INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS REVIEW
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Foreign
Assessment
Center
International
Narcotics Review
State Dept.
review completed
DOJ review(s) completed.
Secret
RP INR 78-001
2 August 1978
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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS REVIEW
2 August 1978
CONTENTS
THAILAND: Traffickers in Refugee Clothing . . . . .
Indecision among Thai police and provincial
officials over the interpretation of the
government edict expelling Burmese dissidents
from Thailand is seriously undermining its
effectiveness.
BOLIVIA: Pereda's Weak Position Likely To
Affect Drug Control Efforts. . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Political dissension in the coca-growing
area could jeopardize the proposed crop
substitution program in Bolivia.
This publication was formerly entitled International Narcotics Bi-
weekly Review.
This publication is prepared by analysts in the National Foreign
Assessment Center for specialists in the Washington community who
are interested in international narcotics matters. Comments and
queries are welcome.
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NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS:
3. Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4. Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
FOREIGN MEDIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
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THAILAND: Traffickers in Refugee Clothing
Indecision among Thai police and government of-
ficials in the Burma-Thailand border area over the
interpretation of the edict expelling Burmese dissident
(trafficking) groups from the country is seriously
undermining its effectiveness. Although many of the
smaller insurgent trafficking groups have departed
Thailand, albeit temporarily, the major target of
this edict, the Shan United Army (SUA) still maintained
an armed presence beyond the 4 July deadline.
The SUA along with several other dissident groups
has adopted schemes for avoiding complete compliance
with the Thai order.
Most of the other Burmese dissident organizations
had reportedly returned to the Burma side of the border
as of 4 July. These groups are now in the process of
rebuilding their narcotics infrastructure along the
border inside Burma. However, it will be most difficult
to prevent the use by these groups of both sides of the
border in future narcotics activities, lacking an effec-
tive Thai and Burmese presence in the area.
It is the need for such an armed presence by the
two governments involved that is the key to the success
of the Thai effort. This would require some form of
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permanent garrisoning of Thai and Burmese troops along
the border to deny these groups access. There appears
to be no intention on the part of either'government
to depart from the strategy of periodic border raids.
It is not believed that this strategy will effectively
reduce the use of the border area for the production
and export of heroin out of the Golden Triangle.
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BOLIVIA: Pereda's Weak Position Likely To Affect Drug
Control Efforts
The recent shift of political winds in Bolivia
may have adverse repercussions for future drug control.
In the two weeks since General Pereda took power in
Bolivia, he has been unable to attract strong support
for his government, either from the major political
parties or within the military. So far he has attempted
to appease his opponents by releasing political pris-
oners and offering to hold new elections in 1980. His
administration, however, is very weak, and a major
challenge to his authority could produce a more repres-
sive dictatorship.
Pereda's efforts to form a government of national
unity have failed. He has constructed a makeshift
cabinet consisting largely of undistinguished representa-
tives of various political sectors. His key advisers--
longtime civilian aides to former President Banzer--are
widely resented in the military and are of questionable
loyalty to Pereda.
The greatest potential threat to his authority
comes from the military. Pereda has never been popular
with the Army, Bolivia's most powerful service, and he
created additional antagonisms on the day of the coup
by threatening to deploy Air Force units in Santa Cruz
against garrisons in La Paz. Moreover, he has passed
over the top generals to fill key posts with those
officers who helped him attain the presidency.
In this highly charged atmosphere, a violent up-
rising of peasants in an outlying province has generated
new tensions. The clash between peasants and govern-
ment troops last week occurred in the Yungas--an area
noted for its coca production. The incident may have
been largely a protest against efforts begun under
Banzer to register coca growers in an attempt to stem
the illicit manufacture and traffic of cocaine.
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Some 70 percent of the approximately 12,000
farmers in the Yungas depend on coca cultivation for
their livelihood. Many of these farmers have privately
stated that they will refuse to comply with regulatory
laws and will physically resist any efforts by officials
to enforce such laws.
There have also been reports that leftist politi-
cian Siles Zuarzo incited the peasants to rebel against
Pereda--an incident that runs counter to traditional
close ties between the peasants and the military. The
issue further divides those who think the military must
get out of politics and those who are ready to man the
barricades against subversion.
In any case, the imbroglio points to continued
uncertainty and political instability that could
jeopardize plans for coca crop substitution in Bolivia.
Pereda is aware, however, of the important role that
drug control measures play in bilateral relations with
Washington. He also knows that Bolivia will receive
as much as $45 million worth of agricultural assistance
from the US provided crop substitution efforts continue.
Even if Pereda survives the present political turmoil,
he is still likely to move cautiously on the sensitive
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,L'i_jri
NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
(Editor's Note: These items, produced for other CIA
publications, do not deal specifically with the inter-
national narcotics situation. They are included here
because they concern developing situations that could
impact on the international narcotics control effort.)
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Noteworthy Political and
Economic Developments
TURKEY: Continuing Problems With Political Violence
Despite repeated assurances by government officials
that public order will be restored, the tempo of Turkey's
domestic violence continues to rise. The death toll from
clashes between extremist groups now averages more than
one person per day. There are indications that Kurdish
separatist incidents in the southeast are also increasing.
Urban Violence
Violence has declined on the campuses, partly as a
result of government efforts to disperse extremist groups
at the schools and partly because summer vacations have
begun. More clashes are taking place in the city streets,
however, making the work of the security forces more dif-
ficult. The killings are no longer targeted only against
members of rival groups. Several government security of-
ficials have also been assassinated. Extremists are be-
coming more brazen; many of the recent killings have oc-
curred in crowded public areas during daylight. The fear
of reprisals prevents witnesses from testifying.
The Council of Ministers discussed the situation for
11 hours on 14 July. Their focus was the prevention and
quelling of violence in Istanbul and Ankara.
On 28 June the National Security Council recommen ed t e
use of military measures that fall just short of martial
law. Thus far the Council's recommendations apparently
have been implemented only in the Kurdish areas of south-
east Turkey. The use of the regular military--as distinct
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from the Jandarma--in the cities would involve serious
problems and political risks that Ecevit probably would
accept only as a last resort.
The attitudes and efficiency of the security forces
in the cities have recently come under fire from Prime
Minister Ecevit. In an effort to reduce efforts to exert
political influence on the national police, the govern-
ment attempted to ban the two main police associations--
the leftist Pol-Der and the rightist Pol-Bir--but the
ban was suspended by the courts. Even if the ban is
implemented, it would not enhance the ability of the
police to cope with anarchy. The forensic and investi-
gative techniques used in Turkey are inadequate for the
needs of modern police work, and there is little system-
atic preparation of criminal evidence.
The Kurds
The situation in the Kurdish areas is unclear.
Several reports of violent incidents in the southeast
have appeared in the press recently, and the government
has announced that clashes between rival Iraqi Kurdish
groups occasionally spill over into Turkey.
The reported implementation of the National Secu-
rity Council recommendations indicates the seriousness
with which the government views the situation in the
southeast. Jandarma and military units in the area have
been reinforced and instructed to provide daily situation
reports to the General Staff. House-to-house searches
and roadblocks are being used to ferret out arms caches,
while night military maneuvers have been introduced in
an attempt to reduce after-dark gun smuggling.
Ecevit's Response
Ecevit is coming under increasing criticism from
all sides for his government's inability to reduce the
violence. The imposition of martial law or severely
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repressive measures in urban areas is not likely, how-
ever, in the near future. Ecevit is personally opposed
to such measures and is reluctant to repeat Turkey's
previous experience with martial law. Moreover, he still
has time in which to maneuver. Parliament has adjourned
until November, and the threat of a no-confidence vote
is not immediate. Still, it is clear that if the level
of violence is not reduced by the end of the year, the
government's continued existence will be threatened.
This may have been a factor in Ecevit's decision
to authorize measures in the southeast similar to those
he deplored as opposition leader. Urban violence presents
a different problem and, unlike the Kurdish incidents,
is difficult to blame on foreigners. Ecevit apparently
has not yet found a formula for dealing with the situation
in the cities that will be both effective and in accord
with his political principles.
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Noteworthy Political and
Economic Developments
AFGHANISTAN: Growing Opposition
After three months in power, internal security re-
mains the top priority of the Afghan Government. Violent
resistance is generally confined to the eastern tribal
provinces and, for the moment, presents no serious threat
to the regime, but opposition appears to be growing within
the military and the population in general.
Since the leftist "revolution" on 27 April, self-pro-
claimed opposition groups, both within Afghanistan and in
neighboring Pakistan, have been growing in number.l-
We do not know the size or strength of the various
rightist and religious opposition groups. They appear,
however, to lack the cohesive leadership and support
within the military necessary to challenge the regime.
The eastern tribal provinces have always been difficult
for any central government to control.
Disillusionment within the military could eventually
prove more dangerous to President Taraki's regime than
the dissatisfaction of either rightwing opposition groups
or tribal dissidents. Disaffection within the armed forces
could arise if Taraki's policies appeared to be anti-Muslim
or if the regime allied itself too closely with the Soviet
Union. Continued action against the tribesmen--some of whom
are relatives of military officers--could also provoke a
military coup.
Taraki has attempted to consolidate his control over
the military
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The civilian party leadership appears to be engaged in a
campaign to downgrade the military's contribution to the
April revolution; the military is not represented on the
important Political Bureau of the ruling party's Central
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BRIEFS
SRI LANKA: IN RECENT MONTHS THERE HAS BEEN AN APPARENT
INCREASE IN NARCOTICS ACTIVITY IN SRI LANKA. The
local press has been giving prominent coverage to
drug trafficking and police efforts to counter it.
Arrests of foreign tourists transiting the island
as well as Sri Lankan nationals arrested abroad
have increased local. concerns that the island may
be, or is in the process of becoming, a transship-
ment point for drugs smuggled from other countries
in the region. While there is no domestic produc-
tion, the government. displays a continuing interest
in antinarcotics activities and will host a,regional
narcotics conference in November. In contrast to
the previous regime, the present government has ex-
pressed interest in obtaining American training for
local drug enforcement officers either in the US or
in Sri Lanka. The Embassy in Colombo reports that
the Sri Lankan Government would be favorably dis-
posed to any offer of.narcotics training.
AFGHANISTAN: NEW GOVERNMENT WANTS JOINT'COMMISSION OF
NARCOTICS MATTERS TO BE CONTINUED. According to
the American Ambassador in Kabul, who discussed the
matter with Afghan Foreign Minister Amin recently,
the new regime, which took over in Kabul last.April,
wants the Joint Commission to continue to function.
The Commission., which includes representatives from
the Government of Afghanistan, the UN, and the US
Mission in Kabul, had operated for about eight
months before the 27 April revolution and was
chaired by Mohammad Yahya Maroofi, who continued to
serve in the Foreign Ministry following the over-
throw of the-government. Maroofi told an Embassy
officer recently that he had already written to the
several Afghan ministries represented on the Joint
Commission and asked them to nominate new members.
He also noted that he intends to call a meeting of
the Commission sometime this month. Amin, in his
recent talk with the Ambassador, also affirmed that
the new government wants to combat opium cultiva-
tion "to the extent possible." The Ambassador views
this as possibly a veiled reference to reports of
resistance to the new regime in tribal areas where
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opium poppies are grown, and also to problems the
government would face if it tried to move too hast-
ily against poppy cultivation, especially at a time
when the government is seeking political support in
the tribal areas.
Kabul has also agreed to continue the UN's
drug enforcement program but has requested that a
representative from a "neutral country" be named
to head the project in place of West German Police
Captain Christian Magnussen whose contract has ex-
pired. The UN Division of Narcotics Drugs is cur-
rently looking for a Scandinavian, a Swiss, or an
Austrian to fill the post.
EGYPT: OPIUM PRODUCTION REPORTEDLY IS INCREASING. Ac-
cording to officials of the Egyptian Anti-Narcotics
General Administration (ANGA), increased acreage
eradication and lower market prices for locally
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grown opium are pointing toward a dramatic increase
in production. Reports of a second harvest this
spring also add to the Egyptian fears.
Other reports indicate that production, which-
has traditionally been confined to the Asyut area
of upper Egypt, is now beginnin to spread to other
areas
ANGA fears that the already i icu t
Z ask detecting opium plantings will became even
harder if plantings spread and has asked US offi-
cials for aid in the detection phase of its eradi-
cation program.
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two-thirds as much hashish oil; and more heroin
than in all of 1977. Bureau officials view the
large-scale seizures as evidence of the "fantastic"
level of use of these drugs in Australia rather than
an indication of Australia becoming a transshipment
point.
BRAZIL--Three Nations Cooperate To Suppress "Uruguayan
Connection"--TNDD, No. L/7916, p. 45. According
to the Brazilian press, drug specialists from Brazil,
Uruguay, and Argentina are setting up a new police
ring to suppress the traffic of addictive drugs.
This action follows the report that Uruguay is the
main underground source for Brazilian addicts.
DENMARK--Dealers Hope To Hook Clientele: Sell Uncut
Heroin--TNDD, No. L/7916, pp. 64-65. In an article
ti It ed, "Narcotics Offenders Sell Pure Heroin at
Dumping Prices," the Copenhagen press charges that
"cynical narcotics dealers" are responsible for re-
cent deaths and acute illness among Danish narcotics
addicts. They claim that the dealers sell. heroin
that is nearly pure at dumping prices in order to
create a large market and then later raise prices
drastically. Some of the heroin seized by narcotics
police in Copenhagen was 73 percent pure. Such
high potency often leads to illness requiring
hospitalization and may lead to death. In addition
to hard drugs, many addicts also use sleeping pills
and other medicines or alcohol. If they also take
heroin with a strength of 20 percent, they can be-
come gravely ill or even die.
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EGYPT--Major Drug Seizure Reported--TNDD, No. L/7905,
pp. 96-98. The antinarcotics department recently
seized 2.5 tons of narcotics powder valued at nearly
$8 million. According to the Cairo press, enough
powder was involved to make 25 million drug tablets.
The Egyptian prosecutor's office has decided to
seek life imprisonment for the five defendants and
is investigating how they were able to get the ap-
proval of the pharmaceutical department of the Min-
istry of Health to release the drugs.
HONG KONG--Antidrug Needle Proves Effective--TNDD, No.
L/7916, pp. 8-9. The treatment of heroin and opium
addicts by acupuncture and electrostimulation is
reported to have achieved outstanding results since
being introduced in Hong Kong a year ago. Accord-
ing to the report, the treatment, which is relatively
inexpensive and involves no medicines, has been more
effective than anticipated. The method involves
electrostimulation through a pair of acupuncture
needles which are inserted simultaneously into the
outer ears. More than 800 patients have been treated
at the facility since it opened a year ago.
HONG KONG--Karachi Drug Link Probed--TNDD, No. L/7916,
p. 13. After several months investigation into the
"Karachi Connection," raw opium worth about $250,000
has been found near the Pakistan Club in Hong Kong.
Police believe two syndicates operated by local
Pakistanis have been importing raw opium from Pak-
istan--perhaps as much as 7.5 tons in the past year.
Narcotics Bureau detectives believe the Pakistani
operators have been recruiting local gangs to dis-
tribute the opium, which is probably being brought
in by freighter. They believe the Pakistanis are
among the new syndicates which have been trying to
fill the vacuum left by traffickers who have been
arrested. They also believe the Pakistanis are
trying to cash in on the drug market shortage caused
by the increasingly strict checks on drugs from
Thailand.
INDONESIA--Flow of Foreign Narcotics a Threat to Indo-
nesians--TNDD, No. L/7916, p. 20. According to a
top ranking police officer in Jakarta, Indonesians
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are being threatened with drug addiction from nar-
cotics coming from China and Thailand. He claims
that opium seized during a recent raid was wrapped
in plastic bags identified as made in China. He
claimed further that opium being cultivated in
southern China is shipped to Hong Kong and then to
Singapore and other areas in Asia. He noted that
most of the 210 people recently arrested were state-
less Chinese living in Indonesia and claimed that
the smugglers work through syndicates headquartered
in Bangkok, Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur, and Singapore.
He further noted that Jakarta has become a send-off
point for morphine going to Amsterdam, and that the
Island of Bali has become a center for drug traffic
aimed at Australia. His fear is that drug addiction
may become a big problem in Indonesia if it becomes
a transit area for drugs going to Australia and to
Europe. Indonesian officials have been warning of
an increased use of drugs in Indonesia, especially
in the cities.
ITALY--Traffickers Using Procaine To Cut Heroin--TNDD,
No. L/7916, pp. 106-109. The latest heroin coming
on the market in Rome is cut with procaine,, an anes-
thetic that may kill instantly, according.-to the
toxicological experts of the Court of Rome. Heroin
being brought into Italy is highly potent-about 70
percent purity and is of the "brown sugar" type
which the Italians call "Chinese." Italian observers
now claim a high addiction rate in the large cities,
with Rome having 10,000 addicts.
PAPUA NEW GUINEA--PNG Easy Transit Point for Drug Smug-
glers--TNDD, No. L/7905, pp. 1-2. The recent haul
of Asian cannabis Buddha sticks in the Coral Sea
would have been worth about $30 million on the
streets of Australia, according to local authori-
ties. The seizure is said to confirm the long-held
suspicion that PNG is an easy target for anyone with
a "reasonable" boat and a little luck who wants to
smuggle drugs from Asia to Australia and the South
Pacific. By its own admission, PNG is extremely
vulnerable as a transit point and is totally un-
equipped to handle the problem--there are few Cus-
toms officers, no aerial reconnaissance capability,
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no patrol boats to cover the thousands of square
miles of sea, hundreds of islands, and long coast-
lines. Neither does it have the necessary radar
equipment to monitor the airspace and the hundreds
of small airstrips spread across the mainland and
the islands.
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