AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010035-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2002
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: March 30, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

National
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Assessment NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-
Center ORCON
Africa Review
Secret
RP AR 79-012
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National Security
Information
Dissemination Control
Abbreviations
STATOTHR
STATOTHR
Intelligence Sources
and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions
NOFORN (NF)
NOCONTRACT(NC)
PROPIN (PP)
NFIBONLY (NO)
ORCON (OC)
Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants
Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
NFIB Departments Only
Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
This Information Has Been Authorized for Release to...
FGI
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on microfiche.
To get a microfiche copy of this
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(PPG/RD).
Foreign Government Information
Derivative classification by 035653
Review 20 years from date
Derived from multiple
All material on this page
is unclassified.
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NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON
AFRICA REVIEW (U)
30 March 1979
CONTENTS
Rhodesia: Ndebele Electoral Strategies (U). . . . .
Leaders of the minority Ndebele ethnic
group in Rhodesia are concerned that a
growing polarization of blacks along
tribal lines will lead to an attempt
by the Shonas to exclude them from a
meaningful role in the government
elected next month. (S NF NC OC)
Zaire: Killing the Goose That Lays the
Copper Eggs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Zaire's economic, and to a lesser degree,
political fortunes, have traditionally
fluctuated in the same direction as
world prices for its leading mineral
exports--copper and more recently cobalt.
(S)
Soviet Leaders Comment on Africa (U) . . . . . . . . 6
In a recent round of speeches on the
occasion of the Supreme Soviet elec-
tion, Soviet leaders played down Afri-
can issues in Soviet foreign policy.
(U)
Note: A Supplement to today's AFRICA REVIEW has been published
and disseminated in special intelligence channels.
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China-Zambia: Military Assistance (U) . . . . . . . 8
China hopes that by increasing its
military assistance to Zambia this
year, Zambia will be less likely to
seek more aid from the USSR, 25X1C
25X1C M (S NF NC OC)
25X1 C
FOR THE RECORD (U) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
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Rhodesia: Ndebele Electoral Strategies (U)
Leaders of the minority Ndebele ethnic group in
Rhodesia are concerned that a growing polarization of
blacks along tribal lines will lead to an attempt by
the Shonas--who make up about 75 percent of the black
population--to exclude them from a meaningful role in
the government elected next month. Joshua Nkomo, the
leader of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU),
may call for a total Ndebele boycott of the election to
demonstrate Ndebele solidarity both within Rhodesia and
with his guerrilla group. (S NF NC OC)
Ndebele leaders, including Chief Ndiweni who broke
ranks with black coleader Chief Chirau last November to
form his own Ndebele-based party, are aware of recent
approaches black coleader Bishop Muzorewa's represent-
atives have made to leaders of the Zimbabwe African
National Union (ZANU). They are concerned that Muzorewa
may succeed in drawing ZANU leader Mugabe or a signif-
icant number of his guerrillas into a Shona-based co-
alition after the April election. As part of this
strategy, they expect the new government of national
unity to concentrate its military operations against
ZAPU guerrillas in Zambia, as it tries to attract ZANU
guerrillas back into the internal government. (S NF NC
OC)
Although Chief Ndiweni is likely to win no more
than 15 of the 72 black seats in the House of Assembly,
he hopes to improve his party's position by gaining
ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo's endorsement. Ndiweni has
tried to contact Nkomo through intermediaries on several
occasions to explore possible Ndebele electoral strategies.
In mid-March, Dr. Elliott Gabellah, a Ndebele and a con-
fidant of Ndiweni, met with Nkomo in Nairobi to ask
that the guerrilla leader instruct Ndebeles inside Rho-
desia to vote as a bloc for Ndiweni's candidates. He
argued that this would create a stronger Ndebele bloc
in the new Parliament. Gabellah had belonged to black
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coleader Sithole's party, but after learning earlier
this month that Sithole would not place him on the
party's list of candidates contesting seats for Par-
liament he decided to leave the party and stepped down
as Cominister for Foreign Affairs in the transitional
government. (S NF NC OC)
Nkomo reportedly rejected Gabellah's request, argu-
ing instead for a boycott that he believed would show
Ndebele rejection of the new government of national unity
and demonstrate Ndebele solidarity inside Rhodesia with
his guerrilla group. Even if Ndiweni agreed to support
a total boycott, it probably would not succeed, given
the mounting pressure from the government and other black
parties to turn out the vote. Moreover, vote totals from
what traditionally have been considered Ndebele districts
are likely to be offset by the votes of Shonas living
in cities located in these districts, such as Bulawayo
and Wankie. (S NF NC OC) (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-
ORCON)
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Zaire: Killing the Goose That Lays the Copper Egg (U)
Zaire's economic, and to a lesser degree, political
fortunes, have traditionally fluctuated in the same di-
rection as world prices for its leading mineral exports--
copper and more recently cobalt. Much of this mineral
wealth comes from Zaire's estranged Shaba region and is
produced by GECAMINES (General Mines and Quarries Com-
pany),* Zaire's largest mining company and the financial
backbone of the government. Over the years, however,
Kinshasa's political interference in the company's opera-
tions has increasingly diverted GECAMINES' financial
and managerial resources away from the mining business
and lowered the company's administrative and technical
competence. Unless these practices are changed, the
fortunes of GECAMINES and the government will continue
to decline. Even with major reforms, GECAMINES would
have difficulty maintaining adequate production levels,
at least over the short term. (S)
Shaba
Shaba region, the center of GECAMINES'--and Zaire's--
mining operations, is plagued by serious economic, polit-
ical, and social problems that Shabans blame on the
neglect and indifference of the Mobutu regime. Kinshasa
has assigned GECAMINES the responsibility for underwrit-
ing a number of socioeconomic programs that are normally
under government control; Shabans see this as an example
J,GECAMINES was created in 1967 by the nationalization of its
Belgian-owned predecessor, Union Minere du Haut Katanga, and until
1972 it enjoyed a monopoly over copper and cobalt production. The
company is still the largest single contributor to Zaire's revenue
and export earnings. This article is the first of a planned series
on GECAMINES and the important role it plays in Zaire. (S)
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of government indifference toward the region. In addi-
tion, economic aid to Shaba goes to GECAMINES and eventu-
ally finds its way to the regional authorities. (C)
This policy places strains on GECAMINES' administra-
tive and financial resources. The company receives an
allocation of only about 38 percent of its earnings, and
a good share of this is siphoned off to pay for imported
consumer luxuries and other nonessential imports. From
these funds, the company must purchase essential imports,
pay salaries, and finance other operating costs. In
addition, the company underwrites food distribution and
other essential services for Shaba's urban population.
These include such diverse activities as keeping hospitals
running, repairing university buildings, paying hotel
foreign exchange costs, and supporting the local trans-
portation system. (C)
The Shaba Maize Operation
GECAMINES has handled the distribution of Shaba's
important staple, maize, since 1974. The company buys
maize either from foreign sources or local merchants and
converts it to flour in one of three company-owned mills.
The flour is then sold to private wholesalers for resale
or to various companies for distribution among their
employees. GECAMINES' hard currency earnings finance
maize imports, and the company must absorb the losses
when the margin between the suppliers' price and the
wholesale selling price does not cover the milling costs.
Because the costs of purchasing and milling the maize
are usually greater than the state-controlled price of
flour, GECAMINES' flour milling operations take much
needed revenues away from its corporate foreign exchange
needs. In 1977, for example, the company lost over $5.5
million as a result of maize operations. (C)
Personnel Policies
Expatriate employees have always played a major role
in the technical and financial management of GECAMINES
and in long-term policymaking. Government control of
GECAMINES operations, however, has expanded sharply in
the aftermath of the second invasion of Shaba by ex-
Katangan gendarmes in 1978. Following the invasion, a
large number of expatriates left Shaba; many were either
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fired or subsequently refused to return. In addition,
the government instituted a new policy substituting short-
term contracts for career employment. The effect of
these decisions was to replace skilled expatriates with
less adequately trained Zairians. If carried out for an
extended period, these personnel changes could hurt the
company's profits. (C)
Reform
In early 1978, Charles Picquet, a Belgian with con-
siderable managerial expertise, was hired as administra-
tive director of the company. Picquet's program to im-
prove production and profits was unacceptable to Mobutu:
it would have ended government interference in the com-
pany's financial operations and expanded the managerial
role of expatriates. Furthermore, the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) made Picquet's
reform policies the quid pro quo for releasing funds to
carry out GECAMINES' ambitious expansion program. Picquet
was fired in February. (C)
Picquet's dismissal indicates that Mobutu is not yet
ready to undertake necessary administrative reforms. In
addition, the IBRD has held up further negotiations on
loans for GECAMINES. Without the loans, the production
of copper and cobalt will not expand to previously
anticipated levels in coming years and may well continue
to decline. There are indications that Mobutu has
softened his objections to IBRD insistence on reform in
GECAMINES, but Mobutu has a long history of reversing
himself when it suits him. There is still a good
possibility that Kinshasa will continue to divert
GECAMINES' resources to the detriment of the company's
financial needs. (S) (SECRET)
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Soviet Leaders Comment on Africa
The recent round of speeches by Soviet leaders on
the occasion of the Supreme Soviet election tended to
play down African issues in Soviet foreign policy. US-
Soviet relations, China, and events in Indochina easily
overshadowed African affairs in this year's speeches,
although Africa fared better than the Middle East and
Latin America.
Economic aspects of the Soviet-African relationship
were given cursory treatment by all of the leaders. Pre-
mier Kosygin, for example, simply noted that the Soviet
Union proposes to continue development of its economic
relations with a "wide range of countries, including the
developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America"
and the West. Other speakers ignored the subject or
treated it as briefly as Kosygin did. Soviet performance
in economic development is frequently criticized by Afri-
can leaders and the offhand treatment of the subject by
Soviet leaders suggests that significant change is not
likely in the near term.
The leaders were a bit more generous in dealing with
political matters, and there were a few interesting vari-
ations in their treatment. Senior secretary Suslov waxed
eloquently on the rapid growth of "liberation forces"
over the last five years and was the only leader to de-
clare that "new states of socialist orientation have
emerged." In this category he included Angola, Mozam-
bique, Ethiopia, Benin, and Afghanistan. The significance
of Suslov's statement should not be exaggerated, but it
is worth noting that he alone included Benin, one of
the West African states Moscow apparently sees as a sub-
stitute for Guinea where Soviet influence and access
have been declining since mid-1977.
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Party secretary Kirilenko, who represented the
Soviet party at the Angolan party congress in 1977,
noted only that an "anti-imperialist revolution" had
triumphed there and in Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Afghan-
istan. Party secretary Ponomarev, who has responsibil-
ity for relations with nonruling parties and has a repu-
tation for favoring aggressive involvement in sub-Saharan
Africa, took the same line as Kirilenko. Ponomarev did
claim, however, that the number of states following the
socialist path had increased; he said socialist Vietnam
is "developing successfully." Foreign Minister Gromyko
welcomed the "revolutionary-democratic transformation
being carried out in Angola and Ethiopia, Afghanistan,
and South Yemen."
General Secretary Brezhnev failed to characterize
regimes at all; he noted only that the peoples of Africa,
Asia, and Latin America had gained "new victories" in their
"struggle for national and social liberation," which he
claimed imperialists are trying to crush. Alone among
Soviet leaders he mentioned friendship treaties con-
cluded with Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Afghan-
istan, claiming that they are an "important feature
of our time." These are not military alliances,
according to Brezhnev.
Brezhnev went on to reaffirm Soviet support for the
"liberation struggle" in Zimbabwe, Nicaragua, South
Africa, Namibia, and Iran. He pointedly failed to
mention any specific group in the Zimbabwe situation
despite recent Soviet efforts to boost ZAPU's Joshua
Nkomo, coleader of the Patriotic Front, as the natural
leader of an independent Rhodesia. Affirmations of
continued support for liberation movements were echoed
by other leaders who addressed foreign policy issues,
but Ponomarev was alone in rejecting attempts "to
force us to abandon the very foundations of Leninist
internationalist policy" and to blame the Soviet Union
for developments in Africa, Afghanistan, Iran, and
elsewhere.
30 March 1979
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China-Zambia: Military Assistance (U)
China hopes that by increasing its military assist- 25X1C
ance to Zambia this year, Zambia will be less likely to
seek more aid from the USSR,
Zambian President Kaunda has been
under strong domestic pressure to improve defenses against
Rhodesian crossborder raids. The USSR has offered a
$200-million military assistance program for a reorgani-
zation of the armed forces along Soviet lines. The
Zambians presumably have not accepted this offer; they
distrust Soviet motives and do not want a large foreign
military presence in their country. (S NF NC OC)
The Chinese first delivered arms to Zambia in the
early 1970s and by 1977 had become a major source of
military assistance. Initial shipments consisted of
artillery and small arms, but in 1977 China agreed to
provide more advanced equipment. Chinese aid will be
continued and expanded under a new agreement signed in
January. (S NF NC OC)
Under the 1977 agreement is acquired its 25X18
first supersonic jet aircraft-INWF-6 fighters, the
Chinese version of the MIG-19--and two MIG trainers, all
of which were delivered last year. Zambia also acquired
its first tanks--M Type-59 medium tanks, the Chinese
version of the T-54--which began arriving in February.
In addition, China delivered early-warning radars, which
have been installed at Lusaka airport and Mumbwa military
airfield. (S NF NC OC)
Under the aid agreements, China currently has about
40 military personnel in Zambia. Some serve as advisers
to Zambia's compulsory military training program; others
are involved in assembling Chinese equipment, providing
training in its use, and building military facilities.
The new agreement does not call for any Chinese advisers
to be stationed permanently in Zambia; most Chinese per-
sonnel are brought in on a temporary basis to perform
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specific projects. Since at least early 1977, several
hundred Zambian military personnel have also received
training in China on aircraft, radars, and ground forces
equipment. (S NF NC OC)
Zambia may have worked out a secret deal with the
Chinese to furnish cobalt in return for the assistance.
Zambia, which is short of hard currency, apparently has
entered into a contract to supply 25 tons of cobalt per
month to China in circumvention of existing contracting
procedures. Last year the Soviets offered to exchange
military aid for cobalt, but the Zambians rejected the
plan. (S NF NC OC) (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)
30 March 1979
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FOR THE RECORD (U)
SEYCHELLES: President Rene is concerned over the
possibility of a coup attempt by former President Mancham.
He recently requested Tanzanian assistance for his secu-
rity force but was turned down. His decision to announce
a new constitution on Monday, which will confine domestic
political activity to a government-controlled, one-party
system, was apparently timed to curtail domestic opposi-
tion from Mancham's supporters. Mancham, who is in Lon-
don, is exploring the possibility of launching a coup
and hopes to form an effective opposition from disgrun-
tled civil servants and members of the traditional elite.
His prospects for success in the near future are slim,
however, given his limited number of supporters and Rene's
new restrictions. (S NF NC OC) (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-
ORCON)
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Secret
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