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NNatio_nai or Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912A0027000 Assessment Center Africa Review 4 August 1978 ret d 4-NOCONTRACT Secret RP AR 78-001 4 August 1978 Approved For Release 2002/01/30: CIA-RDP79T00912A00270001(0A6-4 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010006-4 Warning Notice Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved (WNINTEL) NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor /Consultants PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved NFIBONLY- NFIB Departments Only ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator REL ...- This Information has been Authorized for Release to ... c 1ul.d by 006266 E- V1 haw Gs Dda&Bcoeon S}.64. E.O. 11652.0iwep nay S.c. 56(15 (2 . d rn Avtanclkoty d.dna.r:d a,: dof. Mpo..~*6 Ic d.ww:n. NFAC publications are available on microfiche. To get a microfiche copy of this publication call_(OCR/DSB); for future issuances in addition to or in lieu of hard copies, call MPPG/RD). Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010006-4 Approved For Release,8p3k9 II RRDP79T00912A002700010006-4 AFRICA REVIEW 4 August 1978 CONTENTS Angola: Pushing the Western Option . . . . . . . . . The Angolan Government has embarked on a ma- jor effort to improve its relations with the West and at the same time has taken steps to reduce threats to its security along its north- ern and southern borders. Sub-Saharan Africa: Slow Economic Growth . . . . . . 5 Most of the nations of sub-Saharan Africa have been unable to generate rapid economic growth in the 1970s as a result of internal political strife, sluggish world demand, persistent drought and mismanagement. This publication was formerly entitled Africa Weekly Review. NOTE: A Supplement to today's edition of AFRICA REVIEW has been published and disseminated in special intelligence channels. This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the Africa Division, office of Regional and Political Analysis, with occasional contributions from other offices within the National Foreign Assessment Center. The Africa weekly focuses on major African issues and their implica- tions. We solicit comments on the articles as well as suggestions on topics that might be treated in future issues. Comments and queries can be directed to the authors of the individual articles or to Chief, Africa Division 25X1A 25X1A Approved For Release 2002/0' /iIA-RDP79T00912A002700010006-4 SECRE Approved For Release 28*6 79T00912A002700010006-4 Benin-Gabon: Dispute Over Beninese Expatriates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Charges by Benin's President of Gabonese in- volvement in raids on his country have pro- voked attacks on Beninese resident in Gabon and Gabonese efforts to deport them. Mali: Traore in Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 President Traore is moving Mali gradually to- ward civilian government and seems assured of election to head the new regime, especially after having strengthened his position by ef- fectively suppressing a coup attempt last spring. ii Approved For Release 2002/0'dg3@p'IA-RDP79T00912A002700010006-4 SECRET Approved For Release jl,@ / C&1tJD79T00912A002700010006-4 25X1A Angola: Pushing the Western Option The Angolan Government has embarked on a major ef- fort to improve its relations with the West. At the same time, it has taken steps on the diplomatic front to reduce threats to its security along its northern and southern borders. The parallel efforts seem aimed at permitting a reduction in Cuban and Soviet military and economic support,. Since President Neto met with Portuguese President Eanes in Guinea-Bissau in late June, Angolan officials have approached a number of West European states and Ja- pan in an effort to establish diplomatic ties and to se- cure economic and technical assistance. The US decision to respond to Angola's invitation to send a high-level delegation to Luanda for bilateral talks and South Af- rica's attack on the South-West Africa People's Organi- zation base at Cassinga last May probably served as major catalysts for this drive. Angolan officials say they are turning to the West in part because they are disappointed by the quality and relatively high cost of technical assistance provided by the Communist states. The Angolans argue that Portuguese technicians could do the same job much more cheaply, and they believe other Western countries could provide a higher degree of expertise at the same or lower prices. The Angolans also suspect that the socialist states-- particularly the USSR--are exploiting Angola's resources. For example, Prime Minister Nascimento told Swedish de- velopment officials last month that the recent fisheries pacts concluded with the USSR and Poland posed major prob- lems for his government, particularly when compared with a much more favorable pact Angola subsequently signed with Spain. The Angolans hope greater Western involvement in their country will not only bring them economic benefits but also enhance the political legitimacy of the govern- ment and increase its flexibility in dealing with the 4 August 1978 Approved For Release 2002/0'HBOREIA-RDP79T00912A002700010006-4 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010006-4 USSR. The Angolans appear to be pleased with the results of Ambassador McHenry's visit to Luanda in late June, and the visit probably encouraged them to push harder on their opening to the West. Despite the substantial Soviet and Cuban commitment to Angola, the economy has not improved, and the military situation has actually deteriorated. So long as Angola must divert most of its resources to the military strug- gle, there is little hope for economic progress. Given the apparent failure of several recent offensives against anti-Neto insurgents, the military establishment may have concluded that the guerrillas cannot be defeated on the battlefield--even with the substantial number of Cuban troops in Angola. The South African incursion last May further underscored the fragility of Angola's security situation despite the Cuban military presence. The Angolans--already concerned by the tensions generated by the substantial foreign presence in their country--may have decided that the answer to their prob- lem was not to ask for more troops but to push for a po-, litical solution. The Cubans may also have balked at the idea of sending more soldiers to Angola. In recent months, the Cubans have come under increasing attack in the nonaligned movement for their African activities, and they may be considering withdrawing some soldiers in order to refurbish their credentials before the non- aligned summit meets in Havana next year. By forcing SWAPO to accept the Western proposals on Namibia, Angola opted for an internationally accept- able solution that should eliminate South Africa as a military threat along its southern border. In the north, the Angolans have begun an effort to neutralize the Katangans as a guerrilla threat in exchange for Zairian promises to pacify the border and to stop aiding anti- Neto insurgent groups. The Angolans doubtless believe that once both bor- ders are relatively secure, insurgent groups operating in- side Angola--particularly Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola--will be cut off from foreign support and will eventually wither away. 4 August 1978 Approved For Release 2002/CM(G9EEIA-RDP79T00912A002700010006-4 Approved For Release 2002/081'tIA-RDP79T00912A002700010006-4 Over the long term, the Angolans may also be counting on growing western involvement with the Neto regime to un- dermine political and military support to UNITA. The Angolans probably also hope that the establish- ment of peace on their borders will allow some Cuban troops to be withdrawn. A Cuban troop withdrawal would not only ease internal tensions, but would greatly fa- cilitate efforts to improve relations with the West. If Neto's current peace initiatives allow a substantial Cuban troop reduction and UNITA's position is suffi- ciently undercut, Neto will be in a much stronger posi- tion to push for a political reconciliation on terms more favorable to his regime. Recent Contacts with the West Angola's desire to promote a more "nonaligned" image was a major theme during EC Commissioner for Development Claude Cheysson's visit to Luanda in early July. Neto had requested that Cheysson visit Angola before the OAU summit in Khartoum. On his arrival, he told Cheysson that although some senior Angolan officials were ideo- logically opposed to an opening to the West, the coun- try's serious economic problems have compelled it to solicit Western economic aid. Neto expressed interest in joining the Lome Conven- tion--which links 53 developing African, Caribbean, and Pacific states to the EC--when the agreement is renego- tiated in 1980. Cheysson indicated that in the interim the EC would be willing to provide some food aid and other limited assistance. In mid-July, Neto instructed the Angolan Ambassador to Belgium to convey to West Germany his desire to normal- ize relations. West Germany is the only EC member that does not have diplomatic relations with Angola, and Bonn is willing to begin negotiations immediately. Several issues, including the presence of a commercial West German rocket launching facility in Zaire, have held up talks in the past, however, and it is unlikely relations will be established in the near future. 4 August 1978 3 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010006-4 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/01/XCA-RDP79T00912A002700010006-4 During a recent visit to Japan, the governor of the National Bank of Angola asked if the Japanese would es- tablish a diplomatic mission in Luanda. He also invited two major trading companies to participate in oil explo- ration activities off Angola's northern coast. The Jap- anese Ministries of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and Industry are reluctant to establish diplomatic relations and grant export insurance to Japanese firms dealing with Angola and consequently have agreed only to study the proposals. The Japan External Trade Organiza- tion which sponsored the governor's visit, has decided, however, to station a permanent representative in Luanda to facilitate commercial transactions. Over the past two months, the Angolans have also: -- Signed a technical assistance agreement with Italy involving the ceramic, lock, and ele- vator industries. -- Approached the Dutch for assistance in the fishing, health, and shipping areas. -- Received a Spanish parliamentary delegation. -- Sent the Minister of Justice and the governor of the National Bank to Italy to discuss eco- nomic assistance. Meanwhile, Angolan and Portuguese officials have been implementing agreements signed at the Guinea-Bissau summit. About 2,000 Angolan refugees in Portugal are now registered to return to Angola; of these, 600 are pre- pared to leave as soon as transportation and financing are arranged. Officials of the Intergovernmental Com- mittee on European Migration estimate that between 4,000 and 5,000 refugees eventually will be authorized to re- settle in Angola and that about half this number can de- part by the end of the year if sufficient funding is found. They estimate that about 15 percent of the ref- ugees are of European origin, 60 percent are African, and 25 percent mulatto. Many are skilled workers. (SE- CRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT) 4 August 1978 4 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010006-4 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/0? ?6 IA-RDP79T00912A002700010006-4 25X1A Sub-Saharan Africa: Slow Economic Growth* Most of the nations of sub-Saharan Africa have been unable to generate rapid economic growth in the 1970s. Economic progress has fallen victim to civil wars and coups, which in turn partly reflect the low level of eco- nomic development. Africa has fallen steadily behind in the competition for export markets. Along with in- ternal political strife, sluggish world demand has hampered sales of nonoil minerals; persistent drought in some areas and widespread mismanagement have cut shipments of cash crops. Achievement of higher growth rates will require substantial increases in foreign aid, greater foreign investment (especially in transport facilities), and a backing off from "indigenization" policies. For most countries, little improvement in these areas is in prospect for the next several years at least. Faltering Economic Growth Since 1970, the aggregate GNP of the sub-Saharan countries has risen only 4 percent a year on average, down from 4.5 percent in the 1960s, and only about 1 percent in per capita terms. Performance would have been much worse--2.8 percent a year--without the strong oil-fueled growth of the Nigerian economy, which now ac- counts for 30 percent of sub-Saharan output. Africa's growth pattern looks particularly weak in contrast to the 6.9-percent annual average of all LDCs in the 1970s. This article summarizes a forthcoming OER Intelligence Report, Economic Trends in Sub-Saharan Africa. In it, the terms "Africa" and "sub-Saharan" are defined to include all continental African countries except South Africa, Namibia, and Arab North Africa-- Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. Also included are the islands of Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Comoros, Reunion, Sao Tome and Principe, and the Cape Verde Islands. 4 August 1978 5 Approved For Release 2002/01/3+,.&RDP79T00912A002700010006-4 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 .: 81 -TDP79T00912A002700010006-4 Growth has lagged across all economic sectors. Al- though food production (outside the Sahel) has risen in most years since 1970, declines in the output of coffee, cocoa, and peanuts have kept agricultural growth at 1.4 percent a year, compared with 3.8 percent in all LDCs. Starting from a very low base, real growth in manufac- turing has come closer to the LDC average--6.7 percent a year versus 7.1 percent. Only a few nonoil minerals have done well, notably bauxite, which has been boosted by a large expansion in Guinea. Both political and economic factors have tended to undercut African economic development in the 1970s: -- The sub-Sahara has suffered from 10 local wars and insurrections during the decade; coups have taken place in 17 countries. The civil war in Angola and the transition to independ- ence in Mozambique have proved particularly damaging economically, leading to sharp drops in output of coffee, cashew nuts, and diamonds. More recently, the Shaba invasion disrupted Zaire's copper and cobalt production and ex- ports. -- The 1973-1974 oil price hikes and global re- cession have sharply reduced sales of major African commodities such as copper and sisal. -- Inflation of import costs, particularly for oil, has forced a number of African countries to introduce austerity measures to cut foreign payments deficits. Overall data mask substantial variations in growth among individual sub-Saharan countries. Nine have boosted national output 5 percent or more annually since 1970. Of these, Botswana, Swaziland, Malawi, and Ivory Coast also have made noticeable strides in spreading income gains among average citizens. In other leading growth states, such as Nigeria and Gabon, prosperity has come as the result of the development of one or two major commodities for export, and the benefits have been con- fined largely to urban areas. 4 August 1978 6 Approved For Release 2002/01/lid -RDP79T00912A002700010006-4 Approved For Release 2002/01/f&EtIA-RDP79T00912A002700010006-4 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: Real GNP Growth Trends (Average annual rates) US? 20 Mallawi- I t iopla f1 der' {.ia is NI`pei a?.?- umea RFodesia " ` Eeso[ o am is " Iberia ,' . aqua' uganca Zaire ur ROV."" riAat.. C'am rbi Th` hod2 Kenya?Y,, Liberia upper `-Congo,' PR. 1{enya Mozambique Sierra LLdne Tanzania ' Bi tswana:" Gabon IvoryCoast Mauritania Swa"ziland Togo "Guinea Ivory Coast Mauritius ""[Vigavia J Rwanda Countries experiencing average growth of less than 3 percent a year generally have suffered from political turmoil, a dearth of natural resources, or, in the case of the Sahel, repeated drought. Falling Behind in World Markets Many of the same economic and political factors that have suppressed growth have cost Africa world market shares in the 1970s. Growth in export volume averaged only 2 percent in 1971-1977. It may be even lower this year; copper exports in particular are suffer- ing, reflecting not only production problems at home but also stiff competition of low-cost producers. Variable production costs for copper, for example, average more than 60 cents a pound in Zambia compared with 50 cents in Chile. Among agricultural exports, peanuts registered the steepest drop in market share--from 72 percent in 1969- 1971 to 49 percent in 1975-1977. The falloff mainly 4 August 1978 7 Approved For Release 2002/01 MA-RDP79T00912A002700010006-4 Approved For Release 2002/01/3(PFMTRDP79T00912A002700010006-4 reflects the impact of drought and disease on major pro- ducers, particularly Nigeria. Formerly the world's lead- ing exporter of peanuts, Nigeria has been forced to im- port peanut oil for the past two years. The only dynamic element in the region's trade has been the sharp rise in petroleum exports--of benefit principally to Nigeria--which at $11 billion in 1976 ac- rounted for nearly one-half of total African exports. Terms of Trade, Trade Balances, and Foreign Debt: A Mixed Bag The number of African countries that have gained from shifts in the terms of trade in the 1970s about matches the number that have lost. At the extremes are those benefiting from oil price increases (Nigeria, Gabon, and Angola) versus those hit by declining copper prices (Zambia and Zaire). Copper-producing Zambia and Zaire have been in arrears on import payments for sev- eral years, severely damaging their international credit ratings. Sudan's growing deficit is requiring bailout aid from the International Monetary Fund. Despite the plight of the big terms-of-trade losers, sub-Saharan Africa's foreign debt amounts to only $15 billion, less than 10 percent of the non-OPEC LDC total. Zaire, Zambia, Sudan, and Gabon account for nearly one- half. Except for these countries, the debt service ratios of the African countries remain well below the 15-percent average for all LDCs. Foreign Economic Role Still Strong Low debt service ratios partially reflect the high proportion of grants and concessional aid in inter- national assistance--more than four-fifths of the $5 billion received by Africa in 1976. Africa now receives twice as much foreign economic aid per capita as the average for all less developed regions--$14 versus $7. Although most is used to develop and maintain infrastruc- ture and social services, in recent years a growing pro- portion has been required to cover foreign exchange def- icits. Development Assistance Committee members remain 4 August 1978 8 Approved For Release 2002/01/,A4-RDP79T00912A002700010006-4 Approved For Release 2002/01~~EIA-RDP79T00912A002700010006-4 the largest aid donors; resource flows from OPEC coun- tries have recently been growing. The francophone coun- tries absorb the biggest share of the aid, accounting for 40 percent of the total. The stock of foreign private investment has in- creased in the 1970s, while the role of foreign manpower has decreased: -- The biggest investment jumped has occurred in Nigeria, where the stock of foreign capital has more than doubled since the mid.-1960s due to the oil boom; in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, the value of investment has risen by 60 percent. -- Foreign manpower has decreased steadily in almost all major countries except Nigeria, Gabon, and Ivory Coast; in Angola and Mo- zambique, where fear of political turmoil drove out the great majority of the Portu- guese, the foreign presence has been drasti- cally reduced. Outlook The chronic problems of political turmoil, inex- perience in economic management, inadequate real capi- tal, and rapid population growth will continue to hamper African development. Where political factors remain stable, the small markets and generally unskilled and poorly educated populations will continue to stand in the way of the large-scale investment needed to stimulate development on a broad front. Meanwhile, the continued sluggishness of the developed economies will limit de- mand for African products and could dim prospects for an expansion of economic aid. Given the slow growth in available industrial jobs and the continued population explosion, the proportion of subsistence farmers is not likely to fall much below 80 to 90 percent in the next decade. 4 August 1978 9 Approved For Release 2002/092Ef.IA-RDP79T00912A002700010006-4 Approved For Release 2002/01 ROTA-RDP79T00912A002700010006-4 In particular, the stable political conditions needed to foster steady economic progress are likely to be lacking. The outlook for southern Africa is espe- cially dim because of the black-white confrontation. Tensions in the Horn are unlikely to abate much in the near future, and hostilities between Chad and Libya and among Mauritania, Morocco, and Algeria could escalate. Given the sub-Sahara's record to date, coups can be ex- pected in any number of countries. (CONFIDENTIAL) 4 August 1978 10 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010006-4 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/011% A-RDP79T00912A002700010006-4 25X1A Benin-Gabon: Dispute Over Beninese Expatriates Members of the Beninese community residing in Gabon were harassed and beaten by Gabonese last month. Gabo- nese anger was aroused when the media played up charges made at the recent OAU summit by Mathieu Kerekou, Benin's radical leftwing President, that Moroccan and Gabonese mercenaries had conducted raids into Benin in January 1977. The Gabonese attacks probably had the tacit ap- proval of Gabon's President Omar Bongo, although he con- tinues to disclaim any responsibility for the incidents. Bongo has ordered the repatriation of the Beninese re- siding in Gabon because he claims he can no longer guar- antee their personal safety or security. The Gendarmerie attempted to protect the expatriate community, but Beninese homes were systematically ran- sacked and gutted, and many Beninese were injured. Ex- tensive damage also occurred when an outraged crowd, ac- cording to press reports, looted and destroyed roughly 80 percent of Libreville's central market, where many Beninese work. Repatriation The repatriation of the Beninese nationals has de- veloped into a king-sized headache for Bongo. More than 4,000 Beninese awaiting deportation are reported to have sought police protection. These individuals have been temporarily settled in a secondary school near the air- port. Transportation difficulties have hindered the op- eration. According to the Gabonese Foreign Minister, Gabon is unable to use its own aircraft to transport the returnees. Gabon has made several requests for transport assistance, but the Ivory Coast and Togo--as well as other West African countries--refuse to become involved in the dispute. US assistance was also solicited but denied. 4 August 1978 11 Approved For Release 2002/01/3% Ii gRDP79T00912A002700010006-4 Approved For Release 2002/01/38EQ11 RDP79T00912A002700010006-4 Luanda N I G E R I A EQUATORIAL / GUINEA ( Prrnoips % SAo TOME PRINC E IPE * $Bo Tomb SAo Tom! Boundary representation to not necesaanty, authontatixe 4 August 1978 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 ? 61A-RDP79T00912A002700010006-4 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/03Eif2E'CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010006-4 France has agreed to help and on 31 July sealifted about 450 Beninese to Cotonou. France will provide ad- ditional sealifts if there is no opposition from Kerekou, who may doubt the loyalty of the expatriates and may not permit all of them to return to Benin. Another 300 are reported to have made their own arrangements to return to Benin. Bongo's worries are not over. A total repatriation of the Beninese community could create problems for Gabon's economy. Gabon is dependent on many services provided by the Beninese. Libreville's principal bakery, for example, is primarily staffed by Beninese and was unable to supply bread to the city during the recent disturbances. Because of Gabon's reliance on the ex- patriates, Bongo has relaxed his decision to repatriate all Beninese and agreed to allow political refugees, doctors, teachers, engineers, and Beninese who have Gabonese citizenship to remain in the country. Bongo may also face the problem of granting citizenship to the Beninese rejected by Kerekou. Outlook The actions against the Beninese have hurt Bongo's position in the international arena. In addition to the criticism Gabon has received for its complicity in the mercenary raid against Benin, Gabon will now be cited as a violator of human rights by Africa states. Bongo's attitude probably will be considered by other Africans as evidence of his support for the raid. Bongo's ire against Kerekou plus his move to repatriate the Beninese community sharply contrast with his past performance on similar matters--he intervened on behalf of Ugandan dis- sidents and Western journalists in the Central African Empire last year--and will probably raise serious doubts about the validity of his statesmanlike image. The repercussions of Kerekou's accusations far ex- ceeded his intentions--he probably only wanted the 1977 mercenary raid addressed officially in an international forum--and he did not expect the hostile reaction by the Gabonese or Bongo's orders to repatriate the Beninese community. French participation in Gabon's efforts to transport Beninese nationals to Cotonou may arouse more 4 August 1978 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 3 CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010006-4 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/01/ ck -RDP79T00912A002700010006-4 'WR African concern about external intervention in a purely African controversy. This will be a particularly sensi- tive issue for Kerekou; he also accused Paris of involve- ment in the 1977 coup attempt. (CONFIDENTIAL) 4 August 1978 14 Approved For Release 2002/ 0~ .aIA-RDP79T00912A002700010006-4 Approved For Release 2002/oA E lA-RDP79T00912A002700010006-4 25X1A Mali: Traore in Control President Moussa Traore, head of the 10-year-old military government of Mali, has long favored a return to civilian rule. A 1974 constitutional revision pro- vides for the transition to be made in five years with the ruling Military Committee to retain control until that time. Preparations for the new government has thus far proceeded smoothly. There is to be a single ruling party--the Democratic Union of the Malian People (UDPM)-- for which local units have already been established. Traore has substantial popular support and is likely to be elected to head the new civilian government. Traore has tried to defuse potential problems by emphasizing open dialogue with all segments of the popu- lace. His efforts to create a national youth movement have paid off. In late June, the first congress of the National Union of Malian Youth was held. Debates were lively and candid, and in his concluding remarks, Traore praised the spirit of the attendees. He hopes that by achieving some degree of collaboration with the usually restive youth, chances for disruption during the coming months will at least be minimized, and perhaps a con- structive coalition will evolve. Traore is apparently serious about seeking popular support. In June, he sent the Interior Secretary to each of the regional capitals to hold town meetings, and he has solicited complaints and suggestions for im- proving the lot of the citizens. Meanwhile, Traore appears to have further strength- ened his position as a result of his strong and effective action in the wake of an abortive coup attempt last spring. He has carried out a widespread purge of those implicated, and his main adversary, the corrupt former Defense Min- ister who led the coup attempt, is in jail along with 4 August 1978 15 Approved For Release 2002/0J1(R-,IA-RDP79T00912A002700010006-4 Approved For Release 2002/01/3je 4-RDP79T00912A002700010006-4 the other two coup principals, the Ministers of Security and Transportation. The coup failed mainly because of the plotters' lack of security and coordination. Some of the lesser figures implicated in the coup plot were given reprieves but moved to different jobs. The purge offered Traore the opportunity to revamp the civil service and install some younger, well-educated technocrats. Some of those transferred were given better positions. Immediately following the initial arrests, Traore assumed the portfolios of the three deposed ministers. He has since relinquished the security and transportation portfolios, but retains responsibility for defense. A new ministry has been created to help Traore with some of his expanded responsibilities. (CONFIDENTIAL) 4 August 1978 Approved For Release 2002/01/16: CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010006-4 SECRET Secret Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010006-4 Secret Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010006-4