EAST ASIA BIWEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A002200010004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 24, 2002
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 7, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

Secret
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East Asia
Biweekly Review
7 February 1978
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EAST ASIA BIWEEKLY REVIEW
7 February 1978
Philippine Opposition May Boycott
Parliamentary Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Japan: Social Democratic League--
Bastion for Disgruntled Socialists . . . . . . . . 3
Bangkok and the Shan: Accommodations
in the Golden Triangle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
South Korea: Developments Related
to Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
NOTE: A Supplement to today's edition of EAST ASIA BI-
WEEKLY REVIEW has been published and disseminated in
special intelligence channels.
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by
the East Asia/Pacific Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with
occasional contributions from other offices within the National Foreign Assessment
Center. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors
of the individual articles.
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Philippine Opposition May Boycott Parliamentary Elections
The major national opposition group in the Philip-
pines--the Liberal Party--has announced its intention
to boycott the 2 April parliamentary elections as a re-
sult of new election code procedures that allow bloc
voting--a government scheme permitting the voter to
cast his ballot for a straight pro-Marcos ticket.
Marcos will now have to decide whether to go ahead
with the election campaign and face the almost certain
likelihood that there will be little or no substantive
opposition, or to consider dropping the bloc voting
provision. If he goes ahead with the elections as
scheduled, he runs the risk of worsening his human rights
problem, as the race will then simply be a contest among
government candidates for positions on the pro-Marcos
slate.
The bloc voting provision was previously used in
the fraudulent 1947 and 1949 national elections and
subsequently abolished in 1951 after it provoked a
public outcry. Opposition candidates have argued that
without bloc voting, individual voters would have to
peruse the entire list of candidates, and this would
increase the chance that they would cast their ballot
for well-know opposition figures such as former senators
Aquino or Salonga.
Former senator Salonga has contended that Marcos'
insistence on bloc voting reflects his concern that
Liberal candidates would overwhelm the government
slate in the metropolitan Manila area. The Philippine
First Lady indeed argued successfully, during discussions
on the draft election code, for two additional seats for
the Manila area.
The national assembly will have 196 seats, consisting
of 162 elected regional seats, 20 nonelected cabinet seats,
and 14 seats representing progovernment interest groups
such as youth, labor, and the farmers.
7 February 1978
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President Marcos intends to field a progovernment
slate of candidates called the New Society Movement.
The Philippine leader has emphasized that this new
grouping is not intended to replace his pre - martial
law Nationalista Party, but will incorporate some lib-
erals and members of civic organizations into a broader
pro-Marcos electoral coalition. A campaign is already
under way to draft Mrs. Marcos to head the new slate.
She reportedly intends to seek her first elective office
as a regional Manila delegate.
Marcos has access to all the levers of power and
is fully aware that the opposition remains fragmented
and lacks any organizational strength. Most of the
disparate anti-Marcos elements would be reluctant to
run individually if Salonga's Liberal slate pulls out
of the parliamentary race.
The Philippine domestic political scene is com-
plicated, and Marcos can be expected to take full ad-
vantage of his substantial political skill to continue
to keep the opposition off balance. A more serious
hurdle for Marcos will be whether he can portray the
election outcome as representing a broad consensus
regardless of the level of opposition participation.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
7 February 1978
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Japan: Social Democratic League--Bastion for Disgruntled
Socialists
Disaffected socialists who bolted from the Japan
Socialist Party (JSP) last year formed a sixth opposition
party--the Social Democratic League (SDL)--on 22 January.
Hideo Den, the popular former director of the JSP's in-
ternational affairs bureau, heads the new party. According
to Den, the SDL favors close US-Japan relations, especially
in the economic sphere, and supports the Mutual Security
Treaty with the US.
The SDL is essentially a merger between a group of
middle-of-the-road Dietmen who left the JSP during its
September convention and the Socialist Citizens League,
which was founded by the late Saburo Eda, former leader
of the rightwing faction of the JSP, who bolted the party
last spring. Both groups split with the JSP because of
their opposition to the growing power and ideological
militance of the Socialist Association (SA), the JSP's
extreme leftwing Marxist faction. In essence the SA,
which controls a sizable portion of the JSP's organiza-
tional machinery, advocates a coalition with the Communists
and the conversion of the JSP into a class rather than a
mass political party. In contrast, the moderate Socialists
favor a more broadly based party and a Diet coalition ex-
cluding the Communists.
With the creation of the SDL, Den aspires to become
a leader of the centrists and progressives. So far, how-
ever, with only six Diet seats, the SDL lacks funds and
must build an organizational base to attract uncommitted
voters. Den will also face stiff opposition to his efforts
to assume leadership of the moderates from the established
moderate parties, the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) and
the Clean Government Party (CGP). Both the DSP and the
CGP are now working toward a closer alliance to facilitate
the formation of a coalition government with the ruling
Liberal Democratic Party should it lose its Diet majority.
The CGP leadership, for example, has been moving closer to
the DSP's moderate policy line.
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The SDL cannot count on the backing of organized
labor, especially Sohyo (General Council of Trade Unions),
the financial base for the JSP. Although Den--a well
known media personality--has not relied on labor unions
for his electoral success, he and the SDL will have to
tap such funding sources for their new party.
The SDL must compete as well with the JSP for votes
and financial support. The JSP is currently attempting
to reunite the party under the leadership of Chairman
Ichio Asukata, the mayor of Yokohama. Asukata is calling
for a moderation in the party line to appeal to a wider
range of voters. (CONFIDENTIAL)
7 February 1978
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25X1A
Bangkok and the Shan: Accommodations in the Golden
Triangle
Prime ister Kriangsak has taken pains to publicly
I Ireaffirm his predecessor's aggressive nar-
cotics suppression policy. But contradictory Thai poli-
cies toward the Chinese and Burmese minority groups in-
volved in trafficking across the Thai-Burmese border
continue to strain Thai relations with Rangoon and to
undercut efforts against drug traffickers in the Golden
Triangle.
Kriangsak is emphasizing several approaches to the
narcotics problem: crop substitution, which over time
may provide an economically viable alternative to opium
for the hill tribes in Thailand's northern provinces;
beefing up Border Police Patrol (BPP) capabilities with
more equipment and the development of special strike
units; and improved relations with Burma, a precondition
for more effective coordination against the traffickers
along their common border. A crop substitution program
has been under way for several years on an experimental
basis and shows some promise of reducing domestic opium
production. In the past two years, moreover, Thai police
have had some notable successes in intercepting drug
shipments and destroying refineries. Kriangsak's commit-
ment should help to sustain and improve these efforts.
Nonetheless, whatever earnestness Kriangsak imparts
to the Thai program, opium running out of Burma can be
significantly reduced only through joint efforts by the
Thai and Burmese. Deep-seated Burmese suspicions of the
Thai have prevented sustained cooperation and remain a
serious stumbling block despite Kriangsak's good personal
relations with the Burmese leaders.
Rangoon is committed to narcotics suppression and
has had modest success in cutting poppy production and
interrupting trafficking out of northeast Burma into
7 February 1978
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Thailand. Although insisting on running their own show
without foreign advisers, the Burmese have
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made effective use of US-supplied helicopters.
Tentative steps toward coordinated action with the
Thai were nipped in the bud last June with the seizure
of a Thai border police helicopter inside Burma. Bur-
mese suspicions that the incursion was a manifestation
of longstanding contacts by local Thai officials with
traffickers were strengthened by the tardiness of a Thai
apology for the incursion.
Burma is not yet ready to consider resuming joint
action, an attitude underlined in recent comments by
President Ne Win to advisers seeking policy guidelines
for planning operations against narcotics installations
near the Thai-Burmese border. In rejecting Thai over-
tures for discussions on common border problems, the
Burmese President said that although he had a high per-
sonal regard for Thai Prime Minister Kriangsak, he was
not confident of Kriangsak's intent or ability to trans-
late his expressions of goodwill toward Burma into deeds.
Specifically, Ne Win mentioned his annoyance over Thai
refuge and assistance to Burmese political exiles and
the impunity with which leading Shan traffickers operate
in northern Thailand. He was not optimistic that the
Thai would change their ways soon.
Ne Win's pessimism is well founded. The Thai Gov-
ernment has maintained for years that the presence of
well-armed groups of Chinese Nationalist soldiers (known
as Chinese Irregular Forces--CIF) and Burmese exiles in
the northwest create a cheap defense buffer that would
severely tax Thai military resources to supplant. In
fact, this is a questionable rationale. The Burmese
Communists pose no current threat to Thailand, and their
area of operations is some distance from the Thai border.
The CIF presence may discourage Thai Communist insurgent
activity in the area. Despite the multitude of free-
booting armed groups and the thin veneer of government
authority in the area, it is remarkably free of security
problems for Bangkok--in marked contrast to the south,
where Communists, separatists, and bandits have created
a generally chaotic situation.
7 February 1978
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The difficulties involved in expelling these for-
eign "warlords" and the mutually lucrative arrangements
they have developed with Thai officialdom over the years
are undoubtedly closer to the root of the problem. The
CIF have been in Thailand for some 25 years--their lead-
ers, Generals Li and Tuan reportedly are now Thai citi-
zens--and they are probably a permanent feature of the
landscape. The Shan are in a more tenuous position, but
they are not likely to be forced out so long as there is
an active Communist insurgency across the border and so
long as the Burmese Government has poor relations with
its minority groups.
I General
Li's CIF Third Army; the an United e y Army
(SURA), which operates under Li's patronage; and the
Shan United Army (SUA), one of the more notorious drug-
running organizations in the Golden Triangle, have re-
cently been supplied with arms and other military equip-
ment by the Thai military. Some of the equipment was
directly provided by the Republic of China, which appar-
ently is maintaining its links to the CIF. In exchange
for these supplies, the Shan and Chinese irregulars pro-
tect road construction crews in Chiang Rai and Tak Prov-
inces from harassment by Thai Communist insurgents. Thai
Army leaders also claim to be worried about the apparent
shift of Burmese Communist forces closer to the Thai
border and are anxious to beef up the SURA as a buffer
force.
Although these arrangements with the Shan and CIF
may conceivably serve Thailand's security interests, they
clearly undercut the government's program to block nar-
cotics traffic through the area. The SURA as well as
the SUA are engaged in trafficking; using them as ad hoc
security forces not only enhances their armed strength
but provides them some cover for their smuggling activi-
ties along the border. Air Marshall Sitthi, Secretary
General of the Thai National Security Council, is par-
ticularly worried that the SURA will use their newly ac-
quired police radios to monitor the movements of Thai
border police units looking for drug caravans and refin-
eries, and he has protested the further transfer of arms
and equipment.
7 February 1978
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Sitthi's protests will probably have little effect.
The transfer of equipment to the SURA was specifically
approved by army commander General Soem, reportedly
with Prime Minister Kriangsak's authorization, although
Kriangsak has since denied approving or even knowing of
the arrangement beforehand. Kriangsak has also denied
other reports that SUA leader Chang Chi-fu travels freely
in Thailand on Kriangsak's written authorization and that
he promised to provide the SUA with equipment to assemble
ammunition.
Kriangsak appears to be a man caught in the middle.
On the one hand, he obviously values close relations with
the US and is sensitive to the impact of Thailand's co-
operation in suppressing the narcotics trade. But he
undoubtedly feels pressure from the military who argue
the advantages of a surrogate security force in the
northwest--and probably benefit financially from the
existing arrangements--and from his own long-established
associations with the Shan and CIF.
There have been indications that Kriangsak is at-
tempting to put some distance between himself and the
Shan, however, and his recent protestations that he has
not met or communicated with SUA leader Chang Chi-fu
for many months is probably true. Kriangsak may even
succeed in persuading the Army to be more judicious in
its future arrangements with the Shan and to look else-
where for ad hoc security forces. But the accommoda-
tions between Shan and Chinese smugglers and local Thai
officials are so entrenched that they will inevitably
continue despite formal policy decisions made in Bang-
kok. (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)
7 February 1978
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South Korea: Developments Related to Human Rights
US PL-480 Assistance
The South Korean Government has strongly objected
to wording proposed by the US for this year's bilateral
PL-480 assistance agreement and maintains that it would
label South Korea as a serious violator of human rights.
South Korean Deputy Prime Minister Nam Tok-u has re-
portedly said that Seoul will not sign the proposed agree-
ment; he has instructed his aides to inquire about the
availability of comparable agricultural products in Can-
ada or Australia. Both these countries offered to sell
such products to South Korea at attractive prices in
an effort to make inroads into the substantial South
Korean agricultural import market.
The language that Seoul objects to does not refer
specifically to violations of human rights, although it
does specify that the assistance must contribute to meet-
ing basic human needs. The South Koreans claim that the
proposed wording compels them officially to acknowledge
human rights violations they publicly deny. The South
Koreans obviously hope that PL-480 aid can continue, but
the country's economic growth has evidently brought Seoul
to the point where it can consider other options.
Political Prisoners
South Korea is continuing to work on arrangements
for freeing additional political prisoners early this
year,
repor e y e iev
would be ac ica y wise at this time. Since most of
the prisoners in question were jailed for less politically
sensitive acts than the issuance of the so-called Myongdong
Declaration, the late 1977 release of all but one of the
Myongdong detainees opened the door to the release of
other political prisoners. The cases of some of the
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accused are complicated by the fact that they are also
charged with violation of the anti-Communist law; these
persons are unlikely to be freed in the near future.
The government's more lenient attitude toward dis-
sident activity was reflected in its tolerance of a 16
January prayer meeting held by the released Myongdong
prisoners. Although the protest statements issued by
the former detainees following the meeting were at least
as strong as the Myongdong Declaration that had led to
their imprisonment, none of the participants were arrested.
(SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT)
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