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March 16, 1977
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Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : C - 79T00912A002300010001-3 Secret 25X1 International Issues TIAL ANALYSIS State Dept. review completed Secret RP All 77-003 16 March 1977 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010001-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010001-3 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010001-3 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010001-3 SECRET D INTERNATIONAL ISSUES 16 March 1977 Trends in Terrorist Skyjacking. . . . . . . . . . . 17 Authoritarianism and Militarism: The Roots of the Human Rights Problem . . . . . . . . 25 This publication is prepared by the International Issues Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. The views presented are the best judgments of individual analysts who are aware that many of the issues they discuss are subject to alternative interpretation. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles. RP All 77-003 16 March 1977 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/0C(;1A-RDP79T00912A002300010001-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010001-3 Next 15 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010001-3 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 511AERDP79T00912A002300010001-3 Trends in Terrorist Skyjacking The wave of air piracy by politically motivated terrorists during the late 1960s crested in 1970 (47 recorded incidents), and then subsided almost as rapidly as it had developed. The figure for such activity in 1975 (three terrorist hijackings world- wide) was the lowest in nine years. By way of com- parison, nonterrorist skyjackings peaked in 1969 (62 attempts) and then fell off even more sharply to a low of seven attempts in 1973. (See Table 1) The dramatic decline in terrorist skyjackings during the 1971-75 period stood in marked contrast to a sharp increase in international terrorist inci- dents in general. This shift of tactics was in large part attributable to: --A gradual decline in the number of states willing to grant hijackers unconditional safe haven. --The conclusion of a number of international agreements (including the US-Cuba accord of 1973) that reduced the chances that skyjackers would go unpunished. --Tighter airport security measures introduced in the US and a number of other countries in the early 1970s.* In December 1972, the FAA Administrator ordered screening of passengers boarding US commercial flights. This order was implemented 30 days later on January 5, 1973. RP All 77-003 16 March 1977 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/0&E cflA-;RDP79T00912A002300010001-3 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010001-3 TABLE 1: SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL AERIAL HIJACKING ATTEMPTS CUBA AND OTHER LOCATIONS, 1931-1976 OF US AND NON-US REGISTERED AIRCRAFT TO Total Attempts Year US to US to non-US non-US non-US to non-US to US to US to on US Cuba Success Cuba Failure to Cuba Success to Cuba Failure elsewhere Success elsewhere Failure elsewhere elsewhere Total General Success Failure Attempts Aviation 1931 - - - - 1 - - - 1 - 1947 - - - - 1 - - - 1 - 1948 - - - - 6 1 - - 7 - 1949 - - - - 6 - - - 6 - 1950 - - - - 4 - - - 4 - 1951 - - - - 1 - - - 1 - 1952 - - - - 1 1 - - 2 - 1953 - - - - 1 - - 1 - 1956 - - - - 1 - - - 1 - 1958 - - 2 1 4 1 - - 8 - 1959 - - 1 - 5 - - - 6 - m 1960 - - - - 6 3 - - 9 - 0 1961 3 2 - - 4 2 - - 11 - 7J 1963 - - - - 1 - - - 1 - -4 1964 - - 1 - - 1 - - 2 1 1965 - 2 - - - 1 1 1 5 - 1966 - - - - 2 2 - - 4 - 1967 1 - 2 - 3 - - - 6 1 1968 18 1 7 1 3 1 - 2 33 5 1969 31 6 27 9 9 3 1 1 87 - 1970 13 2 17 5 22 14 2 6 81 2 H ;d 1971 10 4 3 7 7 15 2 10 58 2 M b 1972 6 2 4 2 9 17 6 16 62 4 1973 - - 2 2 8 8 1 1 22 1 1974 1 - 1 1 4 13 3 3 26 4 1975 - 1 - 1 3 9 4 7 25 6 H 1976 - - - - 6 7 1 3 17 2 Totals 84 20 67 29 118 101 21 50 490 27 F-' I lD O -3O ~1W Note: The tally includes all aircraft, including private charter flights. "Elsewhere" includes unknown destinations as well as extortionate "parajackings." "Success" refers to the hijacker diverting the plane to a location of his choice other than that noted in the flight plan. The last successful US-to-Cuba event was the December 14, 1974 di- version of a Tampa Flying Service charter plane. The last hijacking to Cuba of a regularly-scheduled flight was of a Colombian Aeropesca on January 21, 1974. The last successful hijacking of a regularly-scheduled US flight to Cuba was of a Southern Airways jet on November 10, 1972. Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010001-3 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 SDP79T00912A002300010001-3 A sense among terrorists that skyjacking had been overexploited may also have played a role, par- ticularly in view of the massive reverses suffered by the fedayeen as a result (at least in part) of a multiple skyjacking operation staged by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in September 1970.* In any event, the seizure of aircraft had become more difficult, more risky, and a potentially less rewarding proposition. As a result, its place in the arsenal of terrorist "spectaculars" was taken by other forms of hostage operations. Developments in 1976 Despite these disincentives, however, terrorist skyjackings registered a modest revival in 1976, reaching a level (nine incidents) that slightly surpassed the corresponding figures for 1974 and 1975 combined. Although the increase was not large, it ran counter to a further decline in nonterrorist skyjackings as well as to a general shift in terrorist tactics away from other forms of hostage operations toward safer and simpler endeavors (for example, bombing, assassination, incendiary attack, and armed assault.)** The following factors contributed to the increase in skyjacking in 1976 and may be indicators of the possible future dimensions of the skyjacking problem: That operation, which ended with three of the hijacked planes being blown up at Dawson's Field, was the catalyst which sparked King Husayn to engage the fedayeen in a bitter conflict that resulted in their explusion from his country. ' Tighter security practices adopted by US diplo- matic and military installations, as well as by overseas facilities of US-based firms, and the effectiveness of local counterterrorist campaigns in Latin America have contributed to the decline in terrorist operations. RP All 77-003 16 March 1977 Approved For Release 2007/03/06;E IAIRDP79T00912A002300010001-3 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010001-3 SECRET --Disuse of skyjacking had renewed its shock and publicity value. --Changes in the operational environment in various parts of the world had made other forms of hostage operations more risky and more difficult. --At least two African nations, Uganda and the Somali Republic, came to be considered by the Palestinians as potential safe haven states. --Libya continued its active and direct involve- ment in the Muslim insurgency in the Philip- pines. --Terrorist groups exhibited considerable inge- nuity in circumventing airport security ar- rangements. The off-site "supplementary bomb" technique employed by the Croatian extremists who hijacked a TWA plane to Paris last September may inspire other similar cases. The Uncertain Future of the US-Cuban Hijacking Accord Cuban Premier Fidel Castro announced last October that he would terminate the 1973 US-Cuban memorandum of understanding concerning hijackers of aircraft and vessels. It is unlikely, however, that Castro's statements will lead to a new wave of hijacking.* Castro implied that hijackers would still be treated harshly by the Cuban government. Moreover, the US-Cuban agreement was less of a deterrent than other inhibiting factors--tighter airport security in particular--that have been cited above. Finally, similar Cuban agreements with Canada, Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela will remain intact, and there is a good chance that the lapse in the US-Cuban agreement will at worst be of relatively short duration. Castro's decision was occasioned by the bombing of a Cubana Airlines passenger plane Last October by a Cuban exile group. All 73 people on board the air- craft were killed. RP All 77-003 16 March 1977 Approved For Release 2007/03/0?5c l RDP79T00912A002300010001-3 Approved For Release 2007/03/0%E I RDP79T00912A002300010001-3 The Deterrent Effect of the US-Cuban Agreement Skyjacking continued to fall off in the wake of the US-Cuban accord of 1973. A look at Table 1 reveals that, as with skyjackings, the diversion of US planes to Cuba peaked in 1969 and then began to decline rather rapidly. Skyjacking of non-US planes to Cuba also declined. This was probably due to the fact that it had become common knowledge that Cuba was treating most hijackers as common criminals. Moreover, the most precipitous drop in terrorist sky- jackings, and in skyjackings in general, occurred in 1971, over a year before the US-Cuban accord was signed. In short, the agreement appears to have done little more than reinforce trends that were already under way. The effects of the US--Cuban accord are difficult to ascertain. As indicated earlier, the signing of the agreement was preceded and accompanied by the implementation of strict search procedures at US airports. Similar procedures have subsequently been established in a number of other countries that are relatively near to Cuba (e.g., in Colombia, Barbados, and Trinidad and Tobago). Passengers are now subject to body searches at Caracas Airport, and tighter security procedures in Jamaica have delayed flights up to two hours. The US-Cuba agreement had no effect on many potential hijackers. The statistics on weapons seized at American airports (see Table 2) document the con- tinued willingness of individuals to attempt to seize aircraft. The conclusion that security precautions have been more effective than the accord in thwarting potential hijackings is further bolstered by the rise in attacks on general aviation (which is subject to fewer safeguards) in 1974 and 1975. Would-be hijackers--at least those who were unconcerned about publicity--simply shifted to an easier target. The Prospect for Renewal Castro has stated on several occasions that renewal of the US-Cuban hijacking agreement can occur only within the context of general discussions on the RP All 77-003 16 March 1977 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 Sd DP79T00912A002300010001-3 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010001-3 SECRET TABLE 2: RESULTS OF AIRPORT SECURITY MEASURES AT 500 AMERICAN AIRPORTS* Year Firearms Arrests Potential Hijackings Aborted Seized Due to Security Procedures (FAA estimates begun in 1974) 1973 2162 3156 1974 2450 3501** 1975 4783 2464 1976 3936 1040 *Comparable figures for other nations are scarce. West Germany reported that in the first 6 months of 1976, 455 firearms and 5000 other weapons were seized. **2663 other passengers were denied boarding, but were not arrested. RP All 77-003 16 March 1977 Approved For Release 2007/03/G6cKfA-RDP79T00912A002300010001-3 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 :4iP79T00912A002300010001-3 normalization of relations between the two countries. The Cuban leader views the accord as one of many bargain- ing chips he can use in negotiating an improved relation- ship with Washington. The outlook for the agreement is not bleak, although its renewal may be delayed by other issues such as the termination of the economic blockade. The Outlook for 1977 While the ultimate fate of the US-Cuban accord may have little impact on the level of skyjacking in .1977, there are other, more immediate grounds for concern. Although too many variables exist to permit precise forecasts about any type of terrorist activity, most of the factors responsible for the resurgence of aircraft hijackings in 1975 seem likely to retain their force. Moreover, some new incentives may be growing in prom- inence. The frustration felt by Palestinian "rejectionist" groups over recent developments in the Middle East provides a case in point. The leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, George Habbash, recently told a reporter that while his organization planned no such action, he expected other embittered Palestinians to launch a new wave of hijackings. He repeated this prediction in an interview reported by the Washington Post on March 7. Further setbacks at the hands of local security forces may prompt a number of Latin American groups to attempt hijackings. Argentine terrorists may feel the need to stage an aerial spectacular as a means of bolstering morale and re-establishing themselves as a serious threat to the government. Terrorists may be inspired by the opportunities for action associated with the expanding number of cities served by the controversial Concorde supersonic airliner, as well as "inspiration" derived from heavy media coverage of such developments as the recent wave of hostage episodes in the US and Idi Amin's alleged plan to allow Palestinian terrorists to hijack a planeload of Americans who were to be expelled from Uganda. RP All 77-003 16 March 1977 Approved For Release 2007/03/06S:EE&I-~2DP79T00912A002300010001-3 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010001-3 SECRET The revival of skyjacking by terrorist groups will probably continue. While it is impossible to predict whether these will be offset by a greater degree of in- ternational cooperation, the factors discussed above il- lustrate the potential for a further increase in such activity. RP All 77-003 16 March 1977 Approved For Release 2007/03/0C~c l RDP79T00912A002300010001-3 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010001-3 SECRET Authoritarianism and Militarism: The Roots of the Human Rights Problem On March 11, Brazil canceled its 25-year-old mili- tary assistance treaty with the US in reaction to a re- cently released State Department report on the human rights situation in that country, charging that the doc- ument represented "intolerable interference" in Brazil's internal affairs. The following day, the Pinochet re- gime dissolved all Chilean political parties and groups. The regime claimed that its action was necessary because of the "confrontational" and sometimes "subversive" ac- tivities of thoseparties (primarily the Christian Demo- crats and the Social Democrats) that were supposed to be in officially imposed "rece?ss. " In fact, however, Pino- chet's move clearly reflected mounting concern over the potentially destabilizing effect of the increased atten- tion being paid Locally and internationally to human rights violations in Latin America's Southern Cone. These are but the Latest and most dramatic of a series of developments that have underscored US policy dilemmas that arise when promotion of respect for human rights conflicts with this country's relations with non- democratic regimes. The problem has been made more dif- ficuZt by resurgent nationalism--a phenomenon which would seem to be in Large part attributable to a combination of widespread dissatisfaction with the postwar interna- tional order and defensive reaction to the de facto limi- tations on national sovereignty that have resulted from the growing political and economic interdependence of nations. But the heart of the problem lies in the eeu- Liar dynamics and imperatives of authoritarian rule. The following article is drawn from a much Longer study, Authoritarianism and Militarism in Southern Eu- that was published by CIA's Office of Political Research in March 1975. It thus breaks no new ground. Rather, parts of the key judgments and of the text of RP All 77-003 16 March 1977 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 lA-RDP79T00912A002300010001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010001-3 SECRET the study are reprinted here in the belief that they of- fer a useful analytical framework for assessing the char- acter, limitations, and prospects of a wide variety of nondemocratic regimes--many of which are the focus of US concern about human rights. Key Judgments --Authoritarianism generally places far less arduous demands on a society than either totalitarianism or representative democ- racy. For many nations it is, in effect, the only feasible system of rule. For many more, particularly for those with long-standing authoritarian traditions, it offers an easy way out when an attempt at democratic (or, in the case of Yugoslavia, totalitarian) practice runs into trouble. --The societal characteristics and problems that give rise to military intervention and to prolonged or recurrent authoritarian rule are similar, and these conditions tend to be especially prevalent and pronounced in "developing" countries beset by the dis- ruptive impact of belated modernization. --Even when civilians are at the helm, the internal dynamics of authoritarian rule tend to keep the military involved in pol- itics in a significant way--whether as an active participant in policy-making coun- cils, an intermittent veto group, or simply the ultimate arbiter of political strife. --Thus, for most of the world today, authori- tarianism and militarism are norms, not ab- errations. And if world-wide economic strains continue to exacerbate the problems associated with modernizing change, the chances are that both phenomena will become even more common in the decade ahead. --Under certain circumstances, authoritarian- ism can be a fairly stable and effective form of rule over comparatively long periods RP All 77-003 16 March 1977 Approved For Release 2007/03/064lTA-RDP79T00912A002300010001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010001-3 SECRET of time--even in countries which have passed well beyond the initial stages of social and economic development. --Nevertheless, the key internal balances and tradeoffs upon which the successful opera- tion and stability of authoritarian rule depend are easily upset. Hence, most au- thoritarian regimes are prone to recurrent crisis and political violence. And while such domestic turbulence may trigger move- ment toward more efficient and possibly more democratic government, it is more likely to result in paralysis and the emergence of still another ineffective authoritarian regime. --As a long term proposition (i.e., anything over five years), direct military rule has a propensity to suffer from a number of distinct and potentially serious weaknesses. But in the short to medium term, it would seem to make little difference per se whether soldiers or civilians head up an authoritarian regime. --To be stable and effective, any non-totali- tarian regime--whether authoritarian or democratic--must be in basic consonance with prevailing customs and circumstances. Moreover, a nation's political culture cannot be changed by fiat; although far from immutable, its evolution is a func- tion of overall societal development. Over the past several decades, authoritarian govern- ment and direct military intervention in politics have been either constant or recurrent phenomena in most coun- tries of the world. Some observers, particularly those who perceive the widely disparate manifestations of au- thoritarian rule as mutant or nascent forms of totali- tarianism or democracy, consider this to be an unnatural and therefore transitory state of affairs. In contrast, this study is based on the premise that, for all its variants, modern-day authoritarianism is it- self a distinctive system of rule--one in essence neither RP All 77-003 16 March 1977 -27- Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010001-3 SECRET totalitarian nor democratic, and one in which the mili- tary establishment generally plays a significant role. The principal objectives of the discussion that follows are thus (1) to examine the causes, nature, and conse- quences of authoritarian rule and of the separate but overlapping phenomenon of direct military intervention in political affairs, and (2) to assess the local and international implications of both. Authoritarianism It is perhaps more difficult today than ever before to group governments into neat categories. Not only are there nearly twice as many independent countries than just a decade or so ago, but in most cases there is little correlation between constitutional pretension and political practice. Although nearly all contemporary regimes claim to be democratic, relatively few can be classified as representative democracies by any meaning- ful definition of the term. An even smaller number can usefully be considered totalitarian dictatorships. The remainder can be divided up in many ways. As suggested above, however, it is argued here that the governments of the great majority of contemporary societies are most usefully viewed as falling within the bounds of a third and less demanding system of rule: authoritari- anism. The Nature of the Beast In an authoritarian system, predominant power is exercised by a single leader or narrow autocratic elite neither responsible to the general public nor fully sub- ject to legal restraints. At the same time, however, a limited number of relatively autonomous special interest groups can and do influence the political process. This last-mentioned trait--hereafter subsumed under the ru- bric of limited political pluralism--requires special emphasis; of all characteristic features of authoritari- anism, it is perhaps the most critical to understanding the dynamics and limitations of the system. Although the leadership of an authoritarian regime effectively stands above the law, its freedom of action is restricted in often predictable ways by the constant need to manage and manipulate interest group pressures RP All 77-003 16 March 1977 Approved For Release 2007/03/06? IA-RDP79T00912A002300010001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010001-3 SECRET and conflict. Control is maintained through a combina- tion of repression of clearly inimical individuals or groups and conscious efforts to play the remaining polit- ical actors off against each other in such a way that none becomes strong enough to challenge the existing order or even to appear to offer a viable alternative. This is hardly an easy task at best; and, as perhaps best illustrated by Yugoslav experience, its difficulty increases with the number and variety of groups whose interests must be taken into account. Directly or indirectly, the armed forces play a key role in the establishment of any authoritarian re- gime. Thereafter, even if power passes to (or remains in) civilian hands, latent instability and the conflict- oriented dynamics of authoritarian rule usually insure that the military establishment continues to play a sig- nificant political role--whether as an active partici- pant in policy-making councils, an intermittent veto group, or simply the ultimate arbiter of political, strife. The internal dynamics of authoritarian rule also impose certain practical constraints on ideological ri- gidity, electoral practices, and even levels of popular political mobilization. Within these bounds, however, authoritarianism can take many forms--not only with re- spect to general ideological orientation, but (as illus- trated by variations in the number and type of political parties found under authoritarian rule) in terms of or- ganizational structure as well. For example, all politi- cal parties are now banned in Chile--as they were in Greece during that country's most recent interlude of military rule. Both Zaire and Yugoslavia presently have one-party systems, but Mobutu's Popular Movement of the Revolution and Tito's League of Communists are poles apart in terms of functional role and institutional strength. There are multi-party authoritarian systems as well: what might be termed the "predominant party" type has long been exemplified by Mexican political practice, while an officially imposed two-party variant is currently employed in Brazil. Although it is generally relatively easy to distin- guish a multi-party authoritarian regime from a repre- sentative democracy, the dividing line between authori- tarianism and totalitarian dictatorship at the other end RP All 77-003 16 March 1977 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 2~IA-RDP79T00912A002300010001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010001-3 SECRET of the political spectrum is less evident. Indeed, many non-democratic governments seem to exhibit some or all of the traits generally attributed to totalitarianism. But on close examination, only the more rigid Communist regimes seem to fill the bill. For example, in all other possible candidates for this distinction, the monopoly parties lack the cohesion and political clout of their counterparts in the classic Fascist, Nazi, and Soviet models. Political repression is commonplace, but vigorous efforts to employ the full range of totali- tarian thought and behavior controls are notably lack- ing. And while lip service may be paid to the goal of a monolithic society, conflicting interests are both recognized and--within limits--tolerated as essential to the operation of the authoritarian system.* The Why and Wherefore Under most circumstances, authoritarianism places far less arduous demands on a society than either to- talitarianism or representative democracy. In addition, it is adaptable to a wide range of local conditions. For many nations it is, in effect, the only feasible system of rule. For many more--particularly for those with long-standing authoritarian traditions--it offers an easy way out when an attempt at democratic practice runs into trouble. There are many factors which bear on the establish- ment and persistence of authoritarian rule--a fact un- derscored by that phenomenon's seemingly capricious * Since no totalitarian system has been able to re- press all pluralistic tendencies, the difference here is one of degree. Indeed, it can be argued from the slow but steady rise in the influence of professionally based sub-elites in the USSR that the Soviet system is itself inching toward authoritarianism. RP All 77-003 16 March 1977 Approved For Release 2007/03/06: IA-RDP79T00912A002300010001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010001-3 record.* Among these, cultural and historical heritage (e.g., the constellation of hierarchical, patronal, and corporatist customs that make up the so-called "Iberian tradition"), deep-seated societal cleavages and con- flicts, external inspiration and pressures, and the ac- cident of charismatic leadership frequently play partic- ularly prominent roles. But in recent years at least, the key catalytic factor has most often seemed to be the disruptive impact of social and economic changes as- sociated with modernization. Not only does the modernization process itself favor efforts to centralize and expand political authority, but by fostering political Lag or political decay, it can result in a breakdown of domestic order and a con- sequent imposition (or reimposition) of authoritarian rule. Political lag may be defined simply as the fail- ure of political development (particularly institution- building) to keep pace with socio-economic development. Political decay refers to the actual breakdown of estab- lished political institutions which, for one reason or another, are no longer suited to the times. Although felt everywhere, the destabilizing effects of modernizing change are quite naturally most pronounced --and most widespread--among states that are still in an early or middle stage of social and economic develop- ment.** The problems faced by such nations are enormous. .4 Authoritarian regimes have emerged as the result of breakdowns of colonial rule, of traditional socie- ties, and of existing democracies. At least one (.Yugo- slavia's) grew out of an infant and ill-starred totali- tarian dicatorship. Some have persisted, changing in nature and leadership over time. Others have given way to more demoncratic forms of government, often only to reemerge in new guise just a few years Later. As a group, these countries might best be character- ized as victims of delayed development. Whether be- cause of foreign domination, geographic or self-imposed isolation, the strength of traditional customs and in- stitutions, or a combination of these and other factors, all of them were rather Late entrants in the moderniza- tion game. And to add to the other problems they face in trying to catch up, the destabilizing impace of so- cial and economic change increases with its pace. RP All 77-003 16 March 1977 Approved For Release 2007/03/0 P LL -RDP79T00912A002300010001-3 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010001-3 SECRET Rapid increases in literacy, exposure to mass media, in- dustrialization, urbanization, and per capita income ex- pand the politically relevant segment of the population and generate a sharp rise in expectations. Whether or not such factors as poverty of natural resources or tra- ditional ethnic animosities pose additional complications, the general proliferation of new social forces and re- quirements places great strains on existing political institutions. And if these prove resistant to or inca- pable of necessary adaptation, either political lag or political decay ensues. A society thus afflicted generally enters (or lapses back into) what political scientists now commonly refer to as a praetorian phase, i.e., one characterized by the politicization of all significant social groupings and the lack of political institutions strong enough to me- diate, refine, and moderate their interaction. Under these conditions, contending groups increasingly resort to various forms of direct action (e.g., bribery, coer- cion, terrorism, work stoppages, and demonstrations), and the military establishment is inevitably drawn toward the center of the political stage. The overall situation strongly favors the imposition of a law-and-order author- itarian solution, even if only on an interim basis. In- deed, in those countries which by dint of local circum- stance habitually seem to suffer from a lack of strong political institutions, military coups and revolving-door authoritarian governments have become characteristic fea- tures of the political scene. Strengths and Weaknesses Obviously, authoritarianism is far from a sure-fire cure for socio-economic growing pains. Its repeated and sometimes dramatic failures are evidence enough of this. But most of these failures have occurred under circum- stances which would have made it very difficult to estab- lish and maintain any sort of effective government. Ef- fectual rule is, in fact, an elusive quality for most of the world; whatever the form of government, the require- ments are stringent. At the minimum, effective political authority--the power to promote and, when necessary, to guide basic so- cietal change--requires (1) the consent (or at least passive acceptance) of most of the governed and (2) the RP All 77-003 16 March 1977 32- Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010001-3 SECRET support of those institutions which, individually or col- lectively, have been entrusted with a virtual monopoly over the means of coercive force. The first is in large part a function of political organization and legitimacy. The second is basically a question of subordinating the armed forces and paramilitary police to government di- rection. Both are characteristic features of stable de- mocracies and totalitarian dictatorships. By extension, they are critical to the performance and prospects of an authoritarian regime as well. In practice, the form, general orientation, effec- tiveness, and stability of any given authoritarian re- gime are conditioned by the interplay of a host of in- ternal and external variables. But even though the mix of operative factors is different in every case, there are certain general problem areas bearing on the ques- tion of effective political authority that are common to all. Hence it is possible to gauge the outlook for a particular authoritarian government on the basis of its performance with respect to a few basic tasks. Briefly stated, they are: --Centralize and expand political power. Stable authoritarian rule rests on clear- cut hierarchical relationships. Yugoslav experience illustrates how elusive this.. goal can be in a country where culturally and economically based aspirations for greater regional autonomy are strong. --Develop an aura of legitimacy through some combination of traditonal, charis- matic, and legal-rational considerations. The shortlived Ioannidis regime in Greece was particularly deficient in this regard. --Establish stable political institutions (i.e., organizations and procedures which are both effective and valued in their own right). The importance of this task is sometimes obscured by the personal skill and stature of leaders like Tito and Peron. Nevertheless, in the absence of political institutions capable of accommodating conflicting RP All 77-003 16 March 1977 -33- Approved For Release 2007/03/06SEeK-RDP79T00912A002300010001-3 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010001-3 SECRET societal interests and of mediating inter-elite disputes, a society will re- tain strong praetorian tendencies. And this, in turn, will increase the chances of popular alienation, more frequent re- sort to repression and violence, and bit- terly contested succession. --Rationale-ze and increase the competency of the governmental bureaucracy. This is essential because the administrative apparatus not only plays a major role in determining economic performance, itself a key factor affecting domestic harmony, but also substitutes for political action as the primary means for assuring social order and justice. In Franco's Spain, for example, bureaucratic shortcomings undercut efforts to use a combination of social welfare programs, paternalistic labor laws, and elaborate grievance pro- cedures to mute demands for politically independent trade unions. --Co-opt or neutralize potential challengers at an early stage--particularly those who are members of, or allied with, dissident factions within the military establish- ment. As amply illustrated by the ex- perience of a number of ill-fated author- itarian regimes in Africa, Southern Eu- rope, and Latin America during the last decade alone, authoritarian regimes in southern Europe during the conflict- oriented dynamics of limited pluralism generate a special need in this regard. They also require development of a paral- lel capacity to defuse potentially con- tentious domestic and foreign policy is- sues through a flexible mix of repression, compromise, and diversion--lest these is- sues polarize the society and thus deprive the regime of much of its room for maneu- ver and base of support. Although this list of chores seems formidable, weak performance in one or another field is often at least RP All 77-003 16 March 1977 -34- Approved For Release 2007/03/~~, F f -RDP79TO0912A002300010001-3 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010001-3 SECRET temporarily offset by such things as rising living stan- dards or charismatic leadership. Indeed, the record shows that under certain circumstances, authoritarianism can be a fairly stable and effective form of rule over comparatively long periods of time--even in states that have reached a complex and demanding middle stage of so- cial and economic development.* Nevertheless, the key internal balances and trade- offs upon which the successful operation and stability of authoritarian rule depend are easily upset. Hence, most authoritarian regimes are prone to recurrent crisis and resort to political violence (both government-spon- sored and oppositionist). Sometimes such turbulence serves as a catalyst for evolutionary change toward more efficient and possibly more democratic goverment. More often it results in paralysis and the emergence of still another ineffective authoritarian regime. Another clear systemic weakness stems from the fact that, unlike representative democracy, authoritarianism has no built-in mechanism for orderly political succes- sion. Thus each authoritarian regime must devise its own, a requirement which adds urgency to the need to le- gitimize and institutionalize its rule. Personal dicta- torships are particularly vulnerable to succession dif- ficulties. Even if the supreme ruler makes elaborate arrangements for succession, including constitutional provisions for the division of his offices and powers, the basic components of this new system are likely to lie dormant and untested until after he has actually departed the scene. Then, in the absence of his stabilizing in- fluence, they may prove incapable of functioning as in- tended. Militarism Although the fact that both the conditions which fa- vor authoritarian rule and the dynamics of the system it- self tend to draw the military into politics in a major way has been established in previous discussion, some For all but the world's major oil producers, the concept of a middle stage of development can be crudely defined as signifying a per capita GNP in current prices of between $300 and $2,000. RP All 77-003 16 March 1977 -35- Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010001-3 SECRET further observations about the causes and consequences of military intervention are clearly in order. Specifi- cally, what seems to be the reason for the increasing incidence of direct military rule? Why are there such marked variations in the form and direction of the polit- ical role played by the military in different countries? Are military regimes inherently any better or worse than civilian authoritarian regimes? The motives which move military men to direct ac- tion in the political arena are usually complex. The mix varies according to time and place, but almost al- ways includes three distinct areas of concern--personal, institutional, and societal. Sometimes ambitions, griev- ances over pay and promotion, or uneasiness over policies or trends which appear to threaten the perquisites and power of the military establishment clearly predominate. But in a growing number of cases, these considerations seem to have been strongly reinforced, if not overshad- owed, by fear that economic or political mismanagement was threatening to lead the nation to the brink of dis- aster. The process of modernization has, in fact, increas- ingly affected both military motives and capabilities with respect to direct intervention in political affairs. Proliferation of domestic missions (e.g., counterinsur- gency, riot control, and civic action), corresponding changes in the curricula of advanced military schools, and the influence of foreign ideas and developments have combined to increase the level of social awareness with- in the military establishments of many countries--and to generate a consensus that preservation of national secu- rity demands prompt and energetic efforts to resolve pressing economic, social, and political problems. Par- allel development, however gradual, of new managerial skills and bureaucratic resources has tended to increase the confidence of military leaders in their "unique" ability to analyze and cope with their country's ills. Not surprisingly, the emergence of this new breed of soldier-technocrat has been accompanied by a distinct trend toward: (1) military interventions which are in- stitutional rather than personalistic in nature, and (2) both longer and more frequent interludes of direct mili- tary rule. RP All 77-003 16 March 1977 Approved For Release 2007/03/06-: 1A-RDP79T00912A002300010001-3 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010001-3 SECRET Nevertheless, no national military establishment-- no matter what its size or degree of professionaliza- tion--is a monolithic :institution. In fact, with few exceptions, each tends to reflect the currents and divi- sions affecting the country at large. Thus, while it is possible to catalog the conditions which invite military intervention, the form and direction that such interven- tion takes, in any given case, will depend on which mili- tary faction seizes the initiative and which domestic allies it chooses to court or support. Although the effectiveness of each military regime must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, aggregate data analysis suggests that, in the short to medium term at least, it makes little difference per se whether soldiers or civilians hold the reins of power. It seems that mili- tary regimes tend to impose more restrictions on politi- cal activity, achieve greater success in promoting eco- nomic growth in very poor countries, and do less to de- velop primary education than their authoritarian civilian counterparts. (Contrary to popular belief, non-military authoritarian regimes tend to spend more on defense.) Apart from these findings, the differences in overall economic and political performance appear to be negligible. As a long-term proposition (i.e., anything over five years), however, direct military rule has a propensity to suffer from a number of potentially serious weaknesses, including: (1) inadequate political institutionaliza- tion;(2) a lack of compensating charismatic leadership; and (3) increasing factionalism within the military es- tablishment itself. The ill-fated Gowon regime in Nigeria provides a case in point. But even though these profession-related shortcom- ings are in time likely to afflict any predominantly mil- itary regime, there is an offsetting tendency for civil- military distinctions to become blurred under authori- tarian rule. Most military regimes co-opt a large num- ber of civilians into key posts. Moreover, soldier poli- ticians are soon confronted with a number of problems-- including, ironically enough, the need to ensure con- tinued subordination of the armed forces to political authority--which both limit their options and tend to have an erosive effect on their old institutional loyal- ties and ties. The Brazilian government, for one, has clearly benefited from this process. 25X1 RP All 77-003 16 March 1977 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : t 1?RDP79T00912A002300010001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010001-3 Secret Secret Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010001-3