THE EXTENT AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DROUGHT OF 1952 IN YUGOSLAVIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00935A000200160001-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 8, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 3, 1952
• Content Type: IM

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SECURITY INFORMATION
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
THE EXTENT AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES
OF THE DROUGHT OF 1952 IN YUGOSLAVIA
CIA/RR IM-369
3 October 1952
NOTE ON CLASSIFICATION
The over-all classification of this report
is SECRET. Some pages, however, are of a
lower classification and are so designated.
WARNING
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE OF. THE . UNITED . STA'T'ES .WITEIN THE
MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAW, TITLE 18,USC, SECS.
793 AM 794+, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF
WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS
PROHIBITED BY LAW.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
MUM TO ARCHIVES & fECCRS CEN1tr ? S-E-C-R-E-T
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SECURITY INFORMATION
THE EXTENT AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES
OF THE DROUGHT OF 1952 IN YUGOSLAVIA
1. General Agricultural Situation.
The 1952 agricultural production of Yugoslavia has been gravely
affected by the lack of adequate preseasonal rainfall; a drought in
the early spring (April and the first half of May); and a dry, sear-
ing midsummer which has produced drought conditions reminiscent of
the drought of 1950. Preliin3nary estimates by the Yugoslav Govern-
ment show a reduction in crop yields per hectare, as compared with
1951, by the following percentages: wheat and rye, 20 percent; corn,
4+0 to 50 percent; potatoes, 30 to 40 percent; and fruit, 50 percent. ~J*
The unfavorable outlook for feed grains and hay has already caused the
peasants to begin selling livestock which they will be unable to carry
through the winter. During August, prices of corn and forage crops
doubled, while cattle and hog prices dropped by one-third. J
2. Effect of Drought upon Food and Feed Requirements.
The magnitude of the crop losses in Yugoslavia is shown in
Table 1,** where production for 1952 is compared with production
for 1951 and for the drought year 1950. As seen in Table 1, grain
and potato production in 1952 is only slightly larger than in 1950.
As a result, it is to be expected that the Yugoslav Government will
encounter serious difficulties in the fall and winter of 1952-53 in
meeting domestic requirements for food and possibly feed unless there
are substantial grain imports.
The Yugoslav Government has estimated the country's annual wheat
requirements at between 2.4 million and 2.5 million metric tons. /
Since 1949, Yugoslavia has imported wheat because indigenous production
has not been sufficient to satisfy domestic requirements. Corn, the
only surplus grain, has been exported to obtain foreign exchange to
purchase wheat or to be exchanged for wheat. In 1951-52, through barter
agreements, Yugoslavia imported 204,500 metric tons of wheat in exchange
* Footnote references in arabic numerals are to sources listed in
the Appendix.
Table 1 follows on p. 2.
Based upon preliminary grain balances, this quantity allows approxi-
mately 75,000 metric tons for stockpiling. See Table 2, p..5, below.
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. Table 1
Yugoslav Production of Selected Agricultural Commodities
for 1950-52, with Comparisons
1950 1951
1952 Preliminary .J
Commodity
(Thousand
Metric Tons)
(Thousand
Metric Tons)
(Percent
of 1250)
(Percent
of 1951)
Wheat
1, 826.7
2,277.4
10900.0
103.8
83.3
Rye
218.7
276.6
253.3
115.8
91.6
Barley
266.0
358.8
270.0
101.5
75.3
Oats
194.5
292.7
232.0
119.3
79.3
Corn
2,500.0 J
1,032.7
2,500.0
21
100.0
62.0
Total Grain
005.
7,238.2
5,155.3
103.0
71.2
Potatoes
1,018.8
1,621.3
(1,191+.1)
117.2
73.7
(1,026.9)
/
100.8
63.3
Sugar Beets
850.6
1,936.6
91+1.8 J 110.7
18.6
a. 1950 and 1951 production data except for corn figure. 3
b. Official Yugoslav statistics except for corn figure.
c. Agreed estimates of CIA and Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations
(OFAR), Department of Agriculture.
d. Higher figure based upon 30-percent reduction of yield; lower figure
based upon 40-percent reduction of yield.
e. Based upon 40 percent reduction of yield. 5
for 216,500 metric tons of corn. Prior to August 1952, it had been
reported that the 1952-53 wheat import program would be 50 percent
larger than that for 1951-52, or approximately 300,000 metric tons. 7/
However, since the impact of the drought upon the corn crop has been
fully recognized, the Yugoslav Government has estimated import require-
ments at 700,000 metric tons of wheat and 250,000 metric tons of feed
grains. y This amount of grain should be considered as optimum needs.*
Based upon preliminary grain balances, ORR estimates import require-
ments of bread grain at approximately 565,000 metric tons. ORB esti-
mates Import requirements of feed grain as insignificant, assuming that
* This amount of grain is more than double that imported in 1950-51
under the aid program -- 1+35,000 metric tons.
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livestock will be carried through the winter at lighter weights and at
approximately the same numbers as carried through the 1950-51 winter.
On this basis, there would be a reduction in hog and cattle numbers of
only 2 percent from 1952, and it is probable that farmers have already
reduced their herds by this percentage or more. A severe winter could
mean the necessity of importing 100,000 to 200,000 metric tons of feed
grain, but the feed should not be needed until late winter.
The quantity of wheat imports estimated as necessary by ORB would
maintain the population at 1951 levels of consumption, but only if
stocks were utilized and uniform distribution of bread were realized.*
It is doubtful that both of these conditions will be met, and belt
tightening probably will be in order for the urban population and in
some rural areas. Foods other than bread which will be in short
supply are potatoes, meat (next spring), vegetables, and fats and oils.
Although 1952 sugar beet production has been significantly reduced,
there should be sufficient stocks of sugar on hand from the large 1951
crop to alleviate partially the 1952-53 sugar deficit.
In the fall of 1952 the Yugoslav Government will experience more
difficulty in obtaining grain from the peasants than in 1950, when
Yugoslavia had compulsory grain deliveries and food rationing. The
over-all urban bread consumption will be higher, and the Government
will be hampered in collecting grain by its desire to retain the free
market. Unless there are sufficient Government stocks** on hand that
can be used to supply the normally deficit areas of Dalmatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the population in those areas may experience serious food
shortages during the winter. Since food rationing-has been discontinued,
the short supply of any commodity will make equitable distribution of
available food commodities a problem. The Government has stated that
neither food rationing nor compulsory deliveries of produce will be
reintroduced. This appears to be a strong stand to take, at least con-
cerning food rationing, as the Yugoslav Government has indicated that
it is unable to finance approximately $55 million of the total amount
of food that it desires to import. 9 A 10-percent reduction in bread
consumption could result in the saving of approximately 215,000 metric
tons of wheat, or $18 million to $P O million.
See Table 3, p. 6, below, for the 1952-53 grain balance.
Boris Kidric, Chairman of the Yugoslav Federal Economic Council,
has claimed 150 billion dinars of food stocks but implied that they
would be made available only to the urban population.
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3. Some Possible Impacts of Drought upon the Econp .
The importation by the Yugoslav Government of 950,000 metric tons*
of grain and other food commodities -- the quantity that it considers
necessary to import in order to retain a free market and 1951-52 per
capita bread consumption rates -- and Yugoslavia's inability to export
corn to help finance these imports would adversely affect the Yugoslav
balance of payments position. Officials of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) have estimated the resulting loss
at approximately $120 million.
The American Embassy in Belgrade has been approached by the Yugoslav
Foreign Office on the possibility of importing 100,000 to 150,000 metric
tons of wheat or wheat flour from the US under the Mutual Security Agency
(M SA) program. The purchase of this quantity of wheat would require ap-
proximately $9 million to $13.5 million (at parity prices but not includ-
ing transportation charges). Importation of this quantity of bread grain
would represent 12 to 18 percent of the total aid to Yugoslavia authorized
for US fiscal year 1952-53. The incorporation of this aid in the US fis-
cal year 1952-53 program would necessitate a shifting in priorities and/or
grants.
Probably of more serious consequence is the elimination of corn ex-
ports. Corn accounted for 40 percent of the value of all. Yugoslav ex-
ports during the first 6 months of 1952. 10/ The loss of such a high
proportion of foreign exchange will seriously endanger the over-all Yugo-
slav import program, and this in turn may force a reduction in the capi-
tal investment program.
Despite the previously mentioned effects of the drought on the economy
of Yugoslavia, it is felt by the American Embassy in. Belgrade that the
economy probably is better able in 1952 to offset the drought damage than
it was in 1950. The people will suffer, however, as they always do when
drought conditions prevail -- through financial losses to farmers, the
increased cost of living to the urban population, and a decline in the
quality and quantity of the diet.
* 366,000 metric tons of wheat have been contracted. for by the Yugoslavs
of the 950,000 metric tons of grain.
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APPENDIX
SOURCES
1.
SD Tel 178, Belgrade, 15 Aug 1952; New York Times, 16 Aug 1952;
SD Tel 308, Belgrade, 7 Sep 1952.
2.
Joint Weeks, 33, Part II, Belgrade, 16 Aug 1952.
3.
SD Desp 727, Belgrade, 2 Feb 1952.
4.
SD Tel 308, Belgrade, 7 Sep 1952.
5.
SD Tel 178, Belgrade, 15 Aug 1952.
6.
msA, TOTS 27, Belgrade, 12 Jul 1952.
7.
Ibid.
8.
SD Tel 231, Belgrade, 24 Aug 1952.
9.
SD Tel 308, Belgrade, 7 Sep 1952.
10.
SD Desp Belgrade, 108, 15 Aug 1952.
11.
SD Desp 57, Belgrade, 24 Jul 1952.
12.
142A Cable 27, Belgrade, 12 Jul 1952.
13.
SD Tel 308, Belgrade, 7 Sep 1952.
14.
Ibid.
15.
Mild
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