INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS BIWEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001900010014-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2008
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: July 5, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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Foreign
Assessment
Center
14
International Narcotics
Biweekly Review
5 July 1978
State Dept. review
completed
DOJ Review
Completed.
DIA review(s)
completed.
Secret
RPINBR 78-014
5 July 1978
Copy
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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS BIWEEKLY REVIEW
5 July 1978
CONTENTS
CARIBBEAN/CENTRAL AMERICA: New Regions for
Drug Traffickers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
An increasing volume of narcotics may be
passing through the Caribbean Islands and
Central America
LEBANON: Troops Destroy Opium Poppy Fields . . . 5
Lebanese and Syrian authorities have been
concerned about the spread of opium poppy
cultivation in the Bekaa Valley.
This publication is prepared by analysts in the National Foreign Assessment Center
for specialists in the Washington community who are interested in international
narcotics matters. Comments and queries are welcome.
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NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS:
1. Dominican Republic . . _ _ _ 9
Malaysia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4. Peru . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
BRIEFS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
FOREIGN MEDIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
iii
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JGL RGI
CARIBBEAN/CENTRAL AMERICA: New Regions For Drug
Trafficking
US interest in drug control in Latin America con-
tinues to focus on such traditional production and trans-
shipment regions as Mexico and the Andean republics of
South America. An increasing volume of narcotics, how-
ever, may be passing through the Caribbean Islands and
Central America, but this is a supposition based on
fragmentary information.
As enforcement becomes more effective in other coun-
tries, the pattern of narcotics trafficking will be forced
to shift. There are a variety of reasons why such a shift
would be toward the Caribbean and Central America. For
one, the paucity of equipment and manpower in the island
republics and Central America severely handicaps enforce-
ment agencies. Furthermore, the thousands of remote
islands, unpatrolled waterways, extensive coastlines,
clandestine airstrips, and unguarded borders facilitate
the entry and exit of traffickers and cargoes of nar-
cotics. Finally, the generally depressed economy of
both areas, coupled with the institutionalized system
of corruption and graft among government and military
leaders, enables drug smugglers to curry favor or buy
protection from officials eager to grab a percentage of
the lucrative profits.
Because of this is a relatively new area of concern
the
CIA has no definitive information that permits a suspected
increase in drug trafficking to be measured. The exact
nature and scope of drug activity, therefore, remains un-
certain. We can, however, briefly discuss some of the
various political factors in the Dominican Republic,
Costa Rica, and Honduras that have implications for the
drug situation.
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Dominican Republic
The extent of drug traffic through the Dominican
Republic is unknown, but the widespread corruption of
the 12-year Balaguer administration--especially among
high-ranking military officers--provides a conducive
climate. Graft, bribery, and rake-offs have become com-
monplace, and there is little reason to expect that the
incoming administration will overturn tradition. Presi-
dent-elect Guzman ran on an anticorruption platform and
may well be personally inclined to cooperate in efforts
to halt the drug traffic, but he will have little room
to maneuver as he tries to neutralize the suspicious
military establishment and to check the corrupt inclina-
tions of some of his own "hungry" supporters.
Costa Rica
Neither the CIA nor DEA has information that Costa
Rica has been or is becoming a major transshipment point
for South American cocaine and marijuana. Recent news
articles and editorials in the Costa Rican press, how-
ever, suggest the role that some of the citizenry believe
their country plays in the international drug trade.
According to the press, Lt. Colonel Guillermo Vargas
Mora, director general of the narcotics department of
the Ministry of Public Security, believes that Costa Rica
is a "drug bridge" between North and South America. He
cites the limited enforcement resources of his country,
plus over 200 unsupervised airstrips, as encouraging and
facilitating drug smuggling in Costa Rica.
Prospects for US bilateral drug control efforts
with Costa Rica are good. President Carazo--who led his
opposition Unity coalition to victory in the election
earlier this year--favors close ties and continuing co-
operation with Washington. During his campaign, Carazo
spoke out against crime and other urban problems, another
indication that he would support US drug control initia-
tives.
Honduras
Large quantities of marijuana and cocaine recently
have been interdicted in Honduras, giving rise to intense
interest in the local press and to speculation that the
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country has become a major transshipment channel for
narcotics into the US. It is difficult to assess the
present level of trafficking, however, because of in-
complete records on previous arrests and seizures and
insufficient data on current drug networks.
Honduran press reports of corruption in the military
and of the armed forces' involvement in the kidnap/murder
of narcotics traffickers have helped uncover a major drug
scandal. As a result, a high-level military commission
began an investigation in April to "uncover and punish"
any officer or government official associated with drug
trafficking.
No surprisingly,
L the commission publicly announced that its in-
vestigation had uncovered no military involvement in the
scandal. Military leaders--who justified their takeover
in 1975 by pledging an end to corruption--apparently
have chosen to chance an outburst of public indignation
rather than weaken their position by divulging incrimi-
nating details.
Given the aggressive nature of the Honduran press,
it is unlikely that the military will be able to prevent
the identities of the guilty officers from ultimately
becoming public. Moreover, the risks inherent in smug-
gling drugs in Honduras have increased as a result of
the seizures, the investigation, and the public spotlight
focused on narcotics. Still, no major traffickers have
been arrested, no key networks have been dismantled.
It appears likely, therefore, that trafficking will con-
tinue and that as yet undiscovered networks will become
more proficient and prolific.
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LEBANON: Troops Destroy Opium Poppy Fields
Press reports from Beirut claim that Lebanese Army
and police units, supported by Syrian troops stationed
in the Bekaa Valley, have destroyed 180 acres of opium
poppies planted in the area. Other sources confirm that
the raids took place, but put the acreage destroyed
somewhat lower.
Lebanese and Syrian authorities have been concerned
about the spread of opium poppy plantings in the Bekaa
and were particularly apprehensive about the presence of
outsiders in the area. Lebanese newspapers have raised
the specter of Mafia involvement
Reports of opium poppy cultivation in the Bekaa
area first surfaced in 1976. Lebanese Agriculture min-
istry officials reported that acreage planted in poppies
in 1977 was small--perhaps as low as 25 acres--but pre-
dicted the amount would rise owing to the profitability
of the opium crop. A Drug Enforcement Agency official
visited the Bekaa area in late 1977, but could not con-
firm these estimates.
The Lebanese-Syrian force carefully avoided any
action against the extensive hashish plantings in the
Bekaa. Lebanese authorities have traditionally turned
a blind eye toward the hashish trade--which is dominated
by politically powerful figures--and the Syrians have
been reluctant to get involved.
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NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
(Editor's Note: These items, produced for other CIA
publications, do not deal specifically with the inter-
national narcotics situation. They are included here
because they concern developing situations that could.
impact on the international narcotics control effort.)
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Postelection Tension Continues
The Dominican Republic remains uneasy because of
delays in the official certification of Antonio Guzman's
victory in the presidential election last month as a
result of legal challenges and administrative haggling.
The challenges--pushed primarily by National Police Chief
Neit Nivar--have not affected the widespread popular be-
lief that Guzman won fairly. Official results will prob-
ably be announced this week.
Early last month, leaders of the military establish-
ment met with Guzman and publicly pledged to back his ad-
ministration after he agreed to hold his leftist support-
ers in check and not interfere with the armed forces.
Nonetheless, a faction led by Major General Neit Nivar,
the chief of the national police, continued a backstairs
campaign to block certification of Guzman's election and
stir up anti-Communist sentiment favorable to new elec-
tions. Nivar masterminded the military intervention
that briefly halted the vote count last May and has long
been a central figure in the corruption surrounding the
Balaguer government.
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In the past month, Balaguer's diehard supporters--
backed by Nivar--have succeeded in ousting both the
chairman and the secretary of the Central Electoral Com-
mission and have swamped it with legal challenges that
have blocked the official declaration of a winner. In
an apparent effort at intimidation, Nivar's police tem-
porarily detained the head of the commission's computer
center and, according to the press, have remained at the
center to monitor the final tabulations. Last Monday,
an unidentified group raided the commission and stole
several thousand voter identification and registration
cards.
For his part, Balaguer has publicly congratulated
Guzman and has received him three times in the national
palace since the election. Their most recent meeting on
17 June was well publicized and undoubtedly helped ease
public fears. Balaguer has also authorized his apparent
successor to visit various government departments and has
assigned security protection for both Guzman and his run-
ning mate. Moreover, the President has strongly opposed
a Nivar-backed effort to ram through promilitary legisla-
tion without the approval of the new administration and
has flatly rejected Nivar's attempt to have a rival gen-
eral dismissed.
Nevertheless, Balaguer has not called off Nivar or
restrained ruling-party extremists, who he apparently
believes deserve their day in court. Balaguer is aware
of the uneasiness but still refuses to intervene directly.
He told the US Ambassador that he fully expects to step
down in August, but that legal challenges aimed primarily
at congressional and municipal returns should run their
course in accordance with the constitution. He also ex-
pressed complete confidence in his control of the military
which is seriously divided by factional rivalries.
Balaguer's ambivalence will keep tensions high among
a population that generally accepts the unofficial Guzman
victory but continues to suspect behind-the-scenes maneu-
vering. The majority of the military and most political
forces favor a peaceful transition and are almost certain
to increase pressure on Balaguer to resolve the confusion.
They especially want him to rein in Nivar, whose provoca-
tive actions could lead to civil conflict.
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Noteworthy Political and
Economic Developments
MALAYSIA: Election Preview
On the eve of a national parliamentary election and
10 state elections, the position of Prime Minister Hussein
Onn and the 10-party ruling National Front he leads is
fairly secure. Malaysia's sound economy combined with a
fragmented political opposition will probably produce a
strong Front showing. Nevertheless, latent racial ten-
sion and strains between conservative and moderate Malays
might cut into Front strength, particularly that of
Hussein's own party, the United Malays National Organiza-
tion. Hussein's postponement until after the election of
the UMNO General Assembly--at which he expects to be con-
firmed as party president--suggests that these divisions
have already affected the Prime Minister's election
strategy.
Although the legal deadline for the next election
was not until late 1979, Hussein's decision to call one
for 8 July came as no surprise. Malaysia's economy,
which has grown impressively in 1978, is expected to
slow down by next year. Moreover, the two opposition
parties of any significance--the conservative Malay
Islamic Party (PAS) and the Chinese Democratic Action
Party (DAP)--are both at low points. PAS was soundly de-
feated in the Kelantan State election last March by UMNO
and Berjasa, a non-Front Malay party that worked closely
with UMNO. The DAP has suffered from internal leader-
ship struggles.
Hussein's record on issues other than economic ones
will also work to the Front's favor. The Prime Minister
has won general approval for working to reduce communal
tensions, cracking down on corruption, stepping up opera-
tions against Communist insurgency, and promoting friendly
relations with Communist nations--including Vietnam and
Cambodia--while remaining neutral in the Sino-Soviet
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rivalry and reiterating Malaysia's desire to gain interna-
tional recognition of Southeast Asia as a zone of peace,
freedom, and neutrality.
What is less clear is why Hussein chose to postpone
the UMNO General Assembly--originally scheduled for
22-25 June, a period now included in the 17-day campaign
leading up to the election. Hussein, who has been acting
president of UMNO since assuming the premiership on the
death of his predecessor in early 1976, probably would
have preferred to be confirmed as UMNO leader before
starting to campaign. This would not only have enhanced
his political standing nationally, but would have given
him a freer hand to shift or remove certain UMNO members
in the cabinet whose views Hussein does not share.
The election announcement and simultaneous post-
ponement of the UMNO General Assembly earlier this month
may reflect increasing uncertainty on Hussein's part
over a harmonious UMNO convention. One element of UMNO
in particular--the Youth League--is angry over Hussein's
refusal to pardon former Youth League President. Harun
and renounce plans for establishing a predominantly
Chinese university. Although this group would not threaten
Hussein's chances for the party presidency, it might em-
barrass him by nominating someone else or staging a
walkout.
A strong showing nationally may not ensure a smooth
UMNO convention, but it would probably minimize acrimony.
Hussein has moved to prevent flareups of racial tension
and charges of government favoritism toward Chinese during
the campaign. The government has stepped up naval patrols
to minimize the number of refugees arriving from Indo-
china--many of whom increasingly have been Chinese--and
it has banned all rallies during the campaign period.
The government's arrest in April of the DAP chairman
for allegedly violating the Official Secrets Act--al-
though done after a thorough, two-year investigation--
may also have been aimed at currying favor with the
Malay electorate while discrediting a Chinese opposition
leader among non-Malay voters.
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Noteworthy Political and
Economic Developments
PERU: Constituent Assembly Election Results
Based on unofficial returns, Peru's two main con-
tending parties received 63 percent of the vote in the
constituent assembly election on 18 June. Victor Haya
de la Torre's moderate leftist American Popular Revolu-
tionary Alliance (APRA) captured 36 seats in the 100-
seat assembly, and Luis Bedoya's more conservative Pop-
ular Christian Party garnered 27.
Six extreme leftist parties won a surprising 30 per-
cent of the vote in what appears to have been a protest
against the economic austerity program of the military
government.
Plans for postelection cooperation between the two
major parties in the assembly--which will begin work next
month on a new constitution--are already well advanced.
Octogenarian Haya de la Torre reportedly will be selected
as assembly president. The two parties earlier expressed
confidence that they would have little trouble overriding
radical leftist assemblymen on basic constitutional ques-
tions, but the strong showing by the left in the balloting
could make assembly deliberations more difficult than
expected.
Besides drafting the constitution--which could take
only five or six months--the assembly will provide an
important link between the military government and the
political parties to smooth the way for the transition
to civilian rule, now scheduled for 1980.
The Peruvian military is said to be increasingly
weary of governing and could call presidential and
legislative elections early next year. This could per-
mit a civilian government to be installed next summer,
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but both military and civilian political leaders are
reluctant to effect the transition until the economy is
stabilized. Much, therefore, depends on the military
government's handling of the economic crisis.
Peru's need for loans to meet debt service obliga-
tions is critical, but the International Monetary Fund
and private banks have adopted a wait-and-see attitude
following'the imposition of the austerity program in May.
This has forced the central bank to conclude an $85-mil-
lion swap arrangement with its counterparts in Venezuela,
Brazil, Spain, Mexico, and Argentina.
The swap arrangement will help temporarily, but Peru
intends to refinance $6.14 billion in medium- and long-
term public and private sector debt. Without refinancing,
annual payments for the next three years on public debt
alone would exceed 50 percent of the value of Peru's ex-
ports.
For the democratization plan of President Morales
Bermudez to succeed, the government will have to contain
social unrest among a populace already financially hard-
pressed by successive austerity programs. The new civilian
economic team appointed in May will also have to provide
imaginative solutions for the country's -economic malaise,
including restimulating the beleaguered private sector.
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BRIEFS
ECUADOR: INCREASED EVIDENCE THAT PRESIDENT POVEDA IS
PERSONALLY COMMITTED TO A NARCOTICS CONTROL CAMPAIGN.
Several events in recent weeks appear to be directly
related to, or will have an impact on, Quito's an-
nounced "war" on drugs. These developments include:
(1) the dismissal of several judges on grounds of
narcotics-related corruption; (2) the removal of
the head of the National Police Narcotics Service
in Quito and the chief of police in Guayaquil; (3)
the resignation of the subsecretary of government
who was the mission's primary contact on narcotics
matters; and (4) a high-level expression of interest
in stopping the shipment of illicit drugs aboard
Ecuadorean flag ships. The Embassy believes that,
although all of the results of these events will not
necessarily be positive and they do not reflect an
unalloyed antinarcotics effort, they are evidence
that President Poveda's commitment to a "war" on
drugs is more than just rhetoric. The Embassy views
the removal of the NPNS chief and the dismissal of
the judges as the most positive evidence to date
that the Government of Ecuador is serious about its
antinarcotics effort. Although the Embassy regards
the new evidence of high-level dedication as encour-
aging, it cautions that it remains to be seen whether
this high-level dedication can overcome underlying
institutional inertia and corruption.
HONDURAS: COMMISSION COMPLETES INVESTIGATION OF MILITARY
INVOLVEMENT IN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING. The high-level
Honduran commission created to investigate alleged
involvement of several active and former military
officers in international narcotics trafficking has
concluded its investigation and issued a communique.
This statement, which was made public on 24 June,
claimed that the investigation showed that "no of-
ficer on active duty" was involved in the alleged
narcotics scandal. The communique did note, however,
that, in carrying out its investigation, the commis-
sion had established that some members of the armed
forces may have committed "irregularities" in carry-
ing out their duties, and that they will be subject
to military justice. Names and the details of the
investigation were not made public.
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it
seems inevitable that further information concern-
ing the drug scandal linking military officers with
the ongoing speculation involving military
personalities can only lead to increased public
pressure for a full investigation of alleged gov-
ernment misdeeds, placing an even heavier strain on
the regime. The Embassy notes that the communique
attempts to make "a molehill out of a mountain" of
speculation and charges which have occupied public
attention since last December. It notes further
that whether the downplay of alleged military in-
volvement in narcotics trafficking is successful
will depend on the strength of public reaction and
whether further incriminating information leaks out.
ITALY: DRUG ABUSE BECOMING MORE SERIOUS IN THE ITALIAN
ARMED SERVICES. The spread of drug use in the bar-
racks has become a growing concern among Italian
military leaders, according to a recent attache re-
port from Rome. The Minister of Defense admitted
a few months ago that drug use among the Italian
military was increasing. The attache report notes
that probable causes of the increased drug use in-
clude excessive fatigue, idleness, unsuitability
for military service, and frustration, as well as
hardship and danger. A young Italian doctor, who has
followed the drug problem during his military serv-
ice, claims that Italian servicemen involved with
drugs are now turning from marijuana and hashish to
hard drugs. As a control measure, the Italian mili-
tary is increasing surveillance in military hospitals,
especially in those where methadone and heroin are
most readily accessible. The growing problem of
drug addiction within the armed services is said to
reflect the growing drug abuse problem in the coun-
try as a whole, where it is now acknowledged to be
a major social problem. Even though the percentage
of drug abusers within the military is still less
than the percentage of users throughout the country,
concern is growing among the military leadership.
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FOREIGN MEDIA
Dpauuyiab--Banamian Dru _Arr ests--TNDD, No. L/7849, 22 June
1978, p. 26. Bahamian police recently seized 200
pounds of cocaine valued at some $100 million. A
former minister of the government has also been
arrested on drug smuggling charges unrelated to
this seizure.
BANGLADESH--Drugs, Rebels, and Refu ees--TNDD, No. L/7861,
p. 3. The initial reluctance of Burma and Bangla-
desh to move toward a settlement of their border
problem has spawned rumors that there are forces at
work beyond the control of either. According to a
report in the Hong Kong Asia Week, some sort of an
alliance is emerging between Burmese Communists and
Bengalee and Indian border insurgents. No less
ominous is another theory that centers on the drying
up of traditional opium routes through Laos and
Thailand. According to this view, the Arakanese,
in collaboration with the Shans and the Karens of
Burma, are attempting to open a drug trafficking
route through Bangladesh. Both Rangoon and Dacca
*US Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) Translations on Nar-
cotics and Dangerous Drugs. Published by JPRS, 1000 Glebe Road,
Arlington, Va., 22201.
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seem anxious to contain the problem before third
parties move in, but whether the assorted libera-
tionists of the three border regions--Burma, Bang-
ladesh, and India--and the hardy drug merchants of
the Golden Triangle would let them is another matter.
BOLIVIA--Drug Agreements With Peru Set at Conference--
TNDD, No. L/7849, pp. 27-28. At the first sub-
regional conference on illegal drug traffic, which
concluded in Lima in late May, Bolivia and Peru
agreed to sign agreements on programs to replace
the cultivation of coca leaf in the two countries.
The Andean meeting was attended by delegations from
Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela.
Several documents, divided into legal, social,
operational, and other specific areas, were approved.
In the social area, the approved document makes rec-
ommendations for taking action against drug traffic
in the Andean subregion.
BRAZIL--National Security Law May Cover Drug Trafficking
Crimes--TNDD, No. L/7849, p. 30. The Government of
Brra 1 may include drug trafficking among the crimes
covered by the National Security Law, in accordance
with a proposal from the ministers of the Superior
Military Court who compose the committee formed re-
cently to review Decree-Law 898/69, which defines
crimes against security. In principle, the members
believe that the transfer of jurisdiction from the
civilian courts to the military will afford greater
speed in the suits brought against traffickers.
More importantly, they believe that military law
will lend greater uniformity to the decisions.
Traffickers are currently tried by the state courts
of justice, which leads to a wide variety of opin-
ions. Still at issue is whether the National Secu-
rity Law should deal with questions of international
narcotics trafficking or deal only with domestic
trafficking.
BRUNEI--Drug Traffickers Turning to Smaller Countries--
TNDD, No. L/7849, p. 1 (Borneo Bulletin). Drug
traffickers are turning from the major centers of
the world to lesser known places like Brunei to
carry out their illicit trade, according to the
Borneo press. This point was made recently at a
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symposium on drug abuse by the staff forensic pathol-
ogist at the Singapore General Hospital. The
doctor claimed traffickers were turning to smaller
places to avoid the tougher laws of many of the
larger countries. He also pointed out that many
drug users in South Asia turned to hard drugs, espe-
cially heroin, after starting on soft drugs such
as marijuana.
COLOMBIA--First Coca Plantation Described--TNDD, No.
L/7861, pp. 70-71. The first organized plantation
of coca plants known to exist in Colombia was dis-
covered recently. A total of over 1,800 coca plants
was counted, along with a nursery with 6,144 plants
ready for planting. Also, a major crop of marijuana
plants was found on a nearby plot of land. The
discovery of necessary equipment has also lead
Colombian authorities to believe that it was planned
to set up a laboratory to refine cocaine at the
same location.
COLOMBIA--Marijuana, Cocaine Major Source of Foreign
Earnings--TNDD, No. W7849, pp. 41-42 (Business Times
correspondent in Bogota). Colombia's main source
of foreign exchange has traditionally been coffee,
but since the mid-1960s cocaine and marijuana have
begun to compete, even with the recent high price
of coffee beans. The Colombian Attorney General
estimates that the current income from drug traf-
ficking approximates $8 billion annually. The arti-
cle goes on to say that most experts regard this
figure as too high; their estimates range from
$1 billion to $3 billion. The article further notes
that the flood of currency from illicit drugs has
contributed to Colombia's grave economic problems.
Not only do many of the drug dollars go straight
into circulation, but the attractiveness of marijuana
as a low investment, high profit, cash crop has caused
a drop in food production boosting inflation. Cocaine
is said to be even more difficult to control. Local
narcotics officers are cited as estimating that from
3,000 to 10,000 kilograms per month of refined cocaine
pass through Colombia.
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SEYCHELLES--More Effective Anti-Drug Campaign Pro osed--
TNDD, No. L/7861, p. 122. According to the Minis-
ter of Labor, Health, and Welfare, drug use is be-
coming more and more of a threat in the Seychelles,
and a more effective means will have to be found
to combat narcotics trafficking there. Another of-
ficial noted that six or seven years ago a drug
problem was nonexistent in the Seychelles. The gov-
ernment first became aware of the rumors regarding
drugs about the end of 1969 or the beginning of
1970. He explained that drugs were first brought
in by travelers for their own use but that this usage
served to introduce the drugs to the Seychellois.
SRI LANKA--Colombo New Transit Point for Drug Traffick-
ers--TNDD, No. L/7861, pp. 31-32. The Sri Lanka
police, in collaboration with Interpol, have re-
portedly blown the lid off a multimillion dollar
international narcotics racket. A Pakistani, a
British subject, and a Canadian are believed to be
involved in the trafficking scheme with a Sri Lanka
citizen. Police sources claim it has been estab-
lished "beyond doubt" that Colombo has become a
transit point to certain Western countries for an
international ring of narcotics traffickers from
Thailand.
SINGAPORE--Major Drug Syndicates Avoid Singapore--TNDD,
No. L/7849, p. 19. Major drug syndicates are now
bypassing Singapore because of the republic's strin-
gent laws, including the death penalty and detention
without trial. Singapore authorities claim there
has been a marked decrease in heroin addiction among
youths during the past few months. Official statis-
tics show that 7,737 youths were detained in Singa-
pore during the first three months of this year, and
that the number of inmates at the Drug Rehabilita-
tion Center has dropped to less than 3,000. Most
of those arrested were repeats; official sources
claimed there were no new cases of addiction during
the first three months of the year. Although the
syndicates reportedly were being put out of business,
another breed of drug runner known as "ant pushers"
has emerged. These are the traffickers who smuggle
small amounts of heroin into the country, making de-
tection difficult. The number of these "ant pushers"
reportedly has mushroomed.
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THAILAND--Kuomintang Remnants Intercept Heroin Caravan
for Police--TNI1D, No. L/7861, p. 63. Remnants of
the Kuomintang army under General Lao Lee intercepted
a narcotics caravan recently on a jungle trail near
Chiang Mai and seized about 12 kilograms of No. 4
heroin, according to an item in the Bangkok Post.
According to police reports, the Chinese irregulars
informed the Thai military about the drug caravan
and offered to intercept it. The drug haul was
turned over to Thai narcotics police and was air-
lifted to Chiang Mai.
TURKEY--Heroin Smuggling Ring Broken--TNDD, No. L/7861,
p. 129. The Istanbul Narcotics Police reportedly
have uncovered a smuggling ring attempting to smug-
gle heroin out of the country. In one seizure the
heroin was concealed in a pair of shoes. The Nar-
cotics Police have announced that they are in the
process of instituting new measures to prevent nar-
cotics from passing through Customs. The article
made no mention of the source of the heroin or the
country of suspected origin of the opium from which
the heroin was processed. One of the Turkish traf-
fickers had adopted the alias "Alkapon"--any simi-
larity to the name "Al Capone" is probably highly
intentional.
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