INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS BIWEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001900010012-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2008
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: June 7, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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r oreign
Assessment
Center
International Narcotics
Biweekly Review
State Dept. review completed
DOJ Review Completed.
DIA review(s) completed.
Secret
RP INBR 78-012
7 June 1978
Copy 902
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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS BIWEEKLY REVIEW
7 June 1978
CONTENTS
AFGHANISTAN: New Government May Push Opium
Eradication Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
The new leaders appear to be dedicated to a
policy of opium poppy eradication. Politi-
cal factors may require them to move cau-
tiously however.
AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN: Pushtunistan Dispute Could
Hinder Narcotics Control Effort . . . . . . . . . 11
This long-standing dispute could have an
unsettling effect in the area and adversely
affect narcotics control programs in both
countries.
The articles in this publication are prepared by analysts in the National Foreign Assessment Center
primarily for specialists in the Washington community who are interested in international narcotics
matters. Comments and queries are welcome.
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NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS:
1.
Bolivia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
12
2.
Sri Lanka . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
.
15
3.
Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .
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4.
Iran . . . .
BRIEFS- . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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FOREIGN PRESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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AFGHANISTAN: New Government May Push Opium Eradication
Program
The military coup, which overthrew President Daoud
on 27 April 1978, brought to power a government dominated
by members of the Marxist, pro-Soviet Khalq Party. The
new leaders may be more sincere in their dedication to
the eradication of narcotics than the previous govern-
ment, but they may have to move more cautiously, and
some of their policies could conflict with international
narcotics control programs.
Included in the Khalq manifesto, published in 1966
by now head of government Nur Mohammed Taraki, was a
provision opposing the use of opium and alcohol. At the
time, an attack on opium was unlikely to win Khalq any
significant support either at home or abroad. Statements
by the new Interior Minister, Nur Ahmed Nur, also seem
to reflect an opposition to narcotics that goes beyond
an effort to please the US and other Western countries.
He has told UN officials that he wants opium production
eliminated and has told the US Ambassador that he wants
no Afghan opium to reach US addicts. His predecessor
appeared to have little interest in the problem.
The Taraki government recognizes the value of con-
tinued good relations with the US and other Western
countries, but probably places less importance on these
relations than did President Daoud and so will. be less
susceptible to US pressure on narcotics and other issues.
The influence of the USSR has increased, but in the past
Moscow has shown little interest in the Afghan narcotics
problem. A month before the Afghan coup, the Soviet
Charge in Washington told US officials that narcotics
was not a problem in Soviet-Afghan relations and gave no
indication that the USSR was interested in cooperation
with US efforts.
Increased Soviet influence and the Afghan Govern-
ment's own suspicion of Western motives may make the
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government more reluctant to cooperate in police matters--
including narcotics--with the Americans and other West-
erners even under UN auspices. The recent decision against
renewing the contracts of two West German narcotics ad-
visers could well be a harbinger of greater reliance on
nonaligned and Communist countries for help in law en-
forcement.
Initially at least, the inexperience of many Cabinet
ministers and the wholesale replacement of lower ranking
officials will decrease government efficiency in all
fields, including narcotics.
Far more important than these factors, however, will
be the government's relations with the Pathan tribes who
produce by far the largest part of Afghanistan's opium.
In the past, Afghan governments have been reluctant to
take any action likely to stir up these tribes, and the
new rulers may decide an even more cautious policy is
required. They lack both the informal ties and the
status in the tribal hierarchy that gave both President
Daoud and the kings who preceded him some control over
the tribes.
In dealing with the tribes, the government will have
several alternatives. It could try to impose central
authority both to remove a potential threat from the
tribes and to end practices which as Marxists the new
rulers can only regard as feudal. If successful, such a
policy would put the government in a position to eradi-
cate most of the country's opium production. The gov-
ernment is well aware, however, that an attempt to impose
central authority would be more likely to bring on a full
scale tribal rebellion, impose severe strains on the
loyalty of the military--the bulk of the officer corps
is Pathan--open the way to large-scale support for the
tribes from Iran and Pakistan, and seriously threaten,
if not topple, the present government.
A far safer course for the new government would be
to avoid trouble with the tribes wherever possible, at
least until it is in a much stronger position, presumably
years from now. Such a policy would, of course, mean
virtually no action against opium production in tribal
areas.
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An attempt to win tribal loyalty by emphasizing
issues such as the Pushtunistan dispute over Pathans in
Pakistan might also be attractive to the new rulers.
Such an approach would do nothing to limit opium produc-
tion in Afghanistan and would complicate dealing with the
problem in Pakistan.
Not all the new government's programs will neces-
sarily conflict with the goal of opium eradication.
Tighter currency and border controls, according to one
report, caused an immediate colltpse in the price of
opium from $170 a kilogram to $30. Even if true, such a
drastic change is likely to be temporary, but continued
financial controls and the likelihood that both the Afghans
and the Iranians will be watching the border more closely
will hamper narcotics traffickers. If the government
launches land reform programs as it has promised, it
would have an opportunity to gain greater control of
opium production in the process.
Whatever its intentions, however, the new govern-
ment will be dealing with an immense narcotics problem
with very limited resources and little authority in the
opium-growing areas, and the prospects for any early
success are as dim as under President Daoud.
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AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN: Pushtunistan Dispute Could Hinder
Narcotics Control Effort
The longstanding Pushtunistan dispute between Afghan-
istan and Pakistan, involving the status of Pakistani
Pathans, could eventually again become a major source of
instability in the region. The Pathans of Pakistan
and Afghanistan may be the leading producers of illicit
opium in the world, and a revival of the dispute would
adversely affect narcotics control programs in both
countries. Even during the recent period of unusually
good relations between Kabul and Islamabad, both have
been reluctant to pursue narcotics policies which risked
tribal unrest. As a result, despite international ef-
forts to promote crop substitution and the eradication
of poppy fields, production has grown annually, possibly
to the neighborhood of 1,000 tons this year. A revival
of the Pushtunistan dispute would put an even higher
priority on efforts to gain tribal loyalty and support
in both countries to the detriment of any narcotics
programs.
The new Afghan Government is trying to reassure
Pakistan publicly and privately that it seeks a peace-
ful solution to the dispute. The Pakistanis, however,
are deeply suspicious of Afghan intentions--with some
justification. The new Afghan leaders, however, are
likely to move slowly on the issue, at least until they
have consolidated their position at home.
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NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
(Editor's Note: These items, produced for another CIA Publi-
cation, do not deal specifically with the international nar-
cotics situation. They are included because they concern
developing situations that could impact on the international
narcotics control effort.)
BOLIVIA: The Election Scene
Bolivia continues to prepare for its first presi-
dential election in a dozen years, scheduled for 9 July.
The official candidate, General Juan Pereda Asbun, is
still the likely winner, but his commanding lead has
been cut by the efforts of rival candidates and by weak-
nesses in his own campaign.
The Opposition
As expected, Pereda's strongest challenge has come
from Hernan Siles Zuazo, a former President who leads a
coalition of leftist factions and is expected to do well
among urban voters. Siles, however, is not strong in
the rural areas, which account for some 60 percent of
the vote.
General Rene Bernal, a former Defense Minister who
is backed only by the Christian Democratic Party, pre-
sents the major surprise of the election campaign. At
a recent rally Bernal drew crowds considerably larger
than did Pereda and President Banzer a week earlier at
the same location. Bernal's accomplishment was all the
more noteworthy because the government blocked roads and
tried to intimidate those who planned to see him. While
Bernal's showing was impressive, he still lacks the broad
publicity necessary for a victory, especially in the cities.
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The candidacy of retired Colonel Jose Patino Ayoroa,
is com-
plicating the election scene. Patino joined the race for-
mally on 7 May and has the backing of an important faction
of one of the parties behind Pereda. As a result, Patino
may be able to draw off some of Pereda's votes. It is
uncertain what Patino--whose candidacy is unlikely to
make major inroads--hopes to accomplish. One possibility
is that Patino, who earlier opposed the election, may be
temporarily in league with Banzer, his old enemy, who
may still nourish hopes of postponing or canceling the
election. If he can attract significant support among
officers, Patino could tarnish Pereda's image as the
"sole" candidate of a unified military. Banzer and
Patino may see this as a means of splitting the military.
Faced with this prospect, Banzer and Patino may reason,
the officers may be made amenable to the ideal of putting
off the election.
Victor Paz Estenssoro, who recently returned from
exile, could also be an important factor in the election.
He has just been named by his party to be its candidate
in the upcoming elections. Paz, still regarded as the
leader of one of the nation's two principal political
movements, is playing his cards close to his vest, but
has been in regular contact with various political groups.
Given the continuing popularity of Paz, an endorsement
by him of any candidate would be an important boost for
the recipient.
The Government's Candidate
Pereda's own campaign effort is not without problems,
despite his being Banzer's choice as official candidate.
Banzer's support is lukewarm at best. If Banzer, as ap-
pears to be the case, does not in fact want elections,
he more than likely hopes that Pereda will flounder and
that other candidates will prove unacceptable to the mil-
itary. That event might give the President an oppor-
tunity to perpetuate himself in power as the only "accept-
able" solution to the political impasse. Banzer would
seek to drive home his point by stressing that under his
six-year rule, Bolivia has enjoyed relative political
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stability and economic growth. Moreover, Pereda's cam-
paign is suffering from serious disagreements among the
disparate elements of his tenuous coalition. Indeed,
Pereda has still not published a campaign platform be-
cause of the bickering.
with elections six weeks away, none of Pereda's de-
clared opponents appears capable of defeating him at the
polls. There is also little prospect that opposition
forces could unite in an effort to outdistance Pereda.
What is clear, though, is that Pereda's lead is by no
means as comfortable as was earlier assumed.
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Noteworthy Political and
Economic Developments
SRI LANKA: Countermeasures Against Tamil Terrorists
The assassination of five police officers in recent
weeks by a militant Tamil youth organization, the Tamil
State Liberation Tigers, has caused great concern within
the government of President Jayawardene. Reluctant to
impose emergency rule, which discredited the former
regime, the government passed a bill on 19 May that
proscribed the Liberation Tigers, who seek a separate
state for Tamils in predominantly Sinhalese Sri Lanka,
as well as any other organization that advocates the
use of violence to achieve its goals. The bill was
amended at the request of the opposition to limit its
duration to one year. Under the new law the govern-
ment may censor press coverage of matters relating to
proscribed organizations. This last item reflects
Jayawardene's reported concern that communal tensions,
still simmering after bloody countrywide clashes in
August 1977, may be touched off again if Sinhalese
become targets of the separatists.*
The tough approach taken by the government to re-
store law and order in the north and east by reinforcing
the Army and police as well as employing special legisla-
tive powers has yielded immediate results. The prominent
publicity given 38 Liberation Tigers on a "most wanted"
*The Sinhalese, about 80 percent of the population, are the domi-
nant group in Sri Lanka. The Tamil community, predominantly
Hindu, is divided into two distinct groups which together make
up 20 percent of the population. The Sri Lankan Tamils trace
their origins back more than a thousand years to Tamil king-
doms centered around Jaffna in the north. The other group, the
Indian Tamils, came in the mid-19th century to work on planta-
tions in the Central Highlands. Indian Tamils are only
peripherally involved in Tamil politics.
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India
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Sri Lanken Tamil
Indian Tamil
-.~.- Province boundary
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list resulted in 32 arrests. Of this number, 22
surrendered to the authorities through a Tamil member
of Parliament. Two suspects in a case involving the
murder of four police officers have been captured.
Those remaining at large are believed by officials to
be abroad and include the son of the Tamil leader of
the parliamentary opposition who is wanted in connection
with the 1975 assassination of the mayor of Jaffna.
We do not have the names of those arrested and are unable
to judge at this time how seriously their arrest will
affect the organization and activities of the Liberation
Tigers.
Complementing the island-wide campaign to round up
members of the proscribed movement, police officials are
traveling abroad to seek foreign cooperation in appre-
hending and extraditing Tamil fugitives. If this effort
is successful in effectively denying safe havens and
seriously disrupting other support received from abroad,
chances for a period of relative tranquility could im-
prove. Another possible reaction by the militants, how-
ever, would be to step up indiscriminate attacks against
the police and military who have been denounced as a
Sinhalese "occupation army."
The Liberation Tigers have claimed responsibility
for at least 10 terrorist acts going back to mid-1975.
They are a small secret organization of young Tamils
based primarily in the Northern and Eastern Provinces
of Sri Lanka, principally in and around the city of
Jaffna, and their membership has been variously esti-
mated at between 50 and 200. The organization is care-
fully compartmented to prevent penetration by govern-
ment security forces and appears to have been'success-
ful in penetrating local intelligence services targeted
against them.
Cadre for the Liberation Tigers came initially from
dissidents who broke with the youth wing of the Tamil
United Liberation Front (TULF)--a coalition formed in
1972 of several Tamil political parties. For the most
part they are educated, unemployed youth frustrated by
the inability of communal leaders to reduce discrimina-
tion against Tamils by successive Sinhalese governments.
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The first phase of the Liberation Tigers' program
appeared to be to dissuade "collaborators" and "traitors"
within the Tamil community itself. The targets of all
the political killings claimed by them since 1975 have
been Tamil politicians seeking accommodation with the
government or officials investigating separatist activ-
ities. The tempo of the intimidation campaign in-
creased significantly in early 1978 with a series of
dramatic killings. In January, a Tamil member of Par-
liament who crossed over to the government was wounded
by members of the Liberation Tigers, who publicized
the attack as a warning to others who might consider
cooperation with the Sinhalese. In April, four police
officers who were investigating the incident were
murdered. Another police intelligence officer pursuing
the militants was killed by Tamil youths in Jaffna in
early May. By limiting their targets to Tamils, the
movement has appeared to be scrupulously avoiding ac-
tions that would provoke a confrontation with the
majority Sinhalese.
Through much of the colonial period, well-educated,
English-speaking Tamil graduates of missionary schools
in Jaffna held a disproportionate number of positions
in the civil service and the professions. With inde-
pendence in 1947, the Sinhalese began to use their
legislative majority to reduce the proportion of Tamils
entering the university. The campaign became more in-
tense between 1969 and 1977 when the rate of Tamil en-
trants fell from 41 to 16 percent.
The Sinhalese also resorted to linguistic nation-
alism and effectively blocked openings for talented
Tamil youth by requiring fluency in Sinhala_for govern-
ment positions. Another threat to communal identity
was the government's resettlement program, which provided
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land to Sinhalese-in the Eastern Province--long con-
sidered by Tamils to be part of their traditional
homeland.
Frustration with the continued erosion of Tamil
status and opportunity reached its highest level
during the 1977 election. The TULF campaigned in the
north and east calling for a separate Tamil state.
This call by the leadership, intended primarily to
highlight the plight of the Tamils, was taken up by
Tamil youth who saw it as a valid goal for the community.
The TULF emerged from the election with 18 seats--enough
to lead the opposition. Intense pressure by the mili-
tant youth, however, has forced the TULF leadership to
continue to pay lipservice to the separatist rhetoric
of the campaign rather than negotiate with the govern-
ment to end discrimination against Tamils.
After the election, Jayawardene's United National
Party (UNP)--largely a Sinhalese organization--took
office with an overwhelming majority in Parliament. The
new government unilaterally remedied some discriminatory
policies in education and employment and began a limited
dialogue with Tamil leaders. Meanwhile, the activist
Tamil youth, citing the Tamil victories at the polls in
the north and east, argued that the TULF had a "mandate"
for a separate state. The moderate Tamil leadership
thus finds itself in a quandary, fearing that it cannot
actively pursue an arrangement with the Sinhalese with-
out losing the support of the separatists and possibly
even the moderate Tamils. The militants accuse the TULF
hierarchy of "selling out" to the UNP, which will eventu-
ally "betray" the Tamils as previous governments have.
While pressure has been exerted on the TULF to pre-
vent accommodation with the government, the UNP is facing
corresponding constraints from the Sinhalese. The major-
ity community believes that it has a right to preferred
treatment in gaining the limited educational and employ-
ment opportunities that exist. Many believe that their
share of positions would be threatened if the Tamils
were permitted to compete on an equal basis through a
merit system.
For the time being, Jayawardene appears to be satis-
fied with the limited special powers given him to proscribe
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and prosecute the separatists. He also seems confident
that the impending administrative decentralization, which
calls for district ministers, will provide a degree of
autonomy to the Tamils that will moderate their demands.
He cannot, however, make too many concessions without
jeopardizing his political base in the Sinhalese com-
munity. He also must appear to be resolute in his
efforts to eliminate Tamil terrorism. Conversely,
a too heavyhanded attempt to repress the separatists
could only increase the appeal of their program.
Reports on the degree of popular support for the move-
ment within the Tamil community are conflicting and may
be attributed to a generational difference between youth
and their elders. Many Tamil politicians and profes-
sionals do not accept the need for violence to achieve
the equality advocated by their offspring.
If the UNP is unable to ensure law and order, the
government's effort to promote foreign investment will
be seriously affected as will be the overall prospects
for economic recovery. The Jayawardene government is
acutely aware of the interrelationship between economic
prosperity and communal relations. A successful eco-
nomic turnaround would remove many of the factors that
alienate the Tamil minority, and the drive for a sepa-
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Noteworthy Political and
Economic Developments
PAKISTAN: Problems in Forming New Government
Chief Martial Law Administrator Zia-ul-Haq may
have abandoned or postponed indefinitely plans to form
a government with the participation of political parties
because of conditions demanded by the eight-party Pakistani
National Alliance. Zia has been trying to form such a
government for about two months but, with several parties
refusing to take part, his only hope appeared to be an
agreement with the Alliance. In the meantime, popular
criticism of continued military rule is growing. Senior
military officers are disillusioned with Zia and his
policies, but are reluctant to challenge his leader-
ship.
In forming a "national" government, Zia had hoped
to mobilize popular support for a number of difficult
economic and political decisions that he faces--including
the fate of former Prime Minister Bhutto. He may also
have hoped that the participation of political parties
would quiet demands for an election and for the resump-
tion of political activity. Zia would remain in con-
trol of government, with military officers holding key
portfolios.
Several of the nation's most prominent politicians
refused to join a government where they would have little
power and be closely allied with the military regime.
The Alliance had agreed to participate in the government,
but apparently only if the government were clearly civil-
ian with a "fully independent and powerful" civilian
prime minister, and if the ban on political activity were
lifted.
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Zia's problems are compounded by increasing criticism
among senior military officers of his weak and indecisive
leadership. I
Complaints focus on Zia's increasing dependence on c
ian, rather than military, advisers. Some senior offi-
cers have emphasized that only national elections--
unlikely for at least several more months--can solve
Pakistan's political problems.
Despite resentment of Zia and his policies by senior
officers, they are unlikely to challenge his leadership
at this time. To do so would run counter to the struc-
ture and traditions of the Pakistani Army. Zia has re-
organized the command structure to minimize, if not
eliminate, the possibility of a serious threat
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Noteworthy Political and
Economic Developments
IRAN: The Shah and the Clergy
The Shah and Queen Farah used their annual visit to
the religious shrine in Meshed on 28 May to attempt to
open a dialogue with some of the religious community.
An exchange of views between the Shah and the clergy
took place during public speeches at the shrine.
Meshed is probably the easiest place to get such a
dialogue going. The city is religiously significant
because of the Shrine of the Imam Reza, the eighth of
the 12 successors to Mohammad according to the Shiites,
and it is visited by thousands of pilgrims each year.
It has always been less important, however, as a politi-
cal and religious center than Qom, where the most influ-
ential clergy reside and where theological education is
centered.
Although the reason for the existence of the shrine
at Meshed is religious, it is actually a secular institu-
tion. The chief administrator is the Shah--who is enti-
tled to 10 percent of the income of the shrine. The
deputy administrator who carries on the day-to-day busi-
ness is the governor general of Khorassan Province. The
shrine was once one of the major landowners in Iran and
has been engaged in much social service and business
activity.* The shrine's finances have always been a
mystery, but it is known that in past decades substantial
wealth could be accumulated by working there. Most of
the shrine employees are not clerical, and the shrine
and the Shiite clergy are independent of one another.
Nevertheless, some clerics are indirectly connected with
the shrine. A portion of the shrine's income is allotted
*Under the land reform the shrine lands apparently are now leased
to present cooperatives for a period of 99 years rather than sold
outright to the cultivators.
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to religious figures, some religious teachers and stu-
dents are aided by shrine funds, and the shrine provides
services for pilgrims visiting Meshed.*
Although considerable antiregime feeling has been
expressed in Meshed in the past, especially by the most
prominent religious leaders, the dissent has always been
lower key than that expressed in Qom. The heavy involve-
ment of the government in Meshed religious life, compe-
tition with the Qom clergy for funds and religious in-
fluence, and the generally less-politicized atmosphere
make Meshed a natural place to attempt a rapprochement.**
Empress Farah was extensively photographed during
the recent visit wearing the chador, a traditional full-
length garment that for many is a symbol of religious
orthodoxy. This is clearly intended as a signal to the
more moderate among the clergy that the regime is not
rejecting them and their concerns. Most Iranians will
make the immediate connection with a widely known inci-
dent of Reza Shah's time.*** Whether this gesture will
mollify a significant number of the influential clergymen
remains to be seen. It will, however, give them a reason-
able excuse for talking with the government with less
risk of being accused of selling out. Too little is known
*But not as much as formerly. A century ago a pilgrim could expect
six days free maintenance by the shrine. More recently a pilgrim--if
he had good connections--might get a ticket good for one meal at
the shrine guest house.
**A similar attempt by the Shah in 1967, however, led to a rebuff
by the major Meshed mullahs, and the Shah's reception was attended
only by lesser clerics presumed to be on the government's payroll.
%'^In 1936 Reza Shah prohibited the wearing of the chador. To
emphasize the point the Queen and two daughters attended a religious
service in Qom unveiled. The preacher chided them from the pulpit
for such irreverence. When Reza Shah heard of the incident, so the
story goes, he went to Qom, entered the mosque in his cavalry boots
(footgear should be removed in a mosque), dragged the preacher out,
and kicked him down the stairs. The incident failed to endear Reza
Shah to the clergy.
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of the factionalism among the clergy to be certain, but
it is likely that a considerable number of them, while
unenthusiastic about the regime, would prefer not to con-
front it and risk greater losses in position and power
than has already been the case.
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BAHAMAS: NARCOTICS SMUGGLING PROBLEM WORSENS. The Em-
bassy in Nassau reports that it has become increas-
ingly apparent over the past six months that the
Bahamas is growing in importance as a link in the
narcotics smuggling route from Latin America to the
US. It comments that the area, because of its geo-
graphic configuration, is most difficult to police,
and it has obviously become important in the movement
of marijuana in bulk, primarily by ship and light
aircraft, from the north coast of Colombia to the
eastern US. It noted further that since the begin-
ning of the year cocaine smuggling, mainly by couriers
on commercial flights, has also drastically increased.
BULGARIA: CLAIMS OPIUM IMPORTED FROM LAGOS, NIGERIA.
During a recent discussion of opium poppy cultiva-
tion in Bulgaria, a Bulgarian official told an Em-
bassy representative that Bulgaria imports opium
from Lagos. The comment was made sort of inadvert-
ently to illustrate the insignificance of Bulgarian
domestic production. He also claimed that the UN
had actually urged Bulgaria to produce more opium
as it produces less than its quota and that Sofia
had not agreed to increase production because poppy
cultivation is not profitable in Bulgaria due to ad-
verse climatic and soil conditions. Despite an at-
tempt to follow up the Lagos comment, the Bulgarian
official offered no specific data.
BURMA: SPECIAL TASK FORCE ESTABLISHED TO COMBAT NARCOTICS
TRAFFIC. The Special Intelligence Department of the
Burmese Directorate of Defense Services Intelligence
established a special task force last March under the
Division of Drugs to coordinate the suppression of
narcotics smuggling in the Golden Triangle and onward
shipment out of Burma. The project is funded by the
UN and involves the establishment of fixed bases in
and around the Golden Triangle from which operations
will be mounted.
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LAOS: INDICATION OF OPIUM PRODUCTION IN VIETNAM. The
Embassy in Vientiane, in a recent response to a
routine Washington query on opium production and
cultivation in Laos, called attention to a recent
report in the Hanoi press. The report noted that
cadres of the 125th and 127th Border Defense Secur-
ity Police had "patiently persuaded" people in seven
border villages to stop smoking opium. The article
goes on to say that, thanks to study sessions con-
ducted by civic action teams, the local people had
vowed to give up growing opium poppies. The Embassy
pointed out that, aside from spurious reports from
the Vientiane UNFDAC office of opium production in
Vietnam's central highlands, this is the first recent
indication of which the Embassy is aware of opium
production in Vietnam.
NEPAL: INDICATIONS OF ILLICIT OPIUM PRODUCTION. Recent
unevaluated reports received by the Embassy in Kath-
mandu indicate that some opium poppy cultivation is
apparently being diverted from village use and
directed toward illicit trade. Because of the in-
creased use of Nepal as a route for opium/heroin
traffic from the Golden Triangle, local authorities
are unable to differentiate the local crop from that
in transit. Evaluation of the information is further
complicated by the inadequate data available on local
production, which is grown on small plots by villagers.
The UNFDAC representative, extrapolating from the
limited data available and his on-site observations,
estimates the annual opium production in Nepal. to be
1,200 kilograms--most of which is used locally for
medicinal purposes.. The government, however, remains
committed to its policy of not legalizing the growing
of opium. In the fall of 1977, consideration was
given to making opium an export crop but was rejected
because of fears that the government could not con-
trol all aspects of production and prevent diversion
into illicit channels.
TURKEY: ILLICIT OPIUM POPPY FIELDS REPORTEDLY FOUND IN
SOUTHEASTERN PROVINCE.
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The Turkish press carried an item last
April about 2.5 hectares of illicit opium poppies
being destroyed in the Konya area by the security
forces. An Embassy report in late May, citing a re-
liable source, claimed that an opium poppy field
about one-third of an acre in size had been dis-
covered in southeastern Turkey near the town of
Gaziantep. The Turkish National Police later claimed
that this field had been Indian hemp rather than
opium poppies. Because of adverse weather conditions
in the licensed opium poppy growing area of south-
western Turkey, the area under poppy cultivation
this year appears to be somewhat smaller than last
year. It has been tentatively estimated that only
about 50,000 hectares, as opposed to last year's
70,000 hectares, will actually be harvested this
year. It is still too early to attempt any realistic
estimate of poppy straw production for the current
year, but the reduced area of cultivation suggests
a smaller harvest than last year's 36,400 tons of
poppy straw unless there are optimum conditions for
the remainder of the growing season.
VENEZUELA-COLOMBIA: DRUG TRAFFICKERS REPORTEDLY TRADING
ARMS FOR DRUGS. According to the Venezuelan Security
Police, an alarming number of automatic and semiauto-
matic weapons--mostly the 9mm "grease gun" type and
the popular M-16 rifle--have begun to show up along
the Colombian-Venezuelan border west of Maracaibo.
The police suspect that pistols also are being
smuggled into the country, although none have actually
been located yet. This speculation probably is due
to the general popularity of such weapons. The De-
fense Attache in Caracas reports that available in-
formation strongly indicates that drug traffickers
are flying the weapons into Colombia and trading
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them for illicit drugs for the international market.
The reporting officer comments that it is uncertain
whether the weapons are going only to local drug
traffickers or are being passed to guerrilla/terrorists
in the area j the 25X1
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tions into the northwestern art of Venezuela.
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FOREIGN PRESS
BOLIVIA--Thirty Percent of Coca Crop Reported to be
Illegal--TNDD, No. L/7808, p. 77. Pure cocaine
production in Bolivia totals 600 tons per year ac-
cording to a recent report from Interpol's security
administration department, which recently met in
Buenos Aires, Argentina. According to the report,
70 percent of the coca is grown by officially reg-
istered coca producers on 11,000 hectares. It noted,
however, that 30 percent of the crop was being grown
clandestinely. The report added that Bolivia's of-
ficial annual coca production is about 25,000 tons;
about 15 to 25 kilograms of pure cocaine are obtained
from each ton of coca leaf. The amount of illicit
cocaine was not estimated by the report. (See Am
Emb La Paz 3920, 18 May 1978 for latest estimate
*US Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) Translations on Nar-
cotics and Dangerous Drugs. Published by JPRS, 1000 Glebe Road,
Arlington, Va. 22201.
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of coca leaf being diverted from legal channels into
illicit cocaine production. The figure cited is a
hypothetical maximum; seizures, spoilage, and other
losses have not been taken into account in the re-
port.)
BURMA--Over 10,000 Acres of Poppy Razed--TNDD, No. L/7808,
p. 19. According to the Rangoon Domestic Service,
Operation "Mountaintop Flower"--the opium poppy erad-
ication program in Burma--resulted in the destruction
of about 10,300 acres of opium poppies between 10
December 1977 when the operation began and the end
of April. About 9,000 acres of poppies were destroyed
during the government's eradication campaign last
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DENMARK--Narcotics Authorities Expect Increase in Cocaine
From Germany--TNDD, No. L/7796, pp. 60-61. A nar-
cotics consultant in the Department of Education
views cocaine as even more dangerous than heroin,
and is concerned over the increasing amounts enter-
ing Denmark. He claims the abuse of cocaine spreads
like rings on the water from the curious and young
in the upper middle class to groups that are not as
well off and who are in a weaker social and economic
situation. He personally views the psychological
dependence associated with cocaine as more serious
than the physical addition of heroin because not all
heroin users become addicts, but according to the
Danish spokesman, cocaine is a drug that leaves very
few users unaffected.
DENMARK--Lack of Effective Liaison With Dutch Hurts Drug
Case--TNDD, No. L/7796, pp. 64-66. A court case in
Copenhagen has revealed a serious lack of communica-
tions between Dutch and Danish police according to
an item in the Danish press. It claims that the
Dutch police tapped telephone conversations of the
accused for four months before they informed the
narcotics police in Copenhagen about the investigation
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that had been under way. The information about the
lack of cooperation came out during the trial of the
accused.
DENMARK--Arrests of Danes and Italian Smugglers Arouses
Suspicion of Mafia Tie--TNDD, No. L/7796, pp. 67-68.
The involvement of three Italian smugglers in a nar-
cotics case has led to suspicion that the Mafia is
behind the smuggling effort valued at about $6 million.
According to the press, this is the second time in
the past few months when "it has been proved" that
the Mafia is slowly working its way into the Danish
naroctics market. It claims that during the closed
court hearings, the courier confirmed that the Mafia
was behind the smuggling. The two Italians were
charged with having smuggled 2 kilograms of pure
heroin into Denmark from New Delhi using the Aero-
flot airline and flying via Moscow. (Note: This
information suggests that the Moscow route and India
as a point of origin may be more prominent in nar-
cotics smuggling than had previously been indicated.)
EGYPT--Hashish and opium seized in Cairo--TNDD, No. L/7796,
pp. 56-57. The Narcotics Control Division of the
Intelligence Service recently seized about $635,000
worth of narcotics in an abortive smuggling attempt.
Information gathered by the Intelligence Service in-
dicated that a large supply of hashish and opium had
been smuggled across the eastern desert and was to
be brought to Cairo for sale during the Spring Holi-
day. The source of the confiscated narcotics was
not divulged.
KUWAIT--Trafficking Technique Described--TNDD, No. L/7808,
pp. 130-131. A gang was able to smuggle some 46
sacks of drugs (hashish) from Lebanon to Kuwait via
Syria but the drug was seized when the automobile
being used was involved in an accident. The car had
special hidden compartments built into the body; but
they were uncovered as a result of the front end
damage during the accident. (Note: The ultimate
destination of the illicit drugs is not indicated in
the press item; the route, however, is similar to
that involved in another smuggling attempt
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NORWAY--Police Cite Increased Narcotics Deaths, Ask for
More A ents--TNDD, No. L/7808, pp. 135-137. The
narcotics section of the Oslo police station is
being organized to function as a central narcotics
agency which will aid other police stations through-
out the country in narcotics trafficking cases.
The article notes that there has been a marked in-
crease in the number of narcotics deaths in Norway
since the first of the year. Six deaths have been
reported thus far, compared to eight for all of
1977. Other deaths have occurred in which narcotics
were involved but where death was not the direct
result of drug overdose. According to a forensic
medical student in Sweden, 60 persons in the
Stockholm area alone lost their lives last year as
a result of using hard narcotics. Hashish and
marijuana dominate the reports of confiscation in
Oslo, but according to a top police official, many
narcotics addicts admit that they became involved
with hard narcotics as a direct result of the home
parties in which hashish was being used.
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SPAIN--Report Claims Drug Consumption Increased 100
Percent in 1977--TNDD, No. L/7796, pp.. 74-79. The
escalation of drug use in Spain alarms and worries
responsible segments of the society. Numerous
statistics are presented to show the high incidence
and marked increase in crime statistics and in nar-
cotics seizures in recent years. In 1967 prisoners
numbered only 293; by 1977 the total had reached.
5,417 for the comparable 12 month period. By 1977,
80 percent of those arrested were-Spaniards. The
conclusion was drawn that Spain has ceased to be
merely a transit area for drugs. The number of
seizures of illicit drugs follows a similar trend:
in 1967 there were 204 seizures by the police; in
1977 the figure bad grown to 2,725. Substances
confiscated showed cocaine seized in 1970 totaled
8 grams; in 1977 this figure was 23,000 grams. In
1970, 80 grams of opiates were seized; in 1977
2,000 grams were seized. The article estimates
that between 25,000 and 30,000 Spaniards are heroin
addicts.
SWEDEN--Agency Reports Increase in Drug-Related Deaths--
TNDD, No. L/7808, pp. 144-145. At least 150 drug
addicts died last year (in Sweden) directly or in-
directly because of their addiction, according to
a study by a state agency. The study includes the
years 1975-1977. There is clearly an increasing
trend in the number of deaths; from 1975 to 1977
the number has doubled, and most of them occur in
Stockholm where half of the country's drug addicts
live.
THAILAND--Drug Trade Problems Discussed--TNDD, No.
L/7808, pp. 56-64. This .item is based on a series
of articles appearing in the Far Eastern Economic
Review which is published in Hong Kong. The articles
deal generally with Thai Prime Minister Kriangsak's
decision to order the expulsion of Khun Sa (Chan
See-fu) and the Shan United Army from Thailand.
Khun Sa made himself persona non grata to the Thai
Government by his letter, published in a Thai
magazine, which drew attention to his illicit nar-
cotics activities.
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The articles
a it that the move against the Shares does not
guarantee that they will not be replaced by other
traffickers, or that at some later date they will
not themselves return to their Thai base areas.
(Note: There has even been some speculation that
the SUA will not actually pull out of Thailand but
they they will either go undercover or mask their
identity.) Under the terms of the Thai Government's
ultimatum, the SUA has until early July to leave
Thai soil. There continues to be fear in Bangkok
that Thai pressure will drive the SUA and some other
insurgent groups into the hands of the Burmese Com-
munist Party. Traditionally, the Burmese insurgent
groups have been viewed by the Thais as an effec-
tive "barrier" against Communist expansion into
Thailand.
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