ESTIMATE OF 1953 GRAIN PRODUCTION IN THE SOVIET BLOC

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00935A000300020001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 13, 1954
• Content Type: IM

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
ESTIMATE OF 1953 GRAIN PRODUCTION
IN THE SOVIET BLOC
CIA/RR IM-395
13 September 1954
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE
MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS.
793 AND 79k, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF
WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS
PROHIBITED BY LAW.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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FOREWORD
A study of grain acreage, yields, and production is most essential
to an appraisal of the Soviet Bloc's capability to support its popu-
lation under conditions of peace or war. Although shifts in the
grain production pattern within the Bloc from year to year are not of
themselves valid positive indicators of intentions, it is possible
that the Bloc countries would not launch a major military campaign
during a protracted drought or with an empty granary.
This memorandum deals with the production of grain in the Soviet
Bloc as a whole and in each of its major components -- the USSR, the
European.Satellites, and Communist China. It primarily highlights
the current situation regarding acreage, yields, and production. of
bread grains (wheat and rye), coarse grains (barley, oats, and corn),
rice, and several minor grains in 1953 and gives comparisons with
pre-World War II and recent postwar years. This memorandum does
not analyze the relation of grain production to the economy of each
country concerned, but attention is drawn to certain of these rela-
tionships, particularly population numbers, in their broadest sense.
An analysis of the utilization of the production of each grain (seed,
feed, industrial use, human consumption, trade, reserves, and waste),
is being made in a separate report on the food balance of each Bloc
country.
Although the emphasis of this memorandum is on production in 1953,
some consideration has been given to long-te_'m trends and the plans
of the Bloc countries to increase grain production. Crop production
plans for Communist China are vague and do not seem to have the same
degree of importance as they have in the USSR and the European Satel-
lites. Therefore, instead of a section on "Plans" for China, there
is presented a section on "Problems of Supply and Distribution."
The numerical data contained in this memorandum do not represent
measured or weighed quantities -- they are at best estimates and
sometimes approximations. The estimated range of error in most cases
is ? 5 percent.
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CONTENTS
Page
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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..
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1
I. The Soviet Bloc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
..
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3
A. 1953 Grain Production . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
.
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4
B. Significance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
..
.
4
II. The USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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..
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5
.A. 1953 Grain Production . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
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.
1. Bread Grains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
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..
5
2. Coarse Grains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
.
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5
3. Rice and Other Grains . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
.
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6
B. Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
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6
C. Significance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
.
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7
III. The European Satellites . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
.
.
A. 1953 Grain Production . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
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10
1. Bread Grains . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
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11
2. Coarse Grains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
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12
B. Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
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12
C. Significance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
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13
IV. Communist China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
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14
A. 1953 Grain Production . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.. .
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11
B. Problems of Supply and Distribution . . . . . .
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15
C. Significance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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17
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Appendixes
Page
Appendix A. Ll~tatistical Tables . . . . . .
Appendix B. Methodology . . . . . . . . .
Appendix C. Sources and Evaluation of Soure
Tables
........ 19
........ 37
s ....... 43
1. Soviet Blcc: Estimated Acreage, Yield, hand Production
of Grain, Prewar and 1950-53 . . . . . ? . . . . ? . . . 20
2. Soviet Bloc: Per Capita Production of Gain,
Prewar and 1950-53 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3. USSR: Estimated Acreage, Yield, and. Pro uction of Gratin,
Prewar ani 1950-53 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4. USSR: Estimated Acreage, Yield, and. Production of Grain,
Selected Prewar Periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. USSR: Per Capita Production of Grain, Prewar
and 1950-53 . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 211
6. European Satellites: Estimated Acreage, Yield,
and Production of Grain, 1935-39 Averag , 1952,
and Prelininary 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
7. Albania: :estimated Acreage, Yield, and !reduction
of Grain, 1935-39 Average, 1952, and Pr liminary 1953 ?
8. Bulgaria: Estimated Acreage, Yield, and Production
of Grain, 1935-39 Average, 1952, Preliminary 1953,
and 1957 Man . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
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9. Czechoslovakia: Estimated Acreage, Yield, and Pro-
duction of Grain, 1935-39 Average, 1952, Preliminary
:L953, and 1953 Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
10. East Germany: Estimated Acreage, Yield, and Pro-
duction of Grain, 1935-39 Average, 1952, Preliminary
1953, and 1955 Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
11. Hungary: Estimated Acreage, Yield, and Production
of Grain, 1935-39 Average, 1952, Preliminary 1953,
and 1956 Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
12. Poland: Estimated Acreage, Yield, and Production
of Grain, 1935-39 Average, 1952, Preliminary 1953,
and 1955 Plan . . . . . . . .
13. Rumania: Estimated Acreage, Yield, and Production
of Grain, 1935-39 Average, 1952, Preliminary 1953,
and 1955 Plan . . . . . . . . .
14. European Satellites: Per Capita Production of Grain,
Prewar, 1952, and 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
15. Communist China: Estimated Acreage, Yield, and Pro-
duction of Grain, Prewar and 1950-53 . . . . . . . . 34
16. Communist China: Per Capita Production of Grain,
Prewar and 1950-53 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Map
Fol:Lowi f Page
Western USSR: Spring Wheat Acreage . . . . . . . . . . 10
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(ORR Project 21.142)
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ESTIMATE OF 1953 GRAIN PRODUCTION
IN THE SOVIET BLOC*
Summary
Considering the Soviet Bloc as a whole, the 1953 total. grain pro-
duction,** estimated at 225 million metric tons,*** was 12 million
tons below production in 1952 and 24 million tons, nearly 10 percent,
less than the production immediately before World War II. The decline
in production is more serious than the absolute figures indicate,
when they are considered in relation to the over-all increases in
population that have taken place. The European Satellites, considered
as a unit area, had the largest decline in absolute tonnage (more
than 11 million tons), and production per capita fell from 486 to
376 kilograms, or 23 percent. Per capita production in the USSR de-
creased 18 percent and in Communist China, 4 percent. For the Bloc
as a whole, bread grain production was only 5 percent below prewar
production; but coarse grain production was 19 percent lower than
prewar production. Per capita production of all grain fell from
325 to 303 kilograms in 1952 and to 286 kilograms in 1953.
The USSR and Communist China have established high goals for
grain production in their respective long-range economic plans,
but little has been accomplished in actually attaining them. Grain
production goals in Eastern Europe have been at about prewar levels
and have generally not been achieved.
The USSR, after admitting failure to achieve its agricultural
goals, has launched a program to extend grain production to new
lands, to idle land in presently cultivated areas, and to lands
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this intelligence
memorandum represent the best judgment of the responsible analyst
as of 1 July 1954.
** The grain crops considered in this memorandum are wheat, rye,
oats, barley, corn, rice, and the miscellaneous minor grains --
millet kaoliang, buckwheat, spelt, and (in the USSR) pulses.
XXX Throughout this memorandum tonnages are given in metric tons.
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that have not proved to be well adapted to the production of
perennial grasses. Judging from past experien e in extending grain
production into submarginal areas, the Soviet program of seeding
grain crops on virgin lands holds little promipe of increasing pro-
duction by 18 million to 20 million tons as planned. An appraisal
of all factors, including climate, which :s of paramount importance,
indicates that increase in production is more Likely to be within
the order of 6 cr 7 million tons, with a possibility of reaching
9 million tons if climatic conditions are unusually favorable. Some
success can be expected from the much more lim .ted program to ex-
pand the production of grain on idle land and Land formerly used
to a considerable extent for grass crops, but his program will
have :Little effect on the total grain production situation in the
USSR. I
The USSR appears to be in serious difficulty with respect to the
production of grain -- not only for food, but also for nonfood use.
The new program is a desperate move which may,lwith favorable weather,
stave off the time when the country will no longer be self sufficient
in grain production. Unfavorable weather may cause crop production
to fall short of the country's requirements in the near future. In
that event, imports -- largely from Bloc countries -- will be necessary
to maintain the present levels of consumption.,
The situatioa in the European Satellites is also serious. Un-
favorable climatic conditions have been a major factor in restricting
production during the past few years. Lower production has also
resulted from such other conditions as peasantiresistance to col-
lectivization, compulsory delivery of productsito the State, the low
prices paid for those products, and high taxes!-- all of which have
reduced individual incentives. With normal we ther conditions and
the successful prosecution of a program of rea~ incentives to peasants,
the Satellite ar,sa not only could become self-sufficient in grain but
also could regai:l its status as an area of sur~lus production.
The per capita grain production in China 16 clouded by the great
variation in population estimates. Because ofllack of bette informa-
tion, China's po.rpulation count is presently beng held static. As
far as productio:l is concerned, there appears o have been less change
in China (a decrease of about 4 percent) betweOn the late thirties
and 1953 than in the other countries of the Bl~c. On the basis of a
static: populatio:i, per capita production of gr in in 1953 was about
229 kilograms -- far lower than in other Bloc gountries. Moreover,
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population may be greater than that being currently estimated, which
would make the grain situation even less favorable than it appears.
In spite of internal exhortation designed to increase grain produc-
tion in Communist China, it is improbable that in the long run any
significant increase in per capita production can be attained.
The long-term-view of the grain situation in the USSR is not
optimistic. The European Satellites probably can improve their
situation somewhat, but at best the quantity of their surpluses
cannot be expected to equal those enjoyed before the war. The
Chinese situation is more or less static with the possibility of
becoming worse. Therefore, except in years of unusually favorable
climatic conditions, the Soviet Bloc as a whole may be expected to
be not more than self sustaining.
I. The Soviet Bloc.
Grain is the most important class of food and feed products in
the Soviet Bloc. As food, grain contributes, on the average, more
than half the caloric value to the average diet in the European
Satellites, about two-thirds in the USSR, and up to nearly three-
fourths in Communist China. The importance of grain as feed is
greatest in the European Satellites and -- because of human compe-
tition for grain as food -- of least importance in China.
Although all of the countries in the Soviet Bloc are allied
politically, each has its own economic aspirations, goals, and
problems. Inclusion in the Bloc has not resulted in free exchange
of goods among the countries, nor has it resulted in "Bloc unity"
in economic policy and planning. The production and utilization
of agricultural products is not planned for the Bloc as a whole,
and there is enough "rigidity" in each country's agricultural
economy to preclude a "leveling" of per capita production and
utilization.
It must be recognized, however, that in time of emergency the
centralized political and military power of the USSR will attempt
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to mobilize the resources of all Bloc co-intri;es* for a common cause.
It is therefore necessary to consider Bloc capabilities and achieve-
ments in the aggregate and to make comparisons when desired between
these factors :'or the Bloc and for the NATO car for other groups of
free countries.
A. 1953 Grain Production.**
Total grain production in the Soviet!Bloc in 1953, estimated
at 225 million tons, was about 5 percent below the production of
237 million tcns estimated for 1952 and 10 prcent below prewar annual
production. The greatest reduction occurredjin the USSR, whereas
production in China was about the same as in!1952. Production in
Eastern Europe was, however, higher than in 1952, an unfavorable
crop year. I
Although grain acreage in 1953 of 215 million hectares was
1.5 million hectares above 1952, adverse weather in most regions of
the USSR and China resulted in less favorab e growing conditions for
crops in 1953 than in 1952. Yields for 195 , which averaged 10.5
centners per hectare for all grains, were l w in comparison with
11..1 and 11.3 centners per hectare in 1952 nd in prewar years,
respectively.
B. Significance.
Bloc population, estimated at 787 million people in 1953, is
4 million greater than in 1952 and 20 million greater than prewar
population fcr the same area. Because of the increase in population
and the decrease in grain production, the sipply of grain for food
in 1953 was rot so favorable as it was in 1952, and much less
favorable then in prewar years. For example, the gross grain pro-
duction per (zapita is estimated at 286 1ilograms in 1953,
The USSR, Communist China, Albania, Blgaria, Czechoslovakia,
East Germany; Hungary, Rumania, and Poland!
* See Table 1, p. 20, below, for grain tatistics by raajor Bloc
area and type of grain.
aE Althoug:i gross production per capita s a hypothetical concept
which is not appropriate for making quantitative deductions concern-
ing actual food supplies, it is a factor that is useful for making
comparisons of different years. It is a dTvice that changes the
unfamiliar production measure of million mgtric tons to kilograms
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compared with 303 kilograms in 1952 and 325 in prewar years. (See
Table 2.*)
II. The USSR.
A. 1953 Grain Production.
The rainfall pattern in the USSR in 1953 was generally un-
favorable for crop production. Drought conditions prevailed in the
southern Ukraine, a most important winter-wheat region. The drought,
coupled with a continuation of the general shift in acreage from
coarse grains to wheat, resulted in a decrease in total production.
Production in 1953, estimated at 81 million tons, was about 12 per-
cent below the production of 92 million tons estimated for 1952,
and 9 percent below the production of 89 million tons in :prewar years.
(Tables 3 and )+.**) If the total grain production for 1953 is re-
lated to the total USSR population, the resulting factor, gross
production per capita, is considerably below similar factors for 1952
and the average for the late prewar period. (Table 5.)
1. Bread Grains .)()()(x
The 1953 production of bread grains was estimated at ap-
proximately 53 million tons compared with 61 million tons in 1952.
Low yields were the chief cause of the difference in production be-
cause the acreage seeded to these crops in 1953 was only slightly
less than in 1952. Yields in 1953 were about one centner per hectare,
or 12 percent, lower than in 1953. Both the acreage and production
of bread grains were still below the prewar- acreage, the acreage
by 7 million hectares and production by about 8 million tons.
2. Coarse Grains.
Coarse grain production in 1953 is estimated at about
21 million tons compared with about 25 million tons produced in
per person, a smaller measure that is far easier to visualize and
one that makes allowance for changes in population.
Table 2 follows on p. 21.
Tables 3 and 4 follow on pp. 22 and 23, respectively.
Table 5 follows on p. 24.
Wheat and rye.
1938.
Barley, oats, and corn.
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1952, although the acreage seeded remained the same. Prewar acreage
and production were about 7 million hectares and 7 million metric
tons larger, respectively, than those estimat d for 1953.
Although the acreage and production of all grains have
been. below late prewar averages, the emphasid placed on the pro-
duction of wheat in the postwar period by the USSR has been a major
cause of the decrease in the acreage utilize for coarse grain pro-
duction. Unfairorable weather in 1953 was a jor cause of the
decrease in yields; it is estimated that yields averaged only 7.8
centners per hectare compared with an average yield of 8.8 centners
per hectare in 1952.
3. Rice and Other Grains.
From an acreage of about 200 hectares, rice production
is estimated to have been about 400,000 tons in 1953, about the same
as the acreage and production of 1952 and of~late prewar years.
Yields in 1953,, estimated at 20 centners per hectare, also remained
about the same. In comparison with bread an coarse grains, rice
production in the USSR is insignificant.
The production of "other" grains in 1953 is estimated
at about 6 million tons. This is about the Jame production that
was estimated for 1952, but it is some 2 million tons below prewar
levels. In 1913, however, almost 1 million more hectares were sown
to these grain,; than in 1952. Compared to tije 11 million hectares
sown. during the late prewar years, the 1953 acreage represents a
decrease of 2 iiillion hectares.
The Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55) c4lled for an increase of
4+0 to 50 percent in grain production over 190. During the first 3
years of the p'-an, annual production has not increased significantly.
In fact, production in 1953 was about 4 mill on tons, or 4,.7 percent,
below production in 1950, the base year, despite the fact that ap-
proximately 4 izillion more hectares were seeded in 1953 than in 1950.
Recent decrees which are intended to increase grain production
were announced after the 1953 harvest, when production fell- to the
Buckwheat, millet, legumes, and vetch. en reporting grain pro-
duction, the U3SR includes legumes and vetch
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lowest levels since 1949. The most important decision on the expan-
sion of grain production issued recently was on 2 March 1954, when
the plan to reclaim idle land and extend the production of grain in
new areas was announced. l/* The plan provides for an expansion of
the grain acreage- by 2.3 million hectares in 1954 and by 10.7
million hectares in 1955, bringing the total expansion to 13.0 mil-
lion hectares. Envisaged in this acreage expansion is a production
increase of nearly 20 million tons.
The following discussion indicates that although the acreage
goal may be reached, only exceptionally favorable climatic conditions
could result in an increase in production of 20 million tons. If
normal conditions prevail, however, production can be anticipated to
increase by less than half this amount. In addition, some 4 million
hectares more are expected to be seeded to coarse grains and other
crops on land that has recently been used for low-yielding perennial
grasses. 2/ This is a less ambitious project than the plan to expand
seedings on virgin land and is more likely to succeed.
C. Significance.
The USSR depends greatly upon agriculture for food, feed,
and fiber: about half of its population depend directly upon agri-
culture for their living. The failure to increase or even maintain
production presents an alarming picture to Soviet leaders. Soviet
grain production, in particular, has failed to return to prewar
levels. The significance of stagnation in grain production becomes
most apparent when it is contrasted with total population which has
been increasing by about three and one-half million each year.
With a 1953 population of 214 million, the quantity of grain
produced in the USSR in 1953 indicates a gross per capita production
of 377 kilograms for the consumption year 1 July 1953 through 30
June 1954. The gross per capita production for 1953 is 1;3 percent
less than the 435 kilograms indicated for 1952 and almost 18 percent
below the 461 kilograms produced per capita in the late prewar period.
* Footnote references in arabic numerals are to sources listed in
Appendix C.
Chiefly wheat and millet.
Population is estimated at 211 million for 1952 and 192 million
for 1939.
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Althouga not so dramatic as are compa isons of grain to popu-
lation, similar comparisons of coarse grains o livestock cambers
would indicate in even less favorable ratio o feed per animal, which
is a factor terming to reduce productivity significantly. Except for
hogs, livestock numbers will not be affected ~s directly by grain
shortages as wiLl animal weights and the production of dairy products.
Horses, cattle, and sheep -- the roughage con
with little or :.o grain if coarse feed suppli
all decreases i:i grain production, whether gr
umers -- can subsist
s are available. Over-
atest in bread or
coarse grains, impinge upon the food supply -' bread grain directly
and coarse grain indirectly as it reduces animal productivity.
The pro.;ram to expand wheat productio into the lower Volga
(Economic Region VI) and North Kazakh SSE (Ec nomic Region Xa)
indicates that -.;he USSR is putting greatest e~phasis upon bread
grain production. 3/ An interlinear reading Of recent Soviet decrees,
however, indicates that some balance between bread and coarse grains
will be maintained by reducing the seeding of ;bread grains in their
traditional areas of production as expansion akes place in the new
marginal areas. Part of the land formerly usd for wheat in European
USSR may be used for coarse grains. A shift gtrongly in fa'ror of bread
grain production would be counter to the aims of the Soviet consumer
goods program, which is aimed at improving th4 level of living by
providing highe:- quality foods. It is axiomatyic that more mouths can
be fed with the grain produced from an acre o~ land than with the
products from animals fed the same amount of train, but the latter
provide on the whole, a more palatable, and possibly healthful, diet.
A balance between these two extremes appears o be the course the
USSR is taking.
If, however, expansion of the grain a~reages into marginal
areas fails, as it is apt to do unless extremely favorable climatic
conditions prevail, and population continues i;o increase as it most
likely will for some time to come, the consumer goods program will
be hampered. Ao a result the Soviet planners may be forced into a
position of hav:Lng to produce for survival. his eventuality will
demand great increases in the directly consumed crops, chief of which
are bread grains, at the expense of indirectl consumed crops, such
as coarse grain;; and other feed crops. Possitly the only alternative
under these conditions would be for the USSR to become an importer of
staple foodstuffs. As an importer, the USSR could be vulnerable to
ecorromic sanctions imposed by the food export.ng nations.
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The lower Volga and. North Kazakh SSR regions, where most of
the expansion is to take place, are in a belt where the soil is poor
and rainfall uncertain.* The program, however, entails the re-
assignment of manpower, including managers and specialists already
employed on productive collective farms. Some machinery being al-
located to the new areas could be used effectively in the old. areas
of production. The new area is supposed to get 120,000 tractors
(in 15 horsepower units) in 1954. This compares with 139,000
similar general purpose tractors (15 hp units) which were the total
deliveries to all of agriculture in 1953. 4/
The USSR appears., therefore, to be taking a great risk with
its manpower and capital. Rainfall in the new area ranges between
12 and 16 inches per year. Experience has shown that two complete
crop failures usually occur in each 5-year period in these regions
of Russia receiving an annual precipitation of 12 to 20 inches. 5/
In the past, extensions to acreage customarily seeded to spring
wheat in Asiatic USSR have proceeded slowly because of low yields
and frequent crop failures. Yields have been about 7 centners per
hectare in the years when the crop could be harvested. 6/
Increased production from this extension of acreage in 1955
probably will be no more than 6 million to 7 million tons, in con-
trast to the 18 lhillion to 20 million tons calculated by the Soviet
government, on inflated and unrealistic yield estimates. Consequently,
the cost of this production will be inordinately high. The more
modest program to restore grain crops to idle land and land that has
recently been used for perennial grass crops in the better agri-
cultural areas of European Russia should be relatively more success-
ful. The scale of this program, however, is too limited to bring
about a significant increase in total grain production.
III. The European Satellites.**
Excessive precipitation in the European Satellites in the autumn
of 1952 delayed fall plowing and seeding, which resulted in a, decrease
in sown area. In addition a dry and cold spring in 1953 reduced
the yield of grain below earlier expectations. 7/ In East Germany,
See the map, Western USSR: Spring Wheat Acreage, following p. 10.
Include Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary,
Poland, and Rumania.
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Czechoslovakia, and Poland, root crops are ha vested at approximately
the same time that fall plowing and sowing oc,urs. This high seasonal
workload combired with a reduction in farm labor that has taken place
in recent years has resulted in a serious dro in winter wheat and
rye acreage.
:Because of the favorable sowing condtionL existing during March
and April, early estimates indicated that theiloss of acreage devoted
to winter grairs would be made up with spring1grains. The shortage
of farm labor and machinery, unpopular collecltivization programs, and
peasant resistance, however, resulted in disorganization in carrying
out spring sowing plans. Government announcements of plan fulfillment
and its criticism pertaining to support of the "new course" indicated
that the planned acreage goal for bread grain was not fulfilled.
The 1952 planned acreage of bread grain was also underfulfilled.
A. 1953 Grain Production.
Grain* production in the European Sat llites in 1953 has been
estimated to be 34.8 million tons or 103 perc nt of the poor crop
year of 1952, tut only 76 percent of prewar. The 1953 grain acreage
of 28.5 million hectares was less than 1 perc nt larger than 1952
and 12 percent below the prewar average of 32,.5 million hectares.
Acreage of bread grains was below 1952 as a r suit of adverse sowing
conditions in the fall of 1952 and lack of se d in the spring of
1953. Coarse ?xain acreage increased by 3.4 ercent over 1952 as a
result of increased plantings of oats and cor .
Yields of bread grain in 1953 averaged approximately the
same as for 19;2. In the northern area* gro ing conditions were
not as satisfactory for grains as in 1952. Tiese conditions resulted
in yields of wheat and rye remaining at or slightly below 1952 levels,
while coarse grain yields were unchanged,. In the southern area***
yields of all grains were higher than in the poor crop year of 1952.
The most significant increases over 1952 were] in the yields of corn.
* See Tables 6-13, pp. 25 through 32, below, for acreage, yield,
and :production by country. I
Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Pold.
Hungary, F,umania, Bulgaria, and Albania. 7
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The gross per capita production* of grains estimated at 376
kilograms for 1953 is only a slight increase over the 1952 level of
367 kilograms. The prewar average per capita production of grain
was 487 kilograms. When compared with 1952 and 1953 this decline
readily indicates the failure of the Communist governments to in-
crease the production of grain at a rate commensurate with the growth
of population.
1. Bread Grains.**
The bread grain acreage in 1953, estimated at 14.9 mil-
lion hectares, was 300,000 hectares or 2 percent less than the
acreage utilized for bread grains in 1952 and 14 percent less than
prewar. The greatest reduction in the 1953 acreage occurred in East
Germany with a 16 percent decrease as compared with 1952?
The average yield of bread grains for 1953 was 12.7
centners per hectare as compared with 12.9 in 1952 and 14.3 in pre-
war. Rye yields in Poland and East Germany showed the greatest
reduction, while wheat yields remained approximately the same as
1952. The yields of wheat and rye in the other European Satellites
showed increases over 1952, but they still remained below their pre-
war average.
Bread grain production for 1953, estimated at 19 million
tons, is 650,000 tons or 3 percent less than 1952. The 1953 pro-
duction was also 5.8 million tons or 23 percent below the prewar
average of 24.8 million tons produced in the average prewar year
(1935-39 average).
The gross per capita production of bread grain, in.1.953,
estimated at 205 kilograms, is 96 percent of the gross per capita
production in 1952 and 78 percent of average prewar years. Diff i-
culty was experienced by some Satellite governments during 1952-53
in adequately supplying their people with bread. With a decrease
in per capita production for 1953, as indicated above, it appears
probable that the situation will show no improvement unless wheat
and rye are imported in sizeable quantities. Poland and Hungary,
normally net grain exporters, have been negotiating for significant
imports of grain, including bread grain.
See Table 14, p. 33, below.
Wheat and rye.
MEN See Table 10, p. 29, below.
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2. Corse Grains.*
Thy 1953 production of coarse grains, in contrast with
bread grain, i3 estimated to have been larger than 1952, but is still
below 1951 and prewar levels. Production isiestimated to have been
approximately .L5 million tons or 13 percent above 1952, but it is
still 27 percent below prewar averages. The production of both oats
and barley show increases over 1952, but the,most significant in-
crease is that of corn, which increased by approximately 33 percent
over 1952 as a result of increased acreage ar4d yield.
The total acreage of coarse grains for 1952 is estimated
at 12.9 million hectares compared with 12.5 rcillion in 1952 and 14+.4+
million in preirar years. The increase in 1913 acreage over 1952 came
as a result of a favorable spring for sowing and less of a loss in
the corn acreage due to summer drought than occurred in 1952.
The average yield of coarse grains in 1953 is estimated
at 11.6 centner?s per hectare or 109 percent o 1952 and 82 percent
of prewar yielc.s. Yields of oats and barley in 1953 were approxi-
mately the same as 1952, but the corn yield increased by 2.8 percent
as a result of more favorable growing and harvesting conditions during
1953.
B. Plans.
Grain production in the Satellites ha not been meeting planned
goals for the past 2 years. The Five and Six, Year Plans for agri-
culture announced by the various governments,lcalled for grain pro-
duction to reach and in some areas to exc:eed.irewar levels 'by the end
of the plan.** The increased production of grain was to be'accom-
plished by holding the grain acreage generally below prewar levels
and increasing the yields significantly. Thelplan goals, however,
have not been r?~alized to date. The anncuncent of the "hew course"
in agriculture "!~y the various governments is aken to mean an ad-
mission of previous failures.
The "newwr course" in agriculture for Estern Europe places
great; emphasis upon the necessity for increas ng livestock numbers
Barley, oat;;, and corn.
Albania, 19!55; Bulgaria, 1953; Czechoslov kia, 1953; Hungary,
195+; Poland, 1955; and Rumania, 1955.
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and slaughter weights of meat animals. Accomplishment requires an
increase in the feed supply, in which grain plays a significant role.
Although there is to be a slight increase in acreage,* mostly of the
bread grains, the increased production of both bread and coarse
grains is to be primarily a result of increasing yields per hectare.
It is planned that the increased yields will result from increasing
the incentives to the peasants, increasing the use of chemical
fertilizer and agricultural machinery, and a more cautious collectiviza-
tion program during the next two years.
C. Signif icance.
The European Satellites, as a result of a below-average grain
harvest for the second year in succession, now find themselves in the
position of drawing on reserves and of having to be net importers of
grain, if they hope to fulfill recent promises to the population of a
higher standard of living. Bread grain production in 1953 in East
Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia was below 1952. With an increased
population, this situation necessitated increasing imports of bread
grains for East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and a resumption of im-
ports for the first time since 19+7 for Poland** in order to maintain
1952 levels of bread consumption.
Coarse grain production, although more favorable than 1952
because of the increase in corn production in the Balkans, still was
below government expectations. Hungary and Poland have negotiated
for imports of feed grains from Western countries. Normally these
two countries are exporters of feed grains.
The net effects of low grain production in 1953 are estimated
to be: (1) an increase of grain imports by Eastern Europe over pre-
vious years; (2) a decreased ability of some Satellites to implement
fully their consumer goods programs as a result of having to import
grains; and (3) inability of most Satellites to replenish state re-
serves of grain from which withdrawals were made last year without
endangering food and fodder supplies.
* Hungary plans to increase the area sown to bread grains by 5 per-
cent. Poland plans to expand grain acreage by some 400,000 hectares. 8/
** The Minister of Agriculture, Jan Dab-Kocial, in December 1953,
claimed that "in order to secure the food supply of the country .. we
had to import some grain. 9/
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:EV. Communist China.
A. 1953 Grain Production.
Estimates of grain production for Communist China include the
following: rice, wheat, kaoliang, corn, millet, barley, and oats.*
All of these grains excepting kaoliang and milet are shown separately
for consolidaticn into Soviet Bloc totals.. (See Table 15.**) Kaoliang,
the millets, and a miscellaneous grain class are included under the
general classification of "other grains." Thelarea covered by the
estimates of grain production exclude the auto omous regions of Tibet
and Inner Mongolia, the province of Sikang and, except as noted,
Sinkiang.xxx
Adverse weather in 1953 resulted in less favorable growing
conditions for crops than in 1952. During they growing season, rain-
fall was irregular and apparently below normal in much of the rice
growing area. In May and June, for example, drought delayed. rice
transplanting in no fewer than six provinces.j This subnormal rain-
fall area extenLed in a rough semicircle :?rom Xunnan in the south-
west to Kiangsu on the east coast. In much of the winter wheat area,
a generally adverse winter was followed by a ]gate and severe frost
that lowered yields in some of the important wheat producing; provinces.
An expansion in the acreage of both rice and wheat, however, served
to compensate for adverse growing conditions.
The tentative estimate of 1953 grain production in Communist
China, is 109,860,000 tons. This is less than a 2 percent decrease
from the lll,881i,000 tons estimated for 1952. tut is 4 percent below
the prewar average of 114,471,000 tons. The ice acreage expanded
roughly 4 percent in 1953, and the wheat acre ge increased by about
6 percent. The combined production of these drains represented 64
percent of all grain production.
* The Chinese Communists report a grain pr duction tonnage that
includes the grains as given here, plus peas, pulses, soybeans, and
potatoes. It i?s not known if the potatoes are included in this
aggregation on an absolute or on a grain equivalent basis. Un-
fortunately man;r intelligence publications us the same or similar
tonnages for China under the same imprecise h ading.
** Table 15 fellows on p. 34.
XXX The wheat production of Sinkiang is included in the grain pro-
duction estimate for the first time in 1953. As this is less than
500,000 tons, iiteryear comparisons are not s giiificantly distorted
by this additioc.
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In terms of total grain production the increases in wheat and
rice acreage were extremely important in offsetting the adverse con-
ditions of the 1953 growing season. Wheat and rice constituted about
two-thirds of total grain production. As long as this proportion of
the total is maintained, the total grain output will tend to remain
relatively stable.*
Although the rice and wheat acreage was expanded in 1953,
it is unlikely that any of the other grain acreages expanded sig-
nificantly. Total acreage for the listed grains in 1953 was ap-
proximately 7 percent over the prewar average. Moreover, it is
difficult to credit an expansion of principal crop acreages larger
than the 3 percent expansion that occurred from 1952 to 1953. 'Under
these circumstances the grains other than rice and wheat are carried
at 1952 acreage levels. Adverse weather resulted in decreased yields
and thus in lower production of grains other than rice and wheat.
This decrease was approximately 6 percent.
Grain production in 1953 also was lower than the Chinese
Communists had planned. On 4 February 1953, Chou En-Lai in a re-
port to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
stated that the grain production goal for 1953 was 109 percent of
1952. 10/ Adverse crop conditions during the spring and summer caused
a revision (in September 1953) of this target to 106 percent of 1952
production. 11/ By September 1953 it would seem that even this goal
was optimistic. According to CIA estimates, actual grain production
in 1953 was only 98 percent of 1952 grain output. Although not all
Chinese claims of recent production are known, the Communists have
announced that grain production in northeast China in 1953 was only
93 percent of the grain production in 1952. 12/
B. Problems of Su ply and Distribution.
On a per capita basis the production of grain in 1953 was
229 kilograms as compared to 233 kilograms in 1952. This is a
decrease of about 2 percent and is below the prewar production of
grain per capita by about 4 percent. Table 16** gives per capita
production for the various types of grain.
* The acreage, yield, and production of grain in Communist China
are given for a prewar year and for each year from 1950 through 1.953
inclusive in Table 15, p. 34, below.
*'* Table 16 follows on p. 35?
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Rice production in 1953 reached 100 kilograms per capita for
the first time Eince the Communists gained control of China. The
production of wheat per capita has remained repatively stable at about
L7 kilograms, or approximately at the prewar level.
It is to be noted that a constant population figure was em-
ployed in calculating these per capita production data. If the
census currently being conducted by the C:aineEe Communists indicates
a population growth, the per capita grain output figure will. be even
less favorable than that shown in Table 16.
The quantities produced in 153 do not in themselves
of grain indicate a deter?iorated food position. Food 4hortages in a number
of localized country districts apparently hav4 resulted from adverse
weather in 1953, but the problems of interpro\incial movement of
foodstuffs probably have been made more diffi4ult. Food shipments
to urban areas may be an even greater problem' since the traditional
surplus areas o:f rice and of coarse grains wee affected most ad-
versely in 1953. To supply the urban population, it may have been
necessary to draw foodstuffs from areas which normally are more or
less self-sufficient.
The government is encroaching to an iicreasing degree on the
food distribution field. Estimates of the nu~hbers of people dependent
to some degree upon marketing functions performed by the government
range as high as 200 million. Because of thetgovernment's assumption
of marketing functions and delays in its pric(b stabilization activities,
lags in supply adjustment have resulted. A g6od crop year or a plen-
tiful supply of grain tends to obscure the economic strains resulting
from controlled prices and inept distribution{ The slight fall in
total grain production in 1953 tended to reve .l or emphasize the prob-
lems inherent In the Communist practice of controlling prices and
supply movements.
In like manner the failure of the 19);3 crop of grains to equal
or exceed the 3.952 production probably has re4cted unfavorably on the
government's storage or reserve program. Storage or reserve plans
were likely bae,ed on the achievement of the foodstuffs output goal
in 1953, of 1952. Since pro-
duction was scheduled to be 109 percent
duction decreased rather. than increased, maintenance of the reserve
plan would have further worsened the already1precarious food position
of the population.
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The size of the reserves that the Communists wish normally
to carry are unknown. Various indications have pointed to 20 mil-
lion to 30 million tons of grains above commercial stocks. Such
reserves, however, are believed to be relatively small as yet, and
the 1953 crop does not appear to offer a favorable opportunity for
their expansion.
C. Signif icance.
The failure of the 1953 grain crop to increase or even to
equal the production of 1952 probably hinders government operations
in several ways. Exports to the USSR in payment for industrial
capital are made more difficult. Although grain output was not
down sufficiently to indicate that the Chinese Communists could not
obtain the quantities of grain desired for export, internal dis-
content with the regime's procurement and export program would
probably have been less if a larger grain crop had materialized.
Because significant additions to grain reserves are considered to
have been unlikely in 1953, price stabilization of basic foodstuffs
and the build-up of strategic reserves for military use may have
proceeded at a slower than desired pace.
Because the Chinese Communists have firm political control
internally, the decrease in amain output in 1953 is not likely to
have significant effects on their intentions. Any plans of suf-
ficient importance probably will be carried out. Nevertheless,
some delay may result in the implementation of those plans having
a low priority in the economic field.
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STATISTICAL TABLES
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