THE 'NEW COURSE' AND THE LIVESTOCK INDUSTRY IN THE SOVIET BLOC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00935A000300040002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 17, 1954
• Content Type: IM

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
THE "NEW COURSE" AND THE LIVESTOCK INDUSTRY
IN THE SOVIET BLOC
CIA/RR IM-397
17 September 1954
WARNING
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE
MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS.
793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF
WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS
PROHIBITED BY LAW.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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CONTENTS
Page
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I. Recent Announcements of Policy Changes . . . . . . . . . . .
A. USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
B. European Satellites . . . . . . . . . . . 6
C. Mongolian People's Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
II. Current Situation . .
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A. USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
B. European Satellites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
C. Communist China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
D. Mongolian People's Republic . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . . . . 12
III. Probable Results, of the "New Course" . . . . . . . . . . . 13
A. Test of Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
B. Probable Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
IV. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix
Sources and Evaluation of Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
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FOREWORD
Policies relating to livestock have played a major role in the "new
course" which has been charted in varying forms for the USSR, the Euro-
pean Satellites, and the Mongolian People's Republic. The Mongolian
People's Republic is included in this intelligence memorandum because
its economy is closely related to that of the USSR; the animal industry
is probably the mainspring of its economy; and the Republic exports con-
siderable quantities of animal products to the USSR, Communist China, and
North Korea.
This memorandum deals with the various actions that have been taken
recently by the Soviet Bloc governments with respect to livestock, the
probable success of these measures, the probable consumption levels foX,
livestock products, and future trends of livestock numbers and supplies
of livestock products.
The over-all margin of error in the estimates made herein is be-
lieved to be within ?' 10 percent, but in the case of individual figures
it may be somewhat higher.
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Page
1. Estimated Livestock Numbers in the Soviet Bloc,
Prewar and 1952-54 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 3
2. Livestock Numbers, USSR: Comparison of October
and January Estimates, 1950-54 and Goals for
October 195+ and January 1956 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Estimated Per Capita Meat and Milk Availability
by Areas of the Soviet Bloc, Prewar, 1952-53,
and 1953-54 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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(ORR Project 21.144)
THE "NEW COURSE" AND THE LIVESTOCK INDUSTRY IN THE SOVIET BLOC*
Summary
The Soviet Bloc**, excluding Communist China, has officially em-
barked on a "new course" in agriculture. The stated purpose of this
action is to raise the living standards in the various countries. A
major initial objective of the new emphasis on agriculture is to im-
prove the economic and technical conditions under which the livestock
industry operates. Emphasis on the animal industry is to be expected,
since that industry is the main source of those foods -- meats and
dairy products -- which are high in protein and fat. The present diet
in most areas of the Bloc is dominated by foods high in carbohydrates
-- foods such as cereals and potatoes.
By the middle of 1.953 the USSR recognized that the.livestock indus-
try required special remedial measures. Not only had total populations
increased, but the accelerated industrial development throughout the
Soviet Bloc was accompanied by increases in nonfarm populations. In
the USSR, the per capita availability of meaty during the consumption
year 1 July 1953 through 30 June 1954 is estimated to have been 17.2
kilograms, which contrasts sharply with 70 kilograms per capita in the
US for 1953. The-1~53-54 consumption level was about 5 percent below
the 18.2 kilograms available during 1952-53 and 4 percent below the
1938-39 availability of 18 kilograms. In the European Satellites, the
1..953-54 average per capita availability of meat was 24 percent below
that in 1952-53 and 34 percent below prewar levels. The Communist
regimes apparently recognized that supplies of meat were too short to
serve as incentives to greater labor output.
Soviet officials, in speeches in September and October of 1953,
announced the "new course", part of which was designed to increase the
output of the livestock industry. Adjustments were to be made in de-
livery quotas, prices were to become more attractive, and a number of
other concessions were to be made.
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this memorandum repre-
sent the best judgment of the responsible analyst as of 1 July 1954.
** Throughout this memorandum the Soviet Bloc includes the USSR, the
European Satellites, Communist China, and the Mongolian People's
Republic; it does not include North Korea, Sikang, Tibet, or the Soviet
Zone of Austria.
*** The estimates do not include slaughter fats, fat cuts,, or bacon.
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.`['he European Satellites, beginning with E st Germany in June 1953,
also initiated the "new course." Their progr ms,, although similar in
certain respects to the one announced by the 'SSR, were not so compre-
hensive. The concessions granted and the incentives offered were not
so favorable for increasing livestock numbers! total production, or
deliveries to the government. In April 195+ he Mongolian :People's
Republic announced reductions in compulsory dlivery quotas and in-
creases in purchase prices for quota and abov$-quota deliveries. Other
provisions similar to the program of the USSRwere also made.
Decrees implementing these policy changes were released too late to
have any appreciable effect on livestock numb rs carried over into the
1953-54 winter. It is possible, however, that the "new course" may re-
sult in larger quantities being delivered. or old to the governments,
even though total production changes little. Heretofore, large quanti-
ties of meat and dairy products have been consumed by the producing
groups or sold directly to consumers witIKout going through government
channels.
It is to be noted that any buildup of liv stock numbers must be
associated with increased availability of feed. In most parts of the
Soviet Bloc, feed supplies and governmental pplicies have been factors
limiting the numbers of livestock carried. on ollective farms and by
individual households. With sufficient incen ives to convince farmers
that they can benefit by increasing their liv stock holdings, together
with increased feed, and improved management,1livestock numbers and
productivity could increase considerably over;a period of years. Within
the framework of the implementing decrees, ho ever, and taking into con-
sideration the limited potential availability of feedstuffs as well as
the constantly increasing population, it is probable that the animal
industries of the various countries of the Soviet Bloc will be able to
do little more than maintain the present low levels of per capita availa-
bility of its products. It is doubtful whether the prewar levels of
meat and dairy products on a national per capita basis in some of the
Bloc countries can even be regained, much lest increased.
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I. Recent Announcements of Policy Changes.
Livestock numbers in the Soviet Bloc sharply declined during World
War II, particularly in those parts of the Bloc countries in which war
as actually being waged. After World War II there was a relatively
rapid recovery in livestock numbers until the early 19504s. Thereafter.,
unfavorable weather and unpopular measures designed to collectivize
farming in the European Satellites and to increase the socialization of
the animal industry in the USSR resulted in a leveling off and, in some
instances., in an actual reduction of livestock numbers.
It became evident in early 1953 that, in contrast to earlier in-
creases, the numbers of cattle and swine. -- the main meat-producing
categories of livestock -- were lower than those of a year earlier for
the Soviet Bloc as a whole. Estimated livestock numbers in the Soviet
Bloc, prewar, and 1952 to 1954, are shown in Table 1.
Estimated Livestock Numbers in thg Soviet Bloc:
Prewar and 1952-5Ii
Prewar
1952
1953
1954
Cattle and Buffalo
123.2
119.3
116.7
118.5
Swine
119.7
116.1
114.4
116.7
Sheep and Goats
161.6
190.1
191.9
194.8
Horses
35.4
28.3
28.7
28.5
a. These estimates apply to var;4j:~r T,eriods from 1 January to spring
and are based on earlier CIA estimates. Livestock numbers in Poland
have been adjusted to a 1 January basis, and buffalo are included for
Bulgaria.
With reductions in numbers, a substantial decrease in the 1953-54
meat availability was apparent. As a result all the Soviet Bloc govern-
ments, except that of Communist China, successively from June :L953 on,
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announced new Xrograms granting concessions t'o the individual and col-
lective farmer:. These programs were designed to provide incentives
for increasing livestock production and deliveries and sales to the
government. Ccffinunist China has made no pub] is announcements of major
changes in agricultural policy. II
In the USSR the actual decrease in caws and total cattle
numbers on 1 JFxuary 1953, compared with 195 , occurred at a time when
the weather anc crop conditions had been rea onably favorable and the
government was planning on large increases i livestock numbers and
output.. The F.:fth Year Plan (1951-55) had called for very large
increases in 1:-vestock numbers by 1 January 956 and in meat and dairy
products for 1955. Percentage increases ove 1950 were to be as
follows: catt:_e, 18 to 20; swine, 45 to 50; sheep, 60 to 62; horses,
10 to 12; meat., 80 to 90; and milk, 45 to 50
The si-;cation which the USSR faced i 1953 was, along with the
increasing population, a general stagnation n agricultural production.
With the sudde:i downturn in cattle numbers, the Soviet government recog-
nized not only that the FifthFiveYear Plan for livestock (except
horses) was unattainable, but also that there might be a future reduc-
tion in. the su?pl.y of meat and dairy product . This recogaition brought
about a series of decrees, Speeches, and oth r propaganda, beginning in
September 1953, all of which emphasized the adverse situation in the
livestock indu3try. New goals for livestock numbers and output of live-
stock products were issued, and. statements of what must be done to im-
prove the conditions of the livestock industry were made. Publicity
was given in tie central and provincial pres and radio, emphasizing
both the national livestock situation and the situation in the republics
or local areas and specifying the help which. would be given.
The 1953 decrees authorized certain definite measures that, if
successfully put into effect, wouldNtendL to treengthen the animal indus-
try. These measures include the following: (1) a large increase in
procurement prices over the previous very to prices for compulsory
deliveries and for above-quota sales; (2) pr vision for increased out-
put of grass and hay and increased avai1abi4ty of livestock feed to
collective farmers; (3) elimination of tax o private holdings of live-
stock; (fit-) establishment of fixed per-hectare norms for compulsory
deliveries and a policy that these norms be adhered to rather than that
targets be raised for leading collective farms; (5) increased availa-
bility of consumer goods to agricultural producers; (6) provision of
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building materials; (7) improvement of veterinary service's; (8) aboli-
tion of delivery quotas for certain classes of producers; (9) somewhat
reduced rates of compulsory deliveries from individual holdings; and
(10) provision of additional help in the form of experts; machinery,
and equipment. Machine Tractor Stations were charged with the task
of seeing that many of these measures were successfully put into effect.
Large-scale efforts were to be made to increase grain acreage
and production by plowing new land and presently unused land. Low-_
yielding grasslands were also to be used for grain production in many
cases. These measures were to provide increased supplies of grain for
human consumption and also feed for livestock in both the collective
herds and the livestock of collective farriers.
Soviet claims of livestock output generally do not relate to
the total quantity of products available for consumption, but only to
the output processed by the government and passed through state distri-
bution channels. The decision of the Council of Ministries and the
Central Committee of the CPSU On the Increasing Production of Food-
stuffs and Improving their Quality" claimed large increases in the
production of basic foodstuffs i the period from 1940 to 1953 and gave
plans for 1954, 1955, and 1956. J* These claims and plans related to
quantities of meat processed by the state. In 1953 this amounted to
about 1.8 million metric tons of meat (including poultry)** out of a
total carcass weight supply; (indigenous and imported) of 4.3 million
tons*** or about 43 percent;. Efforts have been and are being made to
increase the share of total production that moves through state control.
A considerable part of the meat (about 25 percent in 1952), milk, and
other dairy products consumed by nonproducers was. sold by collective
farms and farmers directly to the consumer. An?'even larger share was
consumed on the farm (35 percent for meat in 1952****).
Footnote references in arabic numerals are to sources listed in
the appendix.
** This estimate is based on reported percentage change and vary-
ing bases for 1952.
The total meat supply includes beef and veal, pork, mutton, lamb,
and goat meat on the basis of carcass weight (including slaughter-fats,
fat cuts, and bacon).,,
**** This estimate is ba&qd on official Soviet estimates p~ deliveries
of livestock to the state-- and production for the market,_ and/or a
CIA estimate of total live weight of meat production.
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B. European Satellites.
On 9 Juae 1953, East Germany became the first Satellite to
officially anno,ance a general change in agricultural policy. Hungary
followed on 4 Jily, Rumania on 22 August, Bul ria on 8 September,
Czechoslovakia in 15 September, and Poland in late October.2 The
changes with re3pect to livestock were revealed in most cases after
the general policy change had been announced. Although the provisions
were similar in many cases to those of tl..e USSR, in no case were the
new programs so extensive nor d.Ld theyprovid as much in t.,,ie way. of
concessions and incentives as that announced by the USSR. The emphasis
on socialized livestock has generally been re axed, with some conces-
sions being made to encourage an increase in he private holdings of
livestock. In Bulgaria, however, the emphasi on socialized livestock
continues with Little cognizance of, or a.ddit oval incentives for, live-
stock raising ii the private sector. I
Reductiins in compulsory delivery quotas for various livestock
products have been claimed for all of the Eurpean Satellites. East
Germany announced reductions of from 5 to 20 percent in the compulsory
delivery quotas for livestock and livestock p oducts on 25 June 1953.--/
In Czechoslovak9..a, the compulsory delivery quotas for meat were to be
reduced by 13 ID 20 percent in 1954._' Simila adjustments probably
were made in otaer Satellites. Throughout the European Satellites,
however, adjustments in delivery quotas favor d the collective over the
private sector.
Various concessions and incentives wh.ch have been applied in
different countries and for different productp include: (1) increased
procurement prices; (2) bonus payments for de Liveries and sales to the
government; (3) cash advances; (4) incentives for concluding contract
arrangements; (j) assurances that delivery qu tas will not be raised
in the next year or two; (6) increased availa ility of consumer goods
for the rural pDpulation; (7) tax reduction; 8) free veterinary aid;
and (9) increased credit.
Together with decrees implementing th~ "new course," new live-
stock goals have been announced in many Of th European Satellites.
These new goals are in some cases lower and it, some cases higher than
were past goals. One of the European Satelli :es, Bulgaria, together
with the USSR, is shifting the planning and a counting data for live-
stcoch, from January to the la'_- fall. I
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C. Mongolian People's Republic.
It was not until Marchand April 1954 that a new livestock
program was announced in the Mongolian People's Republic. This
program, in providing for large increases in procurement and purchase
prices, the cancellation_pf those deliveries which were in arrears,
and the waiving of cert taxes, was very similar to corresponding
sections of the Soviet program. 8/
In. the past, Communist programs affecting the livestock industry
generally have tend.ed, to depress the industry rather than encourage it,
Compulsory deliveries of livestock and. livestock products at extremely
low prices and. collectivization are characters is of past policies.
With the "new course" and the decrees implementing it, there appears to
be some relaxation of these depressing measures. In general, however,
the implementing decrees have tended to fall short of what might have
been expected from the original speeches and promises.
In most areas of the Soviet Bloc, increased supplies of desired
items have been promised. for the rural areas as an incentive for turn-
ing over larger quantities of agricultural products to the government.
In some cases, particularly with collective farms,, sales to the govern-
ment under contract have been made a requirement for obtaining such
items as trucks and building and maintenance materials,. Such measures
may be increasing sales to the government of products that might other-
wise have been consumed on the farm or sold on the free market. It is
doubtful, however, that such goods are being made, available in suf-
ficient quantity to bring sales to the government. to the desired: levels.
A. USSR
Since the number of livestock to be held through the winter is
determined primarily by the amount of feed available, the programs
implemented by the USSR were too late to have a significant effect on
the numbers of livestock carried though the winter or on the total
meat-or milk production during the consumption year, 1 July 1953 through
30 Juno 1954.. Moreover, the USSR appears to have underestimated the
difference in livestock numbers between 1 October and the following
1 January, particularly for hogs, since the reported numbers for 1
October 1953 are already considerably above the October 1951 goal for
swine and only 1 percent below the 195 goal for cattle. A comparison of
October, and January estimates, 1950-54, and goals for October 1951 and
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January 1956 are given in Table 2.
Table 2
Livestock Numbers, U" SR:
Comparison of October and January stimates, 1.950-54
and Goals for October 1951 an' January 1956
Cattle Swine
Oct 1950 a/ b/ 63,100 33,100
Jan 1951 c/ - 57,200 0+,100
Sheep
and Goats Horses
117,800 N.A.
99,000 13,700
Oct 1951 a/ 64,800 39 boo
Jan 1952 c/ 58,800 26,'700
Oct 1952 a/ 62,800 43,300
Jan 1953 1/ 56,600 28,500
Oct 1953 e/ 63,000 47,600
Jan 1954 r/ 57,-700 29, 600
Oct 1954 Goal k:/ 65,900 34,500
Jan 1956 Goal 67,500 35,000
128,300 N.A.
107,500 14,700
132,500 N.A.
109,900 15,300
135,800 IT,A
112,000 16,200
144,400 N.. A.
158,400 15,100
a. Estimates for 1 October are arrived at o the basis of the following
1 January numbers and the estimated d.isappea ante during the last quarter.
b. ''here has teen no goal announced for horses on a 1 October basis.
C. 9
d. 10/
e. 1l/
f. CIA estimate.
g. L2/
h. Q
The increases that occurred in total
October 1952 tc October 1953 are believed to
livestock numbers from
[be considerably less than
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the increases claimed for collective and state farm livestock. It is
probable that the long-ran trend toward increasing the proportion of
total livestock that is in the socialized herds continued during 1953
or at least until October. If the recent decrees are carried out,
there may be a short-run reversal of the trend toward the :increased
proportion of state-owned. livestock. Collective farmers and other
individuals may be given sufficient incentive so that their individual
holdings may show some increase in proportion to the total livestock
holdings.
The total meat production* in 1953-5I was about 3,9 million
tons.-*,* This was slightly less than the 400 million tons estimated
for 1952-53.- Total milk production in 1953-54 is estimated at about
26.5 million tons, slightly more than the 26 million tons for a year
earlier.** On the other hand, the USSR claimed a l2-percent increase
in the quantity of meat processed by the government in 1953 as compared
with 1952. The total meat processed by the state in 1953 is computed
as about 1.8 million metric tons. -* They also claimed a 16-percent
increase for sausage products, 3 percent for butter, 16 percent for
cheese, 9 percent for whole milk, and 21 percent for condensed milk.
'T'hus, although total., meat production, estimated at 3,9 million metric
tons, declined below the 1952-53 level of 4.0 million tons, and total
milk production increased slightly, the USSR claimed large increases
in the quantities of these products processed, by state enterprises.
This is possible and, may well have occurred, since more than half of
the total production of meat and milk is distributed and consumed with-
out going through government channels. The proportion of these commodi-
ties actually under state control is believed to have increased in 1953
in line with the long-range intention of the Soviet government to in-
crease the state control over the sale of agricultural products.
The average per capita availability of livestock products de-
clined in 1,953-51, compared with 1952-53 and with 1938-39., The esti-
mated average availability of 17.2 kilograms of meat per person was
5 percent below the 1952-53 average of 18.2 kilograms and 4 percent
below the 1938-39 availability of 18 kilograms as indicated in Table 3,;
The per capita availability of milk equivalent in 1953-54+ was about 77"
kilo ams per person.* T~ris`' ~s'enl s ~_ h:t1J 1o c~, h a t~.~ .1 52.-53
Beef and veal.,, pork, mutton, lamb, and goat meat is included on
the basis of carcass weight.
These estimates are explained in 14/,.,.,,
This estimate is based on percentage change given in'15/r and vary-
ing bases for 1952,
**** Not including milk equivalent of creamery butter.
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1eve:L, but 4+3 percent below the 1938-39 e:sti to of 134 kilograms.
Estimated per capita meat and milk availe.bili y in the Soviet Bloc,
prewar, 1952-53, and 1953-54 is given in Table 3.
Estimated Per Capita Meat and Mi Lk Availability
by Areas of the Soviet!Bloc
Prewar, 1952-53, and 193-54
Kilograms per Year
Prewa_a
1952-53
1953-54
Meat
USSR a/
18.0 b
18.2
17.2
European Satellites a/
26.8
23.1
17.6
Communist China J
11.7
10.3
l0.-
Mongolian Peoplets Republic J
us d/
56.9 e/
65.3 J
70.0 f/
Milk Equivalence;
USSR J
13r+
78 77
European Sa-;ellites J J
99
73 77
trs k/
206 1/
238 J 235 W/
a.
Not including slaughter fats,
fat cuts,o
? bacon. Estimates are
taken directly from or based on 16/.
b. 1938-39.
c. A complete food balance has not beer. wor ed out for this area but
the per capita availability is probably cons derably above 100 kilograms
per person. '
d. Estimates are generally carcass weight b.sis but exclude lard. L7/.
e. 1938. 1
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Table 3
Estimated Per Capita Meat and Milk Availability
by Areas of the Soviet Bloc
Prewar, 1952-53, and 1953-54
(Continued)
f . 1952.
g. 1953.
h. Does not include milk used for creamery butter production. Esti-
mates for Communist China and Mongolian People's Republic are not
available.
i. Estimates are taken directly from or based on 18/.
j. Not including Albania.
k. 19/.
1. 1935-39 average..
In addition to the efforts to increase both production and im-
ports of highly desired foods, the USSR has been and is continuing.';..
to increase rapidly the production of dried milk. Efforts are also
being made to import dried milk, which can be used in cooking or baking
to enrich and improve the product. Although it can be reconverted for
use as liquid milk, dried milk has not proved to be a highly desired
consumer item such as meat, butter, and cheese. Therefore, it appears
that the primary purpose which the USSR has in mind with respect to
dried milk is raising the protein level of the Soviet diet.
B. European Satellites.
The decrees implementing the "new course" in the European
Satellites came late in 1953 and in many cases did not take effect
until 1954. They were not, however, extensive enough to have caused
any rapid, changes in livestock numbers or output. In many cases, the
state is furnishing feed to farmers at reduced prices, provided their
livestock and livestock products are delivered to the state marketing
organizations. Credit has been made more readily available to col-
lectives, cooperatives, and individuals for obtaining livestock, feed,
and facilities. In addition, an increased amount of veterinary care
is being provided to individual farmers and to group organizations.
These incentives were believed to have had only limited success in
diverting larger deliveries of livestock and livestock products to the
governments from free markets and home consumption.
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In 1951-51 the average consumption of meat in the European.
Satellites was about 17.6 kilograms per perso , about Sercent below
the 1952-53 corsumption of 23.1 kilograms and 34 percent be the pre-
war estimate of 26.8 kilograms. These consum tion figures make an
allowance for trade movements and, changes in stocks. East Germany and
Czechoslovakia have been net importers of meat while the other European
Satellites have shown net exports.
In 195.-54 the per capita availabilit of milk equivalent* for
the European Satellites (not including A1bani ) was 77 kilograms, 5
percent more than the 73 kilograms consumed in 1952-53 but 22 percent
less than the Irewar estimate of 99 kilograms.
C. Communist China.
Communist China has done little to enhourage the livestock
industry. Tice government has issued propaganl.a relating to the need
for sanitation and improving the feed supply For livestock. The aid
which the government is giving has been _Limitpd largely to credits and
veterinary assistance. Although an educatio l campaign together with
veterinary assistance can.gradually improve t e efficiency of the
animal industry, it is a program which has s 11 results in the short
run. On the other hand, the collectivizatio drive in China may have
an adverse effect on livestock numbers, particularly draft animals.
Experience in the other Satellite countr:Les indicates that animals are
often slaughtered excessively by the peasants under conditions of in-
tensified collectivization.
While idely established delivery nors for slaughter livestock
or other livestock products do not appear to ve-been established, the
government obtains quantities of such product through purchase. It is
probable that the government is able to obtain these products at a rela-
tively low price, since in many areas the go rnment is the only of
fective buyer cf livestock products which the IChinese peasant may wish
to sell. There are many areas where the government uses its control
over consumer ?oods to obtain livestock produ,ts.
.D. Mongolian Peoplels Republic.
The poiulation of the Mongolian Peopi
engaged in livestock production. The strateg
this area is the export of slaughter animals
* Not including milk equivalent of creamery
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e's Republic is primarily
c value of agriculture in
~o the USSR. This livestock
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is slaughtered primarily at Ulan-Ude, which has one of the largest meat-
packing plants in the USSR.
In 191, livestock in the Mongolian People's Republic totaled
27.5 million head. 20 Figures released prior to 1954+ indicated that
livestock numbers in 1949 were about at the 19+1 level. 2A/ In connec-
tion with the announcements of the new program for livestock and new
livestock goals, however, failures have been admitted, and in early 1954
it was stated that the 1941 level had not yet been reached. 22
A 195+ goal has been announced calling for 23.3 million head
23/, with the prewar level to be reached by the end of 19, 97, 221./ Either
livestock numbers have decreased sharply since 1949 or then 197-9 figures
were false. In either case, livestock numbers are considerably below
the prewar level in a country that was not directly 'affected by war. It
is probable that large numbers of livestock were exported to the USSR
during World War II, which may have resulted in low livestock'numbers in
the middle and late 19i0's. It may be that government restrictions, a
lack of sufficient incentives, and large exports have continued to hold
down livestock numbers.
III. Probable Results of the "New Course."
Both short-run and long-run effects of the "new course" on live-
stock numbers and'output of:.livestock'products in the Soviet Bloc must
be considered. Although the following remarks do not constitute an
estimate of the maximum levels that may be obtained nor embody a con-
cept of needed or desired levels of production, they forecast the nature
of changes in production and consumption that are most likely to.occur.
Underlying the forecast is a consideration of such factors as t7eather
and crop conditions, feed supplies, governmental programs relating to
collectivization, compulsory delivery and price conditions, availability
of consumer goods, and management practices.
A. Test of Success.
If the programs implemented by the USSR, the European Satel-
lites, and the Mongolian People's Republic are successful in increasing
the level of livestock production, the earliest time that significant
changes might be evident would be the winter of 1954-55. The livestock
numbers carried through the winter could be increased considerably at
the expense of livestock slaughter.
It is over a longer period of time that the real test of the
success of the livestock programs must be made. The programs can be
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Judged successful only if, over a period of 5to 10 years, the average
per capita consumption of livestock products s increased to signifi-
cantly higher levels than those prevailing atithe present time.
:B. Probable Trends .
To fulfill the promises of increased availability of livestock
products, the total production of meat and mi must increase at a
faster rate th?,n that at which the population is increasing. This can
be done through increasing livestock numbers and also by increasing the
productivity per animal. Throughout most parts of the Soviet Bloc, feed
sullies and governmental policies regarding delivery quotas and prices
have been factors limiting livestock production. With adequate feed
supplies and sufficient leeway and incentives, the farmers may be con-
vinced that they can benefit by increasi::ag their livestock holdings.
Over a period of years greater livestock holdings will result in greater
production.
It is believed that sufficient chang s have been me.d.e in the
USSR. for the collective farmers to find it a vantageous to increase
their livestock considerably. However, some of the peasants believe
that this is only a brief respite and that soon they will again lose
their livestock.
If the production of feed grain is significantly increased in
the next 2 or :3 years, production of pork should be increased. The
effect on milk, beef, and veal production isless definite, since some
roughage-producing areas may be taken out of!production. Although these
may be replaced by other feeds, it is doubtf .l whether the production of
milk, beef, and. veal will be significantly a~fected.
In the European Satellites, there have not generally been suffi-
cient concessions or incentives to materially affect the level of live-
stock production. If sufficient feed suppli s become avai:Cable, live-
stock numbers may be increased from present levels (which are relatively
low, due partl;f to the poor feed supplies in 1952 and 1953,).
Certai:a long-term management practic s and government aids could
increase livestock production throughout thelSoviet Bloc. These include
improving the general care and attention givIn to livestock and provid-
ing for increased quantity and improved qualty of feed. Such measures
could result iz greater numbers of livestock and increased production
per head and par unit of feed.
It is likely that Communist programs
increasing the amount of products delivered
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will be mor effective in
r sold to the state than in
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increasing livestock numbers or output. It is in the supplying of the
increasing nonfarm population with high-protein foods that the Communist
governments have experienced great difficulties. Many of their programs
are incentives for turning over larger quantities of meat, milk, and wool
to the government.. Although the quantities of meat and dairy products
distributed by the various governments nay increase considerably, the
livestock industries of the Soviet Bloc will be able to do little more
than to maintain the present level of consumption for the generally
increasing populations.
IV. Conclusions.
There is considerable uniformity in, the government programs relating
to livestock in the USSR, the European Satellites, and the Mongolian
People's Republic. Although there are variations in these programs from
country to country, common to all have been a lessening of coercion and
an increased use of incentives to obtain the desired results.
The main factors motivating the changes in agricultural policies
seem grounded in both economic and political considerations. The supply
situation was deteriorating since agricultural output had stagnated and
in the livestock field was in danger of declining. On the other hand,
demand increased because increasing on `arm populations needed high-
protein foods for their general health and productivity. From a politi-
Cal point of view, the supplying of high-quality foods would increase
the prestige and hence the stability of the various regimes.
A great deal of publicity has been given to the governmental efforts
being made to increase both production and imports of highly desired foods.
In addition to this, the primary. purpose which the USSR apparently has in
mind with regard to the increased production and importing of dried milk
is to improve the protein level of the diet Although certain amounts of
dried milk may be stockpiled and used by the Armed. Forces, the efforts to
increase supplies of this commodity indicate a real concern on the part.
of the Soviet government over the health and. productivity of the people,
rather than Just a concern: aver satisfying demands for highly desired
commodities.
The programs thus far instituted may result in small increases in
livestock numbers in the USSR and. Mongolian People's Republic, but slower
progress is expected in the European,Satellites Increases in total out-
put of livestock products will lag behind increases in numbers In the
USSR, most of the European Satellites, and. in the Mongolian People rs
Republic, incentives and possibly the use of more subtle methods of cps:::,
ercion than used in the past may lead,to increasing the quantities of
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livestock products turned over to the state. Although the "new course"
will. probably :.'esult in larger supplies of 1 vestock products being
made available to the nonfarm populations, i~ appears likely that the
average per capita consumption will not matex?ially increase over present
levels within the foreseeable future.
To the extent that there is concern over1the prestige of the govern-
ments and the nutritional level of the peopl , a lack of Soviet inter-
tioris to wage aggressive warfare in the next7few years is indicated.
Increased numbers of livestock serve as rese ves of meat. It is doubtful
that production, either actual or "on the ho f," will be increased enough
in the next 5 ;rears to increase significant) the Soviet capabilities to
engage in aggressive warfare.
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SOURCES AND EVALUATION OF` SOURCES
1. Evaluation of S?
-- 5X1 A8a
Information from the
Foreign Documents Division of CIA was utilized extensively for material
translated or extracted from Soviet sources. Eowever unreliable Commu-
nist sources may be, it is from these sources that most of the current
information on livestock in the Soviet Bloc originates. Such informa-
tion is temporarily accepted or rejected only after it is examined: in
the light of other available information, checked. with estimates for
previous years, and, compared with analogous situations in areas of the
free world..
Information obtained. from the US Department of Agriculture was help-
ful and... reliable. Other sources of information. that were utilized are
included in the list given below.
Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated
"Eval.y" have the following significance:
Source of Information
Information
Doc. - Documentary
1
- Confirmed by other sources
A - Completely reliable
2
- Probably true
B.- Usually reliable
3
- Possibly true
C
- Fairly reliable
4
- Doubtful
D
Not usually reliable
5
Probably false
E
E
- Not reliable
Cannot be judged
6
Cannot be judged
"Documentary" refers to original documents of foreign governments
and organizations; copies or translations of such documents by a staff
officer; or information extracted from such documents by a staff officer
all of which may carry the field. evaluation "Documentary."
Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on the cited
documents; those designated. "RR" are by the author of this report. No
"RR" evaluation is given when the author agrees with the evaluation on
the cited document.
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25X1A8a
5. CIA/RR IM- 85, Changes in the Agricultural Policies of the
2501 19 Satellites During 1953, 12 Apr 1 51G pp? 3-k- S-
8.
CIA/RR PR-28, Livestock Numbers and Meat 'Production in the
Big Jin 1953, P? 31. S-
11. Pravda, 31 Jan 1954, p. 2.
12. Sel'skoye Thozaystvo, 26 Sep 1953. ]Eval.
13. CIA/RB PR-2!8, op-cit., p? 31.
14. CIA,- ORR Project 21.147, 1953-54 Food .Sit~uatioi in the Soviet
Bloc (unpublished). S.
15. Pravda, 31 Jan 1954.
16. CIA, ORR Project 21.147, op.cit.
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17. US Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing Service,
The Livestock and Meat Situation, LMS-70, 5 Mar 1951., p. 27-
18- CIA, ORR Project 21.1+7, op.cit.
19. US Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing Service,
The Dairy Situation, DS-241, 1 Mar 195+, p. 30.
20. 28Y1 A* Summary No. 4/49, 8 Dee 1949, p. 16. C. Eval. RR 3.
23.
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