AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010037-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2002
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: April 6, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

National c
"Oor Release 2002/01/30: CIA-RDP79T00912A0027000T0ffiF--0
Assessment -orr'RN-? )(OA I R11 (T-
Center ORC ` ' \
Africa Review
Secret
PA AR 79-01?
6 .1 pri l 1979
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AFRICA REVIEW (U)
6 April 1979
CONTENTS
Zambia: Coping With the Guerrillas (U) . . . . . .
Although there are no signs Zambian Presi-
dent Kaunda is wavering in his support of
ZAPU or its leader Nkomo, he is concerned
that the group's growing presence will make
his country more susceptible to Rhodesian
attack, aggravate tensions in his defense
forces, and add to popular resentment of the
guerrillas. (S NF NC OC)
South Africa: Increasing Alienation of Urban
Blacks (U) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The South African police have recently
stepped up their harassment of Soweto
residents, and some local leaders be-
lieve a new confrontation may be develop-
ing between young people and the police.
(C)
Zaire: Government Changes (U). . . . . . . . . . . 5
The recent Cabinet shuffle is unlikely to
help Mobutu come to grips with the coun-
try's myriad problems nor does it portend
great changes in Zaire's relations with
its Western donors. (S)
Central African Empire: Growing Troubles for
Bokassa (U) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Emperor Bokassa faces growing opposition
from disaffected military men and other
segments of the population resentful of
the decline in urban living standards
brought on by Bokassa's extravagance.
(S NF NC OC)
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Zanzibar-Tanzania: What Fate for Jumbe? (U). . . .
14
Tanzanian President Nyerere has been hint-
ing that he will step down from office,
but it is unlikely that he will do so be-
fore the 1980 elections. (U)
Ethiopia: Status of the Eritrean Movements (U) . .
17
Neither major Eritrean liberation move-
ment has made significant progress toward
unity, and this has fueled dissatisfaction
among the movement's supporters with their
leaders. (S NF NC OC)
RHODESIA: AN ANNOTATED CHRONOLOGY (U). . . . . . . 20
FOR THE RECORD (U) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS
Rhodesia: Looking Beyond the April
Election (U) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Somalia: Shift in Tactics in the
Ogaden (U) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
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Zambia: Coping With the Guerrillas (U)
In recent weeks, Zambian President Kaunda has taken
several steps to limit the size of Zimbabwe African Peo-
ple's Union (ZAPU) forces in his country. Although there
are no signs Kaunda is wavering in his support of ZAPU
or its leader Joshua Nkomo, he is concerned that the
group's growing presence will make his country increas-
ingly susceptible to Rhodesian attack, further aggravate
tensions within his defense forces, and add to the grow-
ing popular resentment of the guerrillas. (S NF NC OC)
Last month Kaunda denied Botswana permission to air-
lift some 9,000 military-aged ZAPU recruits from refugee
camps in Botswana to Zambia in part because he was con-
cerned the aircraft might be shot down by the Rhodesians
or attacked on the ground in Lusaka. The Rhodesians
threatened to take such action against a similar airlift
in February, and as a result, the airlift was suspended
after some 3,200 recruits were transported to Lusaka.
The Rhodesians subsequently attacked the recruits' staging
area in Zambia. Kaunda also is concerned that a contin-
uing influx of ZAPU recruits will further aggravate Zam-
bia's economic and security problems and increasingly
threaten the government's ability to maintain law and
order. (S)
Kaunda has instructed the Zambian military to co-
operate fully with ZAPU efforts to outfit, transport,
and infiltrate large numbers of guerrillas into Rhodesia
to disrupt the coming election. The Zambians have set up
special coordinating committees in every military district
to facilitate the rapid movement of thousands of guerril-
las to the Rhodesian border, and the military has agreed
to assist ZAPU in defending these forces against antici-
pated Rhodesian attacks. In the past, the Zambians pro-
vided only logistical support, transportation, and some
training to the ZAPU guerrillas. (S NF NC OC)
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The Zambians' inability to defend themselves against
Rhodesian air attacks has created frictions between Zam-
bian Army and Air Force officers. Army officers claim
that the Air Force is unwilling to risk lives or equip-
ment to repel Rhodesian air attacks. Air Force officers
maintain that the Army is trying to cover up its inability
to counter the Rhodesians effectively on the ground. Such
frictions reportedly are hampering efforts to coordinate
their defenses. (S NF NC OC)
Late last month, relations between the two services
were even further strained when it was reported that a
Zambian jet fighter was shot down by a Zambian artillery
regiment as it was making its approach at Livingstone air-
port. The Air Force maintains it sent Zambian and ZAPU
units in the area the standard signal advising them of
the flight. Some have suggested, however, that the plane
might have been brought down by the Rhodesians after it
was intentionally sent across the border to test Rhode-
sian air defense capabilities. (S NF NC OC)
The substantial ZAPU presence in Zambia has also
become a public hazard. As a result of recent Rhodesian
raids, many guerrillas have become increasingly trigger-
happy when coming in contact with "suspected Rhodesian
spies"--particularly white farmers. As the Rhodesians
increase the number and accuracy of their raids, many
black Zambians have also come to suspect their white
neighbors as spies, leading to a general deterioration
in race relations. (C)
A large number of guerrillas have deserted their
camps, and as a result the number of attacks on white
and black Zambians in rural areas has increased signifi-
cantly in recent months. Zambian journalists and politi-
cians have increasingly criticized such lawlessness, but
there is little Zambian authorities or ZAPU leaders can
do to control the renegade guerrillas. On those oc-
casions when the police have arrested guerrillas for
specific violations of the law, ZAPU leaders have pro-
tested. They want the dissident guerrillas turned over
to them for disciplinary action, but the police often
have resisted such requests. (S NF NC OC) (SECRET NO-
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South Africa: Increasing Alienation of Urban Blacks (U)
The South African police have recently stepped up
the harassment and intimidation of Soweto residents, and
some local leaders believe that a new violent confronta-
tion may be developing between young people and the police.
Soweto, the black township of over 1.5 million on the out-
skirts of Johannesburg, was the focal point of riots that
swept South Africa nearly three years ago. (C)
Bishop Desmond Tutu, the black secretary general of
the South African Council of Churches who warned the gov-
ernment in the spring of 1976 of impending violence in
Soweto, believes that the hectoring methods used by the
police to enforce the pass laws that control blacks in
white areas of South Africa are again raising the level
of hatred and bitterness in blacks to a point that could
lead to violence and bloodshed. At a recent press con-
ference the Bishop urged senior South African Cabinet and
security officials to halt the intensified security sweeps
before blacks become more radicalized. (C)
Privately, Bishop Tutu speculates that the police
may be deliberately provoking the Soweto community to
cause confrontations that will ferret out some of the
more radical Marxist-oriented youths whom they believe
have infiltrated the township during the past year. The
Bishop believes that growing numbers of young South Afri-
can blacks are turning to Marxist theory, although he is
not sure if those who have recently arrived in Soweto
have any connection with the exiled African National Con-
gress, the main South African liberation group. (C)
Sheena Duncan, head of the Black Sash, the white
volunteer organization that provides legal aid to blacks
who run afoul of the pass laws, has confirmed that the
Soweto police have recently doubled the number of arrests
for infractions of the influx control regulations. Dun-
can has a unique perspective on this situation as she has
spent most of her life working for the Black Sash, which
her mother founded. Duncan believes that the October
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1977 government security crackdown on moderate black
leaders and organizations has convinced young residents
of Soweto that nonviolent opposition to the government
is futile. She thinks that the black consciousness
movement is losing its relevance among young urban blacks
because of its basically passive philosophy. (C)
The leading moderate spokesman for Soweto, Dr. Ntatho
Motlana, has surmised that the government is probably try-
ing to intimidate and humiliate what he characterizes as
the "spirit of revolt" in the black community. Motlana
concedes, however, that the pass raids are also intended
to clamp down on urban terrorists. (C)
The police are making no secret about mounting
searches for those without proper documentation. They
often give advance notice of roadblocks, thus allowing
would-be terrorists or guerrillas to evade them. This
practice lends credence to another theory that the gov-
ernment may be trying to find as many illegal sojourners
as possible in Soweto. Up to half of the township's pop-
ulation may not have the proper documentation for resi-
dence there, and shipping them back to the "homelands"
provides an easy way to cut the high employment rate and
relieve Soweto's severe housing shortage. (C)
All of these reasons have undoubtedly contributed
to the government decision to police Soweto so heavily;
whatever the basic intention, the result will be to
further embitter urban blacks. Tensions in Soweto do
not appear to have reached the level that precipitated
the violence three years ago, although the black commu-
nity is visibly disturbed by the police actions. (C)
The situation at present in Soweto underscores the
basic contradiction in South Africa's domestic policy.
On the one hand, the government regularly proclaims to
black leaders that new consultation programs are being
developed so that white government leaders can make poli-
cies with blacks rather than for blacks; on the other
hand, the actions of the security forces are futher
alienating the black community, particularly the young,
and thereby destroying any hope for developing common
interests between blacks and whites. (C) (CONFIDENTIAL)
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Zaire: Government Changes (U)
Mobutu's 6 March Cabinet shuffle came at a time of
growing domestic and international speculation that the
President was in danger of losing effective control of
the country. The shakeup may have been designed to coun-
ter such speculation by portraying Mobutu as a firm ex-
ecutive still in control of Zaire's political machinery.
In any event, it is un-
likely to help Mobutu come
to grips with the coun-
try's serious social, po-
litical, and economic
problems nor does it por-
tend great changes in Za-
ire's relations with its
Western donors. (S)
Perhaps the most sig-
nificant change was the
rehabilitation and rein-
statement of Nguza Karl-I-
Bond as Foreign Minister.
In late 1977 he was found
guilty of knowing about,
and failing to report.,
rebel plans for the 1977
Shaba invasion and was
sentenced to death for
high treason. (The sen-
tence was later sus-
pended.) The President
probably engineered
Nguza's temporary polit-
ical demise in order to
undercut his popularity
Nguza Karl-I-Bond, Foreign Minister (Unclassified)
and remove a political rival.* Nguza's reappointment
as Foreign Minister is probably an effort by Mobutu to
*Nguza, a Shaban and a member of one of the Lunda royal families,
was once seen as the man most likely to succeed Mobutu.
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woo Western donors. Nguza is widely respected among
Zairians and expatriates for his considerable talent,
and he will be a welcome change from his apparently less
competent predecessor. Nguza probably is chastened by
his personal and political ordeal, however, and is un-
likely to be as dynamic and effective as he was in the
past. (C)
Mobutu said publicly that he had rehabilitated Nguza
because he was impressed by his humility and sincere re-
pentance. Mobutu probably hopes the rehabilitation of
Nguza and the appointment of another Shaban, Kibassa
Maliba, as Minister of Sports and Leisure, will help ease
the strain between Shaba and his regime. Most Shabans,
however, are more interested in greater economic atten-
tion from Kinshasa than in Nguza's return, and it is
doubtful that they will see it as a pro-Shaba move. More-
over, Kibassa's portfolio is not a very promising spot
from which significantly
to improve relations be-
tween Kinshasa and Shaba.
Some Shabans were moved
to make sarcastic comments
about the utility of hav-
ing any Minister of Sports
and Leisure in a country
with Zaire's problems. (C)
Political Manipulation
Bo-Boliko Lokonga, Prime Minister (Unclassified)
The selection of Bo-
Boliko Lokonga as Prime
Minister in the recent
shakeup illustrates Mo-
butu's skill at political
manipulation. Bo-Boliko
is more highly respected
and competent than his pred-
ecessor, but the post is
probably largely honorific.
Mobutu assured him he would
have wide authority and
that Mobutu would withdraw
to his estate Gbadolite
for six months a year, but
Bo-Boliko remains unconvinced.
(C)
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By appointing Bo-Boliko, a longtime critic of gov-
ernment corruption and leader of the Legislative Council,
Mobutu can appear to be liberalizing his regime while
simultaneously co-opting a critic. Bo-Boliko has strong
labor support and still exerts considerable influence
over the labor movement. Mobutu, always wary of potential
rivals, may be trying to neutralize Bo-Boliko's consider-
able political talents and at the same time have in place
a useful scapegoat should the country's economic and po-
litical deterioration continue unabated. (C)
The Legislature
The selection of
Ileo Songo Amba to re-
place Bo-Boliko as Presi-
dent of the Legislative
Council was probably in-
tended to weaken that
body. Ileo, who is Per-
manent Secretary and
spokesman of the Politi-
cal Bureau, is honest and
intelligent, but he is
not as aggressive as Bo-
Boliko and prefers to re-
main in the background.
(C)
Over the past year,
Zaire's Legislative Coun-
cil has become increas-
ingly vocal in its criti-
cism of the regime. Sev-
eral members of the Coun-
cil have provoked con-
frontations with the
President, and it has be-
come the focal point of
opposition to the Mobutu
government. The body's
Cleo Songo Ambo President, Legislative Council
(Unclassified)
interpellation of ministers has encouraged those who
would like to see Zaire move toward a more parliamentary
government. Mobutu has recently become increasingly
annoyed with the legislature because it has gone so far
as to imply criticism of Mobutu himself. (S)
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Impact on the Economy
One potentially significant change in the economic
hierarchy was the appointment of Sambwa Pida Nbagui as
deputy director of the Presidency. Sambwa was dismissed
from his position as governor of the Bank of Zaire in
1977 for having argued too forcefully in favor of strict
controls over government spending. If Sambwa is allowed
freedom of action, the International Monetary Fund may be
able to count on more effective support from the Presi-
dency in its attempt to bring economic reform to Zaire.
(S)
Other shifts in the economic sphere--shuffling port-
folios at the Bank of Zaire and the Ministries of Finance,
Energy, Land Affairs, and Labor--appear to be little
more than another turn of the political carousel. The
shift of Bofossa W'amb'ea Nkose from the Bank of Zaire
to the Finance Ministry could facilitate the work of the
UN Development Program comptroller and the Belgian cus-
toms team expected to work there. Bofossa's replacement
at the Bank, Emony Mondaga, might be less amenable to
cooperation with Erwin Blumenthal, the expatriate bank
director. (C)
The General Security Council
In another move on 6 March, Mobutu created the Gen-
eral Security Council and placed it under his direct con-
trol. The organization apparently is charged with cen-
tralizing and reviewing all information relative to the
security of Zaire, and recommending new security measures.
Any decisions the council makes will be enforced only
after presidential concurrence. (U)
The council will be headed by Seti Yale, the former
head of the National Documentation Center, Zaire's secu-
rity organization. The council comprises almost all agen-
cies involved in national defense and security. Four of
the eight council members are from Mobutu's home region
of Equateur, continuing a recent trend toward greater re-
liance by Mobutu on members of his own and neighboring
regions to fill key national security positions. (S)
The creation of the security council suggests that
Mobutu is increasingly concerned about the vulnerability
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of his regime. The President apparently believes that
the United States and other Western governments are will-
ing to provide an advantage to his opponents by not in-
forming him of their activities in a timely fashion. On
two separate occasions when US representatives provided
Zairian officials with information on potentially de-
stabilizing activities of Mobutu's opponents, the Zairians
were already aware of the information. These incidents
may have added to Mobutu's suspicions that the United
States was hedging its support for Mobutu. (S) (SECRET)
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Central African Empire: Growing Troubles for Bokassa (U)
Emperor Bokassa, Chief of State of the Central Afri-
can Empire, faces growing opposition to his regime. Dis-
affected troops reportedly launched an abortive coup on
25 March at the Emperor's palace in Berengo. A day later
in Berberati, approximately 100 miles west of the capital
of Bangui, antiregime riots broke out and demands were
made for the Emperor's abdication. (S NF NC OC)
Government officials believe the abortive attempt
in Berengo was mounted by military leaders loyal to
Colonel Sylvester Yangongo, who was arrested in mid-March
on charges of plotting to oust Bokassa. Although Bokassa
maintained the loyalty of his military establishment dur-
ing antigovernment disturbances last January, the activi-
ties of Yangongo and his cronies suggest that the Emper-
or's grip on the country's security forces may be weaken-
ing. (S NF NC OC)
The Army reportedly is now dissatisfied with Bokassa's
failure to implement promised military reforms and pay in-
creases. The military, along with other important seg-
ments of the population, also deeply resents the decline
in urban living standards that has resulted, in part, from
the Emperor's extravagance. (S NF NC OC)
Significantly, Bokassa, who will probably face more
serious opposition in the months ahead, will be forced to
rely increasingly on the military to suppress major chal-
lenges to his rule. The violent antigovernment disturb-
ances in Bangui last January brought sharply into focus
the regime's precarious position and may encourage Central
Africans to defy the Emperor and register their dissatis-
faction. Given the public mood, widespread demonstrations
could be sparked by even a minor incident. (S)
As Bokassa's military support seems to be weakening,
it is unlikely he can count on his traditional foreign
backers in a crisis. The French, unhappy with Bokassa's
unpredictable rule, which they view as precarious and
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Central African Empire
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confronted with almost universal opposition, are becom-
ing increasingly reluctant to bail him out. Zairian
President Mobutu is also upset with Bokassa for publi-
cizing unsubstantiated reports that Zaire dispatched
troops to support the Emperor during the January riots.
(S) (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)
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Zanzibar-Tanzania: What Fate for Jumbe? (U)
For the past several years Tanzanian President
Nyerere has hinted that he would like to step down from
the presidency and devote himself to party affairs and
ideology. Nyerere's plans are still unclear, but it is
unlikely that he would step down before the elections
in 1980. Although there is no designated successor,
Vice President Aboud Jumbe, a native of Zanzibar, has
generally been regarded as the heir apparent in the event
of Nyerere's death or resignation. Jumbe, however, has
so far generated little popular enthusiasm on the main-
land, and his standing on Zanzibar is becoming increas-
ingly shaky. Zanzibaris now see him as willing to give
in to Nyerere's determination to eliminate Zanzibar's
distinctiveness from the mainland. (U)
Aboud Jumbe presenting membership cards to new Party members at the
Diamond Jubilee Hall in Dar es Salaam. As Party Vice President, Jumbe is
involved in Party politics, but his press coverage is limited and suggests that his
role is primarily ceremonial. (Unclassified)
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Because of Tanzania's electoral process, Jumbe's
chances of becoming President are less dependent on his
regional political base than on his popularity within the
Revolutionary Party (CCM) and among the voters.* If
Nyerere steps aside in 1980, the Tanzanian constitution
provides that an electoral conference of the CCM must
convene to select a single candidate to replace him. In
Jumbe's case, the mainland-dominated CCM would be more
inclined to choose another mainlander, unless Nyerere
chose to use his influence to ensure Jumbe's succession.
In any case, the nominee is subject to a "yes" or "no"
vote from the voters, the vast majority of whom are main-
landers. If the nominee does not receive a majority of
positive votes, the Electoral Conference must choose
another candidate. (U)
Jumbe's standing with the CCM may be slipping. He
was absent from the political scene between early Sep-
tember 1978 and January 1979, ostensibly for medical
treatment. Since his return, media coverage of his ac-
tivities has emphasized the ceremonial rather than the
political aspects of his position. At the same time,
coverage of Prime Minister Edward Sokoine and Minister
of Defense Rashidi Kawana has increased.** (C)
Although Jumbe is chairman of the Revolutionary
Council on Zanzibar, he spends much of his time on the
mainland and leads Tanzanian delegations to international
meetings and state visits. Since the Revolutionary
Council has no deputy chairman, the Zanzibari government
barely functions during Jumbe's frequent absences.
Zanzibaris resent this inattention to the island's af-
fairs and blame it for many of their chronic problems,
particularly food shortages. Commodity prices continue
*In February 1977, Nyerere's Tanganyika African Union (TANU) and
Jumbe's smaller Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) merged to form the Revo-
lutionary Party (Chama Cha Mapunduzi--CCM). (U)
**Kawawa was once considered Nyerere's logical successor, but grad-
ually lost ground to Jumbe. In Nyerere's Cabinet shuffle in Feb-
ruary 1977 Kawawa's position of Second Vice President was abolished,
and he was replaced as Prime Minister by former Defense Minister
Sokoine. (U)
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to climb, incomes remain low, and Zanzibar's separate
foreign reserves are seriously depleted. In a rare meet-
ing with Zanzibari ministers and officials last December,
Jumbe threatened to dismiss them if the local economic
situation did not improve. He also sparked resentment
among the population by announcing that the island's
economy would be incorporated with that of the mainland
when Zanzibar's three-year plan expires in 1981. This
coincides with the expiration date of Tanzania's five-
year plan. (S NF NC OC)
Last summer dissatisfaction over Jumbe's leadership
was so great that Zanzibari military leaders were dis-
cussing ways to remove him from office. In addition,
the military resent the way he has dismissed or sent to
the mainland talented Zanzibari leaders and forced Zan-
zibaris to contribute to Tanzania's military effort in
Uganda. Public criticism of Jumbe is now widespread.
(S NF NC OC)
Nyerere favors having a Zanzibari vice president
as a symbol of a united republic, but in light of Jumbe's
poor standing with the CCM and the voting population and
his declining popularity on Zanzibar, Nyerere may not
endorse Jumbe to become the next President of Tanzania.
Even if the Revolutionary Party did choose Jumbe as the
presidential candidate and the voters approved, he would
not enjoy the trust or supply the strong personal leader-
ship that Nyerere does. (U) (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-
ORCON)
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Ethiopia: Status of the Eritrean Movements (U)
Since the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the
Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) reaffirmed last
January their intention to unite, neither group has made
much progress on the national level toward achieving this.
goal. Limited cooperation on the local. level within
Eritrea continues, although it is hampered by a lick of
quidan,:e from the national leadership. The inabidty of
the leaders to achieve unity continues to fuel di:;satis-
.faction among ELF and EPLF forces and supporters within
Eritrea. (S NF NC OC)
Ahmed Mohammed Nasser, leader of the ELF, blamed
the lack of progress toward unification on the more
Marxist EPLF, whose leaders failed to return to Eritrea
from Khartoum to work out the details of the agreement
with their followers. The EPLF, on the other hand, has
criticized the ELF's lack of military support and co-
operation during recent Ethiopian attacks. The constant
squabbling among the leaders continues to adversely af-
fect the troops in the field. Resentment toward the
leadership of both guerrilla movements may lead to moves
to unseat them. (S NF NC OC)
Despite the problems between leaders of the ELF and
EPLF, limited military cooperation has occurred between
their respective forces in Eritrea. ELF units located
near EPLF areas of operation, particularly around the
town of Nakfa, have been providing rear-guard support,
releasing EPLF units for deployment to other areas.
Both sides have also been sharing supply routes into
Eritrea from Sudan. (S NF NC OC)
The third Eritrean liberation movement, the small
Eritrean Liberation Front/Popular Liberation Forces
(ELF/PLF), is presently troubled by a leadership strug-
gle. In late March, pro-Iraqi members of the organiza-
tion's Central Committee launched a tribally-based coup
attempt to oust the moderate leader, Osman Saleh Sabbe.
The dissident elements--apparently with Iraqi support--
6 April. 1979
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or*
Nakfa
Massaro:
IN
R40"Im
Red
lea
6 April 1979
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A.mara1 % t`
Saudi Arabia
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were prepared to pursue a merger with the ELF, which
had been rejected by Sabbe. At present Sabbe appears
to have blunted the efforts of the dissidents, primarily
as a result of help from the Sudanese, who have denied
the rebels access to ELF/PLF facilities. The Sudanese
have no desire for fighting on their territory and do
not want the Eritreans to become further fragmented.
Khartoum also realizes that, although Sabbe may be dif-
ficult at times, he is an important moderate Eritrean
leader who must be dealt with. (S NF NC OC)
Continuing internal troubles have contributed to
the ELF's decline as a major Eritrean movement. Since
January, the 15,000-man ELF regular force has been re-
duced by defections, casualties, and low morale to a
total of 10,000 to 12,000, augmented by a 12,000- to
15,000-man militia. Despite its problems, the ELF re-
mains active in the Eritrea-Sudan border area, keeping
the Ethiopians bottled up in the population centers; ELF
forces have downed several transport aircraft with SA-7
surface-to-air missiles. Its forces have also been ac-
tive around Asmara, the provincial capital, and along
supply routes south of the city. (S NF NC OC)
The EPLF, with approximately 25,000 armed regulars,
has successfully defended Makfa and Karora--the last
towns held by the insurgents--against repeated heavy
government attacks. According to a number of reports,
they have inflicted heavy losses on the Ethiopians, both
in men and equipment. Although most of the EPLF forces
engaged in the fighting have resigned themselves to the
eventual loss of Nakfa and Karora, morale is high and
they remain committed to the Eritrean cause. In an ef-
fort to weaken Ethiopian morale and disrupt supply lines,
a number of successful attacks have been conducted
against Ethiopian outposts and positions around Keren,
Asmara, and Nakfa. (S NF NC OC) (SECRET NOFORN-
NOCONTRACT-ORCON)
6 April 1979
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25X1A
RHODESIA: AN ANNOTATED CHRONOLOGY (U)
(16-31 March 1979)
16 March A Zambian jet fighter is reportedly
accidentally shot down by Zambian
antiaircraft artillery near Living-
stone, further aggravating relations
between the Army and Air Force.
25X1C suggests, however,
that the plane might have been
brought down by the Rhodesians after
it was intentionally sent across the
border to test Rhodesian air defense
capabilities. (S NF NC OC)
16-17 March Rhodesian aircraft launch their
third and fourth attacks into Mozam-
bique within a week, the first strik-
ing at a large munition depot near
Dondo, about 40 kilometers north of
Beira, and the second hitting a
ZANU camp near Chimoio. (U)
16-29 March Prime Minister Ian Smith visits
South Africa and receives an honor-
ar de ree in Cape Town. Smith meets
on 25 March with South
A rican Prime Minister Botha
tedly
also offer-s Rhodesian assistance
to ensure the new government's sur-
vival. (S NF NC OC)
6 April 1979
25X1 C
25X1 C
25X1 C
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Secretary of State Vance and UK For-
eign Secretary Owen issue formal
statements calling on the Rhodesian
Government to agree to UN-supervised
elections as a precondition for lift-
ing sanctions. ZAPU leader Nkomo
strongly denounces the new initiative;
Prime Minister Ian Smith, Bishop
Muzorewa, and Reverend Sithole later
reject the statements. Only Chief
Chirau reacts positively, supporting
an immediate all-party conference.
(U)
The Rhodesian Government announces
amnesty for guerrillas who defect
before the election, allowing them
to keep their arms. About 1 million
leaflets announcing the program will
be dropped from airplanes over areas
where the guerrillas are known to
be operating. (U)
Zambian President Kaunda denies
Botswana permission to airlift some
9,000 ZAPU recruits from refugee
camps in Botswana to Lusaka in part
because he is concerned the Rhode-
sians might shoot the plane down or
attack it on the ground in Lusaka.
Kaunda is also concerned about the
economic and security burdens such
an influx of recruits would pose
for Zambia. (C)
20-26 March ZAPU leader Nkomo continues his
West African tour soliciting sup-
port from the leaders of Sierra
Leone, Senegal, the Ivory Coast,
and Cameroon. Senegal's President
Senghor gives him permission to
open an office in Dakar and agrees
to provide some training for ZAPU
personnel. (C)
6 April 1979
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A major oil depot just outside of
Beira, Mozambique is attacked,
causing about $3 million in damage.
The electrical supply line to Beira
is also cut, but power is restored
later in the day. The Mozambique
National Resistance Movement claims
responsibility for the attacks; the
Mozambique Government initially at-
tributes the attacks only to "the
enemy," but later states that Rho-
desian saboteurs are responsible.
(U)
The Executive Council makes Prime
Minister Ian Smith Grand Commander
of the Order of the Legion of Merit--
the country's highest civilian dec-
oration. Rhodesian officials say
the granting of the award is not an
indication of Smith's imminent re-
tirement. (U)
The Rhodesian Government issues of-
ficial emigration figures showing
a net loss of 592 whites in February--
compared with 1,073 in January. This
is the smallest loss since March 1978,
when 471 whites departed. White
emigration rose dramatically last
fall, peaking at 2,771 net departures
in December, but most whites now are
willing to wait and see whether the
new government is likely to survive.
(U)
Reverend Sithole calls for an all-
party conference to end the guerrilla
war. He doubts Bishop Muzorewa will
give him a post in the new government
and may be seeking to improve his
standing with ZAPU leader Nkomo.
(S)
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Guerrillas derail a train carrying
Zambian copper en route to South
Africa at Plumtree, near the Bot-
swana border. It is the worst inci-
dent on the line since Zambia re-
opened the southern route last
October. (U)
Zambian defense forces and ZAPU go
on 24-hour alert at the end of the
month in anticipation of major Rho-
desian air and ground attacks against
ZAPU guerrillas massing in southern
Zambia for infiltration into Rho-
desia to disrupt the election.
(S NF NC OC) (SECRET NOFORN-
NOCONTRACT-ORCON)
6 April 1979
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FOR THE RECORD (U)
GHANA: Plans by the military to return Ghana to
civilian rule in July may be deferred until next January.
Representatives of most of the country's 16 recently
formed political parties met last week with Head of
State General Akuffo and asked that the scheduled trans-
fer of power be delayed for six months. The present
timetable calls for civilian presidential and parliamen-
tary elections to be held on 18 June, but party leaders
maintain that more time is needed to select candidates
for public office, raise election funds, and organize
campaigns. Although General Akuffo took no action, he
left the door open for postponement of civilian rule
at the request of the constituent assembly, a partly-
elected representative body that is supposed to complete
its review of the country's civilian constitution by
mid-April. (C)
The regime believes it cannot unilaterally defer
civilian government without opening itself to charges of
trying to perpetuate military rule. The July turnover
was set by the Akuffo government last summer shortly
after it ousted unpopular junta leader General Acheampong.
After six years of military misrule under Acheampong, the
populace probably favors a swift return to civilian gov-
ernment. A six-month postponement of civilian rule
would enhance the prospects of stringent economic re-
covery measures instituted by the Akuffo government
which, under a civilian administration, will be more
vulnerable to interest group pressure. The electorate
would also have more time to familiarize itself with
Ghana's emerging civilian politicians and constitutional
structure. (C) (CONFIDENTIAL) OPA, 25X1A
NIGERIA: Head of State General Obasanjo reportedly
stated during his annual budget message on 31 March that
national elections leading to civilian rule next October
will be held sometime between July and September. This
is the first official pronouncement on the timing of
elections, although the dates and sequence of the elec-
tions have yet to be determined by the ruling military
council. Late last month the federal electoral commis-
sion publicly affirmed its plans to hold five separate
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elections over a period of five to seven weeks. The
contests--not necessarily in this order--would be for
state legislative assemblies, state governors, the fed-
eral house of representatives, the federal senate, and
the federal presidency. The final voter register totals
some 48.3 million voters. The regime had hoped to hold
elections this spring, but the timing has slipped pri-
marily because of logistics shortcomings on the part of
the federal electoral commission. (C) (CONFIDENTIAL)
25X1A
6 April 1979
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25X1A
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS
Rhodesia: Looking Beyond the April Election (U)*
The election later this month of a black-led gov-
ernment of national unity in Rhodesia will bring sub-
stantial pressure on the United States and United King-
dom to recognize the new government and lift economic
sanctions. The Rhodesians will make an all-out effort
to ensure adequate security and a large turnout for the
election. Although the Zimbabwe African National Union
and the Zimbabwe African People's Union will try to dis-
rupt the election, neither guerrilla group will be able
to prevent it from taking place. (S)
Bishop Muzorewa is the most likely candidate to
emerge as the head of the new government. He will seek
to consolidate his position by strengthening his rela-
tionship with the whites, establishing greater control
over the countryside, and inducing defections from ZANU
and ZAPU. He may try to split the guerrillas further
by offering to strike a separate deal with ZANU or ZAPU.
We doubt, however, that the white leaders will show
enough flexibility to allow Muzorewa to propose a deal
acceptable to either guerrilla leader. (S)
The election of a new government, coupled with a
continuation of the fighting, will create some hard
choices for those states most closely involved with the
Rhodesian problem. The frontline states will continue
to support the guerrillas, but an intensification of
the fighting could force some presidents into an open-
ended commitment to an increased Soviet and Cuban pres-
ence in their countries. The frontline states might
also have to consider the possibility of supporting one
guerrilla group against the other in the event of a
civil war. (U)
*These key judgments are taken from Rhodesia: Looking Beyond the
April Election, PA 79-10172, April 1979. A copy of the assessment
may be obtained from the author. (U)
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If the Soviets and the Cubans continue to favor
ZAPU over ZANU, they risk alienating Tanzania and Mo-
zambique, which would like to see more support given
to ZANU. If they agree to support both groups, however,
they could become involved in a civil war. If Nkomo
makes a separate deal with the Salisbury government,
they might find themselves forced to throw their support
behind ZANU. (U)
The United States and United Kingdom must decide
whether to recognize the newly elected government and
lift economic sanctions. A positive decision would
strengthen the position of the new government, but pro-
voke a hostile reaction from black African leaders out-
side Rhodesia. A negative decision would undercut the
viability of the new regime, but not deter the frontline
states from supporting further efforts to reach a nego-
tiated settlement. (U)
Rhodesia is not likely to be a major issue in the
impending British election campaign, given the para-
mountcy of domestic concerns and the reluctance of the
Conservative Party to commit itself prematurely to any
set policy. The Conservatives, who stand a good chance
of coming to power, would prefer not to get out in
front of the United States on this issue, and--at least
initially--are not likely to announce dramatic depar-
tures from current government policy. There will be
mounting pressure within the party, however, to give
at least tacit recognition to the internal regime and
to lift sanctions--particularly by November when sanc-
tions come up for renewal in Parliament. A Tory govern-
ment might be emboldened to act sooner if Congress voted
to lift US sanctions, Prime Minister Smith stepped down,
Soviet and Cuban involvement in Africa increased mark-
edly, or there was a major escalation of the fighting.
(S NF)
Prospects for a successful all-parties conference
or agreement on the part of the internal government to
UN-sponsored elections are dim. Short-term prospects
are for a continuation of the stalemate, particularly
now that South Africa has promised to provide support
to the new government. The fighting certainly will
continue, providing expanding opportunities for the
Soviets and the Cubans. (S NF) (SECRET NOFORN)
6 April 1979
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25X1A
Somalia: Shift in Tactics in the Ogaden (U)*
The Somali Government has recently reduced its
military support to the guerrilla forces in Ethiopia's
Ogaden region to meet conditions laid down by the United
States and other Western countries for badly needed arms
support. It is clear, however, that President Siad Barre
has not renounced Somalia's extraterritorial claims on
its neighbors, but is only lowering the level of con-
flict until its armed forces are rebuilt. Once this has
been achieved, Siad will be in a position to resume the
struggle to unify the Somali people. (S NF NC OC)
In making this tactical shift, Siad reportedly has
the support of his military and the agreement of the
insurgent leadership. This lessens greatly the possi-
bility of an adverse reaction from the armed forces.
Siad has maintained his control over the guerrillas,
covered his tracks at home, and is prepared to increase
military support to the insurgents when he believes the
timing is right. In spite of periodic tactical shifts,
one of the key goals of Mogadiscio's national policy
will continue to be unification of the Somali people by
whatever means necessary. (S NF NC OC) (SECRET NOFORN-
NOCONTRACT-ORCON)
*These key judgments are taken from Somalia: Shift in Tactics in
the Ogaden, RP 79-10165, March 1979. -A -copy of the assessment may
be obtained from the author. (U)
6 April 1979
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