INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS REVIEW

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00912A001900010016-1
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RIPPUB
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S
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26
Document Creation Date: 
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 3, 2008
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16
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REPORT
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Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912AO01900010016-1 Foreign Assessment Center International Narcotics Review State Dept. review completed DOJ review(s) completed. Secret RP INR 78-001 2 August 1978 COPY Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912AO01900010016-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912AO01900010016-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912AO01900010016-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912A001900010016-1 SECRET INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS REVIEW 2 August 1978 CONTENTS THAILAND: Traffickers in Refugee Clothing . . . . . Indecision among Thai police and provincial officials over the interpretation of the government edict expelling Burmese dissidents from Thailand is seriously undermining its effectiveness. BOLIVIA: Pereda's Weak Position Likely To Affect Drug Control Efforts. . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Political dissension in the coca-growing area could jeopardize the proposed crop substitution program in Bolivia. This publication was formerly entitled International Narcotics Bi- weekly Review. This publication is prepared by analysts in the National Foreign Assessment Center for specialists in the Washington community who are interested in international narcotics matters. Comments and queries are welcome. SECRET Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912A001900010016-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912AO01900010016-1 SECRET NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS: 3. Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4. Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 FOREIGN MEDIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 ii SECRET Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912AO01900010016-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912AO01900010016-1 THAILAND: Traffickers in Refugee Clothing Indecision among Thai police and government of- ficials in the Burma-Thailand border area over the interpretation of the edict expelling Burmese dissident (trafficking) groups from the country is seriously undermining its effectiveness. Although many of the smaller insurgent trafficking groups have departed Thailand, albeit temporarily, the major target of this edict, the Shan United Army (SUA) still maintained an armed presence beyond the 4 July deadline. The SUA along with several other dissident groups has adopted schemes for avoiding complete compliance with the Thai order. Most of the other Burmese dissident organizations had reportedly returned to the Burma side of the border as of 4 July. These groups are now in the process of rebuilding their narcotics infrastructure along the border inside Burma. However, it will be most difficult to prevent the use by these groups of both sides of the border in future narcotics activities, lacking an effec- tive Thai and Burmese presence in the area. It is the need for such an armed presence by the two governments involved that is the key to the success of the Thai effort. This would require some form of 2 August 1978 1 SECRET Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912AO01900010016-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912AO01900010016-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912AO01900010016-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912AO01900010016-1 SEC:KET permanent garrisoning of Thai and Burmese troops along the border to deny these groups access. There appears to be no intention on the part of either'government to depart from the strategy of periodic border raids. It is not believed that this strategy will effectively reduce the use of the border area for the production and export of heroin out of the Golden Triangle. 2 August 1978 SECRET Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912AO01900010016-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912AO01900010016-1 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied Iq Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912AO01900010016-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912A001900010016-1 BOLIVIA: Pereda's Weak Position Likely To Affect Drug Control Efforts The recent shift of political winds in Bolivia may have adverse repercussions for future drug control. In the two weeks since General Pereda took power in Bolivia, he has been unable to attract strong support for his government, either from the major political parties or within the military. So far he has attempted to appease his opponents by releasing political pris- oners and offering to hold new elections in 1980. His administration, however, is very weak, and a major challenge to his authority could produce a more repres- sive dictatorship. Pereda's efforts to form a government of national unity have failed. He has constructed a makeshift cabinet consisting largely of undistinguished representa- tives of various political sectors. His key advisers-- longtime civilian aides to former President Banzer--are widely resented in the military and are of questionable loyalty to Pereda. The greatest potential threat to his authority comes from the military. Pereda has never been popular with the Army, Bolivia's most powerful service, and he created additional antagonisms on the day of the coup by threatening to deploy Air Force units in Santa Cruz against garrisons in La Paz. Moreover, he has passed over the top generals to fill key posts with those officers who helped him attain the presidency. In this highly charged atmosphere, a violent up- rising of peasants in an outlying province has generated new tensions. The clash between peasants and govern- ment troops last week occurred in the Yungas--an area noted for its coca production. The incident may have been largely a protest against efforts begun under Banzer to register coca growers in an attempt to stem the illicit manufacture and traffic of cocaine. 2 August 1978 7 SECRET Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912A001900010016-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912AO01900010016-1 Some 70 percent of the approximately 12,000 farmers in the Yungas depend on coca cultivation for their livelihood. Many of these farmers have privately stated that they will refuse to comply with regulatory laws and will physically resist any efforts by officials to enforce such laws. There have also been reports that leftist politi- cian Siles Zuarzo incited the peasants to rebel against Pereda--an incident that runs counter to traditional close ties between the peasants and the military. The issue further divides those who think the military must get out of politics and those who are ready to man the barricades against subversion. In any case, the imbroglio points to continued uncertainty and political instability that could jeopardize plans for coca crop substitution in Bolivia. Pereda is aware, however, of the important role that drug control measures play in bilateral relations with Washington. He also knows that Bolivia will receive as much as $45 million worth of agricultural assistance from the US provided crop substitution efforts continue. Even if Pereda survives the present political turmoil, he is still likely to move cautiously on the sensitive 2 August 1978 Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912AO01900010016-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912A001900010016-1 ,L'i_jri NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS (Editor's Note: These items, produced for other CIA publications, do not deal specifically with the inter- national narcotics situation. They are included here because they concern developing situations that could impact on the international narcotics control effort.) 25X6 2 August 1978 Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912A001900010016-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912AO01900010016-1 Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied Iq Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912AO01900010016-1 Approved For Release 2008/1 2/03 :CIA-RDP79T00912A001900010016-1 Noteworthy Political and Economic Developments TURKEY: Continuing Problems With Political Violence Despite repeated assurances by government officials that public order will be restored, the tempo of Turkey's domestic violence continues to rise. The death toll from clashes between extremist groups now averages more than one person per day. There are indications that Kurdish separatist incidents in the southeast are also increasing. Urban Violence Violence has declined on the campuses, partly as a result of government efforts to disperse extremist groups at the schools and partly because summer vacations have begun. More clashes are taking place in the city streets, however, making the work of the security forces more dif- ficult. The killings are no longer targeted only against members of rival groups. Several government security of- ficials have also been assassinated. Extremists are be- coming more brazen; many of the recent killings have oc- curred in crowded public areas during daylight. The fear of reprisals prevents witnesses from testifying. The Council of Ministers discussed the situation for 11 hours on 14 July. Their focus was the prevention and quelling of violence in Istanbul and Ankara. On 28 June the National Security Council recommen ed t e use of military measures that fall just short of martial law. Thus far the Council's recommendations apparently have been implemented only in the Kurdish areas of south- east Turkey. The use of the regular military--as distinct 2 August 1978 Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912A001900010016-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912AO01900010016-1 D LLt . from the Jandarma--in the cities would involve serious problems and political risks that Ecevit probably would accept only as a last resort. The attitudes and efficiency of the security forces in the cities have recently come under fire from Prime Minister Ecevit. In an effort to reduce efforts to exert political influence on the national police, the govern- ment attempted to ban the two main police associations-- the leftist Pol-Der and the rightist Pol-Bir--but the ban was suspended by the courts. Even if the ban is implemented, it would not enhance the ability of the police to cope with anarchy. The forensic and investi- gative techniques used in Turkey are inadequate for the needs of modern police work, and there is little system- atic preparation of criminal evidence. The Kurds The situation in the Kurdish areas is unclear. Several reports of violent incidents in the southeast have appeared in the press recently, and the government has announced that clashes between rival Iraqi Kurdish groups occasionally spill over into Turkey. The reported implementation of the National Secu- rity Council recommendations indicates the seriousness with which the government views the situation in the southeast. Jandarma and military units in the area have been reinforced and instructed to provide daily situation reports to the General Staff. House-to-house searches and roadblocks are being used to ferret out arms caches, while night military maneuvers have been introduced in an attempt to reduce after-dark gun smuggling. Ecevit's Response Ecevit is coming under increasing criticism from all sides for his government's inability to reduce the violence. The imposition of martial law or severely 2 August 1978 Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912AO01900010016-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79TOO912AO01900010016-1 repressive measures in urban areas is not likely, how- ever, in the near future. Ecevit is personally opposed to such measures and is reluctant to repeat Turkey's previous experience with martial law. Moreover, he still has time in which to maneuver. Parliament has adjourned until November, and the threat of a no-confidence vote is not immediate. Still, it is clear that if the level of violence is not reduced by the end of the year, the government's continued existence will be threatened. This may have been a factor in Ecevit's decision to authorize measures in the southeast similar to those he deplored as opposition leader. Urban violence presents a different problem and, unlike the Kurdish incidents, is difficult to blame on foreigners. Ecevit apparently has not yet found a formula for dealing with the situation in the cities that will be both effective and in accord with his political principles. 2 August 1978 Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912AO01900010016-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912A001900010016-1 SECRET Noteworthy Political and Economic Developments AFGHANISTAN: Growing Opposition After three months in power, internal security re- mains the top priority of the Afghan Government. Violent resistance is generally confined to the eastern tribal provinces and, for the moment, presents no serious threat to the regime, but opposition appears to be growing within the military and the population in general. Since the leftist "revolution" on 27 April, self-pro- claimed opposition groups, both within Afghanistan and in neighboring Pakistan, have been growing in number.l- We do not know the size or strength of the various rightist and religious opposition groups. They appear, however, to lack the cohesive leadership and support within the military necessary to challenge the regime. The eastern tribal provinces have always been difficult for any central government to control. Disillusionment within the military could eventually prove more dangerous to President Taraki's regime than the dissatisfaction of either rightwing opposition groups or tribal dissidents. Disaffection within the armed forces could arise if Taraki's policies appeared to be anti-Muslim or if the regime allied itself too closely with the Soviet Union. Continued action against the tribesmen--some of whom are relatives of military officers--could also provoke a military coup. Taraki has attempted to consolidate his control over the military 2 August 1978 17 SECRET Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912A001900010016-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912AO01900010016-1 SECRET The civilian party leadership appears to be engaged in a campaign to downgrade the military's contribution to the April revolution; the military is not represented on the important Political Bureau of the ruling party's Central 2 August 1978 18 SECRET Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912AO01900010016-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912AO01900010016-1 SECRET BRIEFS SRI LANKA: IN RECENT MONTHS THERE HAS BEEN AN APPARENT INCREASE IN NARCOTICS ACTIVITY IN SRI LANKA. The local press has been giving prominent coverage to drug trafficking and police efforts to counter it. Arrests of foreign tourists transiting the island as well as Sri Lankan nationals arrested abroad have increased local. concerns that the island may be, or is in the process of becoming, a transship- ment point for drugs smuggled from other countries in the region. While there is no domestic produc- tion, the government. displays a continuing interest in antinarcotics activities and will host a,regional narcotics conference in November. In contrast to the previous regime, the present government has ex- pressed interest in obtaining American training for local drug enforcement officers either in the US or in Sri Lanka. The Embassy in Colombo reports that the Sri Lankan Government would be favorably dis- posed to any offer of.narcotics training. AFGHANISTAN: NEW GOVERNMENT WANTS JOINT'COMMISSION OF NARCOTICS MATTERS TO BE CONTINUED. According to the American Ambassador in Kabul, who discussed the matter with Afghan Foreign Minister Amin recently, the new regime, which took over in Kabul last.April, wants the Joint Commission to continue to function. The Commission., which includes representatives from the Government of Afghanistan, the UN, and the US Mission in Kabul, had operated for about eight months before the 27 April revolution and was chaired by Mohammad Yahya Maroofi, who continued to serve in the Foreign Ministry following the over- throw of the-government. Maroofi told an Embassy officer recently that he had already written to the several Afghan ministries represented on the Joint Commission and asked them to nominate new members. He also noted that he intends to call a meeting of the Commission sometime this month. Amin, in his recent talk with the Ambassador, also affirmed that the new government wants to combat opium cultiva- tion "to the extent possible." The Ambassador views this as possibly a veiled reference to reports of resistance to the new regime in tribal areas where 2 August 1978 SECRET Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912AO01900010016-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912A001900010016-1 SECRET opium poppies are grown, and also to problems the government would face if it tried to move too hast- ily against poppy cultivation, especially at a time when the government is seeking political support in the tribal areas. Kabul has also agreed to continue the UN's drug enforcement program but has requested that a representative from a "neutral country" be named to head the project in place of West German Police Captain Christian Magnussen whose contract has ex- pired. The UN Division of Narcotics Drugs is cur- rently looking for a Scandinavian, a Swiss, or an Austrian to fill the post. EGYPT: OPIUM PRODUCTION REPORTEDLY IS INCREASING. Ac- cording to officials of the Egyptian Anti-Narcotics General Administration (ANGA), increased acreage eradication and lower market prices for locally 2 August 1978 SECRET Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912A001900010016-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912A001900010016-1 grown opium are pointing toward a dramatic increase in production. Reports of a second harvest this spring also add to the Egyptian fears. Other reports indicate that production, which- has traditionally been confined to the Asyut area of upper Egypt, is now beginnin to spread to other areas ANGA fears that the already i icu t Z ask detecting opium plantings will became even harder if plantings spread and has asked US offi- cials for aid in the detection phase of its eradi- cation program. 2 August 1978 21 SECRET Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912A001900010016-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912AO01900010016-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912AO01900010016-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912A001900010016-1 SECRET two-thirds as much hashish oil; and more heroin than in all of 1977. Bureau officials view the large-scale seizures as evidence of the "fantastic" level of use of these drugs in Australia rather than an indication of Australia becoming a transshipment point. BRAZIL--Three Nations Cooperate To Suppress "Uruguayan Connection"--TNDD, No. L/7916, p. 45. According to the Brazilian press, drug specialists from Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina are setting up a new police ring to suppress the traffic of addictive drugs. This action follows the report that Uruguay is the main underground source for Brazilian addicts. DENMARK--Dealers Hope To Hook Clientele: Sell Uncut Heroin--TNDD, No. L/7916, pp. 64-65. In an article ti It ed, "Narcotics Offenders Sell Pure Heroin at Dumping Prices," the Copenhagen press charges that "cynical narcotics dealers" are responsible for re- cent deaths and acute illness among Danish narcotics addicts. They claim that the dealers sell. heroin that is nearly pure at dumping prices in order to create a large market and then later raise prices drastically. Some of the heroin seized by narcotics police in Copenhagen was 73 percent pure. Such high potency often leads to illness requiring hospitalization and may lead to death. In addition to hard drugs, many addicts also use sleeping pills and other medicines or alcohol. If they also take heroin with a strength of 20 percent, they can be- come gravely ill or even die. 2 August 1978 23 SECRET Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912A001900010016-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912A001900010016-1 bhcm,r EGYPT--Major Drug Seizure Reported--TNDD, No. L/7905, pp. 96-98. The antinarcotics department recently seized 2.5 tons of narcotics powder valued at nearly $8 million. According to the Cairo press, enough powder was involved to make 25 million drug tablets. The Egyptian prosecutor's office has decided to seek life imprisonment for the five defendants and is investigating how they were able to get the ap- proval of the pharmaceutical department of the Min- istry of Health to release the drugs. HONG KONG--Antidrug Needle Proves Effective--TNDD, No. L/7916, pp. 8-9. The treatment of heroin and opium addicts by acupuncture and electrostimulation is reported to have achieved outstanding results since being introduced in Hong Kong a year ago. Accord- ing to the report, the treatment, which is relatively inexpensive and involves no medicines, has been more effective than anticipated. The method involves electrostimulation through a pair of acupuncture needles which are inserted simultaneously into the outer ears. More than 800 patients have been treated at the facility since it opened a year ago. HONG KONG--Karachi Drug Link Probed--TNDD, No. L/7916, p. 13. After several months investigation into the "Karachi Connection," raw opium worth about $250,000 has been found near the Pakistan Club in Hong Kong. Police believe two syndicates operated by local Pakistanis have been importing raw opium from Pak- istan--perhaps as much as 7.5 tons in the past year. Narcotics Bureau detectives believe the Pakistani operators have been recruiting local gangs to dis- tribute the opium, which is probably being brought in by freighter. They believe the Pakistanis are among the new syndicates which have been trying to fill the vacuum left by traffickers who have been arrested. They also believe the Pakistanis are trying to cash in on the drug market shortage caused by the increasingly strict checks on drugs from Thailand. INDONESIA--Flow of Foreign Narcotics a Threat to Indo- nesians--TNDD, No. L/7916, p. 20. According to a top ranking police officer in Jakarta, Indonesians 2 August 1978 Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912A001900010016-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912AO01900010016-1 are being threatened with drug addiction from nar- cotics coming from China and Thailand. He claims that opium seized during a recent raid was wrapped in plastic bags identified as made in China. He claimed further that opium being cultivated in southern China is shipped to Hong Kong and then to Singapore and other areas in Asia. He noted that most of the 210 people recently arrested were state- less Chinese living in Indonesia and claimed that the smugglers work through syndicates headquartered in Bangkok, Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur, and Singapore. He further noted that Jakarta has become a send-off point for morphine going to Amsterdam, and that the Island of Bali has become a center for drug traffic aimed at Australia. His fear is that drug addiction may become a big problem in Indonesia if it becomes a transit area for drugs going to Australia and to Europe. Indonesian officials have been warning of an increased use of drugs in Indonesia, especially in the cities. ITALY--Traffickers Using Procaine To Cut Heroin--TNDD, No. L/7916, pp. 106-109. The latest heroin coming on the market in Rome is cut with procaine,, an anes- thetic that may kill instantly, according.-to the toxicological experts of the Court of Rome. Heroin being brought into Italy is highly potent-about 70 percent purity and is of the "brown sugar" type which the Italians call "Chinese." Italian observers now claim a high addiction rate in the large cities, with Rome having 10,000 addicts. PAPUA NEW GUINEA--PNG Easy Transit Point for Drug Smug- glers--TNDD, No. L/7905, pp. 1-2. The recent haul of Asian cannabis Buddha sticks in the Coral Sea would have been worth about $30 million on the streets of Australia, according to local authori- ties. The seizure is said to confirm the long-held suspicion that PNG is an easy target for anyone with a "reasonable" boat and a little luck who wants to smuggle drugs from Asia to Australia and the South Pacific. By its own admission, PNG is extremely vulnerable as a transit point and is totally un- equipped to handle the problem--there are few Cus- toms officers, no aerial reconnaissance capability, 2 August 1978 25 SECRET Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912AO01900010016-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912AO01900010016-1 SECRET no patrol boats to cover the thousands of square miles of sea, hundreds of islands, and long coast- lines. Neither does it have the necessary radar equipment to monitor the airspace and the hundreds of small airstrips spread across the mainland and the islands. 2 August 1978 Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912AO01900010016-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912AO01900010016-1 Secret Approved For Release 2008/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00912AO01900010016-1