POPULATION AND MANPOWER OF KOREA 1954

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00935A000300030001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 13, 1954
• Content Type: IM

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
POPULATION AND MANPOWER OF KOREA.
1954
CIA/RR IM-396
13 September 1954
WARNING
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE
MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, usc,_ SEC-3,
793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF
WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS
PROHIBITED BY LAW,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
12
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CIA/RR IM-396 CONFIDENTIAL
(ORR Project 45.550)
POPULATION AND MANPOWER OF?KOREA*
195
Summary
The most recent firm estimate of the population.of Korea is for
1949, when the total population'of 29.3 million included 9.1 million
north of the 38th Parallel, and 20.2 million, south. It is estimated
that the total population of Korea in 1954 is. 29.5 million, of which
21.8 million are in South Korea** and 7.7 million in North Korea.
This total is only a small increase over 1949, since the rapid rate
of natural increase has been about offset by war casualties. The
distribution of the population, however, has reflected the migrations
of refugees and some disparity in the effect of war casualties upon
the rates of growth in North and South Korea. The population of
South Korea increased by about 1.6 million and that of North Korea
lost about 1.4 million. About 40 percent of the population in each
section was under 15 years of age. In 1949 the Korean labor force,
using the broadest definition, was about 12 million of whom 4.3
million were in North Korean The post-World War II repatriation of
some 280,000 Japanese removed a large percentage of the top-level
workers. This critical gap has been only partially filled by
vocational training in South Korea, and by the use of Soviet,
Satellite, and Chinese skilled and technical personnel in North
Korea.
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this memorandum
represent the best judgment of the responsible analyst as of
1 August 1954.
** North Korea and South Korea in this memorandum refer to the
areas north and south of the 38th Parallel.
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The.population of the whole of Korea increased from 23.7 million
in 1940 to 29.3 million in 1949. Of the 1949 population, 9.1 million
were in North Korea and 20.2 in South Korea./* some of the 1940-49
increase was attributable to a net in-migration of repatriated Koreans
exceeding the n unber of repatriated Japanese. Over 5 million, however,
were accounted ror by an excess of births. ove deaths, 2/ thus in-
dicating a rate of natural increase during 1940!s of about 2
percent per year.
If this rats had continued from 1949 to 1954 the population on
both sides of tae Parallel would have been over 32 million with.about
10 million in North Korea and over 22 million in South Korea. The
Korean civil war, however, probably caused de'ths to exceed births in
the North and is addition sent an estimated 1million refugees from
North to South ;{orea** with the result that 1 January 1954 there
were from 7.5 to 8 million persons in North Korea and about 22 million
in South Korea.,***
South Korea, in.1949, already had an exce~s population due to the
influx of nearly 1.5 million**** refugees 1 diately after the
expulsion of th,~ Japanese and to the return O' some Koreans from Japan.
The arrival of :additional refugees during the recent hostilities and
the continuing ugh rate of natural increase oupled with the fact that
few refugees seem to have returned since the istice have left South
Korea with an i-acreased population.
Table 1* * gives estimates of the age d,stribution of,the popu-
lation of North and South Korea in 1949 and 1 54.
Footnote references in arabic numerals
the Appendix.
** It is estimated that 700,000 had defec
Accurate estimates are lacking, because the t
from North Korea to conceal their origin when
the ROK population.
*** One ROK : ublication gives a figure of
1 January 1953, exclusive of armed services.
million as of 30 April 1954. 5/ The latter,
are to sources listed in
ed by April 1952. 3/
ndency is for refugees
possible and merge with
9.4 million as of
J Another gives 21.8
r a somewhat higher
to past trends.
figure, would si:em to correspond most closely
*-x' Official ROK sources estimate a net ga
migration (incliding refugees) between Octobe
***** Table 1 follows on p. 3.
CONFIDENTIAL
n of 1.6 million from
1945 and January 1950. 6/
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CONFIDENTIAL
Table 1
Population of North and South Korea by Age a/
1949 and 1954
Millions
Years of
e
0-14
15-59
6o and Over
Total
1949
3.8
4.7
0.6
9.1;
1954
3.5
3.8
0.4
7.7
1949
8.4
10.7
1.1
20.2
1954
9.0
11.2
1.6
21.i
a. Estimated by applying the 1940 age distribution
to the 1949 totals derived above and adjusting for
war losses and migration.
As in most Asian populations, the persons in the dependent ages
(under 15 and over 60) constitute a large proportion of the total.
The productive ages therefore constitute only about 49 percent of
the total in North Korea and 51 percent in South Korea. The pro-
ductive age group decreased nearly 20 percent in North Korea from
1949 to 1954 as against about a 5-percent increase in the South.
Employment statistics since 1940 are sketchy. CIA estimates,
however, place employment for all of Korea in 1949 at over 12.
million. 7/ Of this total 4.3 million were in North Korea. Many
children and partially employed adults, however, were included
among those considered to be employed.
-3-
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In 1940, there were 280,000 Japanese in
repatriation deft a critical gap in the top
economy, and ;?robably reduced over-all effi
Korean employment. Their
level positions in the
iency.
Since the cessation of hostilities, tec
extended to N )rth Korea by the Bloc and to.
Estimates as to the number of workers invol
the largest group of workers in North Korea
reconstructing and operating the railroads
struction projects. It is estimated that a
Chinese would be required for the permanent
of the North Korean railroads alone.
In broadcasts mentioning that the USSR
had. supplied '100 technicians to North Korea
Russians are rehabilitating an iron works a
slovaks and Hungarians are employed at mach
working at coal mines. 8/
- 4 -
nical assistance has been
outh Korea by the US.
ed are not firm. By far
are Chinese who are
nd engaging in other con-
least 30,000 to 40,000
maintenance and operation
nd the European Satellites
it was specified that
d waterways, Czecho-
ne works, and Poles are
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APPENDIX
SOURCES AND EVALUATION OF SOURCES
1. Evaluation of Sources.
The census of Korea taken by the Japanese in 1940 is considered
accurate. The tabulations from this census by province make it
possible to divide the population north and south of the 313th
Parallel as of 1940. The ROK census of South Korea in 1949 is
reasonably accurate and makes it possible to estimate with some
degree of confidence the population of North Korea also. The trends
since 1949 as estimated in this memorandum have no such firm basis
but are inferred from estimated rates of natural increase, war losses,
and fragmentary information on refugees. The refugees are hard to
segregate because of the deliberate policy of the ROK government to
blend this group with the native population as quickly as possible.
Estimates of present employment are totally lacking and previous
estimates do not provide a reliable basis for calculating changes
because so many of the North Korean enterprises are not operating.
Information concerning the use of foreign technicians in North Korea
is likewise scattered and inadequate.
Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated
"Eval.," have the following significance:
S
ource of Information
-
Doc. - Documentary
1
- Confirmed by other
sources
A
- Completely reliable
2
- Probably true
B
- Usually reliable
3
- Possibly true
C
- Fairly reliable
4
- Doubtful
D
- Not usually reliable
5
- Probably false
E
F
- Not reliable
- Cannot be judged
6
- Cannot be judged
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"Documentary" refers to original documen s of foreign governments
and organizations; copies or translations of such documents by a staff
officer; or information extracted from such ocuments by a staff
officer, all of which may carry the field ev luation "Documentary."
Evaluatiors not otherwise designated are those appearing on the
cited document; those designated "RR" are b the author of this report.
No "RR" evaluation is given when the author ees with the evaluation
on the cited c.ocument.
1. Irene B. Taeuber,"Korea and the Koroans in the Northeast
Asian Region," Population Index, 0 t 1950. U. Eval. RR 2.
2. Ibid.
3. NIS 41, Section 44. C.
4. Refer3nce Handbook of the Gover h b:Li& oforP ,
Seoul, Sep 1953, p. 171. U.
5. State, Seoul, Despatch No. 46,260, 6 Oct 1953. C.
6. Taeuber, oa. cit.
7. NIS 1i, Section 44.
8.
25X1A8a
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