SWEDEN'S MILITARY PROCUREMENT PROBLEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00935A000100050001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: IM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
10 Jeremy 19&'.
INTELLIGENCE *ARAM= no. 505
SUBJECT; Sweden's Unitary Procurement Problem
SUMO!
Sweden normally depends upon the import of considerable ametate
of strategic% nos materials and navy important items of military
equipment to maintain the effeetiveness of its armed form. Ms
greater part of these imports oome from N.A.TO oountries? with the most
important single commodity being petroleum. If the growing reams.4
meat requirements of the NATO group lead to a severe reduction if the
amount of strategic eaterials and military equipment available to
Sweden, the Swedish armed forces would deteriorate in. efficiency-,
There is no practical enky for Sweden to make up any loss in
strategic supplies: from NATO countries, Imports from the Soviet oleo,
or from other nonalATO countries, could meet only a small part of
Sweden's present needs for strategic materials and military equipeent,
Although Sweden has the skills, resoureen, and plants to become nearly
xelf.aufficient both in, manufectured equipment and in materials (axcept
for petroleum? petroleum products, coal and coke), the eeonomio mist of
such a program would be prohibitive except during actwal war or gravest
national emergency, nbreover, the time required to develop suoh self.
sufficiency might not be available I:hen an emergeney arose,
A decline in the efficiency of the Swedish armed forcea would be
detrimental to ns seeurity' because Sweden though not a member at NATO,
is fundamentally anti.Communist and antauesian in orientation? end
would tight if directly attaoked by the USSR, Any weakening of fkiedish
armed strength would make a Soviet invasion of the country easier and
would also exert a depressing effect upon Norway and Denmark, Peri. these
reasons it is still highly important for the US to have Sweden ccitivue
to be as strong and stable as possible,.
TrgiST Lhis emetml-Wrgol been coordinated with the XAC agenpies,
It is based on the premise that Suede:air:ill be unable to seer:an
taw vital military commoditiea from the NATO group and doSes not
attempt to evaluate the policies involved, The serorandus: eon.
tains information available to CIA as of I Jartertry
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siTEDENIS LIILITART PrROCUBBLENT PROBLEM
Sweden, to maintain an effective defense foroea wet import
vaious materials and produote, zany of which eon= frora members of
the NATO. If the rearms:verb require:canto of the NATO group lead to
severe restrictions on exports of a military or strategic nature to
Sweden, the efficiency of Sweden's armed forces 'Would be serioular
affected and would cause the Swedish Gover=errb to seek other mum
of procuring the essential military items formerly' obtained from NATO
countries. The purpose of this stuck, la (a) to estimate the efface
a reduction of strategic imports from NATO would have on the efficient-
ay of the Swedish armed force*, (b) to consider the steps open te
Sweden to resolve the problem arising from reduced strategic importer
and (c) to estimate bow the seourity of the US would be arrogated by
(a) and (b) Above,
Sweden's defense problem is complicated beoauoe it is vulatteable
to Soviet attack by lend, sea, and air. Defenses musk, therefm1-4,be
provided against all three kieds of assault under both cold and term
weather conditions. Liereover, the terrain varies from the rough and
rountainous in the north to the relative flat lands of the south.
Although these circumstances are not unique to Sweden, they take 03
added significance because Sweden, although approximately the sibs
and shape of California, has a total population less than twice 4.;hat
of las Angeles Count-.
Coupled with Sr:adores difficult over.all defense problem is the
detrimental effect that nearly one hundred and forty years of pow)*
have had on the advanoement of the military profession in the theory
and practice of modern warfare. During ard after both world warm
particularly World Tier II, Sweden's policy of neutrality reducted to
a minimum the opportunities for valuable exchanges of military itlfer,.
nation, techniques, and strategic conoeptse Since World 17ar 11,1 how,.
ever, the military leaders have been exerting every posaible ofitirt
to modernize Sweden's armed forces through the utilization of foreign
designs and technicians, the stockpiling of oasmeeditiee in crittoal
abort supply, and the expansion of doraestio industry. Svrederals xerettees,
foreign policy, and various soonordo end financial factors have 'placed
certain limitations on these efforts.
Although Sweden's preeont armed forces area on the Whole, =limy
for a small nation, they suffer from lack of combat experience ald are
purely defensive in coneept.) Thus, the air force, which is the ,,iforld'se
fourth strongest numerioally, is weak in =tern bomber typesa bw; jet
fighter strength is being increased. Sweden's navy ranks sixth n the
world; it has an offielent underwater service consisting of tweztly-,
four submarines, with three additional authorized for construottm.
Sweden's conscript army is second...rate by US standards, sufferin?; rinni
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lack of modern equipment and largeg.unit training? but universal zilitarl
training makea possible the mobilisation, of apprmrAmately 8504,000
mm2, out of a population or SWAM i11ion (equal to that of Dermarc
and Normy ammbinod).
Sweden* to maintain defense forees at the present level of
mess and efficiency, must import certain, strategic raw materials*
finished produats and aomponent parts st of thew imports normally
come from members of tbe NATO. Of these imports petroleum and CUP-0
sociatad products are the most important. Sweden io dependent upln.
outside sources for 90 to 95 perm:out of its petroleumtrequirementes
during 1949 at least .thirds of Sweden's petroleunimports Onal
from areas controlled by HAM couetriel. Also high on the list or
vital imports is solid fUels with about half of Sweden's total re..
quirements =rooming fron the UK, Belgium, and Vestern Germany.
Vero than 90 peroont of Sweden's crude'rUbber iv imported frmm
Britishmoontrolled areas. Finallys Sweden is deficient in the pra-
duction of nonferrous metals* alloy, and ores* which are extremely
important to all military services. Zany suohmotale and ores 03es.
peoially tin and bauxites and including coppers nickelt antimony&
oobalts eadmiur6 vanadium,. and manganese* are nau procured in sub.
stantial quantitiep from several at the NATO oeuntriee.
Notwithstanding the fact that the Swediph electrical induetrt
is well developed and exteesives it bas lagged behind in the epeoiel-
ised field a electronics: currently the armed foroes depend almoet
oompletely upon purahases from the US and the UK. Virteally ever/
radar devios now used by the military* regardless of type or funabions
La of US-UK origin.
Component parts presently obtained from NATO nationo and directly
affecting the effioieney of the fightiag forcea aro vorymmeroust
For examples, subminiature tubes for prOximity (VT) fuses come trout
Nollands and until the Swedish aircraft industry is completely re.
tooled* many important; acoessories for jet airarafts such an instzuffi.
mantis and wheel assemblisas must be obtained from the U3 and UK. As
fler military motor transports Sweden's relatively email automotive
induetry also imports a large nuMber of oomponent items frmn the 1Sp
the UKs and France because thew aro cheaper than dementia produete.
Ino/uded in this aategary are earburetors* electrical equipments ftar
axles, and steering gears.
Thus Sweden's defense femme presently rely to a large decree
for their equipment and supplies upon sources controlled by-mambo:ft
of the NATO. Sweden probably has enough petroleum on hand to pernit
=Mal peacetime operations for six months. At the other =travel
because of non-enembership in the NATOs.there ia virtually no steal.
pile of major electronic equipment such as radars and those dovioas
now in operation would beef= inoperable in a very short time-wit:lout
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eoemwat parts, Row materials in general are probably in no
letter supply than petroleum, and defense industry output would
soon be materially curtailed by a reduction of imprrts of this
nature. Thus, an inability oaths part of the Seedoo to procure
various strategie materials from VAT? oamutrieewould seriously
reduce the effioiency of the armed forces. Without the develop.
mit of adequate alternative sources, Seedents armed feroes neat
soon be practically imeobilised. The air fore* would nutter frot
reduced flight operations and ineffective night and foul4weather
training in oonjunctionwith radar exercises. Fleet exercises
would be curtailed ani the naves operational readiness for =obit
would steadily decline. Similarly, the argyle mobility would deo
crease =darter transport and armor already obsolete would soon
beeome unusable because of replacement part shortages. In addition,
Swedish industry would become less swi loss capable of turning ort
ndlitary orders owing to lack of critical ran -materials.
Sweden oould attempt in several eve to offset the serious
consequences of reduced strategic imports from NATO sources, A
partial solution would undoubtedly be to exploit and develop
domestic mineral deposits and industrial +=peaty; thin could be
done without diverging from& strict policy of neutrality. Indigos?
nous coal and shale oil resources can provide at leant ton percert
of requirements,and this figure could be inoreased to a small
degree by improved processes and greater investment. At the pre*
sent time, the small amount of synthetic rubber produced can be
discounted, tut this industry can be enlarged to some extent. The
scarcity of solid bole :ekes it impossible for Sweden to become-
zslf.sufficent in smelting ores of the most important non.ferrout
metals and allays, The tanufeoture of finished products would bi
possible only hy using less suitable eubstitutes in many instances
and, as a result, the armed forces 'mould not be capable of maintain.
ing the present standards of their equipment.
Unitary electronic equipment, including radar and anti.entnarine
inufare (ASO sets, could be produced in an emergency, but they tould
be of inferior design and reliability, The time required to start
produotionwould depend largely upon the supply of requisite rem
naterials.
At the expense of other production, in many instances of a
military nature, oosponont parts and accessories for motor trenstort
and armor, fuses of all types, and jot aircraft could be manufeetured,
However, the problem of substituting domestic) production for impOrts
from NATO countries is complex and diffioult, Ermaraximmmlutill.
zabion of domestic resources and skills would not enable Sweden to
maintain a fully effective army, navy, and air fore's. Largo govern,
rent subsidies and total technical and scientific nobilisation ttuld
make possible only severely limited production,
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Even though Sweden maybe able to achieve much greater selz.
sufficiency in military productions the formidable expenditures Iv.
quired and the enerroue ?commie waste mould probably be *torah:0
to the Smedes only in time of war or extreme emerge:ley. Thus, it is
very unlikely that Sweden mould make more than perfunatoryattemtte
at aelf.auffioieney tnder any oirounetanceo short of the Travost
national emergency. By the tine suchen emergeney arose, it would
probably be too late.
In searching for additional means of solving the problem of
military production, Sweden would sureky try to obtain needed
naterials from all ronspliATO and non.SoViet bloc souroes,
Indonesia, Argentina, and Egypt all produce oil. Raw rubber niat
be bought from Indonesia and Ceylon, and wolfram is mined in Spain.
Switzerland marszfactures excellent time fuses and is milling to :
engage in business transactions involving strategic commodities"
Although these expedients cannot be entirely dirmiesed, they would
be even less likely to fulfill military requirements than the
exploitation of Swedish resources and capacities.
Before Sweden would turn to the Soviet bloc, an appeal would
be made to Norway and Denmark in the hew that them, too neighbor-a
might carry the Swedish case before the councils of the NATO. Beth
the Danes and the Norwegiana are knaun to favor providing armaments
to Sweden, largely to accomplish a general strengthening of the
Scandinavian area, Vigorous argumonto for favorable action mould
be made by both governments,
A0 a last resort* exolusive of an outright request for admission
to the NATO, Sweden night attempt to transfer some of its depondelce
for military import requirements from. the NATO countries to the tr3SR
and its satellites. Suoh a course is extremely unlikely, It mould
be most distasteful to the Swedes not only bcoeuse of the great
difference in ideologiee, but also bemuse, from a practical viee.
point, it would entail exporting large amounts of strategic comp.
moditiee to their only potential mew. Uereovere the Soviet blol
night be unable to fill all of Swedaa'a requirements' In regard'-to
petroleum, for example, &mia contrail less than ten percent of the
present world output. Any rawmaterials that could be spared by.
the USSR would oertainky oome At a high price in money, geode and
concessions; in fact, Sweden's weakness would probably bo exploitld
talky by the Kremlin,
Finally, Sweden could solve the problem of strategic roquireionts
by abandoning its historic foreign poliay and Booking membership
NATO. Newever, there is no sign of any developnent in this direat.on,
and it is unlikely that more lack:of strategic ouppifterould brtig
the Sweden to such a deoicionmithout a very considerable acoompawing
increase of direct Soviet threats (i.e. an occupation of Finland)
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They are mush nom likely to teeporize* to attempt to solve theat
procurement problems by inadequate expedients* and to socept the
consequence of a considerable deterioration in their armed strergth.
Any substantial impairnent of the effectiveness of the Swetich
armed forces would be detrinental to the security interest of the
United States tooause of the fundamentally antipOoneurist and arbi..
Russian orientation of the Swedish Government and people. The
Swedish politn; matt favorable for DE interests would be full norber..
ship in HATO* with aoceptance of the responsibilities and the privi-
leges of that body* but Sweden is not likely to take such a stet
in the near future. Even though &soden oontinues to unman out.
side IIATO* it is still important to the DS to have Sweden remit
as stable and as strong as possible?
If directly attacked by the USSR:* Sweden would fight* Thua*
a, wakening of Swedish defensive oapabilitiee reduces the military
potential available for resitting ea:tension, by the USSR. LI:weaver?
a weakened Sweden would meat the defense of Norway and De=ark tore
difficult and urgent for the NATO* Psychologically* awakened
defense establishment would reduce the Swedish people"s will to
resist. Another result of awakened Sweden would be the under.
scoring of the defensive limitations and weaknesses oe the DaraW
and Eorwegianspvtioheould probably: (a) cause Denmark and norm'
to demand mere and speedier military asaietarco from the US$ ant
(b) arouse more vocal but !still ineffective opposition to adhertnce
to the nATO* especially in Denmark.
At the present critical tine* when strategic exports to the
Soviet orbit are being further restricted. increased Seidishtrade
vdth, the Soviet bloe sould be a baokward step. Ilereover* inp ?
creased Swedish trade with, the Soviet orbit vould reduce Seedem,a;
present contributions to European sec:tondo recovery and curtail.
shipment of important Swedish products now being received by HATO
countries.
SIZRET
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