INTERNATIONAL ISSUES MONTHLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010015-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2006
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: February 23, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

National Secret
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Assessment
Center
International Issues
Monthly Review
23 February 1978
State Dept. review completed Secret
RP IIMR 78-002
23 February 1978
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INTERNATIONAL ISSUES MONTHLY REVIEW
23 February 1978
CONTENTS
LIMITING CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS TO THE
SOUTH ASIAN SUBCONTINENT: PROBLEMS
AND PROSPECTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
US efforts to curb international transfers
of conventional arms to India and Pakistan
face a serious challenge, in part because
of the effect of both the East-West and
the Sino-Soviet rivalries, and in part
because of potential conflicts between
arms constraints and other US global goals.
INDIVIDUAL LDC PERSPECTIVES ON CONVENTIONAL
ARMS TRANSFER RESTRAINTS: NIGERIA
AND PAKISTAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
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UN CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR
DEVELOPMENT: G-77 EXPECTATIONS AND
BEHAVIOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
The 1979 UN Conference will be the first
global attempt to consider systematically
the potential role of science and tech-
nology in LDC economic and social develop-
ment. The conference is likely to get
caught up heavily in North-South politics
and reflect the temperature of LDC - in-
dustrial state relations generally.
Attempts by the Janata government to re-
move the curbs on civil liberties instituted
by the Gandhi government underscore the
conflicting imperatives between protecting
human rights on the one hand and main-
taining domestic stability on the other.
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
Because of the lucrative financial aspects
of narcotics smuggling, drug groups are
turning increasingly to violence to counter
the efforts of government agencies to curb
the traffic.
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THE JAPANESE RED ARMY ATTEMPTS TO RETURN
HOME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
The JRA terrorist organization, notorious
for its violent activities abroad, is
apparently making a concerted effort to
strengthen its relatively tenuous domestic
base.
This publication is prepared by the International Issues Division, Office of Regional
and Political Analysis, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
National Foreign Assessment Center. The views presented are the best judgments of
individual analysts who are aware that many of the issues they discuss are subject to
alternative interpretation. Comments and queries are welcome They should be
directed to the authors of the individual articles.
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Limiting Conventional Arms Transfers to the South Asian
Subcontinent: Problems and Prospects
US efforts to curb international transfers of con-
ventional arms face a particularly demanding challenge
in South Asia. First, regional tensions are exacerbated--
and the dynamics of the arms transfer process rendered
more complex and resilient--by the East-West and Sino--
Soviet rivalries. Second, US global policy objectives--
including regional stability, nuclear nonproliferation,
and human rights--complicate attempts to reduce conven-
tional arms buildups.
South Asia is dominated by the traditional enemies,
India and Pakistan, and the degree of hostility between
these two nations has historically dictated the political
temperature of the subcontinent. Both states perceive
the need for developing sizable military forces to assure
their territorial integrity and to enhance national
status both internally and externally.
Under these circumstances, both India and Pakistan
have sought powerful outside backers with whom their
vital national interests coincide. By the early 1960s,
Indian leaders were turning toward Moscow to offset the
threat they perceived from China. Their mutual concern
with preventing the extension of Chinese influence in
South Asia still serves as the basis for the alliance
between New Delhi and Moscow that was formalized in the
1971 Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation.
As New Delhi's relations with Moscow warmed, Paki-
stan's leaders discovered that China shared their in-
terest in opposing India. Friction over the disputed
border between India and China augmented Peking's desire
to curb Soviet influence in neighboring regions, making
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NICOBAR
ISLAND
JSRI LANKA
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China a natural ally in Pakistan's struggle to curtail
India's growing power.*
Iran, too, has an interest in strengthening Paki-
stan that stems from Tehran's apprehension about the
Soviet Union's growing influence in South Asia and its
concern about the tribal separatism that reaches into
Iran's eastern border regions as well as into Pakistan.
Furthermore, although India is the most powerful nation
in South Asia at present, Iran, by reason of wealth and
burgeoning military might, is emerging as a potential
challenger for regional dominance. Pakistan's uncer-
tainty over Iran's long-term foreign policy goals has
been largely overridden by its immediate need for sup-
port.
Critical Asymmetries
Regional hostilities in South Asia that reflect--and
are reinforced by--the Sino-Soviet dispute promise to
be stubborn obstacles to limitation of arms transfers
to the region. However, problems arising from the dif-
fering capabilities, vulnerabilities, and perspectives
of India and Pakistan themselves seem likely to prove
no less vexing.**
India is a major arms purchaser deriving most of
its military imports from the Soviet Union. In addition,
it has a growing capacity to manufacture armaments,
*The developing Sino-Pakistani friendship was given added
impetus by the US support of India in the Sino-Indian
border war and Washington's decision in the wake of the
1965 Indo-Pakistan war to discontinue arms shipments to
both South Asian powers.
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primarily under Soviet licensing arrangements.* Although
the growth and improvement of India's armed forces depend
on substantial direct imports of sophisticated weapons,
its domestic defense industry gives it a significant
degree of arms independence.
Security concerns grounded in the unresolved con-
flicts with China and Pakistan provide the principal
motivation for India's efforts to build up its military
capabilities. New Delhi also regards maintenance of its
military preeminence in South Asia as essential to the
realization of its aspirations to leadership in the
region and the Third World. As a result, Indian spokes-
men firmly oppose initiatives that might restrict New
Delhi's ability to acquire arms. They have, however,
welcomed Washington's efforts to limit US conventional
arms transfers, since US restraint effectively favors
India by reducing Pakistan's access to Western military
equipment while leaving Indian production and acquisitions
largely unfettered.
Since the present Indian Government acceded to power
in March 1977, it has attempted to rebalance its non-
alignment and reduce its dependence on the Soviet Union,
including diversifying its sources for advanced weapons.
Of significance in the latter regard is New Delhi's con-
templated purchase of deep penetration fighter-bombers
from a Western supplier. The major contenders are the
UK, France, and Sweden. Already, UK spokesmen have in-
formed US diplomats that if India chooses the British
Jaguar, London will approve the sale because of its
potential importance to the British economy.
An Indian decision to acquire sophisticated Western
combat aircraft could reopen the issue of selling similar
American fighter-bombers to Pakistan. Although New
Delhi claims that the new aircraft are needed primarily
to counter China, Islamabad could see such an acquisition
as directed against itself as well. In any event, Indian
purchase of deep penetration fighter-bombers would shift
the regional military balance further in India's favor
*India also imports and manufactures armaments under
license from Western countries, e.g., the UK and France.
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and effectively undermine US arguments that the sale of
A-7 aircraft to Pakistan would introduce a new level of
arms sophistication into the region.
For its part, Pakistan derives most of its military
equipment from foreign sources. It receives military
assistance from the People's Republic of China and has
purchased sophisticated equipment from other Western
countries, primarily France.
Although the prestige attached to the possession of
advanced armaments undoubtedly attracts Pakistan's
leaders, their demand for materiel is due in large
part
to fear of India, augmented by apprehension about
possible
subversion
sponsored by Afghanistan or the Soviet
Union.
Islamabad's
sense of vulnerability to India--which
is
heightened
by that country's demonstrated nuclear
ca-,
pabilities--precludes Pakistani support for conventional
arms transfer (CAT) restrictions that could seriously
limit its ability to acquire military hardware while
leaving India's domestic defense production relatively
unhampered. Pakistan is, however, loath to align
itself with India--or to offend the US, which Islamabad
views as a potential source of military and political
support. Hence, its statements on CAT restraints tend
to be carefully balanced in order to preserve Islamabad's
room for maneuver.
Conflicting US Objectives
The US has,a number of important global interests
that it seeks to protect and advance in the subcontinent.
The limitation of conventional arms transfers is one of
these. Other related objectives include the promotion
of regional. stability, the restriction of Soviet in-
fluence, the prevention of nuclear proliferation, the
advancement of human rights and the maintenance of a
constructive dialogue with the developing nations. Under
certain circumstances some of these broad objectives can
conflict with one another. Indeed, the regional peculiari-
ties and asymmetries cited above confront US policymakers
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KABUL
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ISLAMABAD *
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with some particularly vexing dilemmas in their efforts
to regulate arms transfers to the South Asian subcon-
tinent. Some of these are suggested below.*
Regional Stability: There is a danger that efforts
to curb the flow of arms to South Asia could exacerbate
the existing military imbalance between India and Pakistan
and therefore prove to be destabilizing.** India's sub-
stantial domestic military industry already gives it a
significant. degree of arms independence. Its major
supplier, the USSR, considers arms transfers to be an
important foreign policy tool and thus would probably be
slow to negotiate away its flexibility in this field.
moreover, even if Moscow were to cooperate in limiting
such transfers, the result might be to encourage India
to accelerate its drive to produce, and perhaps to ex-
port, sophisticated weapons.
Pakistan, in contrast, has little domestic production
capability. Arms transfer restrictions could therefore
seriously affect its defense program. While China would
be unlikely to join any generalized CAT limitations, its
ability to underwrite Islamabad's defense requirements
is already strained. Peking would probably be unable
to meet the shortfall, especially of sophisticated items,
if other traditional sources of arms (e.g., France) were
denied to Pakistan. Under these circumstances, Islamabad
might seek to increase its arms purchases from suppliers
that are likely to resist US pressures to restrict arms
sales, such as Yugoslavia, Brazil, North Korea, and South
Africa. Such an effort would not offset qualitative
Indian advances, even if quantities were sufficient.
It is possible, of course, that a marked deterioration
in Pakistan's position could have the opposite effect,
i.e., it could impel Islamabad to subordinate its griev-
ances and parochial interests to the objectives of main-
taining peaceful relations with its larger neighbor.
Nevertheless, this would seem to be unlikely, at least
in the short term.
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Soviet Influence: While the US may draw some re-
assurance from the fact that Pakistan's arms-based de-
pendency on China is likely to remain limited by resource
constraints on both sides, the same does not hold true
of the India-USSR relationship. Unless Soviet coopera-
tion can be secured, attempts to limit arms sales to
South Asian countries might only make India more depen-
dent on Soviet arms, thus complicating efforts to re-
duce Moscow's influence in the subcontinent.
Nuclear Proliferation: Pakistan's sense of security
is critical to US efforts to halt or slow the spread
of nuclear weapons. Unless offset by compensatory moves,
restriction of Pakistan's ability to acquire conventional
arms would add urgency to Islamabad's desire to develop
nuclear weapons. Fear of India would be the primary
motive, although a sense of diminished national status
would play a role as well. Pakistan regards its nuclear
program as a long-term political and strategic counter
to India's demonstrated nuclear capabilities. In addition,
the Pakistanis may hope that if their country became
the first Islamic state to develop nuclear weapons, its
status within the Muslim world would be enhanced and the
closeness of its ties with the Arab oil states that under-
write Islamabad's weapons imports would increase accord-
ingly.*
In contrast, CAT restraints would probably have
little effect on India's nuclear policies and program.
New Delhi has refused to sign the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, which it describes, like past proposals for
generalized CAT restraints, as "discriminatory." India,
having detonated a "peaceful" nuclear device, has demon-
strated its potential for developing nuclear weapons.
Nevertheless, its incentives for pursuing this option are
diminished by the ability of its conventional arms in-
dustry to ensure India's continued regional preeminence
even if the Soviet Union were to participate in regional
CAT restraints.
*If this were to occur, one of Pakistan's major creditors,
Libya, would probably demand that Islamabad share its
nuclear weapons and technical expertise with its Arab
benefactors, particularly Tripoli. Pakistan would in all
Likelihood be unwilling to do so, but it might take ad-
vantage of the situation to demand more generous access
to arms and funds from other nations as its price for
refusal.
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Human Rights: Respect for human rights is by law
one of the criteria for eligibility to receive US arms.
Under the circumstances that prevail in South Asia,
however, the need to avoid potentially destabilizing
disparities in military power may complicate rigid ad-
herence to this rule. The resultant inconsistencies could
generate considerable confusion and resentment.
Indian leaders accept--and even welcome--US un-
ilateral CAT restraints. Nevertheless, the new Indian
Government could regard its overwhelming popular mandate,
its more positive attitude toward the West, and its
impressive human rights record as qualifying it to acquire
conventional arms under US policy and would probably be
deeply aggrieved by any US moves to curtail its ability
to acquire arms from other suppliers. Indian indignation
would be heightened if it appeared that Washington were
according favored treatment to Pakistan.*
Nonetheless, before deciding on a course of action,
the US will have to weigh the costs--including the loss
of remaining leverage--of further curtailing Western
military sales to Pakistan. It will also have to take
into account the probability that denial of conventional
arms to Pakistan would heighten its sense of insecurity
and could therefore prompt Islamabad to tighten internal
controls. On the other hand, the sale of arms to Pakistan
*For a further discussion of India's human rights record,
see "India: Restoration of Human Rights" elsewhere in
this issue.
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would raise
ou e credibility of the US human rights
policy in South Asia and among LDCs in general.
The promotion of rural development and the satis-
faction of basic human needs are natural corollaries to
the US objectives in the field of human rights--as well
as regional stability. In the case of Pakistan, at
least, regional tensions and insecurities might prevent
realization of this goal. Pakistan's fears of India are
such that it might feel pressed to seek redress at any
cost--and divert scarce funds to its nuclear program--
rather than channeling resources into development proj-
ects. In any event, Islamabad, like most LDCs, views
advanced armaments as an important benchmark of modern-
ization and does not share the Western perception of
rural development as a primary concern.
North-South Tensions: CAT restraints of the type
the US would like to see adopted in South Asia enter
into the overall North-South dialogue because LDCs
generally view them as discriminatory and as focusing
on a peripheral aspect of the international arms race.
India shares this perspective, but because its over-
all approach to the North-South dialogue is firmly
grounded in longstanding policies and aspirations, New
Delhi's multilateral role is unlikely to be greatly af-
fected by US CAT decisions or initiatives. The Indians
will undoubtedly continue to express their unequivocal
opposition to a generalized restriction of conventional
arms transfers to LDCs in such international forums as
the forthcoming UN General Assembly Special Session on
Disarmament. New Delhi's positions on unrelated North-
South issues--e.q., the common fund, debt relief, and
transfer of technology--can be expected, however, to
reflect its broader interests.
Pakistan's approach to the North-South dialogue, on
the other hand, could become more intransigent if its
attempts to acquire sophisticated conventional weapons
are effectively frustrated by US-induced constraints on
suppliers. At present, Islamabad seeks to balance its
effort to court favor with China and within LDC caucuses
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by moves designed to win conservative goodwill. Washing-
ton's refusal to sell Pakistan A-7s last year dampened
Pakistani hopes of securing tangible US support. Con-
tinued rejection of such requests might erode a major
incentive for continued Pakistani equivocation on con-
tentious North-South issues. Under these circumstances,
pressure or encouragement from such key supporters as
Libya might prompt Islamabad to take a less flexible
position in negotiations with the industrialized states.
Outlook and Implications
The above discussion is not exhaustive. Additional
considerations, such as the US desire for Pakistan's
cooperation in stemming the flow of narcotics from South
Asia, also play a role. On the whole, regional im-
balances compounded by great power rivalry created sig-
nificant local resistance to the regulation of conven-
tional arms by supplier or consumer arrangements.
Unilateral US CAT limitations could prove increas-
ingly costly and counterproductive under these circum-
stances, unless steady progress is made toward winning
the cooperation not only of the major arms suppliers but
of India and Pakistan as well. Moreover, such progress
will in itself entail tangible costs for the US, since
trade-offs will be needed to counter the disadvantages
that will accrue to both the sellers and the recipients
if multilateral CAT restrictions are instituted. The
political and economic costs of some potentially effect-
ive options (e.g., security guarantees) could prove pro-
hibitive. Thus, the outlook for curtailing conventional
transfers to South Asia is not promising. Neverthe-
less, financial constraints are likely to keep India's
and Pakistan's share of overall LDC conventional arms
transfers at a modest level.
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Individual LDC Perspectives on Conventional Arms
Transfer Restraints: Nigeria and Pakistan
Nigeria
Nigeria is the most populous and powerful black
African country--a leader, by virtue of its size and re-
sources, within its region and the Third World. It views
a capable military establishment as a natural adjunct to
this leadership role, lending weight to its voice in in-
ternational. forums, particularly on southern African
issues. It has a modest capacity to produce small arms
and ammunition, but relies on imports for heavier equip-
ment. As a consequence of the cutoff of new US and
British arms following the outbreak of the Nigerian civil
war in 1967, Lagos turned to the Soviet Union for jet
fighter aircraft and other heavy weapons. More recent
purchases have been made from West European countries,
especially the United Kingdom.
The small West African nations that are Nigeria's
neighbors pose no significant military threat. Thus,
since the civil war, and particularly during the last
two years, Nigeria has been only a light spender in the
international arms market. Nevertheless, frictions with
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these neighbors exist, and it is unlikely that Lagos
would be willing to allow significant erosion in its
military superiority in the region.
The military's role in internal politics is probably
a more important determinant of Nigeria's decisions on
arms acquisitions and one that will lead it to spend more
heavily for weapons during the coming months. In anti-
cipation of its promised return to the barracks by 1979,
the military regime is pushing a program of reequippin.g
the Army. Although aspiring civilian politicians have.
called for a reduction in the Army's size, none of them
will pose a serious challenge to the strength and in-
fluence of the armed forces in the foreseeable future.
Military officers favor the acquisition of modern equip-
ment as important in maintaining the power and prestige
of a smaller military establishment; civilians will con-
cur in order to keep the military content.
Nigeria's strong commitment to black majority rule
in southern Africa has made it an arms supplier as well
as a recipient. It has sent small quantities of materiel
to Angola and to the guerrilla movements based in the
other frontline states.
Although Nigeria favors moderate tactics in the
North-South dialogue (that is, an avoidance of confronta-
tions and conflicts), it supports, as a long-time goal,
a major restructuring of what it contends is a discrim-
inatory global political-economic system. Applying this
to arms control and disarmament, Nigeria has criticized
the superpowers for being the main protagonists of the
arms race and rejects controls of arms transfers that
primarily affect the LDCs. It has been active in dis-
armament debates at the UN General Assembly, and in the
most recent session it introduced a resolution calling
on the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to sub-
mit a comprehensive program for disarmament to the SSOD.
Lagos will almost certainly view any new US attempt
to restrict conventional arms transfers (CAT) as yet
another act of discrimination directed against the less
developed countries. It would see it as an effort to
divert attention from the superpowers' military spending,
an unwarranted infringement on the right of LDCs to ac-
quire the means to defend themselves, and a blow to its
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own ability to maintain its leadership within Africa and
the Third World.* Nigeria revealed its opposition to CAT
restraints at the 1976 UN General Assembly, when it
seconded the Indian motion that killed the Japanese pro-
posal to study the subject.
Nigeria is an active and influential spokesman for
LDCs in global councils and can be expected to be one in
future discussions on CAT restraints. As a member of the
nonaligned movement's contact group that deals with dis-
armament issues, it has already participated in preparing
position papers for the SSOD. There is little prospect
that it will use this position of leadership to do any-
thing but oppose CAT restraints. This would be partic-
ularly true of US initiatives, which would probably be
associated in the minds of Nigerian leaders with the
arms embargo during the civil war. In any case, to sup-
port restraints would run counter to too many interests--
involving West Africa, southern Africa, and the non-
aligned movement--that Lagos deems important.
Pakistan
Pakistan is totally dependent on outside suppliers
for major military equipment. Since the US suspended its
arms supplies to South Asia in 1966, Pakistan has relied
on the People's Republic of China for military assistance,
including tanks and aircraft. Islamabad has turned to
other countries, particularly France and North Korea,
for items that were either too sophisticated or not
available in sufficient quantity from Peking. Funds for
these purchases have been provided by Pakistan's Islamic
supporters in the Middle East, notably Iran, Saudi Arabia,
and Libya.
Although the prestige attached to advanced armaments
undoubtedly attracts Pakistan's leaders, their demand
for military equipment is primarily due to fear of India.
This fear is grounded in the recurrent Indo-Pakistan wars
of the past three decades that culminated in Pakistan's
resounding defeat and dismemberment in 1971. Islamabad
*Nigeria sees conventional, not nuclear, weapons as in-
struments of dominance in West Africa. Another resolu-
tion it sponsored at the most recent General Assembly
was one declaring Africa a nuclear-free zone.
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is also concerned about Afghanistan's periodic support
of separatist movements among the disaffected tribal
population of Pakistan's Baluchistan border region, but
it could meet this threat with a reduced military estab-
lishment. Because the Soviet Union is heavily involved
in military assistance to both of Pakistan's regional.
enemies, Islamabad regards Moscow as the indirect cause
of many of Pakistan's security problems.
Pakistan's sense of vulnerability to India condi-
tions its posture in multilateral forums, where it fre-
quently expounds political views designed to win sup-
porters among the developing states, particularly in the
Muslim world. Although Islamabad at times has taken
positions designed to win the backing of radical LDCs,
its desire to remain on good terms with the US and its
dependence on financial and political support from such
conservative nations as Saudi Arabia and Iran have limited
this tendency. Pakistan also has a proclivity to assume
positions that it believes will weaken or embarrass India.
Pursuit of these diverse foreign policy objectives ac-
counts for Pakistan's erratic behavior in the North-South
dialogue.
Pakistan's multiple political objectives were re-
flected in its response to the Japanese resolution at the
1976 UN General Assembly calling for a study of conven-
tional arms transfers. Although it abstained from voting
on the Indian motion that killed the Japanese resolution,
Pakistan criticized the Japanese resolution for lack of
balance because of its focus on LDC arms acquisitions
rather than on industrial country military production
and trade. At the same time, Islamabad attempted to
appease the West by expressing willingness to explore the
issue of CAT restraints. In doing so, Pakistan may have
also hoped that restraints on conventional arms transfers
could eventually curb Indian arms acquisitions and help
to slow the South Asian arms race that Pakistan is clearly
losing. Its immediate objective, however, was to enhance
its own ability to acquire arms from foreign sources.
Thus, the US decision in the spring of 1977 not to
permit Pakistan to purchase A-7 aircraft placed a damper
on Islamabad's hopes of once again securing major mili-
tary assistance from the US and thereby reduced the incen-
tives for continued Pakistani expressions of openminded-
ness toward US initiatives on the arms transfer issue.
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The Pakistanis have not, however, entirely given up on
acquiring advanced aircraft from the US or from an al-
ternative West European supplier, and prospects for this
and other future acquisitions will probably influence
Islamabad's attitude toward multilateral arms transfer
restraints.
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UN Conference on Science and Technology for Development:
G-77 Expectations and Behavior
The 1979 UN Conference on Science and Technology
for Development (UNCSTD) will be significantly influ-
enced by general trends in North-South politics. Ini
tiaZ LDC receptivity to an "apolitical" emphasis on the
application of science and technology to meeting basic
human needs is likely to be outweighed by a desire to
gain greater access to high technology as a means of
achieving equality with the industrialized states. The
climate of the conference is thus likely to be more po-
Zitical than technical. Within such an environment,
the prospects for a fruitful meeting will reflect LDC
perceptions about how willing the industrial states are
to meet the overall development needs of poor countries,
not only within the UNCSTD but also in other multilateral
forums.
The UNCSTD, scheduled to meet in Vienna in the au-
tumn of 1979, will be the first major global review of
the application of science and technology to the develop-
ment problems of the LDCs. Although global cooperation
in science and technology for development would appear to
be an apolitical topic, the possession and acquisition
of technology have acquired a definite North-South,
"have - have not" dimension that will undoubtedly be
highlighted at the conference.
The UN resolution in 1976 that called for the
UNCSTD established an explicit link between the goals
of the conference and the movement toward a New Inter-
national Economic Order (NIEO). It also reflected an
LDC consensus that the conference is a major step toward
keeping the responsibility of the industrial states for
the development of poor countries at the center of UN
attention. International scientific and technological
cooperation is expected by the developing nations to re-
duce the inequalities of economic wealth and opportunity
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among nations. In particular, the developing nations
want to use the advanced technology of the industrial
nations to enhance their national and collective self-
reliance and to reduce the present state of dependency
that characterizes most of the Third World.
G-77 Expectations
It is still too early to predict with confidence
the specific topics that the developing nations will
choose to discuss at the conference. Most LDCs have
thus far not focused on the conference because they
lack the interest or the personnel and expertise neces-
sary to tackle a national policy paper on science and
technology. Nonetheless, it is already apparent that
the Group of 77 (the LDC caucus) and the industrial
nations do not agree on the terms of reference for the
agenda. On the one side, the industrial nations, and
the US in particular, want to avoid detailed discussion
of such potentially controversial topics as transfer of
advanced technology and the role of multinational cor-
porations, which, they argue, are being discussed in
other forums. Consequently, they have attempted to
focus attention on helping LDCs apply science and tech-
nology to meet basic human needs (that is, on the devel-
opment of technological capabilities).
On the other side, many of the more technologically
sophisticated LDCs that have already begun preparations
for the conference want to focus on the mechanisms for
acquiring and applying technology in order to improve
their technological position. These and many of the
less advanced LDCs do not generally differentiate be-
tween the development of technological capabilities
(that is, creating the self-sustaining ability to adapt,
innovate, and develop useful technologies for develop-
ment purposes) and the transfer of specific and often
sophisticated technologies to the developing world.
Control of the selection and acquisition of technology
is seen by the LDCs as an important tool with which to
redress what they perceive is a humiliating state of de-
pendence on the industrialized nations. Technology, es-
pecially that which promotes economic growth and pro-
vides employment through industrialization, is consid-
ered by the LDCs to be the key to successful development
and modernization--and to achieving commensurate wealth
and power.
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A partial compromise was reached in the UN's Eco-
nomic and Social Council by which the agenda would ad-
dress three issues of greatest concern to the developing
nations,* in the context of five subject areas. These
areas, agreed on after much debate at a recent prepara-
tory committee meeting, are: food and agriculture;
natural resources and energy; health, human settlements,
and environment; -transportation and communications; and
industrialization. The LDCs, however, intend to mini-
mize the five subject areas and to use them merely to
illustrate the three substantive issues.
Despite the attention that the LDCs now appear to
be paying to a basic human needs strategy, in the long
run as they further develop their national papers and
positions, they are not likely to be satisfied with such
an approach. In their view, a basic human needs ap-
proach does not meet their central concern, which is to
acquire greater wealth and political power in the inter-
national system. Indeed, the LDCs are likely to become
increasingly disturbed by what they perceive as attempts
by the US and other developed nations to minimize the
important questions of technological dependence and
transfer.
Regional as well as national interests will influ-
ence the evolution of the LDCs' expectations. Regional
groupings play an important role in the dynamics of the
Group of 77. Developing nations use the G-77 forum to
coordinate their positions on the various NIEO issues.
This consensus is formed in interregional and intra-
regional consultations, a process that results in a high
*The three issues are: 1) the choice and transfer of
technology for development, including the elimination of
obstacles to the better utilization of science and tech-
nology, methods for integrating technology in economic
and social planning, and the development of new technol-
ogies; 2) institutional arrangements and new forms of
international cooperation in the application of science
and technology; and 3) the utilization of the existing
UN system and other international organizations to pro-
mote the application of technology and development.
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degree of solidarity among the G-77 members.* In the
case of science and technology, the Latin American na-
tions as a group generally have more sophisticated econ-
omies and requirements than the less developed nations
of the African group. The Asian group falls between,
encompassing some of the most advanced (Iran, South Korea,
Taiwan) and some of the most backward (Bangladesh) nations.**
The poorer nations of Africa and Asia that gener-
ally lack the basic scientific personnel, institutions
and the money to buy technology may devote considerable
attention to the selection and application of technolo-
gies to their primary development needs. The more tech-
nologically and economically advanced "upper tier" na-
tions of Latin America and Asia, however, will probably
take the lead in formulating national strategies that
will enable all LDCs to acquire increasingly sophisti-
cated technologies, including, in some cases, nuclear
technology. For example, they may seek concrete agree-
ments with the industrialized nations on the means of
transferring technology to developing nations, integrat-
ing technology in their development strategies, promot-
ing their own technological innovations, and exporting
this new technology to the industrial nations.
International Environment
The environment for the conference and the expecta-
tions and behavior of the developing nations will be
strongly influenced by the progress (or lack thereof)
in discussions of NIEO-related issues in other multilat-
eral forums throughout 1978 and 1979. Of perhaps great-
est impact in shaping the expectations and mood of the
developing nations and the UNCSTD will be the tone and
progress of talks being conducted between developed and
developing nations under UNCTAD auspices, in particular
those on an integrated program for commodities (includ-
ing the common fund), debt relief, and a code of conduct
*The position of G-77 coordinator rotates among the
three blocs of Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Jamaica
viii be the coordinator in New York until September 1978.
The coordinator in Geneva changes every three months.
**The Middle Eastern countries are included in the Asian
bloc.
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on the transfer of technology. Over the past year, little
progress has been made in meeting the demands of the LDCs
on these three issues, adding to the G-77's sense of
frustration.*
During the year and a half preceding the UNCSTD
conference, other opportunities for testing the relative
pressures for conflict or cooperation in North-South re-
lations will arise at the UNCTAD Trade and Development
Board ministerial-level conference to discuss debt (Geneva,
March 1978); the UN Conference on Technological Coopera-
tion Among Developing Countries (Argentina, September
1978); the UN Conference on an International Code of
Conduct on Transfer of Technology (October 1978);** a
negotiating conference on the implementation of the In-
tegrated Program for Commodities (late 1978); the Non-
aligned Movement Summit (Cuba, 1979); the UNCTAD V meet-
ing to review progress on the NIEO (Manila, May 1979);
and preparations for the World Administrative Radio
Conference (late 1979).
The UNCSTD will also be influenced by the smooth-
ness of preparations for that meeting. Major disagree-
ments between developed and developing nations have been
at least temporarily averted by the choice of a secretary
general from a developing country (da Costa of Brazil.),
a deputy from a developed country (Gresford of Australia),
and a neutral site (Vienna). Representational problems
on the preparatory committee that threatened to politicize
and delay the preparations have been solved by a decision
to open meetings to all UN members. The political maneu-
vering of Secretary General da Costa to extend his con-
trol and influence may continue, however, to plague prep-
arations and increase tensions.
**The fifth preparatory session met on 13-24 February and
the sixth session will meet on 26 June - 7 July 1978.
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G-77 Behavior: Cooperation or Confrontation
Those G-77 members that intend to play a leading
role in the UNCSTD--Indonesia, Mexico, and Kenya for
example--have an active interest in the subject matter
and realize that their interests in acquiring technology
are more likely to be satisfied through cooperation than
through confrontation with the industrial nations. These
and other moderate nations such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
Sri Lanka, and Yugoslavia, support G-77 demands for a
NIEO, but their support is often more political than
economic; such nations have benefited from the existing
international economic system. They have undertaken
serious preparations for the conference and have appointed
knowledgeable science and education officials to head
their delegations. These officials are not likely to
raise controversial political issues that could complicate
discussions. Nonetheless, in instances where the prep-
arations for and representatives to the UNCSTD overlap
with discussions on transfer of technology and other NIEO-
related issues, the behavior of these nations at the
UNCSTD will be influenced by the state of North-South
relations in other UN forums.
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The major economic and political differences both
within and among the G-77's three regional groupings
place a continual strain on G-77 unity. Nevertheless,
the major tactic of the G-77 in approaching the in-
dustrialized nations has been to maintain group solidarity.
Hence, the group's behavior in any multilateral forum
will depend on how smoothly the moderates and the radicals
can compromise their differences in reaching a common
position. In general the important factors in determining
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this behavior are: the degree of commitment of influential
moderates and radicals to a particular issue; the roles
of the various country representatives; and the position
of the industrial nations and how responsive they are
perceived to be on a particular issue.
Outlook
In sum, the UNCSTD offers both a topic and forum
conducive to discussions along North-South lines. The
course of negotiations on other such issues and the pros-
pects for success (or failure) in achieving concrete
progress toward key G-77 goals will influence the ex-
pectations and attitudes that the developing nations bring
to the UNCSTD. Despite the emphasis on preparing in-
dividual national papers, the LDCs will approach the
UNCSTD as a group and will use the G-77 coordination
mechanism to formulate common proposals and to enhance
the group's solidarity.
The developing nations' interest in using modern
technology to meet their economic and political goals,
as incorporated in demands for a New International Eco-
nomic Order, will be at issue in this conference. Their
desires for access to technology and for measures to
regulate the practices of multinational corporations,
break up the technological monopoly of the industrialized
nations, and eliminate barriers to the flow of advanced
and proprietary technology will undoubtedly collide with
the interest of the industrial nations in protecting the
proprietary nature of their technology. Whether the con-
troversial issue of technology transfer becomes a focus
of the conference will depend on the progress of the
negotiations on an international technology transfer code
currently being held under UN auspices. It will also
depend on the degree to which the US and other industrial
nations can focus LDC attention on the issue of applying
science and technology to basic human needs. At this
point it would seem that LDC resistance to such a focus
will increase as the conference date approaches.
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India: Restoration of Civil Rights
The Janata government was installed over 10 months
ago with promises to restore and consolidate civil lib-
erties in India. Prime Minister Morarji Desai's cabinet
immediately moved to dismantle portions of Indira Gandhi's
emergency rule, permit open political debate, release
most political prisoners, and reestablish a free press.
But the government was stymied when it came to the more
ambiguous aspects of Gandhi's authoritarian legislation.
In treating both the Maintenance of Internal Security
Act (MISA) and the 42nd constitutional amendment, Desai
and his colleagues were caught between their desire to
have a politically free society respecting human rights
and civil liberties and the need of a democratic govern-
ment to protect itself against extremist threats. The
reconciliation of these often conflicting imperatives
and the consequent degree to which emergency rule can
be dismantled are still being discussed in India. To a
significant extent this process and debate can be gen-
eralized and projected into the international arena. It
could thus prove instructive to both detractors and pro-
ponents of the compatibility of human and civil rights
with the impulse of states toward domestic stability and
external self-preservation.
Gandhi herself took the first steps--perhaps intended
as temporary--to dismantle emergency rule. When she an-
nounced in January 1977 that free elections would be held,
she ordered that arrested politicians be released, per-
mitted electoral activities on the part of the opposition,
and informed the press that censorship was being lifted.
Just before leaving office in March, Gandhi restored
some of the independence of the judiciary by revoking the
internal emergency proclamation of 1975.
It remained for Desai's cabinet to attempt to safe-
guard India's restored democracy after the Janata Party's
stunning electoral victory. The government released most
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of the persons arrested under MISA; by the end of 1977,
some 403 remained in prison, down from 6,851 in March.
(Of these, 388 were foreigners awaiting expulsion.) An
equally small number of people were still being detained
under the Defense and Internal Security of India Rules
for illicit financial dealings and smuggling. The gov-
ernment has also been slowly releasing those Naxalities
from eastern India who agree to give up their insurrec-
tionary methods of protest. (It is not clear if the
Naxalites, members of a far left revolutionary group
formed in 1967, are being detained under either of the
above-mentioned acts or under other constitutional ar-
resting powers of the Indian Government.)
Additionally, Janata moved directly against the
alleged arm of Gandhi's authoritarianism, the Research
and Analysis Wing (RAW) of the cabinet secretariat. RAW
has been reduced in size, reformed at the top, and limited
strictly to its external intelligence gathering function.
To ensure against future aberrations, the new head of
RAW will report only to the cabinet secretariat, composed
of independent civil servants, rather than to the Prime
Minister directly.
The Desai government moved to ensure journalistic
freedom by repealing the Prevention of Publication of
Objectionable Matter Act, which made censorship legal,
and it also returned to reporters their immunity in cover-
ing parliamentary debates. Moreover, the new government
immediately took up the future of Samachar, the unified
news agency created by Gandhi to control the press, and
appointed a commission composed of journalists to suggest
an appropriate revamping of news agencies. The commis-
sion, headed by Kuldip Nayer, a respected editor, pro-
posed dividing Samachar into three new press services.
The report generated much controversy, and in the end,
Information Minister Advani opted for returning to the
old, preemergency system of four independent and com-
peting agencies. This proposal, introduced in the lower
house in December 1977, went into effect on 1 February.
The progress of the Desai cabinet in restoring in-
dividual liberties faltered a bit when it had to deal
with the conflict existing between the political rights
of citizens and the government's need to maintain law
and order. Although one of Janata's campaign promises
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had been to take MISA off the books, due to the influence
of Home Minister Charan Singh, the act is still in effect.
Its content has been modified, however, and persons can
no longer be detained for up to two years without being
told of the reasons for their arrest; they must now be
informed promptly. MISA, incidentally, predates the
emergency but became increasingly controversial after
June 1975 as a result of its widespread use by Gandhi. to
silence her opponents.
A similar hesitation about removing the 42nd consti-
tutional amendment that solidified emergency rule also
prevails in ruling circles. Desiring to retain some
powers of law enforcement in exceptional situations, the
government has not yet moved to repeal the amendment? but
decided instead to revise it in a limited way. Under the
provisions of proposed legislation, Parliament would de-
prive itself of its unlimited power to identify and pro-
hibit "antinational" organizations, and concomitantly,
the old powers of the federal supreme and state high
courts to review legislation would be restored. While
legislative action is still pending in the upper house,
because of complaints that Janata has not lived up to
its campaign pledge, Law Minister Shanti Bhushan has as-
sured the public that the remaining articles over which
Janata and Congress disagree will be dealt with in future
parliamentary sessions. (Congress cooperation is nec-
essary since it still has a majority in the upper house,
which must approve all amendments to the constitution.)
On the whole, the Desai government has made ample
progress in restoring civil liberties in India. Despite
a slowing down of the process in recent months, Janata
apparently retains the trust of the electorate in its
handling of political freedoms.
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Drug-Related Violence in Latin America
Narcotics trafficking in Latin America is so lucra-
tive financially that drug groups are turning increasingly
to violence to counter government efforts to thwart the
traffic. This in turn stimulates the government in many
cases to more forceful counteractions. The most likely
outcome is a stalemate accompanied by increased violence.
Violence has long been associated with narcotics
trafficking in Latin America. The potentially large
financial profits from this trade have removed from many
drug smugglers the compunction against taking human
lives, particularly those of enforcement officers. As
enforcement operations in Latin America become more
sophisticated and efficient, trafficking groups and other
organized crime syndicates involved in the illegal drug
industry are increasingly resorting to violent counter-
measures in order to protect their interests.
Last month a Bolivian drug agent from the Department
of Narcotics and Dangerous Substances (DNSP) was lynched
in a cemetery in downtown La Paz. A note attached to the
murdered official's body stated this was the beginning
of the "elimination of narcotics agents" in Bolivia. The
murder is undoubtedly a scare tactic by one or more
cocaine smuggling groups and is intended as a response
to Bolivia's current priority program to end the lucra-
tive cocaine trade through registration of coca growers
and increased emphasis on enforcement and interdiction.
Although the DNSP has competent and professional
leadership, its staff has traditionally been underpaid
and poorly trained. If more DNSP agents are murdered,
the reluctance that many enforcement officials already
feel about going into parts of Bolivia's drug-oriented
hinterland will increase--perhaps to a point where there
will be no control at all in certain areas.
In Colombia, the gangs that operate cocaine labora-
tories and smuggle marijuana are reportedly well armed
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with automatic weapons. Competition for supplies and
disputes over prices and operational territory have
resulted in frequent gang warfare. This situation has
exacerbated Colombia's already serious crime problem
and complicated the government's effort to solve the
country's social disorders. Efforts over the past year
to control the problem have resulted in an increasing
number of ambushes and assassinations of National
Police and Department of Administrative Security agents
assigned to narcotics control. Even judges have been
murdered in an attempt by the traffickers to intimidate
the judiciary.
Perhaps the most graphic example of violent reprisals
by drug traffickers has occurred in Mexico. Apparently
pinched by the continuing eradication program, poppy
growers in northwestern Mexico have begun firing on
government helicopters spraying herbicides. A number
of helicopters have been hit, several have been brought
down, and at least one pilot has been killed. In addi-
tion, steel cables have been strung across mountain
valleys, but the aircraft have so far successfully
avoided entangling their rotor blades. Although it has
not yet been attempted, there is always a possibility
that some of the prominent drug groups might employ
"commandos" to sabotage the helicopters while they are
still on the ground.
Acts of brutality and sabotage may prove embarrass-
ing for the affected countries, but violent retaliation
by drug smugglers will not prevent governments from
either continuing or escalating their drug enforcement
programs. Indeed, the very extent to which traffickers
can retaliate against enforcement agencies is limited
at the outset.
For example, no matter how well armed they are, no
trafficking groups can match military firepower. Heroin
traffickers in Culican, the drug smuggling capital of
Sinoioa, Mexico, operated with virtual impunity until
the armed forces swept through the city late last year.
Rampant lawlessness, which the ill-equipped local police
had been powerless to stop, ended practically overnight
after the aggressive and tough-minded Mexican Army moved
in.
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Similarly, Colombian drug traffickers--through their
corrupting influence on government officials and their
indiscriminate shootouts among themselves and police
officers--have exceeded the military's tolerance. As
a result, the drug industry in Colombia has,been included
in an intensified campaign to clean up violence and
crime in the country, a campaign that the military com-
mand enjoined President Lopez to undertake.
In the long run, however, a type of stalemate will
persist. The violent reprisals of the drug smugglers
will not dissuade enforcement officials, nor will the
efforts of enforcement officials eliminate the traf-
fickers--they both will endure. In the interim, violence
will be prevalent, and the loss of life on both sides
will be simply one more aspect of the compl -
vasive narcotics problem in Latin America. 25X1
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International Terrorism: The Japanese Red Army
Attempts To Return Home
The Japanese Red Army (JRA), a small expatriate
terrorist organization responsible for a series of widely
scattered and highly publicized operations over the past
few years, is apparently shifting its focus from the
Palestinian cause and world revolution to Japan in an
effort to .rebuild its base at home. For example, the
JRA sought to court wider support among Japanese left-
ists by including non-JR.A members among the radicals
whose release it demanded from Japanese jails during its
two most recent operations: the seizure of the US Em-
bassy's consular section in Kuala Lumpur in 1975 and the
hijacking of a Japanese Airlines (JAL) plane to Dacca in
1977. During the same period, some 20 JRA members re-
turned to Japan, where they have sought to create a new
front organization and strengthen the JRA's ties with
various potentially sympathetic groups.
The JRA apparently hopes to build an apparatus that
can support the return of the two dozen or so of its
seasoned activists who remain overseas. Its tactics and
revised platform--which now places first priority on the
overthrow of the Japanese Government--seem to have won
the approval of a number of small and formerly hostile
radical groups in Japan. Nonetheless, the JRA seems un-
likely to gain any significant support from either the
general public or Japan's orthodox Marxist parties.
Hence, the practical effects of this shift in strategy
on the organization's capabilities and methods of oper-
ation may not be very great.
Origins
The JRA has been isolated from the mainstream of
Japanese politics due to its extremist policies. This
state of affairs originated with the public reaction to
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the activities of its parent organization, the Japanese
Red Army Faction (RAF),* a splinter group that broke
away from the radical Communist League (Kyosando or Bund)
in 1969 to advocate worldwide student revolution. The
RAF was quickly suppressed by the Japanese authorities,
who raided its training site that same year. The police
subsequently arrested most of the RAF's members and drove
the remainder underground.
Because of the RAF's penchant for violence, popular
opinion strongly supported the police measures. More-
over, the hijacking of a JAL jet to Pyongyang in 1970 by
nine RAF members further alienated the general public
and prompted Japan's orthodox Marxist parties to disavow
the group's actions.
In July 1970, an ultraradical wing of the RAF merged
with the Keihin Ampo Kyoto (the Tokyo-Yokohama Anti-Se-
curity Treaty Student Committee) to form the United Red
Army (URA). The discovery of the new organization's
headquarters by the Japanese police in February 1972 led
to the capture of two of its major leaders and revealed
that 14 of the URA's original 31 members had recently
been tortured and murdered in a bloody purge. The pub-
licity accorded this unprecedented massacre further
fueled public outrage, and together with tighter police
surveillance, this development made it even more diffi-
cult for the extreme left to operate in Japan.
Indeed, domestic setbacks had prompted the RAF to
seek an overseas base as early as 1969. In particular,
the group turned to the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine (PFLP) .
As things turned out, however, the Japanese terror-
ists-in-exile split with the RAF home organization in
*An organization distinct from the European Red Army
faction.
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late 1971 due to the latter group's endorsement of the
type of severe disciplinary measures employed by the
URA. The Beirut-based group announced that its goals
were--in order of priority--to support the Palestinian
struggle, to promote world revolution, and to overthrow
the Japanese Government. Two years later it adopted the
name Japanese Red Army.
These Japanese expatriates staged their first over-
seas terrorist operation, the 1972 Lod Airport massacre,
in order to prove themselves to the initially skeptical
PFLP. The three terrorists involved received their
training at a PFLP camp in Lebanon, obtained forged pass-
ports during a stopover in Frankfurt, and were supplied
with Czech automatic rifles and Soviet hand grenades in
Rome. This incident further alienated Japanese public
opinion as well as the majority of the radical left .in
Japan.
The negative outcry did not, however, deter the
nascent JRA. In July 1973, a joint Japanese PFLP com-
mando team hijacked an Amsterdam-to-Tokyo JAL flight,
destroying the aircraft on the runway at Benghazi, Libya,
after unsuccessfully demanding the release of the JRA
surviver of the Lod Airport attack and a $5 million ran-
som. Over the next four years, JRA terrorists mounted--
or attempted to mount--at least six more major opera-
tions in widely scattered parts of the world (see table).
Although the terrorist-trained cadre of the JRA is
believed to consist of only about 20 individuals, the or-
ganization has used both its own external support appara-
tus and those of other international terrorist groups to
operate on a near global basis.
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JRA INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST OPERATIONS, 1974-1977
January 1974
y
m .A
July 1974
September 1974
Singapore
Europe
A joint JRA-PFLP team attacked the Shell Oil
Refinery as a symbolic strike at oil companies
and to protest Geneva talks on the Palestinian
situation. The terrorists, trapped for seven
days, were allowed to leave after the PFLP
seized the Japanese Embassy in Kuwait, where
the Ambassador and 16 others were taken hos-
tage. The Japanese Government flew both
groups of terrorists to Aden.
Operation Translation, a scheme to kidnap a
Japanese consul or corporate representative
for ransom, was aborted by the arrest of a
JRA activist in France. Both the Paris-based
Curiel Apparat, which has given aid to numer-
ous terrorist groups, and the PFLP were in-
volved.
The JRA seized the French Embassy to obtain
the release of their Paris compatriot. The
French paid a $300,000 ransom and freed the
jailed terrorist. Carlos, the Venezuelan PFLP
terrorist, was reported to have furnished the
weapons used in the attack.
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February 1975 Sweden Two JRA members were arrested in Stockholm
while casing the Lebanese Embassy as a pro-
spective target in pressuring the Lebanese
Government to take a more pro-Palestinian
attitude. The duo were deported and jailed
upon arrival in Japan.
August 1975 Malaysia The JRA took over the adjoining offices of
the Swedish Embassy and the US Embassy's con-
sular section in Kuala Lumpur, forcing the
Japanese Government to release the two re-
cently arrested JRA guerrillas and three
other members of different Japanese radical
factions imprisoned in Japan. The prisoners
and terrorists were flown to Libya in a JAL
plane.
September 1977 Bangladesh The JRA hijacked a JAL jet to Dacca, forcing
Tokyo to release six prisoners and pay a $6
million ransom. The terrorists were trans-
ported to Algiers on the same plane.
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Domestic Sympathizers
Despite widespread Japanese resentment of the JRA,
there are a small number of pro-Palestinian organizations
in Japan that have been generally sympathetic to the JRA
and have provided it with some support. The most notable
are the International Revolutionary Front Information
Center (IRFIC), the Jinmin Shimbunsha (People's News-
paper Company), and VZ58--an organization named after
the Czech automatic rifle used by the terrorists at Lod
Airport.
The IRFIC, founded by the prominent leftist movie
director Adachi Masao, has been the domestic propaganda
arm of the JRA. The group produced and promoted the
film "Red Army - PFLP World War Declaration," a roman-
ticized movie glorifying the Palestinian struggle and
its links with the JRA. Adachi left Japan for the Middle
East in 1974 to become a member of the Red Army leader-
ship. The IRFIC continues to act as a Red Army public
relations organization and is suspected of being in
clandestine contact with the JRA terrorist cadre abroad.
The Jinmin Shimbunsha's predecessor organization,
the New Left Company, frequently printed JRA material
in its publication, New Left. The company's name was
changed in conjunction with the Japanese Red Army's
shift in emphasis. The Jinmin Shimbunsha presently
serves as the mouthpiece for JRA policy proclamations.
Policy Shift
The JRA's interest in consolidating and strength-
ening its base in Japan first surfaced in March 1975
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when JRA leader Shigenobu Fusako announced plans for the
"Japan Council for the World Revolutionary United Front,"
a leftist coalition dedicated to the overthrow of the
Japanese Government as a step toward world revolution.
The arena of conflict was not to be confined to Japan,
however, for the strategy announced by Shigenobu included
plans to subject Japanese overseas commercial and dip-
lomatic installations to terrorist action.
The JRA's decision to focus more on Japan was in-
fluenced in part by growing problems in Lebanon--includ-
ing the Lebanese civil war and PFLP criticism of the JRA
for its lack of an effective domestic support apparatus.
The JRA's activities in Japan are now directed by
some 20 activists who returned from overseas between
late 1975 and mid-1977. Together with their domestic
backers, they have become the JRA lobby with the Japa-
nese leftist movement.
The JRA has concentrated on two types of recruit-
ment targets--friends and acquaintances of Red Army mem-
bers and members of other radical left bodies. In addi-
tion to seeking new recruits, JRA activists have sought
to use potential symr.athizers to build ties to other
radical organizations.*
Over the last year or so, the JRA's domestic activ-
ities have included: establishing a JRA front organiza-
tion that has sponsored a series of lectures aimed at
the radical left; founding a new pro-JRA body that pro-
motes the causes of the displaced Ainu minority in Japan
and of the Palestinian people; and publicizing a more
conciliatory line, dubbed the 30 May 77 "Appeal" to the
'''The prospective support organisation is to be patterned
after the Japan Technical Committee to Aid US Anti-War
Deserters (JATECH), a covert arm of the Beheiren (Peace
for Vietnam Committee) which was active during the Viet-
nam War. JATECH served as the Japanese underground rail-
road for American military deserters, providing an effi-
cient infiltration and exfiZtration route. There is no
evidence available at this time, however, to indicate
any success in the development of such an apparatus.
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Japanese left. In early 1978, the JRA publicly empha-
sized the need for leftist unity in order to overthrow
the Emperor and found a provisional revolutionary gov-
ernment.
Although the JRA. has had some success in strengthen-
ing its domestic infrastructure and winning the endorse-
ment of a few small radical fringe groups, it has made
no headway toward gaining broader popular support or
overcoming the hostility of Japan's orthodox Marxist
parties. Similarly, the limited appeal of its ideologi-
cal platform has largely stymied its efforts to unify
Japan's traditionally fragmented radical left.
This situation seems unlikely to change very much
over the next few years. Hence, even though the shift
in the JRA's operational focus may make recruitment of
new members easier, its direct impact on the organiza-
tion's capabilities and methods of operation may be
rather limited. The inherent weakness of its domestic
base--and the watchful eye of concerned police author-
ities--are likely to continue to limit the JRA's ability
to operate at home.
The JRA is thus likely to continue to stage spora-
dic operations abroad. In this context, its decision
to shift its organizational center of gravity to Japan
could yield some tangible benefits. Simply put, the
JRA may find it easier to secure the sympathy and sup-
port of foreign organizations and governments if it is
able to establish more credible credentials as a "legiti-
mate" national revolutionary group.
In any event, the JRA can be expected to maintain
and, if possible expand, its existing foreign links.
Its overseas operations may be directed more frequently
against Japanese officials or business interests, but
attacks on other targets--whether out of revenge or be-
cause of their symbolic significance--will probably be
mounted as well. Moreover, the JRA will probably con-
tinue occasional attempts to seize non-Japanese hostages
in order to increase the Japanese Government's discom-
fiture and willingness to meet its demands.
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