COMMUNISM IN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00935A000100060001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 24, 1951
• Content Type: IM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM NO. 346
COMMUNISM IN AFRICA
24 January 1951
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
General....... ................................. 1
1. North Africa .................................. 6
a. Algeria ................................... 7
b. Tunisia ................................... 10
c. French Morocco ............................. 11
d. Spanish Morocco ............................. 15
e. Spanish Sahara .............................. 15
f. Tangier ................................... 15
g. Libya . , .................................. 16
(1) Tripolitania ....... .. .. ... ... .... . . . . . . .. . 16
(2) Cyrenaica ............................... 16
(3) Fezzan ................................. 16
2. West Africa .......... ........................ 17
a. French West Africa ........................... 17
b. British West Africa . .... .. .. . .. ..... .... . . .. . 19
C. Liberia ..... 22
d. Portuguese and Spanish Guinea 22
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3. South Africa .................................. 22
a. The Union of South Africa ....................... 22
b. South-West Africa ............................ 26
c. High Commission Territories .................... 27
4. Central and East Africa .. .. .. . .. ... ...... . . ...... 27
a. Madagascar and Reunion ........................ 27
b. British East Africa 28
c. British Central Africa ...... . . . ... ... .. .... .. . . 30
d. Belgian Congo ............................... 31
e. French Equatorial Africa (FEA), French Cameroons,
and TogolaT id .............................. 32
f. Angola and Mozambique ........................ 33
5. Northeast Africa 34
a. Somalia (formerly Italian Somaliland) ............... 34
b. British Somaliland ............................ 34
c. French Somaliland ............................ 34
d. Eritrea ................................... 34
e. Ethiopia ................................... 35
f. Sudan .................................... 35
African Members of Communist Dominated International
Organizations .................................. 36
Map: Africa Administrative
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
24 January 1951
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM NO. 346
SUBJECT: Communism in Africa*
Communism in Africa presents a potential rather than an immediate
threat to US security. Although the ultimate aim of the USSR in Africa is
certainly to deny Africa's resources and military potential to the Western
Powers, the Kremlin is currently concerned with preparatory phases and
intermediate goals. Moreover, the effectiveness and extent of European
control in. Africa, combined with the overwhelming illiteracy, inacessi -
bility and provincialism of the natives, will continue to delay the progrt'ss
of the Communist movement there.
In so large and diverse an area as Africa, Communist strength and
intentions vary considerably from region to region. In general, Communist
activities seem for the present to be designed to:
(1) Embarrass the European Colonial Powers whenever possible,
in and out of the UN, and to undermine the stability of the colonial
administrations in Africa;
(2) Limit the use of the Continent as a base for military operations
of the Western Powers; and
(3) Interfere with the flow to the Western Powers of certain strategic
materials for which Africa is the major world source. For example, in
addition to uranium, Africa currently furnishes 80 percent or more of LS
supplies of chemical chromite, battery grade manganese, and asbestos,
nearly all the US supply.of corundum, columbite, industrial diamonds and
cobalt. Africa is also the only source of latex outside of the Far East.
* Except Egypt, which is considered an integral part of the Near and
Middle East.
Note: This report has not been coordinated with the intelligence
organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the
Navy, and the Air Force. It contains information available
to CIA as of 1 December 1950.
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In their efforts to achieve these aims, the Communists concentrate
on two principal groups. The first includes the so-called nationalist move-
ments which frequently have no true nation-consciousness but which do ex-
press the natives' widespread desire to obtain freedom from European
control. Support of these independence movements gives Communism.an
immediate means of fomenting trouble for the Western Powers and offers
the long-range prospect of obtaining the friendship of leaders who eventually
may occupy positions of authority in their countries. The second group
includes the labor unions, which are generally numerically weak, are built
on an illiterate and undependable membership, lack adequate funds, and are
led by corrupt individuals. Thus, these unions provide a natural medium for
disruptive Communist tactics, but a poor avenue to firm Communist ,,ontrol
of the labor force.
Communist agitators make the most of the lack of social legif;lation
and the failures of the colonial administrations to provide security of employ-
ment and satisfactory working conditions. They also exploit the feelings of
inferiority and the anti-white sentiments of most natives, especially the
floating detribalized elements in urban and industrial areas. The Communists
are specifically interested in those leaders and intellectuals who have been
embittered by their contacts with white men or who cannot find what 'hey
regard as suitable employment. The Communists make special efforts to
cultivate Africans studying abroad.
Communism in Africa appears to draw its inspiration and direction
principally from the Communist parties in the colonial powers, rather than
from the few Soviet missions. The French and British Communist parties,
especially the former, maintain liaison with African Communists and con-
tinually make strenuous efforts to influence native nationalist leaders;. In
a relatively few cases there are direct connections between Communist
sympathizers in the different colonial dependencies. The USSR has very
limited open contact with Africa, having in the whole continent only the
legation in Addis Ababa and consulates in Algiers, Pretoria, and Cape town.
The Soviet Satellites have only a few widely scattered consular and cum-
mercial offices.
International Communist and Communist-front organizations have
recently displayed an increasing interest in Africa, which, however, still
comes after Europe and Asia as a target for penetration and propaganda
efforts. Soviet Communist propaganda is paying more attention to African
affairs, describing the nationalist movements in sympathetic terms ordinarily
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reserved for pro-Communist organizations. The attention of Europe:tu.
Communists is directed toward the colonial areas as fields of growing
importance. Although their participation is numerically small,, more
African delegations are being admitted to international Communist front
organizations. Increasing numbers of selected Africans are being sent.
to the USSR and the Satellites for special training.
Among the formidable obstacles impeding the spread of Communist
influence in Africa are the extreme dispersal of the population and I.Wi
general political and economic immatur?ity, the inaccessibility of vas'
areas, and the almost total illiteracy of the savage and semi-savage peoples
who live in ancient, tribal,, and communal societies which until recent l.y
have been satisfactory. Addiiio"al obstacles include the opposition to
Communism of the traditional native hierarchies, the hostility of Islam
and other religions, and a natural native distrust of what frequently appears
to be a white-sponsored movement.
These impediments to Communist penetration are augmented by
the activities of the governments, which without: exception are hostile to
Communism, and with varying efficiency maintain surveillance of pos sthble
Communist agitators. The advantage of modern weapons over the
primitive arms of the natives provides their white rulers with the means
to impose decisions with comparative ease. The British are combatt !rig
Communism's appeal to native nationalism by granting the nnat;ives a
progressively greater share of political responsibility; the French are
increasingly associating native representatives with the governmental
machinery in consultative capacities.
Communism's degree of surcess varies considerably among the
different regions of Af:r?i.ca. In French North Africa, the Communist Party
operates in the open, and with 60,000 members furnishes the bulk of known
Communists in Africa. The close political and economic tie: between
French African territories and the home country facilitate the movement
of Communist organizers, and full advantage of this opportunity has been
taken by the powerful French Communist Party. Although the politica'.
integration of Algeria with. France gives Communism in that: area freedom
of action similar to that which it enjoys in France, the movement is
hampered throughout North Africa by the strong influence of a hostile
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Mohammedanism and by the opposition of the vigorous native nationalist
movements.
To the west, in Spanish Morocco and Spanish Sahara, the Franco
government has successfully suppressed all possibly Communistic
activities. The tiny Communist group in Libya has virtually no followers
within the native population.
In West Africa, particularly in the territories governed by France,
Communism has achieved some success by capitalizing on native discontent
with colonial rule. The area has no Communist Party, but Communist:
sympathizers control the single important native party in French West and
French Equatorial Africa, the Rassemblement Ddmocratique Africain (RDA),.
The natives leading this group accept Communist guidance and have affiliated
with international Communist organizations.
Nationalism is not Communist-oriented in the British territories
of the Gold Coast, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone, where the UK has reduced
the occasion for radical agitation by promoting self-government. Never-
theless, some native leaders have Communist contacts and often dissemi-
nate Communist propaganda in apparent attempts to further their own
nationalist aims. There is no known Communist activity in Gambia,
Liberia, or Spanish or Portuguese Guinea.
The Communist Party with a strength estimated at 1200-2000,
operated in the Union of South Africa until June 1950, when it was banned
by legislative action. The Communist Party's influence among the natives
was limited, however, since most of its leaders were white. Nevertheless,
the prevalent racial tensions, which are being intensified by current ;youth
African Government policies provide the Communists with a continuing
opportunity. Virtually no identifiable Communist influence has appeared
in relatively backward South-West Africa or in the British territories of
Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland.
Communism has no appreciable strength elsewhere in Africa except
in the French territories of Madagascar and Reunion, where in both places
it has` supported the nationalist movements and become an important force
in trade union organizations. In the Belgian Congo and in the generally
backward Portuguese colonies, the authorities have so far successfully
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suppressed what little Communist activity has occurred. There is
virtually no Communist influence in the Rhodesias, Nyasaland, or
British East Africa, although in the latter the presence of a com-
munity of white settlers and a still larger immigrant Indian minority
provides tensions of considerable potential for Communist exploita-
tion. Independence movements in these areas are not far advanced, and
the Communists have made little progress in influencing the active
trade unions.
In northeastern Africa, also a politically backward area, the
only organized Communist group is the minuscule Communist Party
in the Italian-administered territory of Somalia. The Soviet legation
at Addis Ababa has achieved no apparent success in the propaganda and
subversive efforts it is reported to direct in Ethiopia and throughout
eastern and central Africa. Communists have exerted influence upon
a minor Sudanese nationalist organization through contacts with students
in Egypt. In the Sudan, however, as in British and French Somaliland
and. Eritrea, Communism is negligible.
Throughout the continent, Communism feeds upon existing
discontent and endeavors to provoke more. Native sentiment favors
such aims as fuller participation in government, higher and non-
discriminatory wages, improved living conditions, better educational
facilities, elimination of racial barriers, and the realization .of
democratic freedoms championed by the Western Powers. ."erever
natives, pressing such demands, despair of achieving them from the
ruling powers, the Communist potential becomes greater. Until
such a point of despair is reached, Communism will encounter too
much opposition in Africa to become a serious threat.
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COMMUNISM IN AFRICA.
1. North Africa.
The northwest corner of Africa, known to the Arabs as the Maghreb
(Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia), is the part of the continent most closely
related historically and geographically to Europe. With the exception
of the Union of South Africa, the population has the highest percentage
of Europeans (approximately 7 percent); the Moslem natives themselves,
although backward by European standards, ar3 considerably more
advanced politically than the majority of African peoples. The present
social structure of the Maghreb is compounded of a traditional semi-
feudalistic agricultural order with a thin overlay of modern industrialism.
In this more advanced area near Europe, Communist ideology
was able to take an earlier and stronger hold than in the more remote
and primitive regions. Even in the Maghreb, however, and despite tho
pdverty and chronic discontent of the masses, the Communist parties
have remained numerically small and predominantly European.
In North Africa, International Communism has encountered opposi-
tion not only from the European administrations, but also from a self
conscious and growing nationalism which regards Communism as an
alien rival. In this three-way struggle for power, the Communists
are the weakest; fully realizing this, they adopted the strategy of
attempting to make common front with the nationalist parties.
Although the nationalist leaders are still cool toward the Communists,
some of the lower echelons are showing signs of impatience and a
growing willingness to accept the proferred Communist hand. Favoring
rapprochement, from the nationalist point of view, is the manifest
advantage of any alliance that would help them to resist governmental
prossure;* against it is the basic conflict between nationalistic desires
for independence and Communist subservience to Moscow. The
.g., all important nationalist papers in Algeria have joined the
Committee for the Preservation of the Freedom of Expression organized
by the Communists in order to capitalize on recent French repressive
activities directed against one of the nationalist publications
(L'Algerie Libre).
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Mohammedan religion also looms as a formidable, though not insurmountable,
obstacle to the spread of Communism among the masses.
The antagonism of Moslem culture and the opposition of native
hierarchies have slowed the spread of Communism, but the Communists
continue their efforts to influence the nationalist movement, through
collaboration with the nationalist leadership. More recently the
Communists began appealing to the rank and file.
Despite their now open insistence on following the Stalinist line,
the Communists continue to flavor their propaganda heavily with appeals
to nationalist aspirations and resertments in order to take advantage of
any friction between the French and the natives. Communist propaganda
in North Africa on issues elsewhere (as Indochina, for example) will
continue to be presented in nationalist terms.
Communist propaganda in North Africa consistently attacks the Arab
League, impugning its motives and ridiculing its promises -- especially a::
the latter kindle hope of a non-Communist road to nationalist independency.
a. Algeria.
Because Algeria is politically integrated with metropolitan France,:
the Algerian CP has virtually the same status and rights as the CP in
France. Four of the thirty seal's in the French National Assembly to which
Algeria is entitled are presently held by Communists.
The CP in Algeria has six regional centers -- Algiers, Blida, Bone,
Constantine, Oran and Tlemcen -- and is organized in the conventional
Communist pattern.
Resistance to Communism by the traditional native hierarchies is
not of major importance in Algeria because the old tribal discipline has
largely disintegrated and native loyalties are scattered and weak. The
nationalist opposition is divided between two parties, the Union Democratique
du Manifeste Alg(rien (UDMA) and the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des
Li ert s D mocrati4ues (MTLD)9 of approximately equal strength; neither
is well organized. Nei er of the nationalist parties has organized a labor
union, and the native union movement has fallen into Communist hands.
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Party strength is estimated to be about 15,000. The European
population, is largely more conservative than in France; the Moslems,
for reasons of religion, political apathy, and nationalistic sentiment, are
generally unreceptive to Communism. The Party has made some converts
among native intellectuals but little progress among the uneducated rural
masses.
The most powerful potential force controlled by the Algerian
Communist Party is the nttwork of labor unions affiliated with the
General Confederation of Labor (CGT) of France. The Communists
have almost full control over the Algiers dockers, and dominant influence
over many other unions. Although the Communists control the labor union
machinery and are capable of creating disturbances in vital sectors of the
Algerian economy, they are limited by the weak discipline of rank-and-file
union membership. The large supply of non-union casual labor also limits
the ability of union leaders to enforce their will, as evidenced by the ease
with which MDAP shipments have been unloaded despite union obstructionism.
There is considerable Communist influence among the European
skilled workers at vulnerable military installations. For example,
Communist sabotage orders would probably be followed by Communist skilled
workers in the naval base at Mers-el-Kebir, and at similar installations.
Communist strongpoints in the interior are Blida, where there is a
vigorous railway workers union, and Sidi-Bel-Abbes, which has a Communist
mayor, Rene` Justrabo, who is also the sole Communist member of the
Algerian Assembly.
The most widely read Communist paper is that of the CGT, the
Alger Republicain, which has considerable influence with CGT members
an is probablymaking some impression even on illiterate Moslems in
the interior who gather in cafes and public places to hear it read aloud.
In. its current drive for financial support the MTLD as a party and various
UDMA leaders as individuals have seen fit to subscribe substantial sums.
The weekly Liberte, chief Communist Party organ, parrots the pro-Communist
L'Humanit~ of aris.
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The Communists in Algeria, as elsewher in North Africa, have
long followed a policy of collaboration with the nationalist movement
at almost any price. However, the limited response to this policy,
particularly by the UDMA, was based on opportunistic and temporary
considerations rather than on any inclination to form a lasting alliance.
Since the stiffening of the Communist Party line, and the open break
with the UDMA, Communists have slackened their attempts to col-
laborate with nationalist leaders.
Although the MTLD has consistently cold-shouldered the Com-
munists, it contains elements potentially vulnerable to Communist
exploitation. The MTLD leader, Messali Hadj, was a Communist in
his youth, but is not likely to return to Communism.
The Algerian Communist Party is in continuous contact with
the Soviet Consulate General in Algiers, which is the only Soviet
diplomatic post in North Africa. Normal liaison between the two
is probably maintained by the Secretariat of the Algerian Communist
Party and the Soviet Vice-Consul, who is reported to be Soviet
intelligence head in Algeria.
Representatives of the Algerian Communist Party attend inter-
national congresses sponsored by the USSR. Alice Sportisse and
Andre' Ruiz were delegates to the World Congress of Democratic
Youth at Budapest, and Mme. Baya Allaouchiche went to the Moscow
Council, International Federation of Democratic Women, ahd to
the Peiping Asian Women's Conference. Abdherramane Boughama,
Secretary General of the Algerian Association of Friends of USSR,
represented Algeria at the October 1949 Rome meeting of the Soviet-
front World Committee of the Partisans of Peace.
The Algerian. Communist Party is closely connected with the
Communist Party of France. Working relations between the two
Communist organizations are more intimate than in the case of
Morocco or Tunisia.
The French Communist Party (FC') maintains in Algiers a
permanent delegate for North Africa, Leon Feix, who relays instruc-
tions from Paris and is believed to report to the Secretariat of the
FCP through Andr'Marty. The Algerian Communist Party was
represented by its Secretary, Larbi Bouhali, at the 12th National
Congress of the French Communist Party held near Paris in April 1950.
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The Polish Consul, a fanatical Communist, probably promotes Soviet-
Communist interests in the area.
The Spanish Communist Party has followers in Oran, which has the
largest Spanish population of any city in North Africa.
b. Tunisia.
The Tunisians are the most sophisticated people of Africa and the
,Tunisian nationalist movement is politically., the most nature and best
organized in North Africa; the rapidly developing independence of adjacent
Libya under UN sponsorship has greatly increased Tunisia's nationalist
aspirations.
To counteract both Communism and nationalism, the French started
a reform program in July 1950 designed to increase native participation in
the Tunisian Government. Determined resistance of the conservative French
colonists has, however; almost smothered even the mo erately progressive
reforms proposed by the French Resident General. The slow pace of
reforms will increase nationalist discontent and may weaken the popular
support for the Neo-Destour (nationalist) Party if it continues to participate
in the government. Already the acquiescence of Habib Bourghiba, Tunisian
Neo-Destour Party leader, in continuation of the French Protectorate in
return for French promises has aroused the ire of most Moroccan and
Algerian nationalist leaders. General dissatisfaction among Tunisian
nationalists with the progress to date has enabled the Communists to
advance their claims of being the only true spokesmen for Tunisian
'liberation. "
The labor situation in Tunisia is distinguished by the existence
of the Qeneral Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT), which is' a powerful
nationalist union. composed almost exclusively of Moslems and over-
shadowing the rival Communist union.
Since the Communist Union of Syndicates of Wbrkers of Tunisia
(USTT) lost most of its members to the UGTT, the Communists have
tried to get control of the nationalist union by indirection. The WFTU
in July 1949 accepted the long-pending application of the UGTT, thus
bringing both unions under Communist influence, but in the face of
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increasingly shrill Communist demands for "all or nothing" cooperation,
the UGTT left the WFTU in July 1950. The UGTT has scrupulously
refrained from associating itself with USTT demonstrations which back
Soviet foreign policy in the guise of supporting native nationalism.
Present Communist strength in Tunisia is centered in the
relatively small urban proletarian element; any extension of Communism
will depend on its ability to take the leadership away from the nationalists.
The French have been able to keep Communists out of the
administration and will, in all likelihood, continue to do sod French
naval authorities banned the Communist paper, L'Avenir de la Tunisie,
from the naval arsenal at Ferryville because of its subversive i uence
among the skilled workers.
The Tunisian Communist Party is militant, alert, and ingenious;
it is capable of carrying out limited strikes and causing turmoil among
agrictiltural as well as urban workers who receive inadequate pay.
The USSR has no official representation in Tunisia, but occasional
instructions probably are passed to the Tunisian CP by the Soviet
Consulate General in Algiers. Also, some Communist orders may be
sent from Moscow via Paris, though in routine matters instructions probably
originate with the French CP.
The Tunisian CP is directly subordinate to the French CP. Leon Feix
is in frequent touch with the Tunisian CP and attended a meeting of the
Central Committee at Tunis in January 1950. At the 12th National Congress
of the French CP held outside Paris in April 1950, Tunisian Communists
were represented by Mohammed Ennafaa.
c. French Morocco.
The expansion of Communism in French Morocco is seriously
hampered by the hostility of the Sultan and the exclusiveness of Moroccan
nationalism. The aversion to Communism of the traditional native
hierarchies throughout North Africa is strongest in Morocco, where the
Sultanate is powerful and the social system has been least disturbed.
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The groups being rallied to support of the French Protectorate
are opposed not only to Communism but also to the pro-independence stand
of the reigning Sultan and the Istiglal. For example, the Islamic
brotherhoods are strongly conservative and orthodox sects, bearing much
the same relation to Islam as monastic orders bear to Catholicism.
Their outstanding leader in North Africa is the Sherif Abdelhai El Kattani,
who is extremely anti-Communist and pro-French.
The Protectorate Government's policy of proscribing native
labor unions while tolerating the membership of natives in the
Communists-controlled General Confederation of Labor (CGT) is a
great asset to the Communist Party in French Morocco. The Protectorate
Government, however, apparently would rather leave control of union labor
in the hands of the Communists than permit the formation of a native labor
movement, as demanded by the Sultan and the Istiglal (nationalist) Party.
The Government believes a native union would be a more serious threat
to French hegemony.
The dissemination in Morocco of printed Communist propaganda
is considerably restricted by French censorship,-which does not exist
in Algeria or Tunisia. In addition to local control of publications, there is
almost daily censorship of Communist newspapers published in France and
shipped to Morocco. Spanish Communist newspapers (printed in France
at present) are also under regular censorship.
Special US treaty relations with Morocco, antedating the French
Protectorate and never abrogated, give the US equal rights with all foreign
countries including France, and cause constant friction between the US
and the French Protectorate authorities. This situation, and the direct
US-French negotiations which arise from it, give the Communists an excu:-;e
for both anti-US and anti-French propaganda.
Communist Party membership is about 20,000. The Protectorate
will probably be able to control Communism with police measures and use
of the armed forces.
The bulk of the Party following is among the union members and,
middle-class intelligentsia of the small European population. However,
active Communists and fellow-travelers are sprinkled through the
administration and armed forces, particularly the lower grades, in
sufficient numbers to constitute a potential nuisance. They have also
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infiltrated the teaching profession as they have in France. Most dangerous
potential strength is in their control of the CGT.
Present Party membership is almost entirely urban, being largely
concentrated in the Casablanca area, where the destitute proletariat forma
a convenient pool for Communist recruitment.
The Resident General of Morocco is a vigorous and alert anti-
Communist equipped with ample legal power (the state of siege decree
of 1912 has never been lifted) and military force. The activities of the
Party are closely watched, but it has not been banned as have the
nationalist parties. French policy is probably influenced by the continued
legal recognition of a large Communist Party in metropolitan France.
There is also some evidence that the French tolerate the Communists
to encourage competition with the Istiqlal, the leading nationalist party.
Communist periodicals, besides being heavily censored, are
subjected to harassment. For example, L'Espoir was suspended in 1949,
and Le Petit Marocain, organ of the Communist-dominated Union Gn4rale
des Syndicates du Maroclost its printing presses in 1950 to a new con-
servative daily of the same name. In November 1950 the UGSCM began
publishing a new daily, Les Nouvelles Marocaines, slanted to appeal to
the working masses rather than to the intellectual- Communists. The
former Party leader, Ali Yata, an Algerian, was recently arrested and
expelled from Morocco.
Despite these handicaps, the Moroccan Communist Party is very
active and will probably take quick advantage of any opening. It is
presently capable of instigating limited intermittent strikes and keeping
alive some social ferment.
The measure of Communist strength will, however, eventually
bear a very close relationship to the degree of success which the
Communists achieve in their efforts to utilize nationalist energies.
This, in turn, will depend to a large extent on the nationalists' estimate
of their chances of attaining their objectives without Communist support.
The grave concern recently expressed on that score by nationalist leaders
to US officials was possibly exaggerated in the hope of influencing US
policy, yet there can be little doubt that morale is declining and that there
is some Communist infiltration of Istiqlal ranks. In September 1950 a unit
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of the Istiglal located within 50 miles of the capital seceded from the party
and announced its intention of cooperating with the Communists. The state-
ment issued by the defecting unit expressed strong anti-US sentiments anti
impatience with Istiglal policy.
In view of the close working relationship of the Communist Parties
of North Africa, and the long-standing Soviet interest in the territory,
it is probable that instructions, and some money are received through the
Soviet Consulate General in Algiers. The Consul General or his repre-
sentative visits Morocco periodically. He also has had an unofficial
representative in Casablanca, a Mr. Moses Dal jansky, manager of the
Societ6 Multex, and holder of a Soviet passport issued in 1947. Daljansby
has reportedly been in close association with the Union des Patriotes
Sovietiques, a small group of pro-Communist Russians resting in Morocco.
On 24 April 1950, Daljansky was arrested and deported.
The Communist-line weekly newspaper, L'Espoir, until it ceased
publication, used Soviet material extensively. T eF amount of direct Soviet.
...supervision in Morocco is actually relatively small, the main chain of
command being through Paris.
The Communist Party in Morocco is directed and largely finalced
by the parent organization in France, with orders coming either directly
from Paris or through Loon Feix, French Communist Party representative
in Algiers. The normal line of communication appears to be from Feix to
Maitre Henri Bonnet of the Moroccan Communist Party.
Prominent French Communists sometimes attend Moroccan
Communist Party Politburo meetings, and a group of pro-Communist
members of the Assembly of the French Union, on a tour of North and
West Africa in 1949, held a lengthy meeting with Moroccan Communists.
The Moroccan Communist Party was represented by Ahmed Magrobi at the
12th National Congress of the French Communist Party held near Paris in
April 1950.
The Spanish Communist Party also has a branch--1n.Casablanca,
where there is a large colony of Spanish political refugees.
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d. Spanish Morocco.
The Spanish Government, fundamentally and unreservedly anti-
Communist, has declared Communism illegal in all its territories. It
is believed that no clandestine Communist activity takes place in Spanish
Morocco. The Spanish Government maintains a sizable army and tight
political controls in the protectorate. There is, at the present time, no
apparent Soviet or Spanish Communist Party effort to organize the area.
e. Spanish Sahara.
So far as is known, there is no Communist organization or activity
in Spanish Sahara (Rio de Oro).
f. "Tangier.
Because of its singular status as an internationalized zone,
Tangier is clearly an important potential Communist center. Its freedom
from controls and investigations, its cosmopolitan atmosphere, and its
crossroads location make it an ideal clearing house for international
Communist operations. The free money market of Tangier offers
opportunities to the Communists for secret financial manipulations.
Both the Spanish and Moroccan Communist Parties have small
branches in Tangier with a combined membership, including youth and
women's sections, of about 300. Both Parties are legal in Tangier, but
are believed to have instructions to remain relatively unobtrusive for the
time being. Prospects for any immediate substantial membership gains
among the local population are slim. The bulk of the Europeans are
Spaniards, who realize the danger of associating with Communism; the
natives are unreceptive because of the influence of Islam and the anti-
Communism of the nationalists.
There are a number of Communists in the International Administra-
tion, the highest degree of penetration being in the Public Works Department.
Despite Communist efforts, the labor unions on the whole tend to be non-
Communist. Four prominent Communists were expelled from the Zone
at the request of the Spanish Consul General in April 1948.
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The Soviet Union is entitled to be represented on the Committee of
Control (the Tangier international governing body) and to appoint a Consul
General in Tangier, but these rights have not yet been exercised. Nor is
there any evidence of a direct link between the Soviet Consulate-General
in Algiers and the local Communist Parties. Soviet Communists, however,
may have inspired the unsuccessful attempt in November 1947 to amalgamate
the Spanish left-wing parties under the name of "Frente DemocrStica
Tangerina. 99
Spanish and Moroccan Communist Parties in Tangier probably
receive instructions from France via Casablanca. The directing influence
of the Moroccan Communist Party is certainly French, and its most active
native members are either Algerians or Moors from French Morocco.
There is frequent liaipon between the Casablanca headquarters and the
Tangier branch of the Moroccan Communist Party.
g. Libya.
(1) Tripolitania.
There is very little Communist activity in Tripolitania. No
legal CP exists as such, and the estimated strength of Communist groups
is about 150. Activity is confined almost entirely to small Italian left-
wing groups in Tripoli, of which the most important organization is the
Italian Popular Democratic Front headed by Alvaro Felici.
The Communist activity of these groups is undoubtedly
directed from Italy, but there is little accurate information on the
extent and frequency of directives. There is no evidence of any com-
munication with Soviet diplomatic or consular missions, nor of lateral
links with other Communist groups in North Africa or Egypt. Therefore,
there is no formal government effort to suppress the limited Communist
activity.
(2) Cyrenaica.
There is no known significant Communist activity in
Cyrenaica.
(3) Fezzan.
There is no known Communist activity in the Fezzan.
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2. West Africa.
a. French West Africa.
There is no Communist Party in French West Africa despite the
obvious Soviet interest in the area, and the absence of any legal prohibition
of the Party. Since the leaders of the only significant native movement,
the Rassemblement Di~mocratique Africain (RDA), are in close contact
with a ommunis Par y in Par s, -t-H-6 non-existence of an overt
Communist organization probably reflects a deliberate party tactic.
Communist activity, therefore, consists of infiltration of the local labor
unions, and working within the RDA, where the Communists are faced
with the difficult problem of utilizing the large but relatively backward
membership.
The labor unions in French West Africa are new, weak, and
scattered. About half their members are white; the others are natives
unaccustomed to disciplined work habits. In addition, the native Africans
display the sudden shifts in enthusiasm typical of primitive peoples. While
they might be, and are, influenced temporarily by Communism, they are
equally susceptible to any other attractively-presented new notion.
The RDA was organized in 1946 when increased political rights
were given to the natives of French West Africa under the new French
Constitution. It is a native anti-colonial political party which bases its
appeal on the necessity for better economic conditions for the natives.
Generally there is little understanding of or feeling for nationalism among
the inhabitants; political interest is limited almost entirely to intratribal
matters and the natives, largely because of their own limitations, have
been unable fully to take advantage of the political power accorded them.
The RDA has attempted to stir up native racial feeling and to disrupt
harmonious relations between the colonial administrators and the natives,
and it is incrfeasingly apparent that its top leaders are actively promoting
Communist objectives. The RDA probably is not nominally Communist
because of the antagonism of the superstitious native religions for
Communism. The failure of the RDA to propagate fundamental Communist
theories is attributable to a realization that the inhabitants are culturally
unable to understand them. The fact remains, however, that the RDA is
the leading Communist-inspired organization in Africa. Its president,
Felix Houphouet-Boigny, and its secretary general, Gabriel d'Arboussier,
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have both indicated their faith in the USSR as the champion of world peace and
social justice.
During the past few months, there has been increased Soviet
emphasis on this area, expressed in propaganda, the visits of French
Communist Party officials, and trips of RDA officers to the USSR and
international Communist gatherings. The major appeal of the Communists
is to native demands for racial equality. The US and the colonial nations
are presented as imperialist powers determined to make war on the USSR --
the defender of peace, progress, and unifversal liberty. French colonial
officials apparently have taken no steps to eradicate this impression; they
have however, violently suppressed Communist-inspired riots and disorders,
tie instigators of which have been vigorously defended by the RDA. Despite
t* pro-Soviet leaders in the RDA, the Communist movement in French
*est Africa is not likely soon to gain sufficient strength to be a serious
menace, for the basic fact remains that while some natives would like to be
rid of the French colonial administrators, their own simple immediate
needs are largely met in the communal life of the tribes. In addition,
the natives' main line of conduct is determined by the power which exerts
domina.t control on the spot.
During the past two years, internal opposition to the pro-
Communist policies of its leaders has contributed to a decline of the RDA.
Over-all membership has fallen from an estimated 1,000,000 to between
200,000 and 300,000, centered chiefly in the Ivory Coast. In that territory,
RDA representation in the local General Council, which has 27 seats, has
dropped from. 25 to 9, not as a result of the resignation of members, but
rather by their resignation from the RDA. The pro-Communist contingent,
has now belatedly demanded that the Rassemblement purge itself of un-
r.eliables. The "hard core" strength, however, probably remains essentially
the same as in 1946 and its underground efficiency appears to have increased.
There is no Soviet diplomatic or consular representation in
French West Africa. Direct Soviet influence is therefore negligible.
The Communist Party of France, hopeful of tightening and
extending its control of the RDA, follows closely all activities of the
organization, with the aid of RDA leaders. Raymond Barbe, chief of the
African Affairs Committee of the French Communist Party, and Andr6Tollet,
CGT leader in Paris, use Soviet models for circulars and letters of
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instructions directed to subordinate officials of the RDA, but it is
questionable how much effect these instructions have on the mass
of RDA membership, which has little or no comprehension of Com-
munist doctrine.
There have been indications recently that the RDA deputies
in the French National Assembly are tending to break away from the
Communist Party line which they have heretofore followed unswervingly.
b. British West Africa.
There are no overt Communist parties in British West Africa,
nor has,.-Communism made any serious inroads among the native peoples.
However, several prominent leaders of native nationalist movements,
which are more vocal and widespread than in British East or Central
Africa, maintain contact with the British CP. They may well promote.
a Communist alliance and adopt Communist methods when such tactics
would contribute to their acquisition of power.
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- Revised constitutions in Nigeria and the Gold Coast will mean
near-autonomy status for both colonies, probably within a year. Political
extremism in both, and interregional jealousies especially in Nigeria,
however, will challenge stability under the new constitutions.
There is only limited liaison between British West African
nationalists; such liaison as does exist is through London via organiza-
tions like the West. African Students' Union and the fading Communist-
penetrated West African National Secretariat. The latter specifically
has aimed at building a federation of West African states. There is
sporadic contact between British West African nationalists and Communist
sympathizers in French West Africa.
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1 low
In British West Africa, several important nationalist Leaders
are capable of using Communist methods and of attempting revolutionary
action to achieve personal power. Their greatest assets are the anti-
white and anti-imperial attitudes of West African natives. Their debits
are local tribal authority and conservatism, ignorance, and provincialism.
There is no evidence of direct contact between West African
groups and Soviet authorities. There is, however, a limited Soviet
propaganda effort in British West Africa.
The British CP has taken considerable interest in the
British West African colonies, whose natives it considers more politically
mature than other Africans. Its Africa Committee has maintained close
contact with the West African National Secretariat in London, a Communist-
penetrated organization (not controlled by the British CP) whose chairman,
Awooner-Renner, an associate of Nkrumah in the Gold Coast, is an avowed
Communist. The party also aids the Communist-infiltrated West African
Students' Union in London, whose members are invited to the party's
meetings, classes, and social events. The CP African News Letter is
distributed in West Africa and much Communist-line material is published
in nationalist newspapers.
(1) In Nigeria, Communism is almost non-existent, though
some nations ist leaders are in touch with the British CP and receive its
propaganda material. One of the most important nationalists is
Nnamdi Azikiwe. Although he is no Communist, his main organization,
the National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons, remains the most
active nationalist organization whose propaganda occasionally contains
Communist coloration. In the trade union field, Communist opportunity
is growing through the influence of Nduka Eze, who to a considerable
extent is sympathetic towards Communist ideology. Eze is the head
of one of the three major labor federations that joined in the spring of
1950 to form a single Nigerian Labor Congress, and he has been
endeavoring to affiliate the Congress with the WFTU. Eze's paper,
The Labour Champion, which ceased publication in June 1950, carried
the s ogan ? Towards the Creation of the Socialist Republic. " The
World Federation of Democratic Youth and the Women's International
Democratic Federation have tried unsuccessfully to cultivate appropriate
groups in Nigeria.
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25X6A (2) In the Gold Coast
The political consciousness of_
the native has developed more rapidly here than elsewhere, and native
political leaders will gain a large measure of control after elections
under the new Constitution early in 1951. The most rabid and influential
nationalist is Kwame Nkrumah, who in 1945 became the first secretary
of the West African National Secretariat in London, at which time he
may have joined the British CP. For several years thereafter Nkrumah
advocated the over-all unification of West Africa into a Soviet Socialist
Republic, and made several abortive attempts to promote West African
unity. Now Nkrumah acts principally through the strongest political
party in the Gold Coast, the Convention Peoples Party, which he was
instrumental in forming. Its program has called for direct action
to force the granting of dominion status to the Gold Coast, but never-
theless it is expected to participate in the forthcoming elections that
will bring a lesser degree of self-government. Nkrumah is in jail
at least until December 1951 for sparking the abortive general strike
and civil disobedience campaign of January 1950. Though he is a trained
agitator well `versed in revolutionary technique and has Communist
contacts, the evidence indicates that he would not be dominated by either
Moscow or London. He is a nationalist and opportunist adapting
Communist shpport to his own ends.
(3) In Sierra Leone the only nationalist leader of any importance
is Wallace Johnson. He is not a Communist, but has reportedly received
aid from Communist sources. Joh~tson is prominent in two local
nationalist organizations, the West African League and the West African
Youth League. The latter is the mare influential and publishes a
newspaper of its own which prints much Communist-line material.
The League maintains some contact with Nkrumah in the Gold Coast
and with the West African National Secretariat in London of which
Johnson is the official representative in Sierra Leone.
(4) The Gambia presents little danger of Communist penetration,
and the same is true of the Cameroons and Togoland trust territories.
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No CP exists in Liberia and the Government opposes any manifesta-
tion of Communism. The only available vehicle for Communist propaganda
was The African Nationalist, a newspaper published by C. Frederick Taylor,
a naturalized Liberian. The paper, currently suspended, has appeared
intermittently but the source of its funds is not known. Ostensibly The
African Nationalist was anti- administration xather than pro-Communist.
d. Portuguese and Spanish Guinea.
No information is available on political activity in Portuguese or
Spanish Guinea.
3. South Africa.
a. The Union of South Africa.
Until the Party formally announced its dissolution on 20 June 1950
(just prior to the passage of legislation to outlaw it), the Union of South
Africa was the only area in British Africa having an avowed CP and
serving as a base for Communist agents and propaganda. It is still
the only British African area having Soviet consulates. There is little
evidence, however, that the South African CP, directly or indirectly,
controlled Communist activities in any territory outside the Union.
The Party is probably retaining as much as possible of its pre-dissolutio i
influence.
When it existed, the South African CP was always small, but it
shrank further in the postwar years. Its recent membership has been
estimated at 2,000, approximately 500 of whom were Europeans. (The
'hard core' consisted of about 400.) The party'iad little electoral
strength, polling only .1 percent of the total vote in the general election
of May 1948, but it had two elected officials reprOsenting natives:
Sam Kahn is one of three natives' representatives in the Union's House
of Assembly, and Fred Carneson, Secretary of the Cape Town CP, represents
natives of the Cape Western constituency in the Cape Provincial Council.
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Most of the Communist leaders are affluent intellectuals --
idealists who are too unfamiliar with the workers' background and
problems to win wide support. Because of the gulf between the
leaders and the natives, the party has been largely unsuccessful in
recruiting native followers. The only natives on the Central Committee
of fourteen -- Moses Kotane and Mofutsyana -- are intellectuals themselves.
The Party strength has concentrated in the Union's three
principal cities, CapiO Town, Johannesburg, and Durban. Publications
have included The Guardian, Inkululeko, Freedom, and the Democrat,
all with very limited circulations; Tie Guardian, a weekly, was the
most frequently, published periodical.
Communist-oriented labor leaders are not influential,',because
the labor movement itself is of little importance in the conservative
political and economic structure of South Africa. Since the War it
has suffered a further decrease in influence. In 1946 its ranks numbered
only about 170,000, excluding members of native unions, who are barred
from official labor registration privileges. Communists are estimated
to be in key positions in more than 25 percent of the European and mixed
trade unions (Communists are reported to be on 78 out of 248 union
.executive boards) and in all non-European unions. The only European
union under Communist control is the Garment Workers' Union, although
Communists are strong in the Tobacco Workers' Union, Tailoring Worker-3'
Industrial Union, and Diamond Workers' Union. They have also exerted
pressure upon the important coordinating body, the South African Trades
and Labor Council. The Council's strength has been reduced by the
defection of three right-wing unions.
Among non-European unions, the important African Mine
Workers' Union formed in 1941 is headed by a Communist, J.J. Marks,
who is also chairman of the Council of Non-European Trade Unions in
the Rand area. This union claims a membership of 10,000. Communists
are also active among Natal's Indian Workers, constituting a majority of
the officials of unions whose members are mainly or entirely Indian.
But the party has encountered difficulties in further extending its influence
among non-European native unions, because the natives distrust all
European organizers.
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Of the Indian population at large (three percent of the total popula-
tion),about a quarter is under Communist influence. Communists hold
positions of lgadership in the politically important South African Indian
Congress and in the Indian Congresses of Natal and the Transvaal. The
president of the Transvaal Indian Congress, Dr. Y.M. Dadoo, is the most
important Indian Communist and is high in the party hierarchy.
At the time of its dissolution the party was also enjoying more
success among the "coloreds" (mixed breeds constituting about nine
percent of the population), who resent the government's apartheid
program of stricter segregation.
Among the natives, who make up some 68 percent of the popula-
tion, the Communists have had much less success. They have done best
in native trade union activity, where they have long been active, and they
have won an election or two among the natives. Moreover, they s.icceeded.
in gaining native sympathy during the passage of the government's anti-
Communist legislation, by claiming it was but one part of the government'"
broad program of repressive racial legislation. Despite their efforts to
exploit native embitterment at apartheid, the Communists through most
of 1949 and early 1950 were losing ground to Bantu nationalism. They
were defeated in elections of the Natives' Representative Council and
the African Advisory Board. The important African National Congress,
at its December 1949 meeting, elected only one Communist to its
executive committee. The delegates felt that the Communists "want to
keep us a proletarian community while the other racial groups become
the ruling hierarchy. "
Subsidiary Communist organizations have been of little
significance. The Young Communist League had a membership of
about 60. A front organization, the Society for Good Will and Friendship
with the USSR (formerly Friends of the Soviet Union), had a Johannesburg
unit in close contact with the Communist Party there, and a branch in
Cape Town.
The Communists have an excellent opportunity to exploit the
bitterness caused by the racial legislation of the Malan Government.
The non-Europeans outnumber the ruling white minority by approximately
four to one and might some day be used by the Communists to participate
in riots, strikes, and demonstrations. The CP undoubtedly considered
this long-term possibility when it alone among organized parties opposed
racial discrimination.
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The immediate Communist potential is small, the ability of the
Communists to exploit their basic opportunity, or retain their present
influeice as an underground party, being limited by:
(1) Ignorance and conservatism among non-Europeans,
particularly the uneducated natives, whose preoccupation with
day-to-day problems of food and jobs makes persuasion difficult.
(2) Mutual antagonisms among non-Europeans, particularly
the natives, who have a long-standing dislike for the Indians and are
developing an exclusive nationalism which prevents cooperation with
all other races.
(3) The Communists' own lack of sufficient organizers with
contacts among the workers and repressed races. This is particularly
serious with respect to the natives, who now tend to distrust all white
organizers.
(4) The Communists' internal rivalries and dissensions,
particularly between those wishing an orthodox emphasis on class
warfare and those wishing to focus on the racial problem.
(5) The Communists' uniquely unpopular position within the
white community in opposing the color bar.
(6) Widespread anti-Soviet feeling among all segments of the
population.
There is a Soviet Consulate at Pretoria and a Consular Agency
at Cape Town, which together have fifteen Soviet staff members. There
is no reliable evidence of close contact between these missions and
Communist organizations within the Union. The domestic CP itself,
has observed the Party line only as it seemed to fit South Africa's
special problems.
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The South African CP had occasional contacts with US Communist.,
and the Socialist Unity Party (SED) in Germany, and exchanged regular
communications with the Communist parties of the UK and of other
Commonwealth countries.
The legislative ban on Communist activities in the Union of
South Africa, under the terms of the "Suppression of Communism"
bill passed in June 1950, is drawn in stringent terms, and the Party,
already handicapped, can expect no easy underground operation.
Passage of the bill followed earlier restrictions of Communist activities.
It is not yet clear how extensively the government will use its
powers under the new law. The act is sufficiently broad in scope to
prevent resurgence of the party under another name, or its operation
with any facility through front groups. On the other hand, since the
legislative ban now formally extends to all groups promoting hostility
between races, there is the decided possibility that the government
might apply it to non-Communist groups that aim merely to obtain
substantially greater rights for non-Europeans.
b. South-West Africa.
In South-West Africa there is no evidence of native
Communism. However, the Rev. Michael Scott, a Johannesburg
resident who represented the Herero tribesmen before the UN
Trusteeship Council in opposing South Africa's incorporation of
the mandated territory of South-West Africa within the Union, is
believed to be a Communist.
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4. Central and East Africa.
a. Madagascar and R(union.
Communists in Madagascar and especially in Reunion have achieved
varying influence by working through the labor movement and by supporting
elements of the population wishing complete autonomy and separation from.
France; but they are now losing ground. Their greatest influence has beer.
exerted by the General Confederation of Labor (CGT). A 1949 report of the
WFTU claimed that the CGT had 17,000 members on the two islands, but
its strength has been waning.
Communists have displayed occasional popular strength in Re*union,
which, as a department of France, affords most of the liberties of the
French homeland. Two of the three Deputies elected to the French
National Assembly in 1946 are Communists, including the Party leader,
Raymond Verges. Communists also held about two-thirds of the seats
in the Reunion General Council. In the October 1949 elections, however,
they lost control in a major swing to the Gaullists..
Communism has never attained popularity among the natives of
Madagascar. Though Communists have been working on the island
ever since the 1920's, Communism, apart from influence exerted
through the CGT, remains essentially a small and weak movement.
In the last several years a succession of Communist Deputies sent
from France have directed the party's activities. They supported
the 1947 nationalist rebellion, and have endeavored to form Communist
cells of former rebel leaders not jailed or sentenced.
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Further French influence is exerted by the Franco-Malggache
Committee operating in Paris, which may be controlled by the French
CP. The Committee published a booklet, L'Affaire de Madagascar,
containing an article blaming the 1947 rebellion on provocation y
French agents collaborating with South Africa, the UK and the US,
rather than on the discontented elements in Madagascar.
Overt activity consists largely of the publication of a newspaper
and propaganda pamphlets in Malagasy. Press censorship rests with
the High Commissioner, who frequently suspends the paper, which is
immediately re-issued under another name. At least five titles have
been used for it: Tenimiera, Tari-Dalana, Fraternite, Itinimiera,
and Antenimiera. This anti-colonial Communist journal, with 10,000
readers, is reported to be the most widely read of any Malagasy paper.
b' British East Africa.
There are no Communist parties in British East Africa, but in
the embryonic nationalist movements, which are much less advanced
than those of British West Africa, there is an excellent field for
Communist proselytizing among both the natives and the immigrant
Indian community. Communism's appeal here is as a means to nation-
alist revolutionary ends, not as an end in itself.
Though the strong sense of social, political, and economic
inferiority of East African Indians and Africans makes them
vulnerable to Communist intrigue, relatively little has been done
to extend Communism in the area. The chief danger until recently
lay in the presence of a number of local Communist sympathizers,
whose influence has declined since the imprisonment of their leader,
Makhan Singh, an avowed Communist. Strikes have been and probably
will continue to be their principal course of action.
In Kenya and to a lesser extent in Tanganyika, the complexities
and antagonisms of a multi-racial society of permanent communities
are esp1qially favorable for Communist exploitation. The principal
bars to the success of Communism will be the racial rivalries and
the ignorafice, conservatism, and exclusive tribal discipline of the
Africans.
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There is no reliable evidence of Soviet activity in East Africa, despite
persistent, unconfirmed rumors of its existence. The possibility of such
activity is small because of the high cost of sending agents enormous
distapces over difficult terrain.
Some attention has been paid to East Africa by the British Communist
Party, but there is no East Afri.car organization in the UK comparable
to the West African National Secretariat.
Some Communist propaganda, has probably entered East Africa
from Addis Ababa and from the Union of South Africa. The Union's
relatively strong CP, prior to its dissolution in June 1950, had taken
particular interest in the Indian community in East Africa. With
the possible exception of some contact with the Somali Youth League,
there is little to suggest contact with any other outside Communist or
Communist-influenced organizations. There have been contacts,
however, with individual British and US Communists.
(1) In Ken yay. there are three prominent leaders with Communist
contacts -- Jomo Kenyatta, Ptter Koinnaage, and Makhan Singh, the
last being a member of the Indian CP who in June 1950 was ordered
banished by the Kenya Government. The organizations controlled by
these men provide the most promising opportunity for Communism.
Singh's East African Trades Union Congress, which was declared
illegal by the government in early 1950 but was not rendered powerless
in fact, included Indian and African members, and under Singh's
energetic leadership did much to merge the political aspirations of both
communities. Singh was not successful, however, in effecting a rap-
prochement between the East African Indian National Congress mainly
a Hindu organization, and the Kenya African Union, which is the fore-
most African nationalist organization. The latter is headed by Kenyatta,
a Moscow-trained Kikuyu native. Associated with him is Koinange,
another Kikuyu with Communist views. The size of the Union's member-
ship is not known, nor the degree to which its general membership has
been influenced by Communism. At the present time a serious effort
is being made by several African nationalist leaders, Koinange being
prominent among them, to form an over-all African executive body to
coordinate the political and economic objectives of all influential African
organizations, the Kenya African Union among theme Latent discontent
among the semi-detribalized, proletarianized natives of Mombasa in
particular continues to encourage agitation and greater organizational
development.
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(2) In Uganda the only known native leaders having Communist
views are Semakula Mulumba and his cousin Spartas. Their organization,
the Bataka Party, is the principal medium for subversive activity in the
protectorate. It instigated the riots in the Buganda Kingdom ~,n the springy;
of 1949 against the Bugandan king and, indirectly, the British Government.
The Bataka Party has been proscribed by the Government, but works
underground and is still influential among the important Baganda tribe.
(3) In Tanganyika and Zanzibar there are no Communist-minded
nationalist leaders, or Communist-influenced nationalist organizations.
The only organization offering a possible medium for Communist
activity is the African Association of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. It has
branches in all large towns and is believed to have been responsible for
the Da-T'-es-Salaam dock strike in 1947.
(4) In Mauritius and the Seychelles. little is known of Communist
activity. Mauritius has a largely Indian population, and such labor
leaders as Guy Rozemont, head of the Labor Party, are influential and
leftist in their views.
c. British Central Africa.
There is a negligible amount of Communist activity in British
Central Africa.
Among the approximately 150,000 European residents, there is
little likelihood that Communism will have any immediate significant
influence. Since the political consciousness of non-Europeans is still
largely undeveloped, and there is only an embryonic trade union group,
the potential for Communist penetration remains small. Communism
will probably be limited for some time to dissemination of propaganda.
There is no direct Soviet influence in.British Central Africa.
The only important connection with other Communist sources. has
been with the recently outlawed South African CP. Area details follow:
(1) In Southern Rhodesia, known Communist activity has been
limited to the distribution of newspapers published by the recently-
banned South African CP. The Southern Rhodesian Government outlawed
Communism in July 1950.
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ftoop
(2) In Northern Rhodesia there are a few European Communists and
sympathizers, mostly in the native labor union in the copper belt, who have
exerted some influence. The Guardian and Inkululeko have also been
circulated in the colony.
(3) In Nyasaland, where the native population shows little sign of
political consciousness, Communism has no influence.
d. Belgian Congo.
There are no legal political parties of any sort in the Congo.
Some scattered Communist efforts have appeared in the Congo
during the past year, but have had little effect on either Europeans
or natives. Congo Suretd's latest estimate is that there are no more
than eight Co minfor m- indoctrinated Communists in the country. The
Governor-General of the Congo has expressed fear of Communist
infiltration into the Belgian Congo. In the more backward areas,
however, the low standard of social and political development presents
an almost impenetrable barrier to Communism; in the more developed
areas the tribal communities tend to be rigidly conservative. The
Czech Cons..late in Leopoldville, as well as Czech and Hungarian
trading firms in the Belgian Congo, are reportedly providing direction
and possibly funds for Communist activities.
There are no known Communists in the Administration, nor
in the two local trade unions. Underground Communist activities
are reportedly carried on in the two centers of Leopoldville and
Elisabethville, but with little success. Such known Communists or
sympathizers are mainly Belgians and detribalized natives. Communism
is reported to have made headway within the latter group. The vast
majority of natives remain unaffected by Communist propaganda.
There has been one newspaper in the Congo with Communistic
tendencies -- L'Informateur Congolais, which ceased publication in
1950. Its owner, Raymond Cloquet, was expelled from the Congo
early in 1949 for the publication of an unsigned article denouncing
and ridiculing Belgian colonial administration. It is believed that the
paper receives financial and editorial assistance from the Communist
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organ Le Drapeau Rouge of Brussels, for which Madame Cloquet
had worked before her departure for the Congo. Although perceptibly
more circumspect since the departure of Cloquet, the paper's general
tendencies have persisted under Alexis Peclers, who succeeded Cloquet
early in 1949. T .cques .Masa, a prominent native labor leader in the
Congo, is known to have attended Communist-sponsored meetings in
Brazzaville.
Communist activities in Africa will be combatted by security
officers from Accra, Nairobi, and Salisbury, French Equatorial
Africa, and the Belgian Congo who will exchange information through
the British Consul General in the Congo.
Belgian officials are specially concerned over the possibility
of Communist infiltration from Brazzaville, French Equatorial Africa,
directly north across the river from Leopoldville; orders have been
issued for reinforced control of the Congo borders with Northern
Rhodesia as well as with the French colonies.
The Kitawala (the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, or
Jehovah's Witnesses), which teaches an anarchist doctrine and
claims that the day will come when the position of the whites and
natives will be reversed in Africa, was banned from the Congo in
1949.
The Congo's commercial importance to Belgium will assure
continuation of strong security measures. The rich, natural
resources, as well as the highly important uranium deposits,
however, might result in increased Soviet effort in this area.
e. French Equatorial Africa (FEA), French Cameroons and Togoland.
The most influential pro-Communist force is the well-organized
Rassemblement Dmocratique Africain (RDA), which has branches in
all four territories of FEA, in the Cameroons, and in Togoland, as well
as one councillor in the Assembly of the French Union. Overt, French-
directed Communism has made slight progress in the governments
themselves, where some minor officials are known to have Communist
tendencies.
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There is no Soviet or Satellite consular representation in this part
of Africa, nor is it believed that any effectual Soviet activity exists, although
Communist agents may have contact with the Soviet mission in Ethiopia.
The French security organization is fully aware of the potential danger of
infiltration and is working in increasingly close cooperation with the
British pecurity: officials-tb combat it..
f. Angola and Mozambique.
Communist activity in Angola and Mozambique is not important at
present, hor is it soon likely to be. No overt Communist activity is
tolerated by the Portguese administration of these colonies, in which no
nationalist nor labor movements of any strength have developed.
25X1X7Although Communism may be considered non-existent in Angola,
in 1947 a Communist center
was discovered at Lobito Bay. It was supposedly controlled by the
Brazzaville Communists (French Equatorial Africa), who also directed
a parallel organization called the "Association of Mutual Assistance" at
San Salvador in north Angola.
Communist activities in Mozambique have for years been centered
in the Movimento National Democrtico de Mocambique (MND). It attempts
to penetrate cultural and sporting groups and work through young people
and anti-Salazar organizations. There is close liaison with the Union
of South Africa Communists, and to a lesser extent with those in Lisbon
(who in turn are said to receive material from France and Italy).
In October 1949 a number of allegedly Communist-minded agitators
were arrested in Lourengo Marques after forming a front group called the
League of Young Mozambican Democrats.
In general, Communist activities in Mozambique are fed from
across the border with the Union, but organization is weak and is
not considered dangerous at the present time.
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5. Northeast Africa.
a. Somalia (formerly Italian Somaliland).
In the Italian-administered territory of Somalia, there is an organized
Communist Party in Mogadiscio consisting of about 50 Italians and having
little influence. The limited Communist activity has received its inspiration
only through Italian sources. Although the Somalia Youth League naturally
accepted Soviet s,'upport for its efforts in the UN to obtain early independence
for Somalia, there is little evidence of SYL sympathy for, or other col-
laboration with, Communism.
b. British Somaliland.
It is believed that there is as yet no Communist infiltration into
British Somaliland. P ssible sources of future activity might be in
the Rassemblement Democratique Africain (RDA) branch in French
Somaliland, the Eritrean and Somali Communist Parties, or possibly
the Somali Youth League, which in October 1947 claimed 9,000 members
in British Somaliland, a claim believed to be highly exaggerated.
c. French Somaliland.
Government officials of French Somaliland claim no knowledge
of the existence of any Communist organizations in the territory.
The deputy to the French National Assembly, Jean Martine, is reported
to be a former Communist. There is a weak and unimportant branch
of the RDA in French Somaliland.
There was a small Eritrean CP in existence from 1944 to February 1.949,,
composed principally of Italians. However, in February 1949 it was
disbanded.
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There is no evidence that Communism has made any headway among
the native population, nor is there evidence of Soviet activity.
e.. Ethiopia.
It is not likely that Communism will become a significant factor
in Ethiopia under the present Government. Communist activity in
Ethiopia is limited and there are no indications that it has made
effective progress. There is no CP or any other party functioning
in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Government will continue to oppose any
manifestation of Communism.
The Soviet Legation in Addis Ababa disseminates Communist
propaganda and maintains an Exhibition Hall on the main street of
the city. This exhibition consists for the most part of photographs
showing aspects of life in the USSR, stressing freedom from racial
discriminations. Russian language classes were conducted from
April to mid-August 1950 and reopened in September. The decline
in enrollment from 70 students in May to less than 10 in July was
reportedly due to Imperial disapproval. There have been unconfirmed
reports that the Soviet Hospital might be engaged in subversive
activity, as well as rumors that the USSR ig using Addis Ababa as a
base for its underground work throughout the entire continent of Africa.
There appear to be a few members of the Greek and Armenian
Communities who have Communist or leftist leanings, but they exert
little influence and are not now considered to be a threat.
f . Sudan.
There is no legally constituted CP in the Sudan. The Sudanese
Movement of National Liberation has Communist tendencies, but it is
not considered significant, nor is there evidence that it is in contact
with any Soviet diplomatic or consular missions. It is, however, in
touch with left-wing elements in Egypt; liaison is apparently main-
tained through students returning to the Sudan from Egyptian
universities. Two persons reported to be active in the group are
Ahmed Nadeef and Mohammed Omer Beshir.
25X6A
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AFRICAN MEMBERS OF COMMUNIST DOMINATED INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
(1 September 1950)
World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)
General Confederation of Labor (CGT) of France has following affiliations:
Algerian General Confederation of Labor
Union of Trade Unions of the Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Dakar, Niger, Senegal
and Mauretania, the Sudan, Guinea, Haute-Volta, the Chad, Togo, the
Cameroons, Ubangi-Chair, the Middle Congo, Madagascar, Reunion.
General Union of Confederated Trade Unions of Morocco
Trade Union of Workers of Tunisia (USTT) (June 1947)
General Confederation of Workers of the Belgian Congo (June 1947)
Nigerian Trade Union Congress
Sierra Leone Council of Labor
Northern Rhodesia Mine Workers' Union
Southern Rhodesia Trades and Labor Council (Jan 1949)
Trade Union Council of Mauritius
South African Trades and Labor Council
Maltese General Workers' Union (Jan 1949)
World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY)
Union of Algerian Democratic Youth
Tunisia
Youth Union of Morocco
,Nigerian Union of Students
Gold Coast
Union of South Africa
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International Union of Students
Association of North African Students in France
Association of Moslem Students of North Africa
Students' Section of Youth Union of Morocco (Sep 1949)
Algeria (Aug 1950)
Tunisia (Aug 1950)
Dakar (Aug 1950)
Union of Students of Madagascar (or Association of Students of Malagache
Origin) (Sep 1949)
Reunion (Aug 1950)
League of Nubian Students
Nigerian Students Union (Aug 1950)
Gold Coast (Aug 1950)
National Union of South African Students
Women's International Democratic Federation
Union of Women of Algeria
Algerian Association of Moslem Women
Union of Women of Tunisia
Union of Girls of Tunisia
Ivory Coast
Madagascar
Liberia (?)
Moroccan Union of Women
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 Colonies,
Prot:s,etc.
Condo-
minium
Trust
Territories
Mandate
Interim.
Admin.
U. K.
U. S.Afr.
France
Belgium
Portugal
Spain
Italy
GAMBIA
WI. & P.
GUINEA
LEONE
-_C. & P.
Santa Isabel
SPANISH GUINEA
PRINCIP
C .SAO TOM
SSo Tom
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Windhoek
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BASUTOLANI~j
SOUTH AFRICA
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Annrov d For R I ease 19,99/X09_/2"_RDP7ATnnA3_s;Annn~nnn~nnn ,.~
AFRICA
ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS-1950
C.-Colony
D.-Self Governing Dominion
S.C.-Self Governing Colony
T.-Territory
De.-Department
P.-Protectorate
Tr.-Trust Territory
I.-Independent Country
C. & P.-Colony and Protectorate
0 5u0 i0
K~lorr.eter
4?,
?
Ai,A;~ R
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UNCLASSIFIED. RESTRICTED, NFiDENT IAL ~_
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSFiCAi STD 1WD BOTTOM)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP.
TO
25X 1 A9a
INITIALS
DATE
1
ocD
-
2
3
4
FROM
INITIAL
DATE
I
S/Pubs 4
Feb
2 9
C~APPROVAL INFORMATION Ci] SIGNATURE
DACTION F1 DIRECT REPLY, C~ RETURN
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CONCURRENCE RECOMMENDATION FILE
REMARKS: :Attached cc 5`2-92 of IM-346 to be disse i
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No othe ex# fi dtss~tion has been made
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