INTERNATIONAL ISSUES REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010011-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2006
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: January 26, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
International Issues
Secret
State Dept. review completed
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F I
INTERNATIONAL ISSUES
26 January 1977
International Issues Division:
Statement of Mission . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
New Strains Ahead as the North-South
Dialogue Resumes? . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
2
The Abu Daud Affair: A Chronology
and Some Preliminary Observations .
. . . . . . .
8
Soviet Nonproliferation Policy. . . .
. . . . . . .
17
Energy Dependence and Atlantic Relations. . . . . .
20
INTERNATIONAL ISSUES will be published and distri-
buted the third Wednesday of each month.
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The International Issues Division of the recently
constituted Office of Regional and Political Analysis
is the successor organization to the International Func-
tional Staff of the Office of Political Research and the
International Organizations unit of the Office of Cur-
rent Intelligence. The division seeks to support the
policy-making community via multidisciplinary analyses
on the international political implications of global
problems such as Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, Foodeand
Population, Human Rights, Arms and Technology
and Terrorism. It also will be following developments
in key international organizations and analyzing such
international trends as modernization, authoritarianism,
the emergence of regional powers, and LDC demands for
"New International Economic order.
Comments from readers on the priority of topics
for analysis, on the substance of articles in this
f mutual
o
periodic publication, and o
Inte ationa Issues sion
Office of Regional and Political Analysis
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New Strains Ahead as the North-South Dialogue
Resumes?
The atmosphere of accommodation that has eased ten-
sions in North-South relations since the 7th Special
Session of the UN in September 1975 is under serious
challenge. Developments over the past several months
have generated political presures within both camps that
could lead to another round of confrontation. For the
US, this could mean new strains in relations not only
with key LDCs but also with its West European and Japa-
nese allies.
Pressures From the South
LDC demands have been specified many times since
the first call for a "New International Economic Order"
at the summit meeting of the nonaligned states in Al-
giers in September 1973. While the demands cover vir-
tually all aspects of international economic relations,
four areas of major contention with the industrialized
countries are likely to be the focus of negotiations in
1977.
--The LDCs are demanding the establish-
ment of formal mechanisms, under LDC
control, that would guarantee and sub-
stantially increase the real prices of
raw materials they export to the indus-
trialized states.
--Developing countries want a greater
say in the process of review and re-
consideration of their official and
commercial debt obligations. Some
LDCs support this objective reluc-
tantly, but all support the demand
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that the debt burden of the poorest
developing countries be forgiven or
delayed.
--The developing states want to improve
their industrial sectors through manda-
tory programs for the transfer of tech-
nology, and improved access to financing
and markets in developed states for manu-
factured goods and semi-processed raw
materials.
--Notwithstanding the increased LDC em-
phasis on systemic changes rather than
aid, all the developing countries sup-
port the demand that each of the indus-
trialized states by 1980 provide annu-
ally at least 0.7 percent of its gross
national product in official develop-
ment assistance.
Last December, the LDC participants in CIEC (the
Conference on International Economic Cooperation) agreed
to postpone ministerial-level negotiations until a new
US administration had taken office. The review confer-
ence that had been scheduled to begin on December 15
was to be an important test of progress in the "North-
South" dialogue between the industrial and the develop-
ing countries on the future of the international economic
order. Postponement of the review conference probably
avoided a confrontation over LDC demands, the most con-
tentious of which was for the relief of the LDC's debt.
It also provided the US with time to work behind the
scenes to insulate CIEC from pressures by some OPEC
states (most notably Saudi Arabia) to link future oil
price decisions, in part, to US concessions to LDC de-
mands.
There is evidence, however, that key LDCs intend
to put US policy toward North-South relations to an
early test which could lead to increased tensions if
and when CIEC resumes. Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina,
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India, Indonesia, Zaire, and Zambia* have all indicated
that their support for the postponement was based on
expectations that the new administration will soften
the US position on LDC debt rescheduling and ask Con-
gress for increased US contributions to the World Bank's
"soft" loan facility.** Such initiatives, these LDCs
argue, will be essential not only to the continuation
of the CIEC, but also to the success of US diplomacy in
the UNCTAD Commodity Consultations (scheduled through
mid-1978), and on such issues as Law of the Seas, the
UN's international development strategy, reform of the
GATT, as well as in dealing with some key LDCs (e.g.,
Brazil,- Iran) on regulating the export of nuclear tech-
nology.
The politically moderate LDCs in CIEC are under
pressure to show other developing countries that nego-
tiations with the industrial states can lead to the
realization of at least some LDC goals. In the absence
of US initiatives early in 1977, for example, to break
the CIEC impasse on the debt issue or demonstrate "good
faith" by increasing official development assistance
to the lending institutions LDCs prefer, many of the
developing countries that have acted as moderating in-
fluences at CIEC and elsewhere may threaten to change
their tactics.
* These states regard themselves as "moderates" in
North-South relations and their support has been essen-
tial to US efforts to prevent the breakdown of the CIEC.
They also play important leadership roles in the "G-77,"
the UN caucusing group which coordinates LDC positions
at North-South conferences, and they have supported US
policy by advising against the confrontational tactics
of the "radicals" (e.g., Algeria, Cuba).
** The US contribution to the fourth replenishment of
the International Development Authority was lower than
many LDCs expected. They want the US contribution to
the fifth replenishment substantially increased.
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The LDCs will likely voice renewed skepticism
about the US commitment to a North-South dialogue, and
at least some will threaten to reconsider their willing-
ness to negotiate behind the scenes with the US and
other industrial countries to reach compromises on most
LDC demands. At least initially, however, such postur-
ing is likely to be aimed not at alienating the US or
at breaking off the dialogue, but at getting the US
more engaged in seeking mutually satisfactory compro-
mises on North-South issues. Most LDCs--especially the
more influential ones--believe that active US leader-
ship is essential for progress on such key issues as
commodity agreements, LDC debt relief, and the reform
of international financial institutions that will be
high on the agenda of the North-South dialogue in 1977.
The timing of and linkages between a number of
meetings scheduled this year will, finally, provide the
LDCs with additional opportunities to pressure the US
and its allies.
Talks will begin in Geneva on March 7 on a proposed
UNCTAD fund to stabilize the price of raw materials.
LDCs will view the initial stands of the industrialized
states as a test of the latters' willingness to nego-
tiate. The UNCTAD talks could thus influence talks in
the CIEC framework, while the timing of the latter is
certain to depend on the scheduling of an economic :sum-
mit meeting of the Trilateral countries. A delay of
the CIEC ministerial meeting until June, however, would
subject it to pressure from the OPEC oil ministers con-
ference that will be held in early July. Additional
pressures on US policy could also result if the UN Gen-
eral Assembly is called back into session. Delegates
agreed last December not to adjourn as usual, but -to
recess and then reconvene after the CIEC ministerial
to evaluate progress in the North-South dialogue. An
unsatisfactory ministerial--or its cance
raise North-South
provide LDCs with the opportunity to
issues again in a highly politicized fashion at a forum
where the US and the industrialized states are at a,
distinct parliamentary disadvantage.
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Pressures from the North
US policy toward LDC demands will also be compli-
cated by the likelihood of conflicting pressures in
1977 from the West European states and Japan over how
that policy is formulated and the shape that it takes.
These states are more dependent on the developing coun-
tries--as suppliers of raw materials and markets for
exports--than is the US, and some in the European states
and Japan argue that the US would have less to lose
should a new confrontation between industrialized and
developing countries erupt. At the same time, however,
some West German and Japanese officials are concerned
that the US may move too quickly to accept some of the
LDCs'demands, and they will exert pressure for close
consultations. A unified response by the industrial-
ized states to the LDCs' demands may thus continue to
be difficult to work out.
The high-water mark of cooperation among the in-
dustrialized states came during the 7th Special Session
of the UN General Assembly. Determined US leadership
was the key element in the unity of the industrialized
states during that UN session. But many of the West
Europeans complained that the process of preparing the
US proposals excluded them. They have since argued that
the industrialized countries' policies must be developed
cooperatively if their support is to be counted on and
they, as well as the Japanese, have been looking for
early meetings with the new administration on these is-
sues. The European Community has been working on new
positions for the UNCTAD talks, for example, and will
reportedly seek to involve the US in discussions of
these proposals at an early date.
Finding a common stand, however, is likely to be
complicated by real differences in regional and historic
economic interests and relationships, and by the dif-
ferences in each of the industrialized state's percep-
tion of its vulnerability to LDC pressure. Some of
the European states and the Japanese believe, for ex-
ample, that they could not withstand the social and
political disruptions likely to be caused should a new
round of North-South confrontation lead to uncertainties
over raw materials supplies. The West Europeans face
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the additional burden of harmonizing policy among the
nine members of the European Community before they can
begin to negotiate a common stand with the US and Japan.
There are, in any case, many common points of in-
terest among the industrialized states and continued
efforts to find a common response to LDC demands stem
even more from this than from a recognition of the tac-
tical disadvantages of disunity. Virtually all indus-
trialized states agree that wholesale acceptance of the
LDC demands would undermine the stability of existing
economic and political systems. At the same time, most
agree that refusal to concede on any demands, or the in-
ability to put together a program of action on which
most LDCs would find it possible to compromise, could
lead to renewed confrontation with the LDCs, and with
it the possible disruption of OECD relationships.
Implications
To date, most of the political tensions in North-
South relations have been caused by the LDCs' search
for bargaining leverage. Ever since the 1973-1974 Arab
oil embargo, non-OPEC LDCs have sought unsuccessfully
to convert control of raw materials into influence over
the industrial countries.
Current indications suggest that a growing number
of influential LDCs believe their most potent leverage
may now lie in exploiting the political divisions among
the industrial countries over a response to LDC demands.
A key objective of this strategy would be to intensify
pressures on the US from the industrialized states to
soften its opposition to some LDC demands. As in the
period prior to the UN General Assembly's 7th Special
Session, US leadership may be essential to reducing
tensions within both camps. Such tensions, unless
checked, could lead to a new round of North-South con-
frontation, which would interfere with attempts to
address cooperatively such pressing global issues as
energy shortages, food and population problems, and the
performance of the world's economy.
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The Abu Daud Affair: A Chronology and
Some Preliminary Observations
The Prelude, Denouement, and Initial Repercussions:
3 January 1977 Prominent Palestinian "rejectionist"
militant Mahmud Salih is slain in
Paris by unknown assailants.
6 January
Fatah Revolutionary Council member--
and former Black September Organi-
zation (BSO) leader--Muhammad Daud
Awadh, alias Abu Daud, arrives in
Paris to attend Salih's funeral as
a member of a delegation representing
the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion (PLO). He is traveling on an
Iraqi passport under the name of
Yussif Hanna Raji. Together with
the other members of the PLO delega-
tion, he calls on a high-ranking
French Foreign Ministry official.
7 January Alerted to Daud's true identity
French security officials
arrest and detain him. German secu-
rity officals are notified of this
action and are given 24 hours to
submit an arrest warrant. (The
original warrant that the Germans
had issued for Daud's arrest in
connection with the key role he is
alleged to have played in planning
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the BSO operation against the Is-
raeli team at the 1972 Olympic Games
in Munich had been canceled when he
was tried and sentenced to death on
altogether different charges in Jor-
dan in 1973--and no one had thought
to reinstate the warrant when he
was subsequently reprieved and re--
leased.)
8 January With the assistance of the Federal
Criminal Office in Bonn, Bavarian
state authorities issue an interna-
tional warrant for Daud's "provisional
arrest." This done, the Bavarians
begin building and documenting their
case for Daud's extradition. While
review and approval by federal au-
thorities is required before a formal
extradition request can be sent to
France, both Munich and Bonn are op-
erating under the assumption that
the terms of the 1951 Franco-German
Extradition Treaty give them up to
20 days to complete this process.
8-10 January Official and unofficial Arab spokes-
men protest Daud's arrest. The PLO
threatens retribution. French news-
papers draw attention to the dilemma
posed for their government by its
recent endorsement of the Council
of Europe agreement on extraditing
terrorists on the one hand, and its
de facto support of the PLO as the
legitimate representative of the
Palestinian people on the other.
10 January Tel Aviv sends Paris a formal re-
quest for Daud's extradition to
Israel.
11 January French leaders decide that Daud is
to be expelled that afternoon unless
a formal extradition request from
Germany is received in the interim.
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As a result, the wheels of French
justice turn with uncustomary speed.
A French appeals court, meeting
briefly and in camera, rejects the
Israeli extradition bid as legally
deficient. More important, it rules
that the Bavarian warrant is tech-
nically defective and thus provides
no valid grounds for holding Daud
until an extradition request is re-
ceived from Bonn. His release or-
dered by the court, Daud is promptly
placed on board an Algerian airliner
bound for Algiers. Protests from
Western capitals, including an ex-
pression of dismay from Washington,
flow in. Israel recalls its ambas-
sador from Paris.
12 January In a move probably timed as much for
its domestic political impact as for
its reassuring effect on ruffled Arab
states, anonymous French governmental
spokesmen prematurely allege that
France and Egypt have finally con-
cluded a long incubating multi-billion
dollar arms deal centering on the
sale and licensed production of Mirage
F-i aircraft. Following hard on the
heels of the French Defense Minister's
return from a round of negotiations
in Cairo, this development fans fur-
ther critical speculation in Western
circles about France's motives in
freeing Daud.
12 January French Interior Minister Poniatowski,
alleging that the French government
had acted in full conformity with
both its treaty obligations to Ger-
many and the requirements of French
law, lays the blame for the outcome
of the Daud affair on German hesita-
tion. (Earlier, there had been re-
ports that Paniatowski and other
French officials who had been in
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13 January
direct contact with the German :In-
terior Ministry had gradually become
convinced that those officials in
Bonn who were pressing them to hold
Daud were not speaking for the Ger-
man government as a whole.)
Breaking his silence on the affair,
Prime Minister Barre publicly de-
fends French actions and notes that
his government had sent a formal
protest to the PLO for its role in
sponsoring Daud's travel under an
assumed name. A French Foreign Of-
fice official delivers a pro forma
rejection of the US Department of
State's criticism of the release.
Franco-German polemics become harsher.
13-15 January The US Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee approves a nonbinding resolu-
tion declaring that Daud's release
has served to undermine international
efforts to halt terrorism. A group
of over 30 US Congressmen and Senators
send a critical cable to French Presi-
dent Valery Giscard d'Estaing. Major
American Jewish organizations call
for an economic boycott of France.
15 January Speaking from Algiers in one of a
series of telephone interviews granted
for the purpose of exploiting the stir
caused by his arrest and release to
maximum political advantage, Daud of-
fers to stand trial in Munich in order
to clear himself of
the
charge that
he "master-minded"
the
1972
Olympic
Games attack--provided
that
Bonn
guarantees his security and makes the
necessary arrangements through the
PLO.
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16 January German spokesmen, noting that Daud
was fully aware that these conditions
would be unacceptable, dismiss his
bid as self-serving rhetoric.
17 January During the course of a news confer-
ence devoted primarily to domestic
matters, President Giscard also lays
the blame for Daud's early release
on German vacillation. Stressing
France's sovereign right to handle
such cases as it sees fit, he angrily
denounces what he describes as a
campaign of insult and vilification
against the honor and dignity of his
country.
18-21 January Tempers begin to cool, press cover-
age drops off, and efforts to re-
pair the damage done to Franco-German,
Franco-Israeli, and Franco-American
relations are begun.
President Giscard flies to Saudi
Arabia, France's principal oil
supplier, for a long-planned four-
day visit. In a special gesture of
esteem, ailing King Khalid goes out
from Riyadh to greet Giscard at the
airport.
Discussion:
As may be surmised from the above account, the cir-
cumstances surrounding the arrest of Abud Daud in Paris
on 7 January and his abrupt release just four days later
are still somewhat murky. For example, hard information
is lacking as to who ordered the arrest, the precise
nature of any understanding worked out by French and
German security officials beforehand (or, for that mat-
ter, whether such an understanding was worked out at
all), and just how and when senior political leaders
and Foreign Ministry officials in the two countries
became privy to the affair. Similarly, many of the
details of the bureaucratic wrangling within (and bi-
lateral sparring between) France and Germany that
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followed Daud's detention have yet to be established.
Certainly none of the official and quasi-official state-
ments that have emanated from France and Germany can be
taken at face value.
Nonetheless, enough is known to cast the episode
into clearer and broader perspective. To this end,
three general obervations are offered--and their impli-
cations explored--below.
First, the episode highlights the strength and
persistence of obstacles that have been frustrating
efforts to develop more effective international counter-
measures against terrorism for nearly a decade.* Speci-
fically, the Daud incident demonstrates that the damaging
impact of the Lebanese civil war on inter-Arab relations
and the political fortunes of the PLO has not, as some
had hoped, significantly reduced the force of these in-
hibiting factors in cases where Palestinian militants
are involved. Moreover, despite the smoke generated
by recent counterterrorist initiatives in the Council
of Europe and the UN, the Daud case strongly suggests
that the salience of these constraints also remains
basically unchanged with respect to actions against any
political formation that has succeeded in winning broad
popular and official recognition of its "national libera-
tion" or "revolutionary" credentials.
* Foremost among these are the controversy over justi-
fiable versus illegal political violence that has found
reflection in repeated affirmations of the primacy and
inviolability of the right to self-determination, broad
resistance to such infringement of national sovereignty
(i.e., freedom of maneuver) as would be implied in any
inflexible curtailment of the right to grant political
asylum, and a natural reluctance on the part of many
states to commit themselves to any course of action that
might invite retribution--either by terrorist groups or
by states sympathetic to the terrorists' cause.
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T e Germans, less exposed, nave teen a to
pu a better face on things. Nonetheless, their offi-
cial censure of France's action was accompanied by pri-
vate expression of relief. There is, in fact, no doubt
that grave and growing concern over the risks and prob-
lems that Bonn would shoulder in bringing Daud to jus-
tice was as much or more responsible for the deliberate
pace at which the Germans had been moving as belief that
there was plenty of time to act under the terms of the
1951 Franco-German Extradition. Treaty. (Indeed, it
is not altogether certain that the Germans would have
ended up by requesting Daud's extradition even if the
French had been willing to hold him for another two
weeks or so.) Finally, it should be noted that whether
or not the German government was consulted in advance
of the event (and there is some evidence to suggest
that it was), the Germans must have been aware from the
growing urgency of French efforts to obtain an official
confirmation from them of their intention to request
extradition that Paris was seriously considering re-
leasing Daud on January 11. Hence, Bonn's failure to
take advantage of the opportunities offered to weigh in
against such a step at the last minute was in all prob-
ability deliberate.**
** In fairness, it should be emphasized that an apprecia-
tion of the additional costs in terms of damage to Franco-
German relations that would have been entailed in press-
ing Paris to hold Daud against its will was probably one
of the more important factors contributing to German
reticence.
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The second "lesson" that can be drawn from the
Daud affair is the importance of routine pre-crisis
coordination of terrorism-related policies and contin-
gency plans with all the key domestic and foreign actors
whose interests and options they could affect. In the
Daud case, a well-intentioned effort to place a notor-
ious terrorist behind bars was virtually foredoomed to
a failure by a lack of adequate prior planning and co-
ordination. True, the cooperative arrangements that
have been established within the Western security and
intelligence communities worked well. But the specific
contingency of an opportunity to arrest Daud has not
been anticipated. In consequence, no warrant was out-
standing to justify the action. The case against him
had not been fully compiled. Most important, neither
the French nor German political leadership had been
asked to rule whether the benefits to be derived from
apprehending and prosecuting Daud--or others like him---
outweighed the costs and risks that would be incurred.
Thus, not only was action initiated on shaky legal
grounds, but careful spadework and hard decisions that
would normally require months to accomplish were forced
into a time-frame of days. Under these circumstances,
mutually reinforcing French and German apprehensions
were further amplified. The net result was confusion,
misunderstanding--and relative disaster.
Although it can be argued that the phrase "relative
disaster" overstates the case, the perturbations caused
by the Daud affair were substantial. And while, thanks
to the operation of other and overriding concerns, these
are already beginning to subside, their initial scope
and force give rise to a third and final observation.
Because of the attention that has been focused on ter-
rorism and the extent to which that controversial issue
impinges on other pressing international and domestic
concerns, the adverse ramifications of a mistake in
counterterrorist tactics can easily be amplified out
of all proportion.
The calculus at work is much the same as in the
case of the disruptive effects of a successful terrorists
act. The role of the media is, for example, critical
to both phenomena. As demonstrated by the Daud case,
intense international publicity reinforces concern over
"national honor" and the domestic political implications
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of the misstep in question. It thus tends to exacerbate
any ensuing bilateral strains by increasing sensitivity
to criticism and encouraging efforts to shift the blame
onto others. And it also provides the practitioners
of political violence concerned with cost-free dissemi-
nation of their propaganda.
In sum, the events of January demonstrate that the
goal of developing more effective international counter-
measures against terrorism remains a particularly dif-
ficult and challenging task. But the key conclusion
that follows from the above discussion is that when
viewed dispassionately and in relatively broad perspec-
tive, episodes such as the Daud affair will instruct
rather than undermine efforts to this end. They can,
for example, provide all concerned with a better appre-
ciation of what is politically feasible under prevail-
ing circumstances. And they can also furnish useful
insights both as to ways in which to avoid similar
failures in the future (e.g., more extensive pre-crisis
planning and coordination) and methods for muting the
initial reverberations if such failures as do occur.
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Soviet Nonproliferation Policy
The Soviet Union continues to send clear signals to
the United States and other Western countries that it
wishes to reinforce international efforts to halt the
proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Soviets have---
with a possible exception in the case of India--been
consistent opponents of nuclear proliferation, and have
argued for more stringent controls on the transfer of
nuclear materials and technology than currently required
by the US and most of its allies.
Recently, General Secretary Brezhnev advocated a
strengthening of the Nonproliferation Treaty, and a key
Soviet negotiator on nuclear matters, I. D. Morokhov,
Deputy Director of the State Committee for Peaceful Uses
of Atomic Energy, delivered a strong admonition to the
US embassy in Moscow on the need for more serious anti-
proliferation measures. These statements follow a
general pattern of pronouncements by top members of the
Soviet leadership which have been repeated and ampli-
fied in the Soviet press.
The Soviets are focusing their attention on creat-
ing technical international obstacles to nuclear explo-
sive development in candidate nuclear countries. Uni-
versal adherence to the Nonproliferation Treaty and
inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency of
all aspects of the nuclear activity of nonnuclear wea-
pon states are currently the Soviets' highest priority
proposals for halting the spread of nuclear explosives.
The Soviets apparently feel that acceptance of these
measures would greatly ease their own concern about
nuclear development in a number of key countries, such
as West. Germany, Israel, Iran, and Pakistan.
The Soviets believe the present international non-
proliferation regime contains two major weaknesses.
First, several nations of critical importance from the
Soviet point of view are not treaty signatories,
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including the Chinese. Second, some NPT adherents have
not fully subjected their nuclear programs to interna-
tional inspection by the IAEA, relying instead on re-
gional arrangements, i.e., EURATOM.
The Soviets intend to advance their views at the
March meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), also
known as the London Suppliers Conference. Specifically,
they will propose "full fuel cycle" controls. By this
they mean that acceptance of IAEA safeguards and inspec-
tion of all nuclear facilities in a recipient country
should precede any transfer of nuclear materials or
technology by the major nuclear exporters. In addition,
the Soviets recently have been more receptive to US pro-
posals for the establishment of multinational nuclear
reactor spent fuel reprocessing centers and plutonium
storage areas.
Since most of the so-called threshold nuclear states
are antagonists of the Soviet Union or its clients, there
is little reason to doubt the sincerity of Soviet non-
proliferation views. The Soviet Union does not wish to
see sensitive nationally controlled nuclear facilities,
such as enrichment or plutonium separation plants, de-
veloped in any nonnuclear weapon state, including even
its Warsaw Pact allies. Indeed, except for recent ship-
ments of heavy water to India with prior safeguard agree-
ments, the Soviets have been exceptionally careful to
avoid creating the potential for nuclear weapon develop-
ment in any country to which they export nuclear materials.
Even in the Indian case, the Soviets insist they followed
the letter of the NSG agreements and that they had ade-
quate safeguard assurances.
While the Soviets insist on stringent technical
and legal arrangements to halt proliferation, they have
avoided directly addressing the underlying political
factors that advance the process. Their political ef-
forts for the most part have been limited to symbolic
actions, such as supporting UN Security Council Reso-
lution 255 condemning nuclear aggression and advocating
a "no first use" of nuclear arms treaty in the General
Assembly. The Soviets have not proposed any interna-
tional measures involving the cooperation of the major
powers to reduce the fundamental political and security
imperatives that so often impel threshold states to
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initiate nuclear development programs. Instead, the
Soviets fall back on more narrow legal and technical
proposals, such as calls for a comprehensive test ban.
(There are some signs that they may eventually also pro-
pose a moratorium on peaceful nuclear explosions, a re-
versal of a long-standing position.)
The Soviets generally have confined their diplo-
matic efforts to protesting what they consider to be
dangerous acts of nuclear proliferation. French sales
of a reprocessing plant to Pakistan and reactors to Iran
and South Africa have come under harsh criticism. YEet
the Soviets have not overtly applied pressure to states
that may be creating the insecurities that drive these
and other countries to fabricate nuclear weapons. In
part, this is because the Soviets highly value bilateral
relations with some countries whose actions are spurring
the proliferation process. In other circumstances, the
Soviets simply lack any effective leverage, such as in
South America or South Africa. However, even in areas
where they could reduce the political and military ten-
sions that may stimulate nuclear development, as in
Korea, the Soviets have not been especially active.
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Energy Dependence and Atlantic Relations*
Western Europe's dependence on imported OPEC oil
will remain high--probably around 40 percent of total
energy consumption--over the next 10 years. Earlier
hopes for a substantial reduction of this dependence
through the development of alternative energy sources
have had to be scaled back repeatedly during the past
two years because of persistent troubles in the Euro-
pean coal and nuclear industries. While North Sea oil
and gas will soon make a major contribution to Europe's
indigenous energy supplies (and bring energy self-suffi-
ciency to Great Britain and Norway), they are likely at
best to stabilize, rather than to reduce, the total
volume of European oil imports. This continuing depen-
dence, and its various economic and political ramifica-
tions, will have an important impact on intra-European
and US-European relations for the foreseeable future.
Europe's energy dependence in effect "competes"
with its relationship to the US, in that it promotes
both an inward-looking preoccupation with domestic
problems and a high degree of responsiveness to oil-
producing countries. This tension creates the poten-
tial for serious strains on Atlantic Alliance cohesion
in the event of an oil supply emergency like that of
1973-1974. More generally, it may limit the responsive-
ness of European countries to American interests and
priorities in a variety of contexts, including coopera-
tion among oil-importing countries. Despite the fact
that high energy costs have enhanced American economic
strength vis-a-vis Europe, the result may mean new frus-
trations for the US leadership role in the Atlantic Al-
liance.
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Energy trends are unlikely to provide an impetus
for greater unity within Western Europe. On the con-
trary, growing disparities in energy dependence, as well
as in underlying economic health, increasingly challenge
the progress of European integration. High energy costs
have tended to aggravate the gap between strong and weak
economies, since the former have a much greater capacity
than the latter to absorb the shock of increased prices.
Countries like France and Italy, which have neither the
domestic energy endowments of a Great Britain nor the
economic vitality of a West Germany, have found that
high oil bills greatly compound the difficulties of es-
caping a persistent cycle of inflation, depreciating
currencies, and balance-of-payments deficits.
Such problems will continue to complicate the man-
agement of Atlantic trade and monetary relations, and
the coordination of policies on "North-South" issues.
The ideal of a liberal international economic order is
likely to face a variety of neo-mercantilist pressures,
as oil importing nations attempt to manage energy-
related domestic economic difficulties and to form
special trade and investment relations with oil produ-
cers. While such strains are unlikely to rupture the
underlying strategic unity of the Atlantic nations, NATO
solidarity could be tested by growing pressures on Euro-
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pean defense budgets and by the strengthened Mediterra-
nean/Middle East orientation of the heavily dependent
southern European states.
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