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National Secret p V or Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002 - 25X1 Assessment Center International Issues Monthly Review State Dept. review Secret completed RP All 77-012 20 December 1977 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010QJArO 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010013-0 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010013-0 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 SECRET INTERNATIONAL ISSUES MONTHLY REVIEW 20 December 1977 CONTENTS ARMS TRANSFERS ARMS TRANSFERS AND LEVERAGE. . ... . . . . . . . . . one issue raised by current efforts to restrain conventional arms transfers is their role as a form of leverage--a means for a supplier to influence the policies of a recipient. This article provides a framework for assessing the likely outcome of attempts to use arms to exert influence, revealing the reasons a manipulation of arms transfers often fails to achieve its objective. NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS THE COMMON FUND NEGOTIATIONS: SOME TIME, NEXT YEAR? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 The Group of 77 decision to suspend the com- mon fund negotiations at Geneva will probably lead the West Europeans and Japanese to ac- cept limited direct government contributions to the fund and voluntary financing of develop- ment measures. The LDCs would probably agree to reopen the negotiations on the basis of these concessions, even though they fall short of their demands. JAMAICA AND THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE . . . . . . . .. 15 There are conflicting pressures on Jamaican leaders as they formulate that Caribbean country's policy in the North-South dialogue. Approved For Release 2007/02/OWC'@FA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 SECRET As these forces sort themselves out, there will be an uneven character to Jamaican policy that will affect its relations with the US as well as with the LDCs. HUMAN RIGHTS REFUGEES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN ISSUE IN US-ASEAN RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 The five members of the Association of South- east Asian Nations (ASEAN) are concerned that the growing numbers of Vietnamese refugees Landing on their shores will cause serious domestic problems. Such concern has Zed most of the governments to adopt hostile policies despite US and UNHCR criticism that such policies violate the refugees' human rights. PSYCHIATRY AND DISSENT IN THE USSR. . . . . . . . . . 26 This article examines the Soviet practice of using psychiatry as a means of suppressing dissent. It explores the historical roots of this policy and projects its likely continua- tion despite international censure. ii Approved For Release 2007/02$NRAtIA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010013-0 SECRET INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS THE POLITICS OF UN RESTRUCTURE: THE ISSUE OF A SECRE'PARIAT DEVELOPMENT POST . . . . . . . . . . . 33 The controversy surrounding the appointment of a high-level secretariat position for de- velopment did not end with the Ad Hoc Com- mittee on Restructure's compromise on the issue. The months ahead promise increased political pressure from the LDCs, who want the post to rank second only to the Secretary General. This publication is prepared by the international Issues Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with occasional contributions from other offices within the National Foreign Assessment Center. The views presented are the best judgments of individual analysts who are aware that many of the issues they discuss are subject to alternative interpretation. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles. iii Approved For Release 2007/02/0?E~Mb-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 Approved For Release 2007/02/q?CRS'A-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 Arms Transfers and Leverage One issue raised by current efforts to restrain con- ventional arms transfers is their role as a form of lever- age--as a means for a supplier to influence the policies of a recipient. This article provides a general assess- ment of the factors at work that influence the efficacy of arms transfer as a means to exert leverage. Articles in subsequent issues of this monthly will attempt to apply the framework to individual regions and countries. Thus, the reactions of readers to the present article will be particularly appreciated. Although Leverage varies from one case to another, three general factors can be identified that generally tend to enhance leverage or diminish it. The first is the overall relationship between supplier and recipient. (What other Levers of influence can each side use against the other?) The second is the objective for which Lever- age is being used. (How important is it to each side that its will prevail?) The third is the arms transfer itself. This is mainly a matter of assessing the stake that each side has in a transfer of arms. It also re- quires one to take account of the peculiar characteris- tics that set arms transfers apart from other possible means of influence.* A review of these factors reveals why arms transfers have often failed to provide suppliers with sufficient Leverage to accomplish their objectives. Arms transfers generally can be successfully exploited on matters of *In using this framework, however, it should be remembered that Leverage ultimately depends not on how the analyst or any third party perceives the supplier-recipient relation- ship, but on how the recipient perceives it. Mispercep- tions often are more important than material facts in determining the outcome of an attempt at influence. It is useful to know how another government should be think- ing (that is, to note the bargaining chips and resources available to it), but this is not a substitute for exam- ining how it actually does think. 1 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 SECRET small importance to the recipient, but seldom on issues that it sees as involving threats to its security. And what influence arms transfers do provide does not neces- sarily require a previously nurtured patron-client rela- tionship; a promise of future supply is apt to be at least as effective in influencing another state as a threat to interrupt an existing flow of arms. The Overall Bilateral Relationship An assessment of the extent to which an arms trans- fer will be effective as a means of influence must begin Dy placing the supply of arms within the context of the overall relationship between supplier and recipient. Even a large arms transfer constitutes only part of that rela- tionship; nonmilitary commerce, diplomatic initiatives, and the sundry other opportunities one state has for co- operating with or placing demands on another are also parts of it. A government, in deciding whether to resist or to yield to another's pressures, must consider all of the ways each side may impose costs or bestow benefits on the other. Even if arms transfers themselves furnish a supplier with substantial leverage, the advantage they afford in any individual case may be offset by counter- leverage possessed by the recipient. A recipient's con- trol over vital natural resources is an example of such counterleverage; the possibility of an interruption in supply of the resource may well negate the effects of a possible interruption in the supply of arms. The Supplier's Objective The outcome of an attempt to exert influence also depends upon the nature of the supplier's objective, and especially upon the importance each party attaches to the issue at hand. The more vital a state believes an issue to be, the less likely any form of leverage--whether based on arms transfers or on anything else--will be sufficient to induce it to accede to the demands of another state. This is one reason arms embargoes have so frequently failed to achieve an objective for which they have often been used: to induce a recipient to desist from using arms to wage war against, or to occupy, a neighboring country. It is precisely in such a circumstance that the 2 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 Approved For Release 2007/02/$PIRA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 recipient believes that its central interests are at stake while those of the supplier are not. Furthermore, the recipient is likely to perceive a cut-off of arms during this kind of emergency as a hostile act in itself, making the recipient even less susceptible to any kind of influence. The probable response is a stiffening of resistance rather than compliance. This was, for example, the response of Turkey to the embargo of US arms follow- ing Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in 1974. A manipulation of arms transfers generally is in-- effective in attaining this kind of objective even though it offers the possibility of directly affecting the re- cipient's ability to carry out the unwanted action. After all, restricting the flow of arms may make it harder for the recipient to prosecute a war. This means the recipient must consider an interruption of supply not just as one more cost to weigh against the benefits of persisting in its course of action, but also as a possible impediment to attaining the benefits in the first place. It also means the supplier might be able to inhibit the recipient's war-making even if the latter never does de- cide to yield directly to diplomatic demands. But even these additional pressures on the recipient may prove insufficient to achieve the desired result. In addition to the considerations already mentioned, the direct effect of an embargo (even one universally applied) on the recipient's military capability may simply be too little or too late. The arms that are being supplied may not be those most crucial to the military effort. And the recipient might be able to attain its chief goals through a short victorious war before the effects of any arms embargo could be felt, as Turkey was able to do in Cyprus. The leverage inhering in arms transfers is more likely to be effective on matters that, though important .to the supplier, are of relatively little consequence to the recipient. A small but very helpful favor will appear, to the recipient, to be a cheap price to pay if it helps to purchase subsequent military cooperation. It may seem a small price even if the supplier's future help is only a possibility that is not backed up by a formal promise. Pakistan's cooperation in arranging Henry Kissinger's se- cret visit to China in 1971 was probably extended in the hope of being somehow repaid in the form of future US favors. 3 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010013-0 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 SECRET It was in Pakistan's interest to pay the tiny costs in- volved (providing a cover story for a US official) on a matter of great importance to the United States. A more recent example was Somalia's permission to West Germany to assault a hijacked aircraft at the Mogadiscio airport. Again, the costs of granting the favor were modest (having to tolerate a single, small foreign operation on Somali territory), while the benefits to West Germany were large (rescue of the passengers and a major setback to the terrorists). Even though Bonn evidently made no explicit promises of West German arms, the possibility of military support from Bonn or its allies made cooperation seem a worthwhile investment to the embattled Somalis. A promise to initiate or increase a flow of arms is likely to be more effective than other forms of leverage when a bolstering of the recipient's conventional military strength would make compliance seem less dangerous to it. For example, the assurance of further shipments of US arms helped to induce the Israelis to withdraw in the Sinai because an augmentation of their arsenal made withdrawal seem less dangerous to them. Similar reasoning would apply to efforts to dissuade a nonnuclear state that feels militarily vulnerable (such as Pakistan, Taiwan, or South Korea) from acquiring nuclear weapons. The promise of additional conventional arms may be more effective than other types of leverage in accomplishing this objective, because the conventional arms would help to serve the defensive or deterrent function that nuclear ones might otherwise serve. Each Side's Stake in an Arms Transfer Once the supplier's objective and the other aspects of the supplier-recipient relationship are taken into account, an assessment of the leverage obtainable through arms transfers focuses on the nature of the arms transfer itself. This is chiefly a matter of gauging the stake each party has in the particular transfer of arms, whether this be the continuation of an existing arms flow, or the initiation of one not yet started. Other things being equal, the greater the recipient's stake in a particular transfer of arms, the greater is the leverage which the supplier has over it. The recipient's stake has two aspects. One is its need for arms generally. For most states, this is a matter of maintaining the ability 4 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 Approved For Release 2007/02/0 : CIA-RDP79TOO912AO02300010013-0 to defend against armed attacks from possible enemies. In some cases, however, other motives may be involved, such as prestige or a concern for preserving the military's internal political position. The other aspect is the recipient's reliance on a particular supplier--the extent to which it cannot satisfy its need for arms by turning to other states or to its own industry. Such reliance has several possible causes. A given type of weapon may simply not be built anywhere else. Or, even if a com- parable weapon is available elsewhere, the prior commit- ment to the present supplier's training, doctrine, and supply of spare parts can make it prohibitively costly and time-consuming to switch. The financial terms of one offer, including pricing, credit arrangements, and acceptable currencies, might be more attractive than those of competing offers. And there may be other reasons for wanting to do business with a particular supplier, such as to reinforce a security tie. But just as the recipient's dependence on arms transfers establishes the supplier's leverage, so does the supplier's own dependence diminish it. The more the supplier relies on its exports of arms to protect or promote its interests, the less free it feels to forgo these exports. This in turn lowers the risks to the recipient of resisting the supplier's demands. The supplier's dependence might assume either or both of two forms: a perceived general need to export arms (because of economic concerns like its balance of payments or a desire to achieve economies of scale in equipping its own forces) or a desire to supply a particular recipient. The supplier may place importance on furnishing arms to a particular country for several possible reasons. First, it may be motivated by the same kind of economic concern that can lead it to value arms exports generally (a reason likely to increase in importance with the size of the projected sale). Second, it may wish to preempt an adversary, preventing it from becoming the patron of this particular recipient. Third, it may want to preserve a regional military balance. And finally, the supplier may wish to provide arms for the same reason the recipient wishes to obtain them, whether this reason be the pro- tection of a ruling group's internal position or the pro- tection of the state from external enemies. Any of these motives, if present, will inhibit the supplier from manip- ulating an arms flow and therefore will reduce the leverage 5 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010013-0 SECRET it might otherwise derive from arms transfers. Further- more, the more that other facets of the supplier's foreign policy, such as the promotion of human rights or a concern over the reaction of important third parties, impinge upon its arms transfer decisions, the less flexibility it has to use those decisions to influence the recipient. When the interests of supplier and recipient converge-- that is, when the former provides arms for the same reason the latter asks for them--another important implication follows. Disputes are relatively less likely to arise between states with a longstanding relationship of military cooperation. But when a dispute does occur, a supplier may find that it has the least leverage over the very recipients with which it has the closest ties, since they are the ones whose interests it tends to accept as its own. For example, any influence the US might hope to gain over Israel through hints of manipulating the supply of arms would be limited by the obvious American acceptance of Israeli security as an important US interest. Identity of the Decisionmakers Although "supplier" and "recipient" are convenient shorthand expressions for two states, it is important to be precise about exactly which individuals or groups are involved when considering the stakes in an arms transfer and the decisions to comply or resist. Costs and benefits do not affect leverage unless they are somehow felt by the leaders who make the diplomatic decisions. The analyst of the individual case therefore must determine who those decisionmakers are and how they value arms transfers. It is particularly important to discover whether the individuals in the recipient government who would view an interruption in the supply of arms as costly have sufficient power to steer that government in the direction of compliance with the supplier's wishes. If they do not, leverage will be ineffective. Arms transfers may be useful, for example, in influencing senior military officers (or civilian politicians who rely on their support) if these officers place a high value on the continuing import of arms during peacetime. In fact, the direct entry into a recipient's military establishment is one thing that sets arms transfers apart from nonmilitary commerce or 20 December 1977 6 Approved For Release 2007/02/ R'EIA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 SECRET other forms of leverage. But if the leaders whose wills are likely to prevail in most major decisions have only grudgingly accepted a program of military expansion pushed by service chiefs or other parts of the government, they may be little upset by an interruption in the flow of arms. (They might even welcome it privately.) As a result., they may actually be less pliable than a much stronger leader (like the Shah of Iran) who not only makes the important diplomatic decisions but also has personally planned. the acquisition of arms. Longer Term Effects In addition to assessing each side's immediate stake in an arms transfer, it is necessary to consider the likely longer term impact of: (1) the arms transfer itself; and (2) any attempt to manipulate arms transfers in order to exert influence. Both have side effects that can alter each side's vulnerability to pressures from the other. The more extensive a supply of arms and the longer it continues, the more each side tends to become dependent on the continued cooperation of the other. On one hand, heavy reliance on a single supplier's arms may make it more difficult or expensive for the recipient to switch to a different source of supply because of its commitment to the present supplier's training, doctrine, and spare parts. On the other hand, large sales of arms tend to increase the vulnerability of the supplier to counter- pressures from the recipient. For one thing, the loss of orders from a longtime foreign customer can seriously disrupt production lines that are important in keeping the supplier's own forces equipped. For another, the presence of training and technical personnel on the recipient's soil makes them potential hostages in the event of a major dispute. Both of these considerations are likely to be involved when large quantities of advanced weapons have been sold, as with US military sales to Iran. Finally, sales on credit over a period of years lead to an accumulation of debt. The option of renouncing this debt or at least of suspending payments (as Egypt recently did with its debt to the USSR) gives the recipient an added lever for use in later disputes. Probably the most important side effect a supplier's political manipulation of the flow of arms is apt to have is a decision by the recipient to reduce its dependence 7 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010013-0 SECRET on that particular supplier in the future (thus reinforc- ing an existing trend among arms importers to diversify their sources of supply). The recipient may accede to the supplier's immediate demand while at the same time resolving to take steps to avoid a repetition of the un- pleasant experience. These steps may include an intensi- fication of efforts to build a domestic arms industry (as exemplified by the responses of South Africa and Commu- nist China to past cut-offs of arms by their principal suppliers) as well as a turn to other foreign suppliers (the responses of Pakistan and Turkey to US arms embar- goes). The resulting loss of leverage for use in later disputes--on issues that might be more important to the supplier--thus is a potential cost to be weighed against the benefits of bending the recipient's will now. A turning to alternative sources by other recipients or would-be recipients who have witnessed the event and do not wish to be manipulated in the same way is another potential cost. All of this can limit the supplier's freedom to manipulate arms transfers and consequently can reduce the risks to the recipient of resisting. Conclusion Analyzing a supplier's ability to influence another state's policies by exploiting its dependence on arms is inevitably a complex task that requires attention to many matters besides the arms transfer itself. It is made especially difficult by the fact that some attri- butes of a bilateral relationship can be expected to en- hance the supplier's leverage on one count but diminish it on another. For example, the existence of close cul- tural, ideological, and security ties between supplier and recipient can mean a scarcity of alternative sources of supply (enhancing leverage) but also a convergence of interests (diminishing leverage). This roughly describes the US-Israeli relationship, and any impact arms trans- fers have on that relationship depends in large part on which of these two effects will predominate. Although assessing the leverage conferred on a sup- plier by the transfer of conventional arms is ultimately a task for individual case studies, some general conclu- sions emerge. Arms transfers can be useful in quietly nurturing friendly relations with a recipient, particu- larly its military establishment. But a direct attempt 20 December 1977 8 Approved For Release 2007/02/O FITA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 Approved For Release 2007/0262eRE~IA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 to manipulate supply in order to bend the recipient's will is a different matter. For one thing, the reasons even a major transfer of arms may not provide leverage are numerous. Any one of them--whether it is a matter of the supplier's stake in an existing flow of arms, the longer term side effects, or the recipient's deci- sionmaking process--may be sufficient to prevent the supplier from effectively exploiting a recipient's de- pendence on arms. Second, even where an arms transfer itself does provide leverage, it is generally insuffi- cient to alter the recipient's position on matters the latter deems to be of high importance. Although it seems an appropriate matching of means to ends to use a manip- ulation of arms supply to try to curtail the recipient's use of conventional arms (specifically, their use in warfare or military occupation), this is the very sort of issue on which such manipulation is least likely to be effective. Finally, where leverage is effective, the promise or possibility of furnishing arms is at least. as likely to be responsible as a cut-off, or threatened cut- off, of supply. In short, leverage derives not so much from past deliveries of arms as it does from the possi- bility of future transactions. 9 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010013-0 Approved For Release 2007/02/08~a6IVIRDP79T00912A002300010013-0 The Common Fund Negotiations: Some Time, Next Year? The negotiations at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) on the establishment of a common fund for commodities were suspended on 2 December at the initiative of the LDC caucus (the Group of 77). A statement issued by the group Zeft open the possibility of resuming talks at a later date, but not until the industrial countries (Group B) showed the necessary "political will" for progress in the negotia- tions. For its part, Group B acceded to the suspension with regret and stated its willingness to participate in further discussions. The common fund is one of the most important ele- ments of the "New International Economic order" sought by the LDCs. After years of debate on the issue, the LDCs finally won industrial state acceptance in principle of the fund at the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC) last spring. The recent UNCTAD meet- ings were the first discussions since CIEC on the im- plementation of. the concept. The outcome of the common fund issue will have a significant impact on other North-South economic nego- tiations. The following article assesses the pressures that contributed to the suspension of the UNCTAD con- ference and the effect of that decision on the future of the common fund talks. The Group of 77 Position The call to suspend the UNCTAD conference was made to preserve Group of 77 solidarity and to pressure the industrial countries into making greater concessions. During the previous four weeks of negotiations, basic differences among the LDCs, and between them and Group B, over the shape--or even the existence--of a common fund put a major strain on Group of 77 unity. 10 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 Approved For Release 2007/02/9paiIA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 Some of the wealthier LDCs are either opposed or indifferent to the idea of a common fund. Those who support it are interested only in establishing buffer stocks to stabilize commodity prices. Nevertheless, when the original LDC negotiating position was formu- lated, the wealthier LDCs agreed to support not only the idea of a common fund, but also two other important de- mands of the poorer states. The majority of poor de?- veloping countries, who have little to gain from the fund's role as a stabilizing influence on commodity prices, want the fund to assume a development role and finance, through a "second window" such "other measures" as export diversification, infrastructure development, and market promotion. In addition, they demand that the fund be financed through direct government contributions as well as through the pooled resources of individual commodity agreements.* The industrial countries participating in the con- ference generally resisted the demands for a second win- dow and for direct government contributions to the fund. The poorer LDCs feared that their wealthier partners in the Group of 77 might give in to the Group B position. At the same time, they observed that the resolve of many of the West Europeans and the Japanese to oppose the two demands had been weakening. They therefore chose to sus- pend the negotiations, hoping to force the industrial countries into making concessions and at the same time preserve Group of 77 unity. The tactic is likely to prove successful on both counts. Algeria, Ethiopia, Libya, Sudan, and Tanzania were the strongest advocates of suspending negotiations. They were openly supported by Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru of the Latin American bloc, and by Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan of the.Asian bloc. Most of those countries have consistently pressed for direct contributions to the fund and a broad fund role in financing development. They also played an im- portant part in shaping the Group of 77 proposals ham?- mered out earlier by a smaller group chaired by the In- donesian representative. 11 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010013-0 Approved For Release 2007/02/SECRET IA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 Only Argentina and the Philippines spoke out against suspension of the conference. Most of the wealthier LDCs probably felt that, in view of the wavering shown by the industrial countries, they had nothing to lose by sup- porting a unanimous Group of 77 decision to suspend the conference until industrial countries were ready to ne- gotiate on LDC terms. The Group B Position Of the industrial countries, only the Netherlands and the Nordic states support the LDC version of a com- mon fund--just as they do most other Group of 77 economic demands--reflecting primarily a humanitarian commitment to the poor countries. Most other Group B governments are internally split over the issue. Their foreign min- istries, concerned above all with maintaining good rela- tions with the LDCs, generally argue for accommodation, while the budget-sensitive economic ministries take a harder line. The industrial countries generally suffer from slow economic growth, high unemployment, and shaky political positions that are not strengthened by generosity to the LDCs. Major new financial commitments to these countries would thus incur only costs on the domestic political level. At the same time, however, the industrial states are subject to strong international political and eco- nomic pressures to accommodate LDC demands. The industrial states' economic stake in the Third World provides them with a positive incentive to accom- modation in the North-South economic dialogue. With slow growth in industrial markets, the West Europeans and Japanese have an increased interest in selling goods and technology to the LDCs. In theory, the political goodwill earned from an accommodating position in multi- lateral economic negotiations would yield economic bene- fit through increased exports. Such a result, however, would not be certain and would probably at best be ob- served only in the long run. More powerful are the negative incentives that make the industrial states wary of appearing recalcitrant in the common fund negotiations. Joining in a general Group B consensus in support of direct contributions and a second window would not earn any one state special credit 20 December 1977 12 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 SECRET among the LDCs. Being singled out as a roadblock to Group B agreement on these issues, however, would cer- tainly earn it discredit among the Group of 77. For the West Europeans, that would conflict with their aim of increased political influence in the Third World. In. addition, the West Europeans and Japanese want to avoid political conflict with the LDCs because of their con- cern with the security of non-oil raw material supplies. A final negative incentive arises from the fact that the Netherlands has threatened to break EC solidarity if the other members do not accept the LDC demands. France, West Germany, and the United Kingdom would be extremely reluctant to allow that to happen. The Evolution of the Group B Position Most industrial states have already privately ex- pressed a willingness to compromise on financing of other measures and direct government contributions to the com- mon fund. Only the US and West Germany have officially remained inflexible. There is considerable debate over the issue, however, within the West German Government:. Now that the Group of 77 has served notice that it in- tends to stick to its demands, the West Germans will prob- ably alter their position. They are not likely to hold out, either alone or with the US, and risk being blamed by the LDCs and other EC members for the failure of the negotiations. The West German fear of being identified as a key impediment to the success of the common fund talks is probably heightened by their uncertainty about the evolution of the US position. Domestic political and economic problems will still place important limits on the concessions that the West Europeans and Japanese can make to the LDCs. They will probably agree to limited direct contributions and vol- untary financing of other measures, in an effort to avoid, as best they can, the political costs of recalcitrance and the economic costs of accommodation. In doing so, they would hope that acceptance of the principles behind the LDC demands would satisfy the LDCs in the short run, putting off the difficult decision about how to react if and when the Group of 77 insisted upon larger, manda- tory government contributions. 13 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 SECRET Outlook The Group of 77 will probably agree to reopen the common fund negotiations on the basis of the concessions that the West Europeans and Japanese seem willing to grant. Even though these concessions fall short of their demands, the LDCs probably recognize that the industrial countries will not go any farther at this point. If the Group of 77 refused to resume the talks until even greater concessions were extracted, they would obtain no common fund at all in the foreseeable future. While some LDCs would prefer that outcome, they would not be willing to pay the costs involved in terms of spoiling relations among LDCs. By agreeing to limited contributions and voluntary financing of other measures, the Group of 77 would have taken a major step toward a common fund and also gained an opening for more substantial mandatory funding arrange- ments at a later date. In addition, they would be able to preserve Group of 77 unity by partially satisfying the disparate aims of the poor LDCs and of the commodity producers, the states who advocate confrontation with the developed countries and those who counsel moderation. 14 Approved For Release 2007/02/ ! lA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010013-0 SECRET 25X1 Jamaica and the North-South Dialogue Jamaica's activities during recent North-South meet- ings such as the UNCTAD common fund negotiations suggest that over the medium term it will often pursue accommoda- tion with the industrial countries in general and the US in particular. Nonetheless, there will continue to be conflicting pressures on Jamaica's leaders as they formu- late their North-South policy. On one hand, domestic political and economic pressures discourage the use of radical confrontational tactics in international meetings and encourage the search for practical solutions to LDC--and Jamaican--problems. On the other hand, Prime Minister Manley feels Jamaica must show distance from the US. He believes that he has a mandate to take his country on a different and more "equitable" path of development than that prescribed by conventional Western modelE and he advocates bold redistribution of interna- tional poZiticaZ-economic decisionmaking power. Thus, the distinctive feature of Jamaica's posture in multi- lateral economic forums will be an unevenness, as it at- tempts to balance its staunch belief in LDC solidarity with its pursuit of bilateral benefits from the US and other industrial countries. Domestic Pressures Manley's options for attaining rapid development and greater economic independence for Jamaica have been constrained by an assortment of economic problems. Ag- gravated by soaring oil bills and the slowdown in the industrial economies since the 1973 OPEC oil price in- crease, these include lagging growth, capital flight, inflation, high unemployment (especially among youth), and severe balance of payments difficulties. The global recession has cut into bauxite sales (the major source of government revenues), and world sugar prices have 20 December 1977 15 Approved For Release 2007/02JRECIA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 fallen two-thirds below previous levels.* Moreover, local crime and violence have contributed to a dropoff in the Jamaican tourist industry. While bauxite/alumina sales may benefit from currently rising demand, the expansion of output will be difficult because of capacity constraints. Also, foreign investors, dissatisfied with Jamaican efforts to nationalize their operations, are exploring the feasi- bility of shifting some of their bauxite investment out- side of the Caribbean. One aluminum company official has stated that his organization will not invest further in Jamaica. Manley's support of radical attempts to restructure Jamaican society along Cuban lines has come under increased criticism from moderates in his own party as well as from the opposition party, and the party-based trade union re- cently took the unprecedented move of criticizing the government's handling of the country's economic problems. Manley's weakened situation was demonstrated in September 1977, when party moderates successfully forced the resigna- tion of an influential radical leader from key party and government posts and blocked the election of several other radicals to the powerful party executive council. Manley has cooperated with the moderates by adopting a flexible posture toward the US, a more subdued attitude toward nationalization of the foreign bauxite companies in Jamaica, and negotiating in good faith with the World Bank and the IMF. He has also stated that his plans for transforming Jamaican society leave room for private enterprise and democracy. In early 1977, his administra- tion reached agreement with US bauxite/alumina companies over tax and other issues.** Manley also appointed a *Combined earnings from the bauxite, sugar, and tourist industries make up approximately 70 percent of foreign exchange earnings of the Jamaican Government. In 1974 Manley's government imposed a 600 percent in- crease in tax levies on foreign bauxite/alumina com- panies in Jamaica in order to help pay his country's soaring oil bi7Z. The companies have been contesting the government's action ever since. 20 December 1977 16 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 SECRET moderate leader as Foreign Minister and sent him on a goodwill mission to the US. Subsequently, after pro- tracted negotiations, the Jamaican Government concluded an agreement with the US for $63 million in bilateral assistance. The Manley government also adopted a fiscal and economic austerity program that met most World Bank and IMF' criteria in order to receive major loans from these agencies. Manley had previously scorned sugges- tions by party moderates that he negotiate loans from the World Bank. Radical. Views Despite the economic dilemmas and domestic pressure that will encourage Manley to seek wider areas of mutual accommodation with the US and other industrial countries, there still are factors at work that will tend to make his country's policies in international forums at times radical. and confrontational. Manley requires the organizational talents of the radicals in his party--as well as their ties to Jamaica's youth---to survive Jamaica's electoral politics and there- fore cannot afford domestically to be seen as under US influence. In part, he arranged Cuban President Castro's visit last October to relieve pressure on his administra- tion from the radical wing. Castro's visit was intended to assure the radicals that Manley's tactics to placate the moderates and shore up the economy would not jeopard- ize the party's ties to Havana.* *At the same time, Castro's restrained and conciliatory activities and speeches underscored for Manley 's moder- ate opposition the value of Cuban assistance to Jamaican development. Castro played down the idea that Cuban ties to ManZey's party are contingent on ideological congruence between Kingston and Havana, acknowledging that Jamaica could take its own road to development. 17 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 SECRET An equally strong force for radical Jamaican poli- cies is Manley's belief that cooperation between the developed and developing world is a necessary but tem- porary feature of international relations. He views the broad range of North-South issues as a fundamental dis- pute over the redistribution of wealth and power between the industrial and developing countries. He equates the relationship between them to a master-slave rela- tionship that is under constant stress. There must be radical change, he argues, because the present relation- ship of LDCs to the international system is detrimental to their efforts to develop indigenous, self-reliant economic systems. International Pressures Jamaica's dependence on good relations with the US is the most significant moderating force on Manley's policies in the North-South dialogue. The importance he attaches to a leadership role in the Third World meanwhile serves as the principal external factor en- couraging a more radical Jamaican posture. Manley is a strong advocate of LDC unity and soli- darity as a tool for achieving the objectives of the New International Economic Order. His desire to promote LDC solidarity is balanced, however, by the necessity of pursuing national interests. During the 1977 Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC), Kingston exploited the discussions on substantive issues to make progress in its own negotiations with the IMF and the US. Dissatisfied with the austerity restrictions de- manded by the IMF, the Jamaican delegation tried to in- clude on the CIEC agenda the issue of reforming loan requirements for LDCs. It also used the occasion to engage the US in detailed talks on bilateral assistance to Jamaica. Jamaica has also contributed to the volatile po- litical dynamics of the Group of 77 that stem from traditional differences of political and economic in- terests within this LDC caucus. At the CIEC, Jamaica argued that OPEC policies are contrary to the LDC's long-term interests and openly criticized OPEC dominance in the G-77. Jamaica and some other LDCs were also 18 Approved For Release 2007/02MgREEIA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 SECRET critical of the OPEC states' reluctance at the 1976 UNCTAD Conference to use their $800-million special aid fund to support LDC demands for an integrated program for commodities. Jamaica has itself been criticized by some of the more radical African countries. Algeria at one point led a move---supported by a number of Africans--to prevent a Jamaican from representing the Group of 77, alleging he was untrustworthy because of his close personal rela- tions with certain industrial country leaders. The move may have been prompted by Kingston's criticism of OPEC and fueled by longstanding African distrust of the Latin American countries; Manley nonetheless recognize that he must maintain close relations with these states to preserve his leadership and will be careful to sup- port them as often as he can. The competing domestic and international forces that shape the direction and style of Jamaican North- South policy seem to favor moderation for now, although the forces that encourage radical demands and tactics should prevail often enough to give the Jamaican policy a somewhat erratic appearance. 19 Approved For Release 2007/02/'O'BCRE'IA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 Approved For Release 2007/02/RQJ1A-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 Refugees and Human Rights: An Issue in US-ASEAN Relations Developing Third World nations--generally those most affected by large numbers of refugees--are concerned about attempts by developed Western nations, and the US in particular, to guarantee the legal and civil rights of refugees by tying international financial and re- settlement assistance to a country's acceptance and treatment of refugees. Such a policy, the developing nations believe, would seriously impair their ability to resolve the difficult domestic problems that refugees pose. One region where Western emphasis on the human rights of refugees has become a major issue in US- developing world relations is Southeast Asia, where con- cern is mounting among the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) over the growing in- flux of Vietnamese refugees into their countries. For domestic political, economic, and security reasons, and also out of concern over harming relations with Vietnam, all five states (Thailand, Malaysia, Singa- pore, Indonesia, and the Philippines) are reluctant to accept Vietnamese refugees. In addition, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia have adopted hard-line tactics to discourage new refugees and put pressure on the US and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to take immediate and long-term steps to resettle them outside the region. Out of fear of being swamped by refugees turned away by their neighbors, Singapore and the Philippines will probably ultimately adopt similar antirefugee policies-- which in effect deny even temporary asylum. Thus far the individual ASEAN nations have dealt with the problem largely in the context of bilateral relations with the US and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Recent pronouncements, however, could indicate a growing inclina- tion among the ASEAN nations to act in concert in order to strengthen their collective hand. This article exam- ines the refugee policies of the ASEAN states, with par- ticular regard to the Vietnamese "boat cases," and the implications of these policies for the broader issues of human rights and ASEAN-US relations. 20 Approved For Release 2007/02/cEA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 Approved For Release 2007/02/=:RE3IA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 The five ASEAN nations have been affected in varying degrees--depending on their geographic proximity to Viet- nam--by the growing number of "boat cases." There are some 9,500 "boat cases"--Vietnamese who escaped by boat and are in temporary asylum--4,400 in Malaysia, 3,800 in Thailand, 1,150 in the Philippines, 100 in Indonesia, and 50 in Singapore. During 1977, refugees have been arriving on Southeast Asian shores at the rate of 200- 500 a month.* Contrary to earlier indications that the number of fleeing Vietnamese would remain stable or decline toward the end of 1977, there has been a sharp increase in boat cases, despite adverse seasonal weather conditions and increased Vietnamese security patrols. Poor economic conditions (including food shortages), conscription for the armed forces, and government economic and security policies (such as forced resettlement of urban dwellers in new economic zones) are cited among the most compel- ling reasons for taking the risk of setting out to sea in small, dilapidated boats. In addition, it is possible that many Vietnamese who were considering flight were encouraged by the announcement in late summer (broadcast by international radio) that the US would accept more boat case refugees. Domestic and Diplomatic Concerns Throughout Southeast Asia there is a longstanding and intense ethnic animosity toward the Vietnamese, which makes it difficult for the individual ASEAN gov- ernments to offer more than temporary humanitarian as- sistance to the refugees. The ASEAN nations, moreover, are concerned with their internal security and are worried. that Communist agents, posing as refugees, might stimulate Communist and dissident movements in their countries. The present Thai Government has made clear that it will not attempt to resettle any Vietnamese, al- though it has planned a program to absorb Lao and Cambodian refugees in its northern provinces. The Malaysian Gov- ernment: has found many Chinese among the Vietnamese refugees** and fears that the presence of both ethnic *A record 1,271 boat cases arrived in Malaysia in Octo- ber. There are an additional 85,000 Lao and Cambodian refugees who crossed river and land borders into Thailand. **Most of those fleeing Vietnam are from urban, not rural, areas, and many are Chinese with enough money to provi- sion boats and bribe Vietnamese patrols. 20 December 1977 21 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010013-0 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010013-0 SECRET groups would exacerbate existing communal tension be- tween Chinese and Malays. The Indonesians dislike the Vietnamese almost as much as their own Chinese minority, whom they treat largely as unwelcome resident aliens. The ASEAN governments are also concerned about the economic problems that any increase of refugees would pose. The financial burden for Thailand has been especially heavy, and the government has been criticized by farmers who believe that the refugees are receiving better treatment than they and are consuming scarce de- velopment funds. Malaysian authorities cite the social and economic problems they face with the growing refugee influx. Although not a financial burden, the care of large numbers of refugees strains local government man- power and facilities in several Malaysian states. Both Thailand and Malaysia claim that the newest refugees appear to be unskilled farmers, motivated by monetary factors, who would compete for land with local farmers.* Indeed, the status and cost of the refugees may become a political issue in the forthcoming Malaysian general elections. Faced with serious problems of overpopulation, food shortages, and unemployment, the Indonesian Government finds it difficult to justify offering even temporary asylum to refugees and has turned away many attempting to land. The Philippine Government has sought to capi- talize on the presence of the small number of refugees in its borders by widely publicizing--primarily for US consumption--its humanitarian aid. Faced with a serious armed rebellion in its southern province, however, the Marcos government is not likely to extend more than temporary asylum and may, in the future, find the pros- pect of additional refugees intolerable. Singapore has felt that it cannot offer even temporary asylum because of its small size and dense population. It has no room for a separate camp and has housed its few refugees either in a prison or in a fishing village. In the wake of the Communist victories in Indochina and a reduced US role in Southeast Asia, the non-Com- munist ASEAN nations have been very sensitive to main- taining Vietnamese good will. All the ASEAN nations This has not been substantiated. If true, there has been a significant change in the reasons for Zeaving Vietnam. 20 December 1977 22 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010013-0 Approved For Release 2007/02/OCIM-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 have been careful to inform the Vietnam Government of their policies with regard to accepting, even temporarily, refugees. Thailand and Malaysia have unofficially raised the idea of repatriation with Vietnam. The Vietnamese Government continues to equivocate, however, on the subject of repatriation. Although it. has stated that "political" refugees will not be taken back, the broader issue of repatriating the Vietnamese in Thailand has been under discussion with the Thai. For the most part, Vietnam has not made an issue of the refugees in its bilateral relations with the other four ASEAN nations. Diplomatic considerations are secondary, however, to the common ASEAN concern with domestic dis- locations. Refugee Policies Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines have agreed to accept Vietnamese refugees for temporary asylum until arrangements are made by the US and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for them to leave the country. Singapore, thus far, has been unwilling to grant even temporary asylum, although it is currently negotiating an agreement with the UNHCR. None has offered to resettle--i.e., give permanent asylum to---any Vietnamese, and several are beginning to impose tougher measures denying temporary asylum in many cases. Critical of the slow pace of US and UNHCR efforts to resettle refugees in other regions and of the absence of any concrete, long-term US or UNHCR program to bear the burden of future refugees, the ASEAN nations have begun to discuss concerted measures to deal with the refugee situation. The issue was raised at the ASEAN summit conference in August and again at the recent standing committee meeting, where it was discussed in terms of urging the UNHCR to accelerate efforts to re- settle Indochinese refugees in third countries. In November, Thailand and Malaysia announced policies aimed at discouraging new refugees and en- couraging the international community to take effective steps to grant permanent asylum to the refugees and reduce the number presently in camps. The new Thai and Malaysian policies involve treating all illegal immigrants; classifying them into "political" 20 December 1977 23 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010013-0 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010013-0 SECRET and "economic" categories and forcing repatriation of those determined to be motivated by purely economic factors; and turning away those attempting to land by boat. Indonesia already has such guidelines, and it is likely that Singapore and the Philippines will ultimately adopt similar policies to avoid being swamped by refugees turned away from neighboring countries. Unpublicized negotiations between the UNHCR and Singapore over the latter's offer to designate an island for temporary asylum may be adversely affected by the announcement of the Thai and Malaysian policies. The Singapore Govern- ment has already placed stringent conditions on an agree- ment--an ironclad written guarantee that refugees will be moved out at a reasonable rate and under no circum- stances be permitted to remain permanently--and may find it necessary to reconsider its offer. Implications for ASEAN-US Relations The strict policies announced recently by Thailand and Malaysia are strongly opposed in principle by the US and the UNHCR, which argue that enforcement of the meas- ures, especially turning away boats, could violate human rights and, thus, both tarnish the countries' interna- tional image and jeopardize the willingness of third countries and the UNHCR to provide further financial and resettlement assistance.* Nevertheless, the ASEAN nations--Thailand and Malaysia in particular--will weigh their concerns over domestic dislocations and relations with Vietnam against the possibility of international disapproval and will probably decide to enforce, at least on a case-by-case basis, tougher antirefugee meas- ures. Despite objections on the grounds of violating human rights, these policies--including forced repatria- tion and return to sea--will probably be enforced when the number of refugees in camps is high in order to induce the US and UNHCR to reduce the numbers immediately and implement serious follow-on programs. Tactically, the ASEAN governments probably believe that they can *The UNHCR, through its representative in Southeast Asia, has assumed the responsibility of providing finan- cial support for refugee relief efforts by ASEAN gov- ernments and of persuading third countries to take refugees. 24 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010013-0 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010013-0 SECRET shift the blame for any violations of human rights onto the US and the international community and apply moral pressure on them to accelerate resettlement programs.* In so doing, the ASEAN nations will argue that the situation is not of their making, that they have carried more than their share of the burden, and that the US and UNHCR are ultimately responsible (by written guarantee) for resettling the Vietnamese elsewhere. From the ASEAN nations' point of view, the only viable long-term solu- tion will be permanent resettlement of the Vietnamese refugees in other, non-ASEAN countries. Consequently, they are not likely to consider suggestions that they attempt to share the burden among themselves or offer permanent asylum and resettlement. The ASEAN nations will probably also seek other means of solving the refugee problem. They may reach an understanding with Vietnam and the UNHCR that would provide for repatriation of some refugees (under UNHCR supervision), and they may privately encourage Vietnam to tighten its border patrols and prevent people from leaving. Finally, in the councils of the UNHCR, they will. oppose measures to give refugees legal rights, and they will seek to lobby in developing nation caucuses to in- fluence the choice of a new UN High Commissioner for Refugees. ASEAN nations (along with many other develop- ing nations) will seek to ensure that the commissioner and deputy commissioner will be sympathetic to their particular situations and points of view and not have the "Western preoccupation with human rights."** *For instance, in southern Thailand some 400 refugees ar- riving in seaworthy boats were reprovisioned and towed back to sea, while some 500 in unseaworthy boats were forced into a detention center. Later boat cases were allowed to Land at the urging of the US and the UNHCR and in response to US promises to speed up processing and to take all boat cases out of the camps, if not the country, by the end of 1977. Malaysia has similarly been mollified temporarily by US promises to reduce the number of refugees in camps by the end of the year. The European nominee, Poul Hartling, was recently elected as commissioner. He is under pressure from the developing nations to replace the incumbent deputy--an American-- with an African. 25 Approved For Release 2007/02/8RL'IA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010013-0 SECRET Psychiatry and Dissent in the USSR International attention recently has been increas- ingly focused on the Soviet Union's abuse of psychiatry for political purposes. In August 1977, the World Psychiatric Association passed a resolution condemning Soviet practices. This article briefly explores the origins and nature of psychiatric abuse in the USSR and assesses the outlook for the continuation of such practices. Soviet Practices Soviet abuse of psychiatry has its roots in pre- revolutionary times, when criticism of the regime could lead to a judgment of insanity. Under Stalin, commit- ment to a mental hospital was one of many means of ex- tending political control and probably was considered by the victims to be preferable to imprisonment or con- signment to a labor camp. Since the mid-1960s there has been a steadily increasing stream of information that use of forced psychiatric hospitalization has con- tinued in the post-Stalin era. The publication of Valery Tarsis' Ward 7 in 1965 was primarily responsible for the initial focusing of international attention on the issue. Bloch and Reddaway's Russia's Political Hospitals (1977) is the latest and probably most author- itative treatment of the subject. While there are no firm figures on the number of dissenters interned in mental hospitals for political reasons, 210 documented cases have reached the West since 1962. This is probably only a small fraction of the total. Information on Soviet abuses comes from dissi- dents in the USSR, from emigres, from ex-patients, and from Soviet psychiatrists who have recently emigrated to the West. There are a number of reasons for the Soviets' use of psychiatry against political dissent. Placement of dissidents in mental institutions both reduces publicity that might be generated by other kinds of actions against them and undermines the credibility of nonconformist 26 Approved For Release 2007/02/g$C-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010013-0 SECRET ideas and actions. It is calculated that the dissidents will be silent and inactive. even after their release be- cause of the ever-present possibility of recall for further "treatment." International Scrutiny Prior to the 1971 meeting of the World Psychiatric Association (WPA) in Mexico City, Vladimir Bukovsky, a former internee in a Soviet psychiatric hospital, sent to Western psychiatrists records of the forensic psy- chiatric examinations. of six Soviet dissidents. Bukovsky said that friends and relatives of the dissidents con- sidered them sane, and he asked for an evaluation of the need for their forced hospitalization. West European psychiatrists who studied the docu- ments concluded that the diagnoses had been made on the basis of the dissidents' attempts to exercise fundamental freedoms stated in the Soviet Constitution", that is, for political rather than medical reasons. The Western doctors called on the Mexico City congress to discuss the issue. Despite considerable lobbying by those interested in having the matter aired, the issue of Soviet psy- chiatric abuses never reached the WPA agenda. The or- ganization's secretary-general concluded that the WPA charter did not allow it to become responsible for the ethical. aspects of psychiatry. Nor, he stated, were there statutes or bylaws governing the handling of com- plaints made by one member of the society against another. . Soviet dissidents, emigres, and Western psychia- trists intensified their efforts to publicize Soviet abuses during the six-year interval. between WPA confer- ences.- The campaign coincided this year with the gen- erally increased international attention to human rights prompted by the Carter administration's interest in the issue. At the 1977 WPA congress in Honolulu in August., a resolution condemning the Soviet Union for using psy- chiatry to repress political dissenters was passed. The resolution called on the WPA to "take note of the abuse of psychiatry for political purposes and con- demn those practices in all countries in which they 27 Approved For Release 2007/024qERE9IA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 SECRET occur." It specifically committed the organization to look at the "extensive evidence of the systematic abuse of psychiatry for political purposes" in the Soviet Union. The Soviets rejected Western allegations of psychi- atric abuses, charged that the vote was rigged,* and warned that they would counterattack if Western attempts to "interfere" in Soviet internal affairs continued. Countercharges could, they suggested, involve the cita- tion of malpractices in the West, including, for example, experiments on prisoners. The Soviets also threatened to withdraw from international psychiatric organizations. The Outlook The Soviets are unlikely to abandon their practice of committing dissidents to mental hospitals. KGB chief Yury Andropov recently reiterated publicly the official Soviet position that "psychic instability" sometimes explains the "appearance of individuals whose actions do not tally with the ethical or legal framework of Soviet society." Psychiatric abuse of dissidents will continue at least until the Soviets conclude that the costs in terms of international outcry exceed those in- curred by the use of other methods. 0 *The vote was 19 national psychiatric societies for and 33 against, although under the bloc system it was passed by 90 votes to 88. Each vote is weighted by the size of its membership; the larger blocs of Western psychi- atric societies overrode those of the Soviet Union, its Communist allies, and some Third World countries. 28 Approved For Release 2007/02/cc-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010013-0 Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010013-0 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 SECRET The Politics of UN Restructure: The Issue of a Secretariat Development Post The increasing scope and complexity of economic and social problems confronting the UN system, coupled with pressures for fiscal austerity, have prompted a major effort to restructure the UN. One of the most visible results of this exercise will be the creation of a high- level Secretariat post to oversee activities affecting LDC economic development. Despite the adoption this month of a compromise on the issue, the controversial question of the post's authority remains unresolved. The months ahead promise increased pressure from the LDCs to define the mandate of the new position to their benefit. There is at present no formal structure to oversee the development activities in which the UN engages. The numerous; bodies and funds established over the years in response to LDC demands for assistance often duplicate efforts and place heavy administrative demands on the UN system. Currently, each of the UN specialized agenciep, controls its own budget and competes for direct voluntary funds from donor governments. Both the LDCs and the in- dustrialized countries have recognized the need for re- form, but each group approaches it from a different per- spective. The industrialized states want better coordina- tion and planning of development activities. While the Group of 77 (the LDC UN caucus) agrees in principle with the need for reform, it insists on concomitant recognition of the necessity for greater contributions to development activities and, more importantly, of the right of LDCs to increased decisionmaking authority. The Ad Hoc Committee on Restructure, established after the 7th UN General Assembly Special Session in 1975, was tasked with identifying ways to mobilize UN machinery to promote development and international economic coopera- tion. What many participants hoped would be only a mana- gerial overhaul of an unwieldy system took on a political Approved For Release 2007/0 8 ETCIA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 SECRET dimension because of LDC frustration with the fact that their majority voice in the UN does not readily translate into economic benefits. The final recommendations of the Committee represent two years of sometimes very difficult negotiations. Of the eight areas covered in the recommendations, the pro- posed creation of a high-level Secretariat position to oversee development activities has proven one of the most contentious.* Originally an LDC bargaining chip for other conces- sions, the idea of a Director General for Development and Economic Cooperation took on symbolic importance to the Group of 77 in their quest for more decisionmaking authority in the international system. The priority attached to the post by the LDCs was reiterated at the G-77 Ministerial meeting in October. Among representatives of the industrial countries, there is concern that the proposal may create an "economic czar" and might split the UN, with the Secretary General controlling political issues and the new post economic ones. Initially, however, the issue caused more tension among the industrialized countries than between them and the Group of 77. France was the most active opponent of the proposal, which it regarded as a threat to the authority of the traditionally French-held post of Under Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs. This position is particularly important to the French in view of their perception of US domination of other major multilateral institutions concerned with developmental matters (e.g., the World Bank and the UN Development Program). France finally agreed to the creation of a position, but sought to have the title changed to "special assistant" and its holder's authority limited. Other industrialized countries, realizing that the LDCs could force adoption of the pro- prosal without Western support, preferred to argue about its mandate rather than its title. *The eight areas covered in the report of the Ad Hoc Com- mittee are: the effectiveness of the General Assembly; the role of the Economic and Social Council; other UN forums; the role of regional organizations; operational activities for development; planning and programming; interagency coordination; and Secretariat support. Approved For Release 2007/02/08 ! RDP79T00912A002300010013-0 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010013-0 SECRET In the G-77 view, the title "director general" is critical to giving the incumbent the possibility of exercising systemwide influence, while "special assistant" would place the position beneath the Under Secretaries and take away any independent authority. The compromise reached by the Ad Hoc Committee called only for the Secretary General "to be invited to appoint a high-level official to assist him in carrying out his responsibilities in the economic and social fields." Sub- sequently, the General Assembly approved the title of "director general," but left to the Secretary General the responsibility for making the appointment. This con- sensus in part responds to the concern of some industrial countries that the authority of the Secretary General under the Charter to staff the UN Secretariat might be infringed upon by hasty General Assembly action. The controversy is not over. In the-months ahead pressures will build from the G-77 to get the maximum authority for their position. Despite the possibly limited mandate, the post offers an ideal trainingground for officials from developing countries aspiring to the Secretary General position. More importantly, the G--77 is sure to continue to view the position as an important step in their overall push for greater influence in multilateral organizations. Approved For Release 2007/02 ETCIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010013-0 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010013-0 Next 11 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010013-0 Secret Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010013-0 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010013-0