AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010038-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2002
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: April 13, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

:r cc
pi' or Release 2002/01/30: CIA-RDP79TO0912A0027000100etNOCONTRACT-
Assessment ORCON
Center
Africa Review
Secret
PA AR 79-014
13 April 1979
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STATOTHR
STATOTHR
National Security
Information
Dissemination Control
Abbreviations
Intelligence Sources
and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions
NOFORN (NF)
NOCONTRACT (NC)
PROPIN (PP)
NFIBONLY (NO)
ORCON (OC)
REL...
FGI
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Review 20 years from date
Derived from multiple
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NOFORN-NpCONTRACT-ORCON
AFRICA REVIEW (U)
13 April 1979
CONTENTS
Rhodesia: Sithole's Prospects (U) . . . . . . . . .
Reverend Ndbaningi Sithole is fighting an up-
hill battle to maintain his political credi-
bility in the face of heavy competition from
his rival, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, who is likely
to head the government of national unity to
be installed in late May or early June. (S)
Rhodesia: Election Timetable (U). . . . . . . . . . 5
South Africa - US: Deteriorating Relations With
the United States (U) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
The expulsion of US diplomats on 12 April
makes clear that the short period of South
African good will toward the United States
that followed Secretary Vance's visit to
Pretoria last fall is over and that the
South African Government has reverted to
the anti-US posturing that marked the 1977
parliamentary election campaign. (S)
Black Africa: Relations With Israel (U) . . . . . . 9
An Israeli delegation headed by Ehud Auriel,
an adviser to Foreign Minister Dayan, report-
edly was well received in Ivory Coast, Ghana,
Liberia, and Togo during a recent official
visit, but no promises were made to reestab-
lish diplomatic relations. (C)
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Seychelles: Rene's Fears of a Coup (U). . . . . . . 12
The hastily arranged port call at Victoria
of a Soviet Kresta-I class cruiser on 10 April
was probably prompted by Seychellois President
Rene's fears of an externally mounted coup
attempt, and could portend closer relations
between Moscow and Victoria. (S NF NC OC)
Nigeria: Election Scheduling Problems (U) . . . . . 14
Head of State Obasanjo's recent announcement
that state and national elections will take
place at weekly intervals between July and
September is the latest indication that Lagos
has little appreciation for the immense lo-
gistical problems involved in conducting a
reasonably efficient election. (S)
FOR THE RECORD (U) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
ABSTRACT OF RECENT PUBLICATION
A New Government for Uganda (U) . . . . . . . . 18
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Rhodesia: Sithole's Prospects (U)
Reverend Ndbaningi Sithole is fighting an uphill
battle to maintain his political credibility in the face
of heavy competition from his rival, Bishop Aben Muzorewa,
who is likely to head the government of national unity
to be installed in late May or early June. Sithole is
concerned that he will be excluded from the government
if, as seems likely, his party fails to make a good
showing in the national election next week. In the hope
of improving his electoral prospects, particularly among
members of the Ndebele ethnic group, Sithole last week
said his party would support bringing guerrilla leader
Joshua Nkomo into the new government as president. (S)
Sithole's party is expected to win no more than 20
of the 100 House of Assembly seats next week, and he has
little hope of being considered a serious candidate for
prime minister. His only chance, and a slim one at that,
is to join a coalition with the whites, Chief Ndiweni,
and Chief Chirau. Given recent indications of Muzorewa's
growing strength and the difficulties Sithole would have
in bringing all these parties into a single coalition,
prospects of a Sithole-led government now appear very
slim. (S)
If Sithole is not a contender for prime minister,
he could still be eligible for a major Cabinet post.
Under the agreement struck by the internal leaders last
fall, any party that wins five seats in the House will
be entitled to a Cabinet post. Muzorewa probably would
prefer to keep Sithole and his party out of the govern-
ment altogether, but he is under pressure from some
white leaders to offer Sithole the foreign affairs port-
folio. His deputies have argued strongly, however,
against giving Sithole any position in the Cabinet. If
Sithole's party wins a respectable number of seats in
next week's election, Muzorewa is committed to give
Sithole a Cabinet post, but probably would give him a
minor one. (S NF NC OC)
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Prime Minister Ian Smith
(Rhodesian Front)
Under pressure from some
whites to leave politics, but
so far has resisted. Most,if not
all. RF candidates are running
unopposed,
Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole
(Zimbabwe African National
Union/Sithole)
Broke with ZANU external
organization in 1977. Popularity
appears to be on the decline
Inside Rhodesia.
Probable Distribution of Seats in
New Rhodesian Parliament
Chief Kayisa Ndiweni
(United National Federal Party)
Broke with Chirau and the
transitional govt. early this
year to form a Ndebele-based
party. Would be a stalking
horse for Nkomo In the election.
Bishop Abel Muzorewa
(United African
National Council)
Most likely candidate for Prime
Minister, but would rather place
himself above partisan politics
and could opt for the Presidency,
Chief Jeremiah Chirau
(Zimbabwe United
People's Organization)
Generally considered a "stooge"
of the whites, but recently has
taken a more independent position
calling for an all parties conference
before the election and the
disbanding of all auxiliary forces.
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Muzorewa reportedly has considered offering Sithole
the presidency, but only if Sithole admitted defeat at
the polls and agreed to play a subordinate role in the
new government. Although many whites would like to see
Sithole as president, he is unlikely to agree to these
conditions. (S NF NC OC)
Although Sithole has boasted publicly that his
party will win as many as 57 seats in the House, his
recent actions suggest that he expects to fare poorly
and may be contemplating new alliances. His prospects
would improve if he could win'a strong Ndebele vote.
Early last month, Sithole told a representative of
Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) that he
wanted to meet with Nkomo to explore the possibility of
a reconciliation with him. Last week, a spokesman for
Sithole's party announced that the two leaders had been
in contact, and that Sithole is prepared to offer Nkomo
the presidency and give his deputies positions in the
Parliament, the civil service, and the diplomatic corps
if he wins the election. Sithole said that he thought
there was an even chance Nkomo would agree to serve as
president with Sithole as prime minister. (S NF NC OC)
Sithole withdrew the offer to turn several parlia-
mentary seats over to ZAPU the next day--presumably be-
cause of the hostile reaction it provoked within his
own party--but he has renewed the offer to support Nkomo
as president. Nkomo has rejected any suggestion that
he might be willing to make peace with the winners of
this month's election, saying that he would not go back
to Rhodesia and charging--probably correctly--that Sit-
hole's offer was no more than a ruse designed to attract
Ndebele votes. (U) (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)
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Formation of Government of Zimbabwe Rhodesia
5 Ndebele and
10 Blacks elected by
10 Whites elected
Senate
5 Shona Chiefs
black members of
by white members
elected by Council
the House
of the House
of Chiefs
House of
Assembly
President
Chosen by electoral
college made up of
the members of
House and Senate
Prime Minister
Appointed by
President
Cabinet
Selected by
Prime Minister
72 Blacks elected by
black and white
voters
20 Whites electe
by white voters
8 Whites elected by
92 other new mem-
bers of parliament
from list of 16 white
candidates selected
by the 50 members
of the present
parliament.
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25X1A
10 April
17-21 April
18 April
23 April
26 April
27 April
7 May
15 May
RHODESIA: ELECTION TIMETABLE
Prime Minister Smith's Rhodesian
Front Party wins the 20 directly
elected white seats in the House of
Assembly. Only four of the seats
were contested.
White and black Rhodesians vote for
the 72 black seats in the House.
Voting will be for party rather than
candidate. Parties will select mem-
bers of the House.
The Rhodesian Front Party caucuses
to select at least 16 nominees for
the eight indirectly elected white
seats in the House.
Counting of votes for 72 black and
20 white seats begins.
Whites meet, if necessary, in an
electoral college to pare down to
16 the list of white nominees for
the indirectly elected seats.
Electoral results should be announced
by this date.
The newly elected black and white
House members elect eight white
members to the House, bringing the
total House membership to 100.
Nominations for 10 black and 10
white Senators are solicited by
nomination court.
13 April 1979
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17 May
23 May
The Council of Chiefs elects five
Shona and five Ndebele chiefs to
the Senate.
White members of the House elect 10
whites to the Senate; black members
of the House elect 10 blacks to the
Senate.
Parliament is dissolved.
The new parliament is formed and the
House and the Senate elect Speakers.
Parliament nominates and elects a
"nonexecutive" President.
The President appoints a Prime Minis-
ter.
Acting on the advice of the Prime
Minister, the President appoints a
Cabinet.
13 April 1979
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South Africa - US: Deteriorating Relations With the
United States (U)
The expulsion of US diplomats on 12 April makes clear
that the short period of South African good will toward
the United States that followed Secretary Vance's visit
to Pretoria last fall is over and that the South African
Government has reverted to the anti-US posturing that
marked the 1977 parliamentary election campaign. Prime
Minister Botha believes that South Africa was deceived
in the development of the UN Secretary General's report
on Namibia and the government is currently making public
attacks on US United Nations Ambassador McHenry. The
South Africans probably also feel that by blaming the
West, they have a convenient excuse for further stalling
on the Namibian negotiations. (S)
The recent anti-US pronouncements may also be part
of internal political maneuvering by Prime Minister
Botha's government to heal the party rifts caused by the
revelations of the Information Department scandal. The
onus of the scandal would be off the government to some
extent if the underhanded dealings of South Africa in
the United States could be justified as necessary evils
to combat a hostile Washington. Some of the rekindled
animosity may also stem from South Africa's successful
management of its current oil crisis. The long-dreaded
specter of sanctions may seem less frightening now that
the country is actually coping with the effects of a
massive oil cutoff. (S)
The South African Government is also reviving the
southern African regional cooperation policies of both
the Verwoerd and Vorster eras. The Prime Minister talks
of nonalignment and a "wall of steel" (presumably South
African military might) around a group of states that
is to include Rhodesia and Namibia. In readjusting its
foreign policy, South Africa is again making clear to
the outside world that it is pivotal to progress in the
area. (S)
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While publicly vilifying the West, South Africans
still hanker for Western acceptance, and they have not
given up hope of being taken back into the fold. In
this context, they view the prospect of the election of
a conservative government in the United Kingdom as work-
ing to their advantage, particularly if the conservatives
stick to their campaign promises to eschew economic
sanctions. The South Africans continue to feel that,
despite what they perceive as negative results in many
of their dealings with the US Government, South Africa
has a wide sympathetic audience in the United States
whose opinions are not reflected in current US policy.
(S) (SECRET)
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Black Africa: Relations With Israel (U)
An Israeli delegation headed by Ehud Auriel, an
adviser to Foreign Minister Dayan, reportedly was well
received in Ivory Coast, Ghana, Liberia, and Togo during
a recent official visit, but no promises were made to
reestablish diplomatic relations. Nevertheless, the
conclusion of the Israeli-Egyptian peace negotiations
is probably causing some African moderates to rethink
their policy and to search for ways to resume what were
in many cases friendly and mutually beneficial relations
with Israel. The Israelis are not pushing matters, in
large part because Israeli commercial interests are
thriving in Africa even without formal ties. (C)
Background
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, Israel estab-
lished diplomatic ties with most black African states,
many of which had only recently gained their independence.
The Africans especially valued Israel's expertise in agri-
cultural, military, medical, and other technical matters.
Israel, in return, was able to count on the votes or at
least the sympathetic neutrality of a large bloc of black
states at the UN and within the Organization of African
Unity to repel Arab efforts to turn these bodies into anti-
Israeli forums. (S)
Arab offers of financial assistance, below-market
oil prices, and political backing on southern African
issues began to undercut Israel's support by the early
1970s. This trend was capped during and immediately
after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war when almost all African
governments cut ties with Tel Aviv in a display of
solidarity with the Arabs. Today Israel maintains for-
mal relations only with Malawi, Lesotho, and Swaziland,
and interests sections in Ivory Coast, Ghana, and Kenya.
(S)
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Visit of Israeli Delegation
According to Hanan Aynor, director of the Israeli
Foreign Ministry's African department and a member of
the delegation, all of the countries visited wanted to
improve relations with Israel. Several intimated that
the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty might help break the
ice, leading Aynor to speculate that some moderates
might try to coordinate a simultaneous resumption of
relations. (C)
Aynor believes that Ivory Coast and Liberia probably
will be among the first to reestablish ties, followed by
Ghana, Upper Volta, and Kenya. Ghana probably will wait
until a new civilian government is installed this summer
before making any decision. Aynor doubts that Nigeria,
despite active discussion within the government, will
reestablish relations because of concern over Israeli -
South African ties. He also speculated that Senegal
would not soon reestablish ties because of its support
for the Palestine Liberation Organization. (C)
The Israelis perceive West African moderates as
disillusioned with the Arabs. Extravagant Arab promises
of assistance frequently have not been implemented.
Limited aid often has been offset by steep oil price
increases. (C)
Israeli Commercial Interests
Israeli Foreign Ministry specialists on Africa re-
main ambivalent about prospects for improving Israel's
political position in black Africa. They clearly hope
to resume formal relations at least with many of the
key moderates in the region. But they deny making
great efforts to woo the Africans and instead seem to
be waiting for them to make the first move. (C)
Given the ability of Israeli business and trade
interests to prosper in Africa even without formal ties,
Israeli officials probably believe that they have little
reason to push matters. According to Aynor, nearly 5,000
Israelis now are working on the continent. Israeli-African
trade has grown to a considerably greater volume than be-
fore the 1973 war, reportedly exceeding $100 million in
1978. Israeli construction firms have secured contracts
13 April 1979
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worth nearly $1 billion, with nearly $400 million in con-
tracts in Ivory Coast alone. Solel Boneh, a large con-
struction firm owned by Israel's huge Histadrut labor
federation, reportedly has more equipment operating in
Nigeria than in Israel. (C) (SECRET)
13 April 1979
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25X1A
Seychelles: -Rene's Fears of a Coup (U)
The hastily arranged port call at Victoria of a
Soviet Kresta-I class cruiser on 10 April was probably
prompted by Seychellois President Rene's fears of an ex-
ternally mounted coup attempt, and could portend closer
relations between Moscow and Victoria. Very few Soviet
warships have called at the Seychelles since the islands'
independence in 1976 and, unlike the unannounced visit
of the Kresta-I, previous calls were planned well in ad-
vance. Rene's concern over a possible coup also led him
to request military support from Tanzania, which was un-
able to cooperate, and from Madagascar, which has sent
over 200 troops in the past week to defend Mahe, the
Seychelles' main island. The Seychellois police have
arrested a Belgian citizen who they claim is a profes-
sional mercenary sent by former Seychellois President
Mancham to make the final preparations for an impending
mercenary invasion. (S NF NC OC)
It is difficult to tell whether Rene's fears of a
coup are real or imagined. He came to power by over-
throwing Mancham in June 1977 and is convinced that
Mancham intends to unseat him. Mancham, who resides in
London, probably has not been actively planning a coup,
although he may recently have sent agents into the is-
lands to organize an underground opposition movement.*
(S NF NC OC)
The Soviets probably offered to send the cruiser,
and the arrangements to allow the Soviet ship to call
in Victoria probably began in Madagascar. The Soviet
Ambassador to the Seychelles was in Madagascar at the
same time Seychellois pro-Soviet Foreign Minister Michel
was there arranging for Malagasy troop support. (S NF
NC ?C)
-Members of Mancham's former party, the Seychelles Democratic
Party, have not meet openly since February 1978, when Rene out-
lawed their political activities. Rene's announcement last month
of a new constitution that provides for a one-party state formally
ended all legal political opposition. (S NF NC OC)
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The Soviets probably believe that a show of the
flag at a time when Rene feels unusually threatened
might soften his suspicions of Moscow. Moscow has in
the past been eager to assist Third World nations facing
coup attempts and provided a similar show of force in
Guinea in the early 19708. The Soviets might also want
to take advantage of Rene's recent suspicions of US in-
tentions in the Indian Ocean. Rene, who recently ex-
pressed concern in a letter to President Carter over re-
ports of US plans to increase its presence on Diego
Garcia, may also intend the Kresta visit as another way
of signaling his displeasure over a possible US naval
buildup. (S NF NC OC)
Rene's decision to call in Malagasy troops indi-
cates that he lacks confidence that his Tanzanian-trained
250-man army, augmented with a small militia and police,
could deter or defeat a mercenary invasion. Seychellois
Minister for Internal Affairs Berlouis had requested a
company of Tanzanian troops during his visit to Dar es
Salaam last month, but Nyerere was unwilling to provide
assistance because of the conflict in Uganda. Malagasy
President Ratsiraka, who also constantly fears a coup,
was probably sympathetic to Rene, who he regards as the
only other truly progressive leader in the Indian Ocean
island community. (S NF NC OC) (SECRET NOFORN-
NOCONTRACT-ORCON)
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Nigeria: Election Scheduling Problems (U)
Head of State Obasanjo's recent announcement that
state and national elections will take place at weekly
intervals between July and September is the latest in-
dication that Lagos has little appreciation for the im-
mense logistical problems involved in conducting a rea-
sonably efficient election. Unless the government is
able to overcome these problems, it runs the risk of be-
ing confronted with stormy elections and controversial
results, which could prompt the military regime to can-
cel its commitment to return Nigeria to civilian rule in
October. (S)
since the government lifted the 12-year ban on
political activity last fall, its efforts to prepare
the way for elections have been marked by bureaucratic
inefficiency, logistical problems, and poor planning.
The federal electoral commission, which is in charge
of carrying out the elections, remains committed to
setting up just under 100,000 polling stations through-
out the country--one for every 500 voters--which will be
manned by 125,000 poll clerks, 25,000 counting clerks,
and some 300,000 additional personnel. Little has been
done to recruit or train these people, however, and vot-
ing supplies and equipment are not in place. Neither has
the government been very successful in acquainting the
largely illiterate rural population--the majority of the
48.3 million registered voters--with the various party
candidates and issues, which could present numerous op-
portunities for voter manipulation and electoral fraud.
(C)
By putting off the elections until July, the ruling
military council's efforts to get out the vote will be
hampered by Nigeria's rainy season. Problems will be
most serious in the rural areas, where villages are fre-
quently isolated by roads that are flooded or otherwise
impassable. Transporting voters to their respective poll-
ing places on at least five separate occasions will put
a severe strain on Nigeria's weak transport system. Lagos
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may decide to combine some of the elections, but a sub-
stantial share of the voters have never participated in
an election before and could have difficulties in handling
more than one contest at a time. (S)
Election problems will be complicated by the fact
that the rains vary by region in both intensity and dura-
tion. According to the US Embassy, most of the voting
will take place in August when the rains are the heaviest
in the north, the home base of the National Party of
Nigeria (NPN). Most Nigerians consider the NPN the front-
runner among the five recognized political parties. On
the other hand, the rains drop off substantially during
August in southern Nigeria, where the Unity Party of
Nigeria--the NPN's leading opponent--has its greatest
strength. (C)
Voter turnout in the north may also be affected by
the concurrent observance of the Muslim holiday of Rama-
dan, a period of fasting when Muslims are traditionally
lethargic and personal tensions are abnormally high. This
year, Ramadan begins on approximately 24 July and concludes
on 23 August with a major festival that may coincide with
the presidential election. Such a prevailing mood could
easily spark renewed incidences of violence and disrupt
the electoral process. A low voter turnout might also
prompt a northern backlash if regional politicians be-
lieve the military government deliberately delayed the
elections to impede Muslim efforts to win the presidency.
(S) (SECRET)
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FOR THE RECORD (U)
CONGO: Col. Denis Sassou Nguesso, who replaced
Joachim Yhomby Opango as interim president in an in-
traparty squabble last February, was unanimously elected
President and Chairman of the ruling Congolese Workers
Party on 31 March. Although Sassou is considered to
be more leftist and pro-Soviet than Yhomby, the politi-
cal direction of the new government remains unclear.
In any event, Sassou, recognizing Congo's need for West-
ern aid, has indicated that the country will remain open
to international cooperation, especially with the United
States and France. (S)
Congo's inherent economic problems--a bloated civil
service, meager resources, a restive labor force, and a
large unemployed urban population--will continue to
threaten the country's political stability and challenge
Sassou's leadership abilities. Sassou, whose election
continues a 10-year tradition of northern minority rule,
will also have to contend with the increasing southern
influence and the ambitious political maneuvering of two
high-level southern colleagues, Prime Minister Sylvain-
Goma and political bureau member Thystere-Tchicaya. In
addition, the decision by the Party Congress to prose-
cute Yhomby on charges of high treason could also cause
problems for Sassou. Sassou probably fears that Yhomby's
trial could trigger a reinvestigation of the assassina-
tion in 1976 of the late President Marien Ngouabi and
that he could be im licat a probe. (S) (SE-
25X1A CRET)
MAURITIUS: The Mauritian Foreign Ministry announced
on 10 April that Mauritius and Cuba have agreed to es-
tablish diplomatic relations. Relations will be mainly
symbolic, however, because the two countries will not
exchange resident Ambassadors. The Mauritian Ambassador
in Washington will be accredited to Havana, and Cuba's
Ambassador in Madagascar will serve concurrently as Am-
bassador to Port Louis. The two countries' decision is
tied to the Nonaligned Conference scheduled to take
place in Havana in September. Mauritian Prime Minister
Ramgoolam expects a personal invitation to the meeting
from President Castro, and by establishing diplomatic
ties Ramgoolam hopes to avoid embarrassment over not
having previous contact with Cuba. The Cubans believe
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they can improve their image among the nonaligned coun-
tries by establishing ties with smaller, moderate nations
that distrust them. The pro-Western Labor government in
Mauritius long has been concerned over Cuban activities
in Africa and has supported the efforts of moderate states
at previous conferences to restrain the Cubans' attempts
to radicalize the nonaligned movement. (S NF NC OC)
(SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON) OPA,
25X1A
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25X1A
A New Government for Uganda* (U)
Now that the invading Tanzanian and anti-Amin Ugan-
dan forces have established control over Kampala, install-
ing and gaining recognition of a new Ugandan government
will be their next order of business:
-- The Ugandan National Liberation Front is the
leading candidate for the role of successor
government.
-- The Front is a coalition of long-time rivals
hastily put together last month under Tanza-
nian auspices. It has geographical balance,
but little political cohesion.
-- Formation of the Front dims the prospects of
former Ugandan President Obote, long regarded
as Tanzania's favored candidate to succeed
Amin.
-- once it is in place in Uganda, a Liberation
Front government will encounter deep-seated
ethnic, religious, and political divisions as
well as resentment from those who remained in
Uganda throughout the Amin years. (S NF NC OC)
The 2,000-man exile army did not give a very impres-
sive account of itself in the war against Amin, but it
may yet become an arbiter of power:
-- Obote apparently has many supporters in the
exile army and reportedly believes he can use
this force to intimidate the Front's civilian
leadership after the war is over. Ambitious
commanders might, however, use the troops to
wrest control for themselves. (S NF NC OC)
'These key judgments are taken from A New Government for Uganda,
PA79-10184, April 1979. A copy of the assessment may be obtained
from the author. (U)
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Restoring the Ugandan economy to full productivity
will be a two-to-three-year proposition at best:
-- Agriculture--the principal sector--should revive
readily but the economy's once well developed
infrastructure is a shambles. (U)
Tanzania will face some hard decisions about its
future role in Uganda:
-- Maintaining the military force currently in
Uganda is a heavy economic drain, even if no
effort is made to occupy the remaining two-
thirds of the country.
-- Prolonged support of a new regime in Uganda--
basically a richer country than Tanzania--could
cause discontent at home. (S)
In foreign affairs, since Kenya controls the transit
routes to Uganda its approval of a new regime will be
crucial:
Not only are its own relations with Tanzania
strained, but Kenya also shares the apprehen-
sion of most African countries that Tanzania's
intervention in Uganda may establish a danger-
ous precedent.
The Soviet Union--the major military supplier
of both Uganda and Tanzania--may emerge as a
prime contender to assist the rebuilding of
the Ugandan military forces. (S) (SECRET NO-
FORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)
13 April 1979
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