AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010004-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2002
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: March 9, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

National For Release 2002/01 CIA 2 P79 912AOO27OO 666 t6
Assessment NOFORN-NO00NTRACT-
Center ORCON
Africa Review
Secret
RP AR 79-009
9 March 1979
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Intelligence Sources
and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
National Security
Information
Dissemination Control
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STATOTHR
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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NOCONTRACT(NC)
PROPIN (PP)
NFIBONLY (NO)
ORCON (OC)
REL...
FGI
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AFRICA REVIEW (U)
9 March 1979
CONTENTS
Tanzania-Uganda: Mediation Unlikely (U) . . . . . . 1
The Organization of African Unity and some
individual African states are attempting to
mediate between Tanzania and Uganda, but
their efforts are likely to fail. (S)
Uganda: Ethnic Factors in the Post-Amin Period (U). 5
Ethnic and regional factors--always impor-
tant in Uganda--are likely to play an impor-
tant role in any regime that might take over
if President Amin is ousted. (U)
Rhodesia: Nkomo's Diminished Options (U). . . . . . 10
Joshua Nkomo, leader of the Zimbabwe African
People's Union, needs either an accommoda-
tion with the government in Salisbury or a
new international push for a political set-
tlement to revive his sagging political
fortunes. (C) 25X1A
Nigeria: Preelection Politicking Intensifying (U) . 12
Political campaigning in Nigeria, in antici-
pation of elections and a scheduled return
to civilian rule next October, has intensi-
fied in recent weeks after an extended period
of concentration by the country's five com-
peting political parties on internal organi-
zation. (C)
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Djibouti: Calm Continues (U). . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Although President Gouled has managed to
maintain his country's independence, com-
peting interests of the Afars and Issas
and meddling by neighboring Ethiopia and
Somalia could easily upset the situation.
(C)
Zaire: Student Unrest (U) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
President Mobutu's "bandaid" approach to
solving student grievances could lead to re-
newed confrontation between the government
and the students. (C)
Comoros Islands: Prospects for Abdallah's Regime
(U) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
It is too early to tell whether President
Abdallah's move from a progressive Marxist
society to a Western-style republic will
produce favorable results. (S)
Angola: The Ethnic and Re ional Basis of the
Political Movements U . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Support for political organizations in
Angola, as in other African countries, gen-
erally follows ethnic and regional lines. (U)
Rhodesia: An Annotated Chronology (U) . . . . . . . 33
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS
Impact on Neighboring Black African States of
Chad's Turmoil (U) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
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25X1A
Tanzania-Uganda: Mediation Unlikely (U)
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) and some
individual African states are attempting to mediate be-
tween Tazania and Uganda, but their efforts are likely
to fail. Despite some conciliatory public statements,
Tanzanian President Nyerere is clearly determined to
pursue the overthrow of Ugandan President Idi Amin. (S)
Nyerere's Speech
The depth of Nyerere's commitment to Amin's downfall
shows through in a speech to party and government leaders
in Dar es Salaam on 28 February. When examined against
the background of Tazanian culture, the speech makes clear
why--in Nyerere's view--mediation is impossible. (S)
When Nyerere gave his speech, the Tanzania People's
Defense Forces (TPDF) had taken both Masaka and Mbarara
in southern Uganda, forcing Ugandan troops to withdraw
toward Kampala for an eventual defense of the capital.
Mediation attempts by the OAU were still in process, and
while Amin was amenable to a negotiated settlement of
the border conflict, Nyerere continued to be intransigent.
(U
Parable of the Thief
Nyerere explained that his speech was intended "to
dispel any doubts in your minds" about his position on
the Ugandan conflict. He then said:
If your neighbor has stolen from your house, the
thief will usually flee if he gets the chance. When he
has got what he wanted, he flees and for your part you
will try to chase him. A person who does not understand
the real reason for the thief's flight and questions
your chasing him, saying that you are the aggressor and
stopping you in your pursuit, assists the thief by this
action. He might argue that he wants to mediate, but at
the same time this is a type of mediation geared toward
aiding the thief. (U)
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This parable with its readily identifiable actors (the
thief, Amin; the aggrieved neighbor, Tazania; the well-
intentioned but uninformed mediator, the OAU) permits
Nyerere to justify his continued "chase" of Amin. (S)
Nyerere is making more than a simple analogy. Among
the societies of East Africa, theft has traditionally
been considered a crime of singular proportion.* Even
today, the cry of Mwizi! (Swahili for thief) in a Dar
es Salaam street energizes otherwise placid pedestrians
into mob pursuit of the fleeing suspect. (U)
Traditional Tanzanian society condemns the thief
not because he acts against another individual, but
because he violates the rule of sharing, a fundamental
principle in communalistic societies. The community
must ensure respect for this principle if its social
structure is to survive. The procedure for identifying
the thief and the process of reconciliation between him
and the aggrieved party requires the intervention of the
community or its representative. (U)
Once the thief is identified, every possible step
is taken to reestablish the social equilibrium upset by
the infraction. If the thief refuses to admit guilt,
fails to make compensation, or refuses to repair the
broken relationship with the aggrieved party, the com-
munity can no longer admit the thief to its protection
and he becomes an outcast. To Nyerere's audience the
speech meant that in the first instance it is the respon-
sibility of the larger African community--as represented
by the OAU--to deal with the disruption caused by Amin's
October 1978 invasion of Tanzania. But if the OAU does
not take action against Amin, the aggrieved party--
Tanzania--must take responsibility. (S)
*A thief is not only capable of taking material things. If he is
a mchawi (Swahili for witch), he can steal sexual potency, faculties
of the mind, even the power of life itself. The mchawi obviously
is a much greater threat to the community than the ordinary thief.
If material goods are stolen, ordinary measures will do; but if
Lite thief employs witchcraft, extraordinary means--requiring the
services of a mganga (Swahili for traditional "doctor")--must be
used. (U)
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Thus, Nyerere called for the OAU to condemn Amin,
who must admit the crime, but at the same time suggested
he did not expect it to respond. He ended his remarks
to the OAU with the following challenge: "If you cannot
deal with him, then let us alone to deal with him." (S)
Outlook
Nyerere's present position on mediation appears in-
tractable. He has established the case that Amin cannot
be trusted as a neighbor. By casting Amin as a thief,
and by characterizing the OAU as impotent, Nyerere re-
veals that he does not expect Amin to recant or the OAU
to intercede. Nyerere himself is thus obliged to see
that Amin is cast out of the African political "community."
(S) (SECRET)
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UGANDA: Ethnic Groups
KQLE
Mbarara \
7.13
5.87
5.11
3.23
2.92
2.15
1.73
1.66
1.44
.74
.56
.54
.37
NILO-HAMITIC
Iteso
8.14
Karamojong
2.04
Kumam
.95
Kakwa
59
Sebei
57
Suk
34
Labwor
16
Tepeth
07
NILOTIC
Lango 5.64
Acholi 4.42
Alur 1.91
Jopadhola 1.57
Jaluo .58
Jonam .43
Bantu
Nilotic
Nilo-Hamitic
Sudanic
SUK Ethnic name
Percent of Population
SUDANIC
Lugbara 3.66 OTHER
Madi 1.25
Lendu .07
BANTU
Baganda 16.20
Banyankole 8.05
Bakiga
Banyaruanda
Bagisu
Batoro
Banyoro
Rundi
Bagwere
Bakonjo
Banyuli
Sarnia
Bagwe
Baamba
Bakenyi
65.48
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25X1A
Uganda: Ethnic Factors in the Post-Amin Period (U)
Ethnic and regional factors--always important in
Uganda--are likely to play an important role in any re-
gime that might take over if President Amin is ousted.
Before Amin seized power in 1971, the influence of ethnic
and regional divisions was very much in evidence, and
under his rule a major change in the ethnic/regional
power balance has taken place and aggravated existing
animosities. In a post-Amin period this balance is
likely to shift again, initiating a new period of in-
stability. (U)
Amin is currently under more pressure than at any
time in the past eight years. Tanzanian forces occupy
a large sector of southern Uganda and reportedly are re-
paring to advance toward the capital. Reports indicate
a high Ugandan desertion rate, and a tendency simply to
fade into the bush when Tanzanian forces are encountered.
The Ugandan military is undisciplined, and many are of
questionable loyalty to Amin. Promotion on the basis of
political favoritism of semiliterate, uneducated northern-
ers to positions of authority has created intense resent-
ment among southerners and northerners of other tribes
and religions. (S)
Restructuring Uganda by any successor regime will
be complicated by deep-seated ethnic rivalries, regard-
less of whether it is undertaken by northerners in the
military, by traditional southern leaders, or by groups
now in exile. (U)
The Ethnic Factor
Uganda has some 42 different ethnic groups, repre-
senting four linguistic families--Bantu (mainly in the
south), Nilotic, Nilo-Hamitic, and Sudanic (all primarily
in the north). Languages in the same family are structur-
ally similar and more or less mutually intelligible;
those in different families are structurally different
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and mutually unintelligible. Linguistic differences
profoundly affect the level of communication between
ethnic groups and inhibit feelings of national unity.
(U)
Ugandan ethnic groups are divided in two ways. One
division is between the Bantu to the south of Lake Kyoga
and the non-Bantu to the north of the lake. While no
single ethnic group is large enough to be politically
dominant, the southern Bantu, located in the economic
heartland of the country, together account for about 65
percent of the population. Because of geographic differ-
ences in the rate of modernization, many northerners have
migrated south to take advantage of economic opportunities
and some degree of ethnic mixing has occurred in the
south. (U)
The second important division is among the Bantu
speakers. Linguistic and cultural differences and
competition for political power have kept the Bantu
speakers from forming any effective long-term coalition.
Cooperation, when it occurs, is generally within the same
language family, but the general rule is conflict. In-
ternal differences among the Bantu speakers have tradi-
tionally been so strong that effective organized opposi-
tion to any unpopular ruler--foreign or Ugandan--has
been difficult to achieve. (U)
The Baganda,* located along the shore of Lake Vic-
toria, are the largest (about 16 percent of the total)
and wealthiest group of Ugandans. The central location
of their area--and its excellent soils and ample rain-
fall--enables them to earn their living from agriculture
and to grow sufficient quantities of coffee to make it
the country's most important export crop. About 60 per-
cent of the agricultural land in Buganda is devoted to
cash crops, in contrast to about 30 percent for the coun-
try as a whole. (U)
The Baganda traditionally had a highly centralized
tribal political system but they have not been well
represented in Uganda's military or police, probably
because of the wide range of alternative opportunities
;:Baganda refers to the people and Buganda to the area they occupy.
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open to them. They tend to exercise less political in-
fluence than their numbers would indicate and have never
formed longstanding coalitions with other ethnic groups.
During the colonial period, the British considered Bu-
ganda to be the most advanced area of the country and
frequently used Baganda as administrators in other areas.
This reinforced the Baganda view that they were superior
to other Ugandans, and caused non-Baganda to perceive
them unfavorably. Poor northerners, migrating to Buganda
to seek jobs, resented Baganda control, which aggravated
north-south divisions. Other Bantu groups--formed into
three other centralized kingdoms--exhibited similar char-
acteristics. (S)
Conflicts Under Obote
Former President Milton Obote, an Acholi from the
north (some sources indicate he is a Lango), was sup-
ported by an alliance of Acholi and Lango peoples who
had traditionally dominated the military. Combined,
these two groups accounted for only 10 percent of the
total population of Uganda, but formed 30 percent of
the non-Bantu northern population and about 40 percent
of the armed forces. Obote sought to establish a unitary
state in which the more populous and influential groups--
especially the Baganda--could not dominate his northern
supporters. (S)
Conflict between Obote and the Baganda was inevi-
table. At independence Obote was named Prime Minister,
and the Kabaka (King) of the Baganda became President.
Obote's pursuit of socialist development was in direct
conflict with the capitalist tendencies of the southern-
ers. In 1966, he seized control of the government, in-
troduced a new constitution, and had. himself proclaimed
President by Parliament. The new constitution abolished
the Kingdom of Baganda and the other southern Kingdoms
and forced the Kabaka into exile in London. Later,
Obote carried out a bloody purge of those who resisted
the changes. (U)
The Amin Era
In 1977, Amin--then Uganda's senior military offi-
cer--ousted Obote. A Sudanic-speaking Kakwa from one
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of the smallest ethnic groups, Amin initially was pop-
ular with the southerners, if only because Obote was
so intensely disliked. Amin curried additional favor
with the Baganda when he allowed the body of the Kabaka
to be returned from London for burial in Uganda, but
soon lost popularity when the southerners realized that
he was simply replacing north-central (Acholi-Lango) rule
with north-western (Kakwa-"Nubian")* rule. In recent
years, because of declining political support within
the country, Amin has been -forced to rely increasingly
on minority peoples from the northwest to maintain
his only power base--the military. (S)
"Nubians" were always well represented in the Army
because a military career offered a chance for a young
Nubian to substantially improve his prospects. But Amin
increased the numbers and dominance of the "Nubians" in
the military through selective recruitment and promotion
of his ethnic brothers, many of them from the border
areas of neighboring Sudan and Zaire. Predominately
Muslim, they differ from most other Ugandans in religion
as well as culture. (S)
Leadership Prospects
Detailed accurate information on the current ethnic
makeup of Uganda is unavailable. Most institutions cap-
able of providing leadership have been destroyed or se-
verely damaged; the badly shaken military is one of
the few viable organizations remaining. (S)
The Army will probably play a critical role in
the post-Amin era. If Amin alone is removed, leaving
the "Nubian" dominated military leadership intact, and
if the men in the ranks follow their leadership, changes
will be minimal. But if chaotic conditions follow
Amin's ouster and large numbers of Nubians flee the
country, chances are good that the remaining southern
officers could assert themselves and possibly provide
some measure of stability. In either case, a return to
civilian rule is unlikely. (S)
'"Nubians" are members of northern ethnic groups--Acholi, Kakwa,
Lugbara, and others--who have converted to Islam and the cultural
practices of the southern Sudanese. (S)
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Still another possibility is that leadership will
be provided by an exile group or even by the reinstate-
ment of Milton Obote as President, though the latter
seems remote at this time. Amin's systematic decimation
of the previously powerful Acholi and Lango peoples has
probably destroyed their internal leadership potential,
though significant numbers of them were in exile in Tan-
zania with Obote. We can assume that the Baganda have
also suffered politically and economically under Amin's
rule, but the current leadership potential among the
Bantu is unknown. Bantu resurgence is possible, but
cooperation would have to occur at a level rarely exhi-
bited before. (S)
The number, capabilities, and ethnic affiliation of
exiles who may return when Amin is removed is the larg-
est unknown in the equation. Regardless of what govern-
ment emerges, the longstanding north-south differences
and the rivalries within each bloc that have been mani-
fested throughout this century are not likely to cease.
(S) (SECRET)
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25X1A
Rhodesia: Nkomo's Diminished Options (U)
Joshua Nkomo, leader of the Zimbabwe African People's
Union (ZAPU), seems to have run out of political options,
at least for the time being. As a result, he has become
locked into a military course of action that could prove
disastrous in the long run for him and for ZAPU. To re-
vive his political fortunes, Nkomo needs either an accom-
modation with the government in Salisbury or a new inter-
national push for a political settlement. (C)
Nkomo's Decline
Several factors have contributed to Nkomo's decline.
His fragile Patriotic Front alliance with Robert Mugabe,
leader of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU),
has all but collapsed. The alliance was never more than
a framework for the two leaders to coordinate a negotiat-
ing position, but it provided the platform Nkomo needed
in order to maintain his position as the senior nationalist
leader. In the absence of international negotiations,
the Patriotic Front has lost its reason for being, thus
depriving Nkomo of an important publicity tool. (C)
The shooting down of a second Rhodesian civilian
airliner in February by ZAPU guerrillas has made an
accommodation with the transitional government in Salis-
bury much more difficult. Until recently, Nkomo was able
to exploit the transitional government's eagerness to
bring him into the internal settlement to show how im-
portant his participation was to a successful settle-
ment. Moreover, it provided him with a convenient option
of last resort. (C)
In addition, Mugabe has emerged as Nkomo's equal in
the external nationalist movement, largely because of
ZANU's increasing strength inside Rhodesia. About 7,000
ZANU guerrillas are reportedly inside the country, com-
pared with about 2,000 ZAPU guerrillas. ZANU's growing
strength has enabled Mugabe to win international
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recognition in his own right rather than as Nkomo's junior
partner. It has also encouraged him to try, unsuccess-
fully so far, to break Nkomo's monopoly on Soviet assist-
ance. (S NF NC OC)
Nkomo's Options
Nkomo's loss of political options has left him no
choice but a military course. He probably realizes,
nonetheless, that the military option holds a number of
dangers. Any major step-up in the fighting against the
Rhodesian security forces would result in heavy casualties
and increase tensions between the military and civilian
leaders within ZAPU. Moreover, it would place ZAPU
on a collision course with ZANU. Given ZANU's growing
strength inside Rhodesia and its broader tribal base,
ZAPU might not be able to win such a showdown. Even if
ZAPU proved capable of holding its own, Nkomo's leader-
ship would be thrown open to challenge by military rivals
within ZAPU. In addition, the military option runs against
the grain of Nkomo's principal backer--Zambian President
Kenneth Kaunda--who prefers a political settlement to an
increase in Zambian, not to mention Soviet and Cuban,
involvement. (S NF NC OC)
Given the gloomy military prospects, Nkomo may try
to revive his political fortunes by making another
attempt at accommodation with the Salisbury regime. He
might do so before the transfer of power to the govern-
ment of national unity takes place in the belief that
Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the most likely winner in the
April elections, would be less inclined to strike a deal
with him than Prime Minister Smith would be. Nkomo would
find it difficult if not impossible to approach Smith,
but he might explore an accommodation indirectly through
other internal black leaders such as Ndabaningi Sithole,
or Chief Chirau. (C)
A new international initiative toward a settlement
would help to revive Nkomo's fortunes. It would be beyond
his ability to control, but.it would put him back in the
limelight. (U) (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)
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Nigeria: Preelection Politicking Intensifying (U)
Political campaigning in Nigeria, in anticipation
of elections and a scheduled return to civilian rule
next October, has intensified in recent weeks after an
extended period of concentration by the country's five
competing political parties on internal organization.
The increase in politicking has been accompanied by some
sporadic clashes between rival parties and warnings by
state authorities against disorders. Apparently in re-
sponse to recent incidents of political violence, General
Obasanjo's government issued a tough nationwide public
order decree late last month. It transfers primary re-
sponsibility for monitoring political campaigning from
local police officials to state military administrators
and sets stiff penalties for political violence and
thuggery, problems that helped undermine the first re-
public. (C)
Despite its latest firm measure to deter violence,
the regime does not feel that the transition is seriously
threatened and is confident Nigeria will be returned to
civilian rule on schedule. The new decree should rein-
force the government's ability to keep political violence
within bounds and Nigeria on track toward constitutional
government. Nevertheless, Nigeria's greatest potential
challenge could be to move successfully through state
and national elections. The elections have not yet been
scheduled and may not be held until summer. Only when
Nigeria draws closer to voting will it become clear
whether the political process becomes turbulent enough
to force cancellation of civilian rule. (S)
The worst politically inspired violence to date
erupted last January in the northern city of Kano. The
two incidents involved followers of the major National
Party, which represents the conservative northern Muslim
political establishment, and those of the small Muslim-
oriented People's Redemption Party whose reformist leader-
ship seems especially confrontation prone. Nigerian se-
curity officials expect that clashes between the two
parties will continue to be a periodic but manageable
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problem. They reportedly are more worried about the pos-
sibility of serious clashes between the National Party
and the predominantly southern Yoruba-based Unity Party.
(S NF NC OC)
The electoral strengths of the various Nigerian
parties (see chart) are difficult to judge because of
the lack of reliable political data. Beneath the facade
of 13 years of military rule, several potentially important
sociological changes have taken place that could affect
Nigerian voting behavior. The influence of local tradi-
tional rulers has eroded in varying degrees, educational
levels have increased, and urbanization has accelerated.
(C
As in the past, voters in rural areas, where the
bulk of Nigeria's population still resides, are generally
expected to vote along ethnic and regional lines and to
be more receptive to political guidance by local chiefs.
Voters in the larger urban centers, who are presumed to
be more "detribalized" and politically aware than their
rural countrymen, may be more influenced by party stands
on contemporary social and economic issues. Thus, the
two parties with the strongest populist platforms--the
Unity Party and the People's Redemption Party--may have
considerable appeal among urban dwellers. (C)
At this point, most Nigerians consider the National
Party, based in the more populous far north, to be the
frontrunner, with the Unity Party, Nigerian People's
Party, Great Nigerian People's Party, and People's Re-
demption Party following in that order. Still, the party
lineup could change dramatically. Most observers expect
several party mergers after the first round of elections*
when party strengths and weaknesses become evident.
Further party realignments will occur in the probable
event that a presidential runoff is necessary. (S)
Nnamdi Azikiwe's financially impoverished Nigerian
People's Party seems the most eager at this time for a
*Tentative government planning had originally called for a series
of five elections in ascending order for state legislative assem-
blies, the federal house of representatives, the federal senate,
state governorships, and the federal presidency. In order to adhere
to the October target date for transition to civilian rule, the
regime undoubtedly will have to combine some of the elections. (C)
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Nigerian Political Parties
Party Name
Ma or Parties
National Party
W Nigerian People's
U Party
Unity Party
Minor Parties
Great Nigerian
People's Party
National Candidates--
Tribal Affiliation
President: Shehu Shagari (Fulani)
Vice President: Alex Ekueme (Ibo)
President: Nnamdi Azikiwe (Ibo)
Vice President: not yet chosen
President: Obafemi Awolowo (Yoruba)
Vice President: Phillip Umeadi
(Ibo)
President: Waziri Ibrahim (Kanuri)
Vice President: Benjamin Nzeribe
(Ibo)
Northern Muslim oriented and dominated by
major Hausa-Fulani ethnic group; has some
support among major southern tribes and
minority tribes of Nigeria's middle belt;
generally conservative, right-wing cast.
Based heavily on major southern Ibo ethnic
group, eastern minority tribes, and middle
belt support; moderate centrist group.
Based primarily on major southern Yoruba
ethnic group with little support elsewhere;
left-of-center populist stance.
Dissident northern Muslim faction with a
small scattering of southern support; mod-
erate centrist grouping.
People's Redemption President: Aminu Kano (Fulani) Alliance of anti-traditional northerners,
Party Vice President: Samuel lkoku with a reformist and xenophobic outlook,
Oho) and progressive southern loos. (U)
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merger or some form of electoral alliance to bolster its
prospects. It has its sights on the two minor northern-
based parties--the Great Nigerian People's Party and the
People's Redemption Party, but recent negotiations have
proved fruitless. Thus, all three groups will probably
go it alone for now. Nevertheless, Azikiwe's predomi-
nantly southern Ibo-based party reportedly is benefiting
from some additional support from former northern
adherents of the National Party and the Great Nigerian
People's Party who are unhappy over intraparty squabbles
or their failure to be named party candidates for public
office. As a result, Azikiwe's party may select its
vice-presidential candidate from the Muslim north in
hopes of picking up some votes in an area it had largely
written off. (C) (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)
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25X1A
Djibouti: Calm Continues (U)
President Gouled was warmly received in Djibouti's
Afar and Issa ethnic areas during a tour of provincial
capitals last month. The uninspiring Gouled, who has
managed to maintain his country's independence, may with
luck be able to continue the feat for some time. Given
Djibouti's poor foundation for independence and fragile
political institutions, however, competing interests of
the Afars and Issas and meddling by neighboring Ethiopia
and Somalia could easily upset the situation. (C)
Gouled's trip was his first extensive tour of the
interior since the pre-independence referendum and elec-
tion in May 1977. Gouled promised more attention to the
countless needs of Djibouti's neglected interior, includ-
ing the establishment of municipal local governments in
many of the smaller towns and villages. (C)
Prime Minister Bourkat Gourad, who was appointed
last October, has avoided confrontations with the Presi-
dent. The previous Prime Ministers, all Afars like
Bourkat Gourad, continuously challenged the President,
an Issa, on domestic and foreign issues. This played
into the hands of radicals on both sides, leading to con-
tinued crises within Djibouti. Bourkat's reluctance to
challenge the President is more the result of the Prime
Minister's retiring nature than the product of any sig-
nificant improvement in ethnic relations. (S)
Djibouti continues to steer a neutral course in its
relations with its two neighbors, Ethiopia and Somalia,
which have traditionally had designs on the country and
are involved in covert attempts to further their national
interests there. In pursuing its goals, Somalia has
worked through the ethnically related Issas; Ethiopia
has similarly employed the Afars. (S)
Somalia has lost substantial influence with the
Djibouti Government over the past year. While Isaas
are the dominant group, most were quick to recognize
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military realities after the Ethiopian victory over So-
malia last March. Some hardline, pro-Somali Issas still
have access to President Gouled, but their influence has
diminished. (C)
The Somali Government, however, is still capable of
causing problems within Djibouti. Mogadiscio has a num-
ber of diverse economic holdings in the country, using
Djibouti nationals as fronts. Somalia also has strong
influence in the Djibouti security service, the fledgling
Army, and workers in the port and railroad to Addis Ababa--
the country's only economic assets. However, Somali ac-
tivity has, at times, prompted Djibouti to arrest Somali
nationals or their Issa allies for anti-government or dis-
ruptive activity. (S NF)
For their part, the Ethiopians are watchful for
any sign of increasing Somali influence in Djibouti.
Addis Ababa regards access to the port as vital to its
foreign trade and expects the cooperation of the Djibouti
Government to insure it. To protect its interests, the
Ethiopians have been training radical Afar youth in ter-
rorist and guerrilla activity. The Ethiopians are play-
ing on Afar hatred of the Issas and the desire of the
younger generation of Djibouti to bring about political
change. There have been reports that the lack of activ-
ity by the dissidents, some of whom began training in
mid-1978, has led to morale problems and some weakening
of the exile organizations. The Ethiopians, however,
will probably refrain from unleashing the radical Afars
as long as they see no shift in Djibouti's policy toward
Somalia. A recent Ethiopian shakeup of the exiles'
leadership has caused some of the Afar leaders who lost
out to attempt a reconciliation with Gouled's govern-
ment. (S NF NC OC)
The calm of the last six months has given the gov-
vernment some breathing room. The prospect of internal
development programs offered by Gouled and efforts to
establish a government presence in the small villages
could help establish credibility and support. (C)
The government, however, still has serious ob-
stacles to overcome. Little has been done, for example,
to defuse tribal animosity or to introduce such basic
institutions as a constitution. Ethiopia and Somalia
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continue to meddle in Djibouti, and the recent opening
of the Soviet Embassy adds to the potential for unrest,
especially in view of the government's inadequate seurity
service. (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)
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25X1A
Zaire: Student Unrest (U)
In late February and early this month, President
Mobutu was confronted by student demonstrations at the
Kinshasa and Lubumbashi campuses of the University of
Zaire. The short-lived student outbursts were sparked
by inadequate government stipends for the students, a
shortage of food in the campus cafeterias, and the ab-
sence of basis services such as running water. The
demonstrations come at a time when the Mobutu govern-
ment feels threatened by various internal and external
political forces and popular dissatisfaction is at a
high point. Student demonstrators tried to draw paral-
lels to Iran, calling one government representative the
"Shah of Shaba" and referring to a student leader as
the "Ayatollah." (C)
The problems on university campuses are to some
extent a reflection of Zairian society as a whole. Cor-
ruption is rife in the university administration, and
the rolls of students and employees are swollen by non-
existent people listed for the purpose of collecting
government fees. The periodic food shortages are widely
believed to be caused by the diversion of funds by gov-
ernment officials more concerned for the health of their
commercial ventures than that of the students. (C)
Faculty and students often criticize Mobutu's regime
privately, but expressions of discontent have usually
been restrained and unorganized. Although university
students have habitually complained about campus condi-
tions, they are still beholden to a government that
literally feeds and clothes them. In a society where
jobs are difficult to find they are hesitant to risk
their benefits by engaging in public protest. The
university population could nevertheless become a seri-
ous problem, particularly if the interests and grievances
of the students and the Zairian public, already disaf-
fected, should converge, leading to widespread civil dis-
order. (C)
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Although Zairian students have been relatively
quiescent in recent years, they have at times been a
problem for Mobutu. In 1969, striking students appealed
to poorly paid troops in Kinshasa to join them in a pro-
test over low pay and stipends. A few did, but the pro-
test ended quickly when other troops were ordered to
fire on the students. (C)
Mobutu dealt quickly with the recent student dis-
turbances. He personally visited the campus at Kinshasa,
listened to grievances, and ordered water service re-
stored and food delivered. Control at both campuses was
reestablished with minimum force, but intrinsic malaise
remains, and Mobutu could well face a new dilemma. By
responding with conciliatory gestures, the government
has demonstrated the efficacy of student protest. If
Mobutu is unable to meet future demands or if the army
were to overreact to student violence, anti-government
demonstrations by the students could easily get out of
hand. (C)
This time the students made no attempt to enlist
the support of the local population, nor did they re-
ceive any, no doubt because of fear of the government's
pervasive security apparatus. The students did, however,
show some signs of organization. If the government does
not follow up with significant reform, Mobotu's "bandaid"
approach to solving the students' grievances could lead
to renewed confrontation between the government and the
students. (C) (CONFIDENTIAL)
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25X1A
Comoros Islands: Prospects for Abdallah's Regime (U)
In May, the Comoros Islands will mark the first
anniversary of the coup that overthrew ALL Soilih's
three-year socialist regime. The new government led by
President Ahmed Abdallah was harshly denounced by most
African nations because it was installed by European
mercenaries, whose leader, Bob Denard, stayed on until
last September in a key government position.* Although
the Comoros' international standing is slowly improving,
the domestic situation has changed little; there are
few signs of popular support for the government, and the
economy is totally dependent on foreign aid. It is too
early to tell whether Abdallah's move from a progressive
Marxist society to a Western-style republic will produce
favorable results. (S)
International Relations
Since Denard's departure, the Abdallah regime has
begun to win international acceptance. Although most
Indian Ocean countries initially regarded Denard's coup
as a dangerous precedent, some, such as Mauritius and
the Seychelles, are negotiating an inter-island fishing
consortium with the Comoros. The island republic was
readmitted to the organization of African Unity (OAU)
during the Khartoum summit last month after having been
expelled last July because of its cozy relationship with
Denard's mercenaries. Official relations with most black
African countries, however, have yet to be established.
(S NF NC OC)
France, which refused to provide aid to the islands
until Denard left, has established diplomatic relations
with the Abdallah government. Paris hopes that its
*Abdallah himself was ousted by Denard in 1975, three months
after the Comoros became independent from France. (S)
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Republic
of the
Comoros
Rhodesia
Mozambique
Madagascar
He Tramelm
Francel
INancei
Cargados
Caralos
Shoals
MORO I * Comoro
Comoros
Agalega
Islands
lies Glorieuses (France)
Mahe Island
Destachai Islands
Amuanle
Isles
Aldabra Cosmoledo FarWhar
Islands Group Group
Grand \ Iles
Comoro AnlouanGlorieuses
t Mabeli ifrancel
Mararse
Comoros
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military and economic aid will lead to a better environ-
ment to negotiate the reintegration of Mayotte into the
Comoros; Mayotte voted to remain a French overseas de-
partment when the Comoros gained independence in 1975.*
(S)
The Domestic Situation
The gradual international acceptance of the Comoros
has already alleviated one major problem, the large
current-account deficit. French aid, IMF loans, and
grants from the Saudis are supporting the economy, al-
though the long-term results of these and other foreign
assistance packages depend in large part on how the
President chooses to distribute them. (C)
Abdallah has funneled most foreign aid into secu-
rity and military development. The French are training
an army, and privately hired European military "techni-
cians" have organized a 250-man presidential guard. (C)
Abdallah's concentration on internal security and
military concerns has been at the expense of the Como-
rian economy. He recently claimed, however, that he
will focus on improving'the islands' economy, which is
crucial to winning popular support. Most Comorians are
subsistence farmers and would welcome even a marginal
rise in their low income level. (S)
Western observers doubt Abdallah's sincerity. They
describe him as more committed to personal financial
gain than national concerns. As the wealthiest land-
owner on the islands, the President considers the Comoros
primarily a business venture and reportedly told one
government creditor that he intends to reimburse himself
from government coffers for what he lost during Soilih's
reign. (C)
Abdallah alone makes major decisions, even though
the constitution specifies that he cooperate with an
*Mayotte, the most prosperous of the Comoros Islands, rejected mem-
bership in the Comorian Government in the belief that such a union
would work to its economic disadvantage. France has been harshly
criticized by the African countries for its retention of Mayotte
and would like to see the island reintegrated. (S)
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elected national assembly and three governors. Further-
more, his economic plans are vague, and he has taken
no concrete steps to improve the economy since his de-
cision last fall to revert from government-controlled
monopolies to a free enterprise system. (C)
In addition to the country's economic difficulties,
Abdallah faces the challenge of reconciling those fac-
tions that fared well under Soilih's regime with those
that have become more powerful since Soilih's departure.
Students, who ran "popular committees" under Soilih and
are resentful of the sudden renewal of their elders'
status, have demonstrated against Abdallah. Progressive
politicians and former members of Soilih's Tanzanian-
trained security force also oppose the new government.
(S)
Outlook
Despite many obstacles, the government still has a
good chance of enlisting popular support if Abdallah can
restrain his acquisitive instincts and concentrate on
effective government. He is under considerable pressure
to do so, given the threat that the French will probably
withdraw aid if he refuses. (S) (SECRET NOFORN-
NOCONTRACT-ORCON)
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25X1A
Angola: The Ethnic and Regional Basis of the Political
Movements (U)
Support for political organizations in Angola, as
in other African countries, generally follows ethnic and
regional lines. Each of the three major political move-
ments in preindependence Angola drew most of its support
from a single regionally based tribal group. Little
else is known about the current ethnic and regional
strength of each, now that one has become the recognized
government, another is waging an extensive insurgency,
and the third, for all practical purposes, no longer ex-
ists as a political force in the country. This article,
although admittedly written from sketchy and conflicting
information, assesses the support for each of them. It
is condensed from a longer paper to be published later.
(U)
The Demographic and Ethnic Background
The population of Angola, according to a UN esti-
mate on 1 January, was 6,527,000. Although current in-
formation is lacking, blacks probably make up about 98
percent of the total population, mulattos no more than
2 percent; whites, who composed about 5 percent of the
population prior to Angolan independence in 1975, prob-
ably now total only a few thousand, well under 1 percent.
(U)
The Portuguese, like other colonial powers on the
continent, stressed and encouraged tribal differences.
This policy discouraged a unified resistance to Portu-
guese rule and contributed to the development of the
three liberation groups during the colonial period.
Tribal lines nonetheless have become increasingly blurred,
particularly in urban areas. There are more than 100
distinguishable tribes in the country. Despite the large
number of tribes, more than 90 percent of the black popu-
lation belongs to five major tribal groups--the Ovimbundu,
Kimbundu, Bakongo, Chokwe-Lunda, and Ganguela. The fol-
lowing table gives the approximate percentage of the
total for each of these groups. (U)
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ANGOLA: ETHNIC COMPOSITION*
(U)
Group
Percentage of Total
Numbers
98
6,396,460
Percent of
Blacks
Ovimbundu
36
2,302,000
Kimbundu
27
1,727,000
Bakongo
12
768,000
Chokwe-Lunda
8
512,000
Ganguela
8
512,000
Cuanyama (Ovambo)
1
63,000
Others
8
512,000
Mulattos
2
120, 540
Whites
-
10,000
6,527,000
The Political Movements
Anti-Portuguese liberation movements emerged in Angola
in the early 1950s. By the mid-1960s, they had evolved
into the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
(MPLA), now the governing body in Angola; the National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the
government's major political and military opponent; and
the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA),
now weakened and ineffective. Each drew the bulk of its
support from a single tribal group (Kimbundu, Ovimbundu,
and Bakongo respectively). Portugal, taking into account
the tribal and regional underpinnings of this support
and its own weakened position in the colony following
the Lisbon coup in April 1974, turned Angola over to a
-Percentages of the major black groups are commensurate with their
percentages in the 1950 census, the last census for which tribal
data is available. The figures for the Bakongo are the least re-
liable. Several hundred thousand fled to Zaire (then the Democratic
Republic of the Congo) after an abortive revolt against the Portu-
guese in 1961; data is lacking on the numbers that have since returned.
Numbers for the mulattos and whites are rough estimates. (U)
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25X1 C
government of national unity consisting of the three
movements in January 1975. But they had fought the
Portuguese separately for a considerable period and were
unwilling to submerge their differences; civil war
erupted in mid-1975 and continued after independence in
November of that year. Spheres of influence quickly
developed: the MPLA, which controlled the government,
was also dominant in the Kimbundu heartland in the north-
central region and in the major cities; FNLA, the Bakongo
stronghold in the far north; and UNITA, most of the
south. These areas, which reflect tribal and regional
divisions, have existed for centuries, and have changed
little in the intervening three and a half years since
independence. MPLA and UNITA have both attracted some
support from the Chokwe-Lunda, Ganguela, and Ovambo, and
other minor tribal groups. FNLA has remained essentially
a Bakongo organization. (U)
The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA)
UNITA was formed by Jonas Savimbi, an Ovimbundu and
still the leader, in 1966. He had broken with the FNLA
and its leader, Holden Roberto, in 1964. (U)
The area of UNITA strength encompasses most of the
southern half of the country, except for the southwest
and the major cities. The core of its strength lies in
the densely settled and economically well-developed
Ovimbundu provinces of Huambo and Bie. It draws most of
its secondary support from the lightly populated prov-
inces of Moxico and Cuando Cubango. (U)
UNITA spokesmen claim that it is a nontribal organi-
zation that has the backing not only of the Ovimbundu but
of all other southern tribes as well. MPLA officials,
on the other hand, charge that UNITA is an Ovimbundu or-
ganization and has little support from non-Ovimbundu
tribes. claims
that MPLA officials will privately acknowledge that UNITA
has greater support among the southern tribes than it
acknowledges publicly.) Based on available information,
the UNITA view is more nearly correct; UNITA does draw
significant support from a number of non-Ovimbundu
tribes in the south, especially from the Chokwe-Lunda,
Ganguela, and Ovambo groups. All of these groups have
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been greatly influence by the Ovimbundu over the years.
Southern loyalties unquestionably would favor UNITA, an
indigenous group, over either the MPLA or FNLA, which
are probably considered by most southerners--regardless
of tribal affiliation--as outside organizations. These
loyalties, however, would probably be less pronounced in
the cities where ethnic and regional allegiances have to
a greater extent broken down than in the countryside and
where the MPLA has maintained a presence. (S)
There is little question that most Ovimbundu support
UNITA. One of the three Ovimbundu chiefs claims that
Jonas Savimbi is the only one of the nationalist leaders
who understands the Ovimbundu. Agostinho Neto, he points
out, is foremost a Kimbundu, is married to a white woman,
lived a long time in Europe, and does not care about the
Ovimbundu. The chief's attitude both to Savimbi and to
Neto probably mirrors the attitudes of most Ovimbundu as
well as those of the neighboring tribes who have been
influenced by the Ovimbundu. (U)
A UNITA spokesman has claimed that UNITA has
broadened its ethnic base since the inception of UNITA's
insurgency against the Luanda government. It has inte-
grated its combat units and recruited most of their
strength in the regional commands from local populations.
A US journalist who traveled with UNITA in 1973 and 1977
confirms the spokesman's claims. He observed that UNITA
forces were recruited from 10 or 12 different southern
tribes and that all of the villages and guerrilla camps
that he visited were mixed and included members of the
Chokwe-Lunda and Ganguela tribal groups that predominate
in southeastern Angola. He reported that speeches at
the 1977 UNITA congress were translated from Portuguese
into the Ovimbundu, Chokwe, and Cuanyama (the principal
Ovambo tribe) languages. He also noted, in 1977, that
mulattos composed about 10 percent of the UNITA members
that he interviewed and that there was a sprinkling of
white membership (mostly Portuguese who had married
Ovimbundu women). Two other American journalists who
traveled with UNITA in 1976 also reported that the pop-
ulations in the UNITA camps transcended tribal lines.
(S)
When UNITA was formed in 1966, Savimbi and the other
Ovimbundu who had left the FNLA because it was dominated
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by Bakongo provided the core of the new leadership.
Today, the leadership in UNITA is still predominantly
Ovimbundu, but does include representatives of several
of the other major tribal groups. (There are no known
mulattos in the top leadership.) Among the top leaders,
Jonas Savimbi is an Ovimbundu; Jose Samuel Chiwale, the
Military Commander in Chief, and Jorge Sangumba, the
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, are also believed to be
Ovimbundu; Miguel Nzau Puna, the Secretary General, is
a Bakongo from Cabinda; Waldemar Chidondo, the Army Chief
of Staff, is from Cunene Province and probably a Cuanyama.
Most tribal groups are represented in the leadership of
the regional commands. For example, Antonio Vakulukuta,
leader of the southern front (and also Secretary for
Internal Affairs), is a Cuanyama; the chief of the Moxico
General Staff is a member of the Ganguela tribal group.
A number of UNITA representatives abroad are reported
to be Cabindans and formerly members of the Front for
the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave (FLEC). (S)
Even though the southern cities are under the con-
trol of the central government, UNITA probably has the
greatest tribal following of the three organizations.
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) Conciliation
Commission reported in 1975 that 2.5 million people,
about 40 percent of the total population, supported
UNITA. In 1976, Jonas Savimbi claimed that UNITA had
the support of more than two-thirds of the Angolan pop-
ulation. Based on the sketchy information available to
us on the current demographic and ethnic framework of
Angola and on the extent of tribal support to the three
major nationalist movements, tribal support for UNITA
today probably breaks down as follows: most of the 2.3
million Ovimbundu, probably most of the 512,000 Ganguela,
maybe half of the 512,000 Chokwe-Lunda and the 63,000
Ovambo (Cuanyama). It also draws much support from the
remaining southern tribes (Haneca-Humbe, Herero, Xindonga),
which combined probably number between 300,000 and
400,000. (C)
The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)
The MPLA was famed in 1956 from a merger of smaller
liberation movements. Its major area of operations
against the Portuguese was in Moxico and Cuando Cubango
provinces in the southeast. Today, its strength is in
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the cities and in the Kimbundu tribal area of the north-
west. (Urban areas make up about 15 percent of the total
Angolan population according to the 1970 census.) MPLA
is also dominant in most of the rest of the country north
of the Benguela railroad (except for areas where rem-
nants of the FNLA still operate in the far north) and in
the southwest. The MPLA, however, does not have strong
support and only rudimentary organization in large parts
of these areas, especially in the southwest. (C)
The MPLA draws the bulk of its support from the 1.7
million-strong Kimbundu tribal group as well as from the
urban middle class (including whites, assimilados, and
mulattos). Racial and tribal divisions have been a prob-
lem within the movement since its founding, particularly
between the black rank and file and the predominantly
mulatto leadership. Although President Neto is a Kimbundu
and several of the top-level positions in his government
are held by blacks--mostly Kimbundu but some Bakongo
and Ovimbundu--the black rank and file have charged that
a disproportionate number of positions at all levels of
the government are occupied by mulattos. This dissatis-
faction has resulted in significant racial stresses within
the MPLA. (S)
The token Ovimbundu and Bakongo in the top leader-
ship of the MPLA government do not reflect the tribal
balance of the membership or support. They have been
added to give the leadership better geographic and tribal
balance. Although the MPLA draws some members from non-
Kimbundu tribal groups, including Ovimbundu and southern
Bakongo, the organization has been unable to attract
significant support from UNITA or FNLA tribal areas.
The MPLA, during its fight against the Portuguese, mobi-
lized support from among the eastern tribes--especially
from among the Chokwe-Lunda and Luene (Luvali) and Luchazi
tribes of the Ganguela tribal group; multitribal fight-
ing units were formed. These groups, as well as the
Cuanyama from the south, are still represented in MPLA
units today. But because the MPLA, unlike UNITA, is not
a movement indigenous to the south and east, it is doubt-
ful that the same level of support of the local tribes
for the MPLA has carried over into the postindependence
era. (C)
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National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA)
The FNLA was formed in 1962 from two smaller liber-
ation parties. Once a movement of considerable polit-
ical and military influence, the FNLA has become weak
and relatively ineffective in the past four years. The
FNLA and its predecessor organizations have served pri-
marily as vehicles for the reestablishment of the Bakongo
Kingdom, which had straddled territory in Zaire, the
Congo, and Angola, and had been broken up when the Euro-
pean colonial powers moved into the region several cen
turies ago. Holden Roberto, a Muchicongo from the Bakongo
group, has been the leader of the FNLA since its incep-
tion. Jonas Savimbi, originally one of the leaders of
the Front, left it in 1964 because of its Bakongo paro-
chiality. The FNLA has over the years suffered other
top-level defections, usually over the tribal issue.
The Bakongo led an ill-fated revolt against Portuguese
rule in 1961. They argued that the Bakongo tribal area
was separate from the rest of Portuguese Angola to the
south and that it had been unjustly joined to the rest
of Angola in 1884. The FNLA, even more than UNITA or
the MPLA, is seen by most Angolans as essentially a
tribal association with little support outside of the
Bakongo tribal group. (U)
Conclusions
Based strictly on ethnic considerations (but keeping
in mind that political loyalties don't rigidly follow
ethnic lines), UNITA appears to have the greatest tribal
support of the three organizations. It could probably
reasonably claim the support of about 50 percent of the
population; the MPLA could probably claim about 35 per-
cent; the FNLA, no more than 12 percent. Based strictly
on demography, UNITA and the MPLA appear to be more evenly
balanced: UNITA can claim to dominate most of the country-
side in the populous Benguela Plateau as well as the
lightly peopled southeast; MPLA controls the cities as
well as most of the fairly densely populated northwest
and lightly populated northeast and southwest; FNLA is
influential only in the far north. Because it is not
possible to define accurately the areas under real con-
trol of each of the organizations, we can'only draw a
rough estimate of the popjlations living in the areas of
influence of each group; UNITA, about 45 percent; the
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MPLA, 45 percent; and the FNLA, less than 10 percent.
Taking only ethnic and demographic factors into consider-
ation, UNITA appears to have slightly greater support
than the MPLA. (C) (SECRET)
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25X1A
RHODESIA: AN ANNOTATED CHRONOLOGY (U)
(January 1979)
2 January Rhodesia publishes proposed consti-
tution for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, which
ensures continued white dominance of
the military, police, judiciary, and
civil service, and gives whites 28
seats in the assembly, 10 seats in
the senate, and four cabinet posts.
(U)
8 January Rhodesians attack a Botswana defense
force camp approximately 13 kilometers
from the Rhodesian border. (U)
Dennis Walker is sworn in as new
white Co-minister of Internal Affairs
in the transitional government, vice
Rollo Hayman. Walker was elected to
Parliament in 1974 and served as
Deputy Minister of Education until
April 1978. (U)
8-9 January ZAPU leader Nkomo visits Belgrade and
meets with several party officials.
(U)
8-12 January Chinese Vice Premier Li Xiennian
visits Mozambique and meets with
President Machel and ZANU leader
Mugabe. Mugabe assures Li that ZANU
has no intention of breaking rela-
tions with China in order to obtain
military aid from the Soviet Union.
(S NF NC OC)
9 March 1979
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10 January The first black conscripts report
for training at Llewellin Barracks
near Bulawayo. Only 300 of the ini-
tial 1,500 blacks call up for duty re-
port. Government sources claim that
the new selective service scheme will
produce a new manpower pool of about
25,000 blacks. (U)
12 January Chief Chirau announces he will boy-
cott the April elections unless pri-
vate armies belonging to Bishop
Muzorewa and Reverend Sithole are
disbanded. (U)
12-16 January Chinese Vice Premier Li Xiennian
visits Zambia, meets with President
Kaunda and Prime Minister Lisulo, and
promises to speed the delivery of
Chinese military aid to Zambia. (C)
12-20 January A Patriotic Front delegation led by
Joshua Nkomo visits Hanoi at the in-
vitation of the Vietnamese. ZANU
is not represented in the delegation.
(U)
13 January The Rhodesian Government places 15
more districts under military law,
bringing 90 percent of the country
under martial law. Salisbury and
Bulawayo are the only major cities
that remain unaffected. (U)
17 January British Prime Minister Callaghan re-
ports to Parliament that the Hughes
Mission to southern Africa has con-
cluded that an all-parties conference
would be useless in the immediate
future since a successful outcome
would be unlikely. He added, however,
that the UK would be prepared to call
a conference if developments improve.
(U)
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20 January Chief Chirau calls for a meeting be-
tween the leaders of the transitional
government and the Patriotic Front,
hopefully before the April national
election. (U)
21 January ZAPU guerrillas force down a small
Zambian military plane conducting
aerial surveillance of ZAPU air de-
fenses in the vicinity of Chinuny,
Zambia, about 70 miles east of Lusaka.
(S NF NC OC)
23-29 January ZAPU leader Nkomo visits Moscow. (U)
25-26 January Senior Botswanan and Rhodesian of-
ficials meet in South Africa to dis-
cuss mutual concerns over the increase
in ZAPU operations into Rhodesia from
Botswana. Rhodesian officials say
they might attack concentrations of
ZAPU guerrillas, but not before warn-
ing Botswana. (S NF NC OC)
30 January White Rhodesians approve the proposed
majority-rule constitution by an 84-
percent vote with a 72-percent turn-
out. (U)
31 January ZANU leader Mugabe addresses the Co-
ordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned
Conference, which opened in Maputo on
30 January, and asks for military as-
sistance, including antiaircraft
weaponry. (U) (SECRET NOFORN-NOCON-
TRACT-ORCON)
9 March 1979
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25X1A
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS
IM act on Neighboring Black African States of Chad's
Turmoil (U)*
Chad's future evolution is of growing concern to
surrounding black African states as the long struggle
there between warring Muslim and non-Muslim factions
appears to be becoming increasingly chaotic. Niger,
Nigeria, Cameroon, and Central African Empire are reas-
sessing their vulnerability to instability in reaction
to what they see as the danger of growing fragmentation
in Chad and intensified civil war along racial and re-
ligious lines. (S)
The concern of Chad's neighbors partly reflects a
fear that the conflict there--if it intensifies and
spreads--may generate border security problems and pos-
sibly lead to an influx of refugees. (S)
Bordering countries are worried that the status quo
in central Africa--a bridge between Arab and black Africa--
may be upset by the emergence of a Muslim-dominated regime
in Chad that includes influential Libyan-oriented elements.
(S)
The real underlying anxiety of adjacent states, all
of which have Muslim populations of varying size, is
that they may become more direct targets of Libyan activ-
ism in the future. (S)
Regionally influential Nigeria is seeking to play a
more vigorous peacemaking role in Chad than it has in
many previous African disputes. (S)
-;These key judgments are taken from Impact on Neighboring Black
African States of Chad's Turmoil, RP 79-10121, March 1979. A copy
of the entire text may be obtained from the author.
9 March 1979
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Doubts about French determination to stick it out
in Chad may cause moderate francophone states to look to
the United States to be more responsive to their security
needs and to seek better accommodation with Libya. (S)
(SECRET)
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