AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010009-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 18, 2004
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: August 18, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

National
pfMOO Fo Release 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP79T00912AO0270
Assessment
Center
Africa Review
Supplement
18 August 1978
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AFRICA WEEKLY REVIEW
SUPPLEMENT
18 August 1978
CONTENTS
Somalia: Prospects for Political Stability. . . . . 1
The internal political situation in Somalia
has become increasingly unstable since the
country's defeat in the Ogaden war, and, if
President Siad cannot attract outside sup-
port, the prospects are better than even
that he will be overthrown.
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Wash-
ington community by the Africa Division, Office of Regional and
Political Analysis, with occasional contributions from other of-
fices within the National Foreign Assessment Center. The Africa
weekly focuses on major African issues and their implications. We
solicit comments on the articles as well as suggestions on topics
that might be treated in future issues.
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Somalia: Prospects for Political Stability
The internal political situation in Somalia has be-
come increasingly unstable since the country's humiliat-
ing defeat at the hands of Soviet- and Cuban-backed
Ethiopian forces in the Ogaden war. The war enjoyed
widespread popular support and generated a strong spirit
of national unity, but the forced withdrawal of Somali
regulars in early March has exacerbated and exaggerated
the basic tribal, regional, and ideological conflicts in
Somali politics and society.
Somali President Siad's most fundamental problem
has been to demonstrate his ability to restore confidence
and direction to Somali politics in order to dampen the
destabilizing forces at work in the country and the Army
in the wake of the Ogaden conflict. To accomplish this,
however, he believes he must attract significant foreign
support to prove to his critics that he is firmly in
control and that Somalia is not friendless and isolated.
The internal situation promises to remain unsettled
until and unless Siad can compensate for his rejection of
Soviet patronage by attracting major political and military
support from Western and conservative Arab states. Fail-
ing this, the prospects are better than even that the
Somali leader will be overthrown by a successor military
regime that might be willing to permit at least a limited
restoration of Soviet influence in Mogadiscio in return
for appropriate security guarantees.
Somali President Siad is probably more politically
vulnerable now than at any time since he came to power
nearly a decade ago. Siad's internal base of support
has, over the past six months or so, been significantly
weakened by:
-- Somalia's military debacle in the Ogaden,
for which many Somalis hold him respon-
sible.
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-- Somalia's inability to establish a major
arms supply relationship with some rela-
tively generous source, such as the US,
West European, or conservative Arab states,
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-- A resurgence of tribal dissidence, high-
lighted by the abortive coup staged in
Mogadiscio last April.
Siad is a tough and shrewd political operator, how-
ever, and should not be counted out easily, whatever
his difficulties. The Somali leader has made a number
of moves to insulate himself from hostile elements in-
side and outside Somalia. Among other things, he has:
-- Supported a continuation of the Ogaden in-
surgency as a means of assuaging Somali
national pride in the wake of the with-
drawal of Somali regulars and demonstrat-
ing his unshakable commitment to Somali
irredentism.
-- Skillfully exploited the attempted coup
of 9 April to purge real and potential
opponents in the Somali military, polit-
ical, and security apparatus.
-- Embarked on a series of high-visibility
trips to China, Western Europe, and the
Arab world to plead Somalia's case.
These measures have given Siad some breathing space
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I is efforts to oam substantial supp ies
o arms rom non-Soviet sources to rebuild Somalia's
weakened and demoralized Army continue to founder, this
alone could lead to his ouster.
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The situation would be further compounded if, by
continuing and/or increasing his support for guerrilla
activity in the Ogaden--particularly in the form of re-
newed attacks against the vital Addis Ababa - Djibouti
railroad--Siad invited major Ethiopian retaliatory
moves ag forces could not
handle. r7
Under such circumstances and barring the unlikely
introduction of friendly Arab troops to bail out Siad's
forces, the Somali President would run the strong risk
of being deposed. A successor military regime might
look to Moscow for help in restraining the Ethiopians
and securing Somalia's borders in return for the restora-
tion of at least a limited degree of Soviet influence
in Mogadiscio.
Siad must also contend with the same longstanding
tribal tensions that helped spark the 9 April uprising
and that have been greatly exacerbated by the trials
of coup plotters and alleged sympathizers currently
under way in Mogadiscio. There is a strong probability
that the National Security Court will mete out the death
penalty to virtually all of the 150 or so defendants.
Large-scale executions will almost certainly create a
serious tribal crisis that could result in widespread
bloodletting and Siad's eventual undoing.
Siad may decide to grant clemency in most of the
cases in order to reduce tension, but this too could
rebound to his disadvantage by making him appear weak
and indecisive in the eyes of powerbrokers from his
own tribe on whose support he depends.
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