for trafficking
in hard drugs. Users are not imprisoned in the Netherlands,
although the new law which went into effect last fall
provides short sentences in order to give officials a
chance to persuade them to seek treatment.
Prospects: Dutch backing for the UN Fund for Drug Abuse
Control is tepid and reflects opposition within the
Public Health Ministry
=to perceived excessive concentration of the and on
law enforcement at the expense of fostering programs to
reduce demand. The Dutch government has furthermore
stated its intention to seek amendment of the UN single
convention to allow states to legalize cannabis. The
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government is probably motivated, at least in part, by
the domestic political need to satisfy left-wing members
of parliament as the country approaches a general elec-
tion in May, but it is also speaking for the majority
of the population which apparently does not consider
cannabis a problem.
The Netherlands has become a major transit country
for four basic reasons:
--Narcotics laws have been relatively lax.
Until last fall the maximum penalty for
trafficking in hard drugs was four years
and even serious offenders could count on
serving only half of that.
--There is easy access from other countries,
particularly from Belgium where narcotics
laws are even less restrictive.
--It is a convenient seaboard location for
distributing narcotics to the rest of
Europe.
--Large numbers of Chinese immigrants from
the former Dutch East Indies have settled
in the Netherlands and brought over rela-
tives from Hong Kong, Singapore, and
Malaysia; the narcotics traffic in the
Netherlands is almost entirely in the
hands of Chinese ethnics.
Recently
the Dutch police in a new approach to the
problem have deported over 200 illegal
Chinese immigrants.
The new laws raising the maximum penalty for traf-
ficking in hard drugs to eight years imprisonment have
brought Dutch law more in line with many other European
countr'
The Netherlands has gained experience during the
past years in fighting narcotics trafficking and has
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benefited from working together with US and German ex-
perts in the field. The Dutch now have a record of
accomplishment to point to and a potential for regional
leadership, and there are some indications that other
Rirop an countries may be willing to follow their lead.
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JAMAICA: Jamaica's minister of national security and
justice has agreed to a joint air and ground survey
of the island in order to calculate more precisely
current production levels of marijuana. Unlike
other islands in the Caribbean, which serve primarily
as transit points for drug smuggling, Jamaica has
become a significant source of marijuana. Produc-
tion there could be increased to take up any slack
should the traditional sources of supply--Mexico
and Colombia--be reduced through crop eradication
and interdiction efforts. The minister's willing-
ness to cooperate at this juncture is significant
because it will enable local officials to monitor
more effectively future increases in marijuana cul-
tivation and facilitate law enforcement programs.
YUGOSLAVIA: Small quantitites of "Iranian" poppy are
being grown on a trial basis by the alkaloid enter-
prise in Tikves, according to the Yugoslav press.
These poppies are said to contain a higher amount
of morphine than local Macedonian varieties. Yugo-
slav agricultural experts believe this strain of
opium poppy can also be grown in the Skopje and
Pelagonija regions. According to the press, Yugo-
slavian agricultural experts are currently working
on a strain of opium poppy that will have a more
even growth which will permit harvesting by machine.
F7 (Nova Makedonija, ApriZ 13, 1977)
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