AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010041-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2002
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: January 19, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

Nat; l '~''~ /~ Secret
r Apr Release 2002/01/3O-::4;-RD~Pn9T OO27OOO100444ORN-NO00NTRACT-
Center
Africa Review
Secret
RP AR 79-003
19 January 1979
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National Security
Information
Dissemination Control
Abbreviations
STATOTHR
STATOTHR
Intelligence Sources
and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions
NOFORN (NF)
NOCONTRACT (NC)
PROPIN (PP)
NFIBONLY (NO)
ORCON (OC)
REL...
FGI
Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants
Caution---Proprietary Information Involved
NFIB Departments Only
Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
This Information Has Been Authorized for Release to...
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Derivative classification by 006266
Review 20 years from date
Derived from multiple
All material on this page
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AFRICA REVIEW (U)
19 January 1979
CONTENTS
Rhodesia: The Emergence of Private Armies (U)
Former guerrillas, who have been used to
encourage other guerrillas to defect, are
in practice being organized into private
armies loyal to Bishop Muzorewa or to
Ndabaningi Sithole. (C)
Rhodesia: Dim Economic Outlook (U) . . . . .
The decline of the Rhodesian economy
will speed up in 1979 if white emigra-
tion and guerrilla activity continue
to increase. (C)
Nigeria: Election Scheduling Dilemma (U) . .
Nigeria's military rulers face some
agonizing and potentially controversial
decisions in scheduling elections as the
country enters the most difficult phase
of its planned transition to civilian
rule in October. (C)
. .
1
. .
4
. .
10
Ivor Coast: Irreparable Split Between Houphouet-
Boigny and Yace (S) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
A widening rift between Ivorian President
Houphouet-Boigny and his constitutional
successor, Philip Yace, will probably
prompt Houphouet to remove Yace from the
line of succession sometime soon, 25X1C
(S NF NC)
25X1 C
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Madagascar: Ratsiraka's New Year's Speech (U) . . 17
President Ratsiraka strongly criticized
the West in his New Year's speech to the
diplomatic corps on 11 January. (C)
Swaziland: Kin Sobhuza, Traditionalism, and
Succession U . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
As the Swazi people and the economy become
more sophisticated King Sobhuza's autocratic
style is being viewed as an anachronism by
growing numbers of educated Swazis. (C)
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25X1A
25X1 C
Rhodesia: The Emergence of Private Armies (U)
The use of former guerrillas--known as auxiliaries--
promises to be more of a disruptive factor in Rhodesia
than a positive one. As originally conceived by Prime
Minister Smith and his black nationalist partners when
they agreed to the internal settlement last March, guer-
rillas who took advantage of the transitional government's
amnesty program would be put into uniform and used to
encourage other guerrillas to defect. In practice, how-
ever, the ex-guerrillas have been organized into private
armies loyal to Bishop Muzorewa or to Ndabaningi Sithole.
(C)
Rhodesian security officials estimate that Muzorewa
has as many as 2,000 former guerrillas under arms while
Sithole may have as many as 750. They are operating in
22 of Rhodesia's 52 tribal trust lands, mainly in eastern
and southern Rhodesia and around Salisbury and Fort Vic-
toria. They are supposed to coordinate their military
operations with Rhodesian security forces, and some white
officers are assigned to monitor their activities. In
essence, however, they are responsible only to the po-
litical organizations to which they ostensibly belong,
either Muzorewa's United African National Council or
Sithole's faction of the Zimbabwe African National Union.
(S NF NC OC)
The auxiliaries--mostly defectors from Robert
Mugabe's Mozambique-based faction of ZANU--have a mixed 25X1C
military record.
the auxiliaries have
had fair success in restoring a 'number of basic welfare
services in the trust lands and thereby winning local
support for Muzorewa or Sithole. (S NF NC OC)
On the other hand, Rhodesian military reports in-
dicate that the auxiliaries often have performed poorly
in clashes with guerrillas. The Rhodesians are not
using the auxiliaries as an offensive, counterinsurgency
force, however. Until recently, they did not receive
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any military training beyond what they acquired as
guerrillas, and they are armed basically with what they
brought with them when they defected. (S NF NC OC)
Nevertheless, many security officials believe that
the auxiliary program has gotten off to a good start
and they would like to see it expanded. The military
high command has decided to provide some training and
logistical support and to bolster the auxiliaries with
personnel from regular black military units. Military
officials believe that if Muzorewa and Sithole had
sufficient funds they could attract large numbers of
defectors. Smith, however, does not want the two black
leaders to establish large private armies and has re-
fused to review the law that forbids black political
organizations from soliciting private financial support
or bringing into Rhodesia funds raised abroad. (S NF
NC OC)
The auxiliaries receive basic subsistence but be-
cause of a lack of funds they are not paid on a regular
basis. As a result, they often resort to extorting
food and money from local villagers. In addition, po-
litical intimidation has become widespread. The auxil-
iaries are forcing villagers to swear allegiance to
Muzorewa or Sithole and the competition for new party
members is strong. Late last year the government was
forced to ban the "sale" of party membership cards and
T-shirts in order to curb coercive membership drives. (C)
Last November, two of Sithole's auxiliaries were
sentenced to death for the murders of five villagers
who were not Sithole supporters. The incident forced
the resignation of the black cominister of defense--a
Sithole appointee--who had provided the auxiliaries
with arms and had harbored them after the killings.
Nor is Chief Chirau, the third black leader in the
transitional government, immune from the trend toward
political violence, even though he has no auxiliaries
behind him. Two Chirau supporters, including Chirau's
brother, recently were sentenced to four years' impris-
onment for setting fire to business properties belonging
to a Muzorewa supporter. (C)
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Outlook
The Rhodesian media, presumably with official
cooperation, have been giving favorable publicity to
Muzorewa, Sithole, and their auxiliaries over the past
several months, some of which has been deserved. On
balance, however, the Rhodesians are taking a short-
sighted view of the auxiliaries. Already, their activi-
ties have become disturbingly reminiscent--albeit on
a smaller scale and in a different political context--
of the situation that prevailed in Angola prior to the
civil war. (U)
The temptation for Muzorewa and Sithole to carve
out political fiefdoms in the countryside will only
grow stronger as the national elections draw closer.
Clashes between their supporters-are likely to become
commonplace in the scramble for popular support. At
the same time, of course, the guerrillas will be doing
their utmost to disrupt the electoral process. Thus,
the regular Rhodesian security forces are likely to
find themselves caught between a growing insurgency
and a rising tide of violence inspired by leaders in a
government that they are attempting to defend. (C)
(SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)
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Rhodesia: Dim Economic Outlook (U)
The economy, which had been a source of strength to
the government of Prime Minister Ian Smith during most of
the period since Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of
Independence (UDI) in 1965, has deteriorated in the past
three years. The pace of decline will speed up in 1979
if white emigration and guerrilla activity continue to
increase. (C)
Despite UN economic sanctions, real economic growth
averaged 6 percent in the decade after UDI, largely be-
cause of the development of import substitutes and the
diversification of agriculture. Since 1974, the trend
has reversed dramatically, with GNP falling about 16 per-
cent. While the recession so far has mainly reflected
weakening internal and foreign demand, a likely increase
in guerrilla activity this year points to greater prob-
lems on the supply side. The economic decline seems cer-
tain to continue, the only question being the pace of
the drop. (C)
The Demand Side: Accumulating Problems
The economic slump of the past three years largely
reflects the increasing burden of defense, erosion of
the middle class market by white emigration, and waning
business confidence due to persistent guerrilla activity
and highly uncertain political prospects. These factors
contributed to the near collapse of private investment
in 1976-78 while undermining consumer spending. Weak
international demand for Rhodesian products, in part
related to economic sanctions, further eroded national
output. Without substantial South African financial sup-
port, economic losses would have been still greater. (C)
The Defense Burden
The mounting diversion of resources into defense
since 1975 has directly undercut economic growth, since
Rhodesia buys most of its military equipment and supplies
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RHODESIA: Indicators
"0"
abroad, except for small arms and ammunition. Direct
military, police, and internal security outlays in the
fiscal year ending in July will reach an estimated $400
million, 28 percent of total budget expenditures com-
pared with only 17 percent earlier in the 1970s. Count-
ing the defense-related expenditures of other ministries--
estimated at $50 million in the current fiscal year--the
cost of defense rises to nearly one-third of the budget. (C)
To help finance the domestic costs of the military
buildup, the government has initiated programs to tap
private savings. Under the latest mandatory bond pur-
chase program, all white taxpayers and about 1,000 high-
income blacks must buy government bonds equal in amount
to 12.5 percent of their income tax. To help free for-
eign exchange for military imports, Salisbury has tight-
ened quotas on imports of civilian goods, including raw
materials and capital equipment. (C)
White Emigration*
Further dampening domestic demand has been an up-
surge in white emigration in the past three years at-
tributable to declining living standards, increasing war
*For a discussion of emigration trends and their economic/politi-
cal/military implications, see "Rhodesia: White Emigration on
Rise," Economic Intelligence Weekly Review, 5 January 1979, pp. 4-8.
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casualties, and mounting uncertainties surrounding the
transition to black majority rule. On a net basis, an
estimated 31,000 persons officially emigrated in 1976-78,
a loss of about 12 percent of the white population. An-
other 20,000 to 30,000 Rhodesians may have left on "ex-
tended vacations." This drain, which is concentrated in
the middle class, has reduced the demand for furniture,
appliances, and other consumer goods and has contributed
to a steep decline in housing construction. Only in-
creased South African purchases of light manufactures
arrested the drop in industrial output in 1978. (C)
Sagging Confidence
Business confidence of course has suffered from the
uncertainties associated with stepped-up guerrilla activ-
ity and with Smith's so-called internal settlement.
Planned industrial plant construction has dwindled to $7
million annually from a peak of $34 million in 1974, and
purchases of machinery and equipment have also plummeted.
As in the case of housing, most new business investment
is apparently going into physical security rather than
into the buildup of economic assets--an ominous sign for
future economic growth. (C)
Exports and Sanctions
Since 1974, weak foreign demand for Rhodesian com-
modities has reinforced the deterioration in domestic
demand. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the impact
of economic sanctions on Rhodesian exports was mitigated
by the scramble on world markets to secure raw materials,
which make up one-third of total Rhodesian exports. As
developed-country demand slumped in the aftermath of the
Merchandise trade balance
159
98
58
259
215
150
Exports'
702
820
870
905
855
827
Imports
543
722
812
646
650
677
Services balance
-173
-216
-222
-208
-222
-237
Transfer payments
-12
-33
-46
-38
-25
-28
Current account balance
- 26
-1-51
-210
13
- 32
-115
Net capital transactions
92
111
178
43
-36
170
Total current and
capital transactions
66
-40
-32
56
-68
55
Estimated. CONFIDENTIAL
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1973-74 oil price hikes, however, the existence of sanc-
tions no doubt caused Rhodesia to suffer disproportion-
ately from the drop in world demand. Many foreign firms
turned to alternative suppliers of chrome, nickel, cop-
per, tin, and asbestos; Rhodesian mining output was 9
percent less in real terms in 1978 compared with 1973.
In the particular case of chrome, the drop was reinforced
by repeal of the Byrd Amendment in March 1977, a move
that cut off the lucrative American market, and by a new
European metallurgical process that reduces the cost
competitiveness of high-grade Rhodesian ores. (C)
The Supply Side: Light But Growing Damage
Although on the rise, physical damage has so far
been relatively light and concentrated in rural areas.
In the zones with the highest guerrilla activity--along
the Mozambican border and northeast of Salisbury--many
small white-owned farms have been abandoned because of
the constant threat to homesteads, cattle, crops, and
vehicular traffic. In the tribal trust lands set aside
for blacks, thousands of dip tanks used for tickborne
disease control have been destroyed. The ensuing spread
of livestock diseases--nearly eradicated prior to the guer-
rilla war--caused an estimated $80 million in cattle losses
in 1978. Most large inland plantations, however, appar-
ently have not suffered much damage. (C)
The only major urban damage inflicted by guerrillas
so far has been the destruction in December 1978 of
roughly 300,000 barrels of oil--15 to 20 days supply at
estimated current consumption rates--at the Salisbury
fuel depot. The replacement of the lost $8 million
worth of storage facilities and oil will prove difficult
because of the country's foreign exchange bind and dis-
ruptions in South African oil supplies due to the Iran-
ian strikes. The impact of this attack on white morale
may prove more damaging than the loss of assets since it
could lead to an acceleration in white emigration. (C)
Impact on Living Standards
On average, the blacks are suffering more from the
recession than the whites. Employment among black wage
earners--almost 40 percent of the 2.4 million black labor
force--has dropped by at least 33,000 persons since 1975.
Heavy job losses have occurred in plantation agriculture
and in construction, which traditionally provide employ-
ment for 40 percent and 6 percent, respectively, of the
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country's black wage earners. The 1.5 million black sub-
sistence farmers have also been hard hit by war-related
cattle and crop losses and supply shortages. Many of
these farmers as well as those who once worked on white
plantations are flooding into the already over-crowded
black townships in Salisbury and Umtali. (C)
The remaining whites are also tightening their
belts, largely because the prices of basic foodstuffs
are rising while salaries stagnate. The most severely
affected whites are those in the service sectors, such
as salesmen, shopkeepers, and construction contractors,
many of whom are joining the white exodus. The decline
in real incomes among white farmers is lessened to some
degree by high prices for key crops and Salisbury's will-
ingness to provide subsidies; the jobs of many white
industrial workers are also protected by subsidies. (C)
Payments Developments
Although the recession has slashed the demand for
most important goods in recent years, the rising costs
of military imports and difficulties in finding export
markets are weakening the current account, which was prob-
ably $115 million in the hole in 1978, compared with a
deficit of only $32 million in 1977. The trade surplus
fell by nearly one-third in 1978, to an estimated $150
million, as bad weather reduced tobacco and cotton ship-
ments and demand for key mineral exports remained low.
Although freight and insurance payments may have dropped
somewhat, tourist receipts have fallen off badly. In
addition, the middle men that help circumvent trade sanc-
tions are undoubtedly hiking their fees because of the
mandatory US arms embargo adopted against South Africa
in early 1978. (C)
With reserves probably fluctuating around the equiv-
alent of one month's imports through much of 1978, Salis-
bury has had to borrow heavily to cover the current ac-
count deficit. South Africa undoubtedly is the major
creditor, and financial support probably ran into several
hundreds of millions of dollars last year. In addition,
a $15 million Eurocurrency loan was secured in July 1978;
other possible creditors include confidential sources in
some Middle Eastern countries. (S NF OC)
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Outlook: Continued Downturn
A likely pickup in guerrilla activity in 1979 points
to further economic losses even if the scheduled transi-
tion to black majority rule in May goes off relatively
smoothly. The guerrillas operating inside Rhodesia more
than doubled in number over 1977, to about 10,000, and
are being bolstered by military supplies from the Commu-
nists and other sources. Depending on the pattern and
intensity of their strikes, the economic decline of
Rhodesia could be either precipitous or gradual. For
instance, a few major incidents of urban terrorism could
easily spark a massive surge in emigration, which is apt
to accelerate in any event. A white population loss on
the order of 25 percent, a plausible development given
the large numbers of Rhodesians who are already consider-
ing leaving, would chop at least 15 percent off of GNP.
The loss of managerial and skilled labor talent would
make economic recovery by any type of black government
difficult. (S NF NC)
A gradual encroachment of guerrilla activity into
Rhodesia's central economic heartland would lead to a
less precipitous economic decline. Although many white
farmers would cling to their plantations, the guerrillas
could drive increasing numbers of black farm workers
into city enclaves, cutting into output of cash crops.
Similarly, mining output would begin to suffer, while
transportation disruptions would continue to increase.
As physical damage and casualties mounted, large numbers
of white Rhodesians would leave the country, further
reinforcing the decline. (C) (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT)
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Nigeria: Election Scheduling Dilemma (U)
Nigeria's military rulers face some agonizing and
potentially controversial decisions in scheduling
elections as the country enters the most difficult
phase of its planned transition to civilian rule in
October. Despite mounting public impatience, the regime
continues to put off formal scheduling of a series of
elections this year that are intended to lead to a
transfer of power. The delay apparently stems mainly
from electoral-related logistic difficulties and the
problem of how to deal with the realization that a
presidential runoff contest probably will be necessary.
(C)
There are a number of indications that the cycle of
elections may be altered and that they are unlikely to
begin until this summer instead of early spring as had
been expected. It is also possible that the procedure
in Nigeria's new constitution for a presidential runoff
election will be altered. All of this does not
necessarily mean the timetable for the advent of consti-
tutional government will be pushed back, but some slip-
page is possible. (C)
Government officials are planning the election
schedule with the expectation that a presidential runoff
will be required. Because the three major regionally
based parties are likely to split the vote, the regime
now expects a deadlock under constitutional rules that
require the presidential victor to obtain a plurality
nationwide and a quarter of the votes in 13 of 19 states.
Failing that, the Constitution provides that the selec-
tion is to be made by an electoral college consisting of
all members of the federal National Assembly--95 senators
and 450 members of the House of Representatives--and the
1,350 members of the 19 state assemblies. Two presiden-
tial candidates participate in the runoff--the one with
the highest number of votes countrywide and the individual
among the remaining contenders with a plurality of votes
in the highest number of states. (C)
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In order for the electoral college arrangement to
work, federal and state legislatures must be elected, in
place, and reasonably operational well before the pres-
idential. contest. Tentative government planning had
called for a cycle of elections some time between April
and July in five successive stages: state legislative
assemblies, the federal House of Representatives, the
federal Senate, state governors, and the federal presi-
dency. Several hurdles have now become evident, most
notably:
-- The federal electoral commission is far from
ready logistically to supervise elections in-
volving more than 47 million registered voters.
Specifically, precinct boundaries and polling
places have not been determined, supplies and
equipment are not in place, and the staff to
man the polls has not been recruited or trained.
-- Many state governments have not even begun to
think about preparing for the organization and
operation of state assemblies and the training
of state assembly staff members. (C)
Given the lag in logistic preparations, the cycle of
elections will probably not begin before June or July.
Thought is being given to combining some elections--such
as those on the state level--to save time. Lower rank-
ing officials believe that separate races would probably
be more easily handled by Nigeria's inexperienced and
largely illiterate electorate. According to the US
Embassy, however, several members of the ruling military
council are advocating that only two sets of elections
be held or even one that would include all five contests.
With preparations for the operation of state assemblies
moving so slowly, the military government reportedly is
considering the option of a national runoff election, in
place of an electoral college solution, if the presiden-
tial contest is not decided in the first round. The chair-
man of the federal electoral commission recently told a
US Embassy official that a second national election defi-
nitely would be held if needed. (C)
The military government thus faces some tough choices.
If the election schedule is delayed substantially, Nige-
ria's ethnically oriented and confrontation-prone civilian
politicians would have even more time for campaigning. A
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delay also would further increase chances for serious
communal unrest that could force the cancellation of
plans for civilian rule. If the government opts for
relatively early elections with imperfect logistical
preparations, it runs an even greater risk of stormy
elections and controversial election results. The latter
choice would also probably result in nullifying the con-
stitutional provision for a presidential runoff selection
in favor of a more workable procedure. (C)
Nigeria's aspiring presidential contenders and
competing regional and tribal groups will be watching
the government's election decisions closely for the im-
pact on their electoral chances. The parties are expected
to concentrate their efforts on the first election on
the presumption that the winning party will be perceived
as the eventual national victor and will benefit from a
bandwagon effect. After the first set of elections, some
party mergers and political realignments are likely, al-
tering somewhat the present regional lineup. The chances
for electoral violence will also increase if leaders of
those parties faring poorly cannot accept the possibility
of overall defeat at the hands of their rivals. (C)
(CONFIDENTIAL)
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Ivory Coast: Irreparable Split Between Hou houet-Boi n
and Yace S
A widening rift between Ivorian President Felix
Houphouet-Boigny and his constitutional successor, Philip
Yace, who serves as National Assembly president and party
secretary general, will probably prompt Houphouet to re-
the line of succession sometime soon,
(S NF NC)
Houphouet reportedly plans early this year to name
a prime minister and to press for a constitutional amend-
ment that would provide that he, rather than the National
Assembly president, would assume the national presidency
upon Houphouet's death and retain the office until the
next regularly scheduled elections now set for 1980. In
addition, Houphouet reportedly intends to ensure that
the prime minister will be the presidential candidate of
the Ivory Coast Democratic Party--the country's sole po-
litical party--in those elections. Houphouet also plans
to remove Yace from the post of party Secretary General.
(S NF NC)
The President, who is 72 years old, apparently is
infuriated by Yace's heavyhanded style and has lost con-
fidence in Yace's ability to maintain national support
in the post-Houphouet era. Houphouet, for example, was
disturbed by the popular resistance to the authoritarian
manner in which Yace conducted the recent selection of
party candidates for the mayoral elections. Yace, who
claims to have been protecting party interests, tried to
avoid primary elections and instead insisted on choosing
party candidates through a controlled, consensus approach
involving local government and party officials. Houphouet
reversed Yace's decision and authorized primary elections
in those communities that had resisted Yace. The Presi-
dent's action was viewed by Ivorians as a direct slap at
Yace and it produced a considerable loss of face for the
President's heir apparent. Houphouet may also have been
angered by Yace's reported practice of issuing instruc-
tions to members of the party's political bureau without
presidential clearance. (S NF NC)
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IVORY CPA{ ST
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The election incident further strained Yace's al-
ready poor relationship with many of his party colleagues.
Although Yace has a reputation for tough political in-
fighting, he has many enemies and lacks the power and
popularity needed to thwart his ouster. Yace probably
is unable to put together an ethnic or other constituency
strong enough to aid him in a showdown with Houphouet.
(S NF NC)
If Houphouet goes through with his plans, he will
probably appoint Mathieu Ekra, the Minister of Reform
of State Societies and a longtime enemy of Yace, to the
post of prime minister. Ekra, like Yace, is an apparent
follower of Houphouet's moderate, pragmatic domestic
and foreign policies, which have featured a relatively
liberal political atmosphere, heavy Western investment,
and close relations with the West--especially France and
the United States. (S NF NC) (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT)
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Madagascar's President Ratsirako being greeted by Soviet leaders in Moscow
on 29 June 1978
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25X1A
Madagascar: Ratsiraka's New Year's Speech (U)
President Ratsiraka strongly criticized the West
in his New Year's speech to the diplomatic corps on 11
January, departing noticeably from his previously cool,
but not antagonistic, remarks. Although he did not men-
tion the United States by name, he singled it out for:
-- Developing the neutron bomb.
-- Creating a military base at Diego Garcia.
-- Allegedly supporting Rhodesian Prime Minister
Ian Smith with arms sales.
-- Refusing economic sanctions against South Africa.
In contrast to these remarks, the President praised Soviet
President Brezhnev and Pope John Paul II as defenders of
peace which, he asserted, is threatened by Western mili-
tary activities. (C)
Although Ratsiraka's speech could be read to suggest
he intends to strengthen his already warm relations with
the Soviets, he may have intended it simply as a rhetor-
ical tradeoff for Soviet assistance. Ratsiraka signed
several military and economic agreements during a visit
to Moscow last June. He is currently waiting for the
delivery of Soviet MIG-2ls and probably hopes that his
anti-US speech will be accepted as partial payment; at
the moment at least, he seems eager to avoid giving in
to a longstanding Soviet request for base rights at
Diego Suarez.* (C)
*Ratsiraka has refused to allow any country to use Madagascar's
ports for military visits. We have no evidence that any Soviet
destroyers on patrol in the Indian Ocean have docked during the
past several years. (S NF)
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Ratsiraka has repeatedly resisted Soviet requests
for the base rights, despite Moscow's substantial mili-
tary aid. He is suspicious of Soviet motives, and fears
that he will be faced with strong domestic opposition if
he grants the Soviet use of the harbor. He also probably
recognizes he might endanger important Western--especially
French--economic interests. In addition, he probably
reasons that a Soviet presence would undermine his aspi-
ration for leadership among the Indian Ocean states and
the Third World. (C)
There is, however, an outside chance that Ratsiraka--
whose position is far from secure--may believe that a
strong Soviet military presence would give pause to
would-be coup plotters, particularly those on the left.
Despite his repeated assertions that he would not permit
superpower use of Malagasy ports, Ratsiraka's publicly
proclaimed affinity with the Soviets lays the ground-
work for a switch in this policy. Since the French mer-
cenary involvement in the takeover on the Comoro Islands
last May, the President has stepped up contacts with the
Soviets, calling them a "natural" ally of Madagascar. (C)
Ratsiraka has also been concerned about South African
overflights and recently increased the Defense Ministry's
budget to prepare against are alleged "threat of foreign
invasion." Furthermore, a Soviet presence might placate
the leftist students who rioted last May and were rumored
to have been encouraged by a radical and influential Su-
preme Revolutionary Council member. The extent to which
Ratsiraka perceives that plotters--domestic or external--
present an imminent threat, might well affect his decision
on whether to open Diego Suarez to the Soviets. (C)
Whatever Ratsiraka's ultimate intentions are toward
the Soviets, his pro-Moscow leanings have already engen-
dered some domestic opposition. One member of the
National Assembly and the Supreme Revolutionary Council,
Dr. Razanabahiny Marojama, who regards trade with the
West as more beneficial to Madagascar than a close rela-
tionship with the USSR, is already working behind the
25X1Cscenes, to reduce Soviet
influence over t e government. Marojama claims to have
support from a number of other Council members. (S NF
NC OC) (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)
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25X1A
Swaziland: King Sobhuza, Traditionalism,
and Succession* U
Swaziland became independent in 1968 with its tra-
ditional political structure intact and in some ways
strengthened by the British system of indirect rule
during the country's years as a protectorate. During
the period prior to independence the country operated
under a dual government structure: a formal Western-
style parliamentary system inherited from the British
and the Swazi National Council (SNC), a group of chiefs
and headmen dominated by the King. In theory, the SNC
only dealt with tribal matters but it always main-
tained a strong voice in governmental affairs. (C)
The veneer provided by the British-imposed consti-
tution and parliamentary form of government left the
King a great deal of room for exercising political
power but it also left room for a substantial degree
of political maneuvering by nontraditional oriented
political parties. King Sobhuza staked his prestige
on the formation of his own political party and won
an overwhelming victory, sweeping 24 seats, during
the country's first postindependence election in
1967. During the next election in 1973, however,
Sobhuza's party lost three of the 24 parliamentary
seats and the King dissolved Parliament, suspended
the Constitution, and assumed power by decree. (C)
Most of the vote against Sobhuza's party in 1973
came from an area that contained the capital city,
much of the country's developed industry, the civil
servants, and almost half of Swaziland's urban popula-
tion. While many observers did not feel that the loss
of three parliamentary seats represented a serious
threat to the King and his party, the King probably
interpreted the vote as the initial stages of the
*This is the second in a series of articles exploring the problems
of leadership and succession in Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland.
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breakdown of tribal authority. Sobhuza probably felt
that as the country continued to modernize and the civil
service and urban population expanded the day would
inevitably come when the opposition would be able to
mount a serious threat to his power. (C)
Perhaps as a sop to his critics, the King instituted
a complicated electoral process last October for estab-
lishing a new bicameral parliament. Forty members of
the lower house have been chosen through an electoral
college directly elected from Swaziland's largely
rural electoral districts. The King has named 10
additional members to the House and 10 to the Senate.
The next step will involve the 50-member house electing
10 additional members to the Senate. Selection of the
members of Parliament apparently is to be completed
this month, but it is unclear how much latitude par-
liamentarians will have. The deliberate pace that
Sobhuza's government has followed in selecting the
new members suggests he is putting together a body
that will not interfere with his authority. (C)
Basis for Traditional Rule
Sobhuza's move in 1973 met with little opposition
and was heartily supported by Swazi traditionalists.
Unlike most other African countries at independence,
in which the traditional political elites contended
not only with modern political factionalism but also
with other tribal groupings, the King and his tra-
ditionalist allies were aided by Swaziland being
culturally and socially homogeneous. Further, in 1973
Swaziland was surrounded by white minority governments
that had little interest in the country other than
maintaining the political status quo. Swazi traditional-
ists, led by the King, could thus control more easily
Swazi political modernists than might have been the
case if the contiguous countries had been led by African
governments that disliked the King's style of rule. (U)
As long as the 79-year-old Sobhuza remains healthy
and vigorous he will continue to dominate Swazi political
life, but it is questionable that the power of the
monarchy, so carefully built up during his tenure, can
be passed on to his successor. The King, who has been
on the throne since 1921, has proved to be an astute
and flexible politician. Now, however, he is increasingly
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challenged by problems not easily reconcilable with the
traditionalist-based solutions that have worked over
the years. As the Swazi people and the economy become
more sophisticated, Sobhuza's autocratic style is being
viewed as an anachronism by growing numbers of educated
Swazis. There is an unquestioned reservoir of reverence
and affection for Sobhuza, but this is unlikely to be
easily transferred to his successor. (C)
The Selection Process
Choosing a new king is a complicated process and
traditionally the heir to the throne is not designated
or even known during the king's lifetime. In theory,
the king and his mother (Ndlovukazi) rule coequally,
although in practice the King clearly dominates. When
the king dies the Ndlovukazi and the dead King's senior
paternal uncles call a family council to choose a succes-
sor. They are required by customary law to select only
a son of the dead king's "favorite" wife; who is favorite
depends on circumstances, but is often associated with
clan rank. If the heir is a minor, the favorite wife
rules in conjunction with the Ndlovukazi until he comes
of age and his mother becomes the new Ndlovukazi. Tra-
dition dictates that the nation cannot be without a
Ndlovukazi; should she die before her son, one of her
sisters is selected to be the Ndlovukazi. Sobhuza's
mother died in 1938 and the current Ndlovukazi exer-
cises little authority. (C)
Outlook
The installation of a new king may well usher in a
period of uncertainty. The prospect for continued sta-
bility in Swaziland depends heavily on the new King's
personality and character. He could be anything from
an enlightened progressive monarch to a strongly xeno-
phobic tribal traditionalist. Whoever is chosen, the
next King may have difficulty in dominating the politi-
cal life of Swaziland to the extent Sobhuza has. The
present King had over 30 years under the aegis of the
British to gain experience and political expertise before
he was called on to play a meaningful governing role; the
next king will be faced with the need to act as soon as
he assumes office and will be faced with a political system
dominated by traditionalminded politicians with experience
and confidence. (C)
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There are several important economic factors that
will further complicate the next ruler's ability to
govern as an absolute monarch. The present generation
of workers and educated Swazis is unlikely to accept
without question the authority and paternalism of the
king as did earlier generations. Because the present
King and his government rely almost exclusively on the
tribal system for its political power, such opposition
as currently exists has sprung almost entirely from the
modern sector and has grown in concert with it. During
1971-76, the number of Swazis with education beyond the
secondary level has quadrupled while secondary school
enrollment increased by more than 50 percent. The number
of trained Swazis available for employment in the modern
sector has been growing at the rate of 10 percent a year,
and the growing ranks of unemployed and underemployed
could become a threat to royal absolutism. Those in
the modern sector who now make up about 25 percent of
the Swazi society may try to bring pressure on the new
ruler for remedies for their frustrations, remedies
that probably will entail substantial modification of
the present traditionalist/tribal framework. (C)
(CONFIDENTIAL)
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