EFFECT OF THE 1954 FLOODS ON AGRICULTURE IN COMMUNIST CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00935A000300060001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 14, 1954
• Content Type: IM

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
'EFFECT OF THE 1954 FLOODS ON AGRICULTURE
IN COMMUNIST CHINA
CIA/RR IM-399
14 October 1954
WARNING
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE
MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS.
793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF
WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS
PROHIBITED BY LAW.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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FOREWORD
This memorandum was prepared in response to inquiries concerning
the 195+ floods in Communist China and their effect on agriculture.
Estimates in terms of hectares inundated and quantities of production
lost can be only preliminary and are subject to revision. These
limitations are imposed by the lack of observational evidence in key
areas - a gap which forces the analysis to rely largely on Communist
statements and claims; by the use of a comparative base almost a
quarter of a century old (the 1931 flood) for estimates of areas
flooded; by the use of averages for the determination of crop produc-
tion lost; and by the possibility of increased damages caused by
continued unfavorable weather. In spite of the limitations, the main
outline of the development of the 195+ floods in China is clear, and
.a broad sketch of their impact can be drawn.
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CONTENTS
P, age
Summary . .
I. Introduction .
II. Crop Conditions Outside the Major Flood Areas 3
III. Development of the 1954 Floods o . 5
INT. Effects of Floods on 1954 Crop Production . . . . 7
endix
Tables
? l? Average Annual Flooded Areas in the Major River Basins
2. Provinces Damaged by 1954 Floods in Communist China , , , 8
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CIA/RR IM-399 CONFIDENTIAL
(ORR Project 210584)
EFFECT OF THE 1954 FLOODS ON AGRICULTURE
IN COMMUNIST CHINA*
Summary
The 1954 floods in Communist.China represent a major development
unfavorable in its impact upon the country and its government. A
careful assessment of available material indicates that the flooding
in the Yangtze Basin is as severe as it was in 1931. This makes
likely the loss of summer crop production in the Yangtze Basin on
approximately 6 to 8 million hectares. The government's flood con-
trol measures in the Huai River Basin have apparently been beneficial,
but it is estimated that the flooding in the Huai Basin is approxi-
mately 40 percent as severe as in 1931 -- that is, that crop produc-
tion losses have occurred on 2 million hectares. The total cropland
flooded in the two river basins is thus estimated to be 8 to .10 mil-
lion hectares.
An accurate assessment of total crop production losses in Com-
munist China is difficult at this time. On the basis of 1.5 metric
tons** of production per hectare, the estimated crop loss would be
12 to 15 million tons. This loss is about 10 percent of China's
total food crop production. The upper North China plain and Manchuria
appear to be on the way to a much better crop production year in 1954
than in 1953, and the total 1954 food production in Communist China
will probably be only 7 to 10 million tons (from 5 to 7 percent) be-
low 1953.
This assessment of crop prospects for 1954 has several signifi-
cant aspects. Any one or all of the following problems confront the
Chinese Communist regime. (1) Grain exports from China, if maintained
at 1953--54 levels (1.08 million tons), will place greater-than-normal
strain on available supplies. Any curtailment of exports or any im-
ports to assist in feeding the population will increase the problem
of payments for industrial goods imports. (2) The building up or
maintenance of stocks will be deferred, probably for the second suc-
cessive year. The Communist goal of building a strategic and/or
The estimates and conclusions contained in the memorandum repre-
sent the best judgment of the responsible analyst.as of 31 August 1954.
Throughout this memorandum tonnages are given in metric tons.
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emergency reserve of 16 to 20 million tons of.grain by 1957 is one
more year nearer failure. (3) The ability tolsupport Communist
Vietnam, itself subject to a bad crop year, wtll be curtailed.
(4) The springs of 1953 and 195+ brought localized famines '_n
various areas o:? China. These emergencies wee met by the govern-
ment by shifting food from surplus to deficitlareas and by the
imposition of rationing in most urban and some rural areas. The
problem of famine is almost certain to recur,,and conditions will
probably be at ,heir worst in the spring of 1 55. This will be an
especially acute problem, as the flood areas Ire normally surplus
food areas which supply normally deficit food; areas.
The four problems outlined above suggest - he following con-
clusion: the ability to develop the industri*l sector of the
Chinese economy at the planned rate, without Further compounding
the food problem, will be curtailed.
I. Introduction.
The alluvial basins of the Chinese ri.vershave long been subject
to periodic flooding. Of all the river alluvum of China, the Hai
Yellow-Huai-Yangtze-Chientang plain, streetchi4.g continuously from
north of Peiping to south of Hangchow over a .istance of 1,200 kilo-
meters and with a width varying from 200 to 7b0 kilometers, is the
most extensive. /* All the rivers which flog through this plain
are connected by the Grand Canal, which exten .s from Peiping to
Hangchow.
The method of flood prevention in this rekion is, primarily,
diking. Dikes are usually constructed of earth, but some are
provided with stone masonry walls. The total!. area protected by
dikes amounts to 41 million hectares, J approximately 4+3 percent
of the total ci;ltivated area of China.
Some part cf this cultivated area is flooded in almost any
given year. Fcr instance, the average annual{ flooded area from
Footnote references in arabic numerals are
the Appendix.
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1949 to 1952, inclusive, was 3.3 million hectares. J Average annual
flooded areas in the major river basins of China are shown in Table 1.
Average Annual Flooded Areas
in the Major River Basins of China
River Basin
Period Averaged
Hectares Flooded
Hai
1917-39
233,000
Huai
1852-1935
371,000
Yangtze
1,930,000
Yellow
1855-1938
231,000
Total
2,765,000
a. As estimated by the Yangtze River Com-
mission.
It must be recognized that these figures are averages and are but
imperfect reflections of a truly major flood year such as 1.931. or
1954. The most disastrous flood situation occurs when all three
rivers -- the Yangtze, the Huai, and the Yellow - - flood at the same
time. This particular situation occurred in 1931, and approximately
15 million hectares were flooded.
II. Crop Conditions Outside the Major Flood Areas.
In the first 4 months of 1954, Communist China had favorable
weather. As a result, the 1953-54 winter crops harvest was about
8 percent greater than the 1952-53 winter crops harvest.* 5/
Approximately 41 million tons in 1954 as compared with 38 mil--
lion tons in 1953. The winter crops are wheat, barley, oats,
field peas, broadbeans, and rapeseed. The winter crops constitute
between 20 and 25 percent of Communist. China's production of food.
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Extensive snows fell throughout the Ncrthw~st, / North,
East, 8J and Northeast / Administrative Divisions.* These rela-
tively heavy snows over the northern third. of China seemed to assure
sufficient ground moisture for favorable g;ermiiation of spring wheat
and other summer crops.
The heavy spring snows also had some adverse effects. They
caused spring floods in certain areas of Sinking, 10 and in the
Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region they made nebessary an air-drop
to transport focd supplies to herdsmen and feed supplies to hard-
hit livestock areas. ll Although there is not conclusive evidence
of high death losses in the grazing areas, it s possible that they
were greater then normal.
With abundant winter moisture, howeve_?, and generally favorable
conditions up to the end of August 1954, he drop prospects north
of the Yellow River indicate a better harvest in 195+ than in 1953.
If no adverse conditions affect the crops in this area before the
harvest, 195+ crop output in the Northeast Adinistrative Division
could well reach 22 million tons, as compared with 18.6 million
tons in 1953. 14'J
There is sozie possibility of flood damage~in the Northeast area.
Flooding was reported along the Yalu in the middle of August, l
and near the end of August the water levels o~ other rivers in the
Northeast were :?eported to be approaching flocd stages. L4/ These
floods, however, tend to be localized, and raxely do they seriously
affect crop production in the area.
Beginning in April and extending through I'iay, there was excessive
rainfall on the South China coast. Total rainfall in Kwangtung,
Kwangsi, and Fii ien for the month of April raged from 15.75 inches
to 23.62 inches over large parts of the area.;l5 This rainfall is
roughly 2 to 3 times the record for April. in *any previous years.
Severe local flooding apparently occurred. in rwangtung as early as
the first half of May. L6/ in this area, however, standing water
after floods is not a major problem, and replanting of damaged
crops could well have taken place. With comp ratively little in-
formation on which to base an estimate, it wo ,il.d appear that the
* The Communist major Administrative Divisio:is have, of course,
been abolished. Because of their convenience;, they are used in
this memorandun.for reference to certain geographical areas.
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South China coast and the Southwest Administrative Division will have
a crop production year at least as good as was 1953,
III. Development of the 195+ Floods.
In May the same belt of rainfall that deluged the South China
coast passed over the lower Yangtze Basin but did not cause flood-
ing. In June, however, a. series of stationary fronts resulted in
excessive rainfall over the middle reaches of the Yangtze River.
The normal June rainfall at Wuhan for past years has averaged 9
inches. The rainfall in June of this year reached 19.25 inches, 17
and excessive precipitation continued well into July. 18
By 18 August, serious flooding and flood control problems had
been reported by the Chinese Communists in 8 provinces -- Hupeh,
iz/
Hunan. 20 Anhwei, 21 Chekiang, 22. Kiangsi, 23 Honan, 214/
Kiangsu, L5/ and Shantung. 26
The extent of the flood. disaster is difficulty to .determine . All
three of the great river basin.areas of Middle and North China --
the Yangtze, the Huai, and the Yellow -- have been affected. A.
preliminary assessment indicates that the Yangtze flood has been
the most extensive and damaging. The Chinese Communists have an-
nounced. that the Yangtze River was in many places between a half
a meter and one meter above the previous highest watermarks registered
in 1931. and 1949." 27/ The extreme seriousness of the situation is
reflected. in the official announcement that the Chingkiang water
detention basin was opened for 5 days. beginning 22 July and was re-
opened on 29 July in an effort to relieve the pressure on the Tungting
Lake area and the down-river dikes.* On 9 August the detention
basin was reported to be holding 6 billion cubic meters, and efforts
were being made to evacuate the water to Tungting.Lake. ' This
indicates that the efforts to prevent flooding in the Tungting Lake
area have been subordinated to the problem of preventing breaches in
the east=bank dikes of the Yangtze north of Tungting bake. This
supposition is supported by the comment of an American priest
arriving in Hong Kong that "the Tungting Lake area would be lucky
to get one percent of its annual production." 31 Below the
This represents the deliberate flooding of about 92,000 hectares
in an effort to protect 600,000 hectares further downstream. The
capacity of this detention basin is 5.5 billion cubic meters, 2 bil-
lion cubic meters of which. were used in the 5 days, 22-27 July. 28_
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Tungting Lake area the Yangtze appears to be gompletely out of con-
trol. The Communists are expending their gre"test efforts and
devoting the moat news coverage to the attempts to save the city of
Wuhan. Frequent news reports place the Yanngt~e flooding on a scale
that equals, anti perhaps surpasses, the flood 'of 1931. 32/
The Huai River Basin was not subject to the June series of
storms that inundated the Yangtze valley. In the early part; of
July, however, heavy rains began falling :aartY~. of the Tsingling
Shan,* and the Huai River began to rise. ;3 These heavy rainfalls
continued through the first week of August, d by 11 August 5 flood
crests had passed Pengu. City (Anhwei 'rovince)). 34 In the first
week of August, water levels reached 26.41 meters at Chengyangkwan
(Western Anhwei Province). 35 The Chinese C{uununists have claimed
that the flood prevention works along the Hua have prevented severe
damage. Reservoirs and water-detention b.asine were claimed to have
absorbed 20 bil:.ion cubic meters of water. The water level of
Hungtse Lake on the Lower Huai, it is claimed has been kept well
below the high watermark of 1.931, although thh amount of water stored
reached 10 bill.on cubic meters. 36 As late as 11 August, Peiping
claimed that the main Huai dike remained intact. Peiping ad-
mitted, however, that "inevitable dike breach s" have occurred
(17 August), but there was a specific claim that no dike breach
occurred along the Piho River, a major tribut of the Huai. 38f
Since the middle of August the Huai has been, ailing, and there is
little apparent danger of new flood crests. 3
Reports of crop replanting 40 and flooding in southeast Honan 41
indicate that the Huai River Basin suffered food damage. Careful
assessment--of the available material indicate , however, that efforts
in flood. prevention in the Huai Basin have ben effective. It is
doubtful that the severity of the flooding all ng the Huai approaches
the magnitude of the flood of 1931.
The same ra'.ns that caused flooding along the Huai also resulted
in high water along the Yellow River. 42 Althhough the Chinese
Communists announced that the flood crests in!the Yellow River in
Shantung Province were above 29 meters for 9 days and were expected
to remain at th:.s level for the next 15 days,'official news releases
have paid comparatively little attention to flood threats from this
The mountain range that is the watershed b~tween the Yangtze
and the Huai anal Yellow Rivers.
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in Shantung in the middle of August. i4 This danger was apparently
averted, and some pressure on the Yellow River system was relieved by
the opening of a detention basin in western Shantung. As the Yellow
River is extremely unstable, there are many areas where the dikes
are 10 to 15 kilometers apart. In nonflood years the area between
the dikes is normally farmed. With the river up, crops will obviously
not be taken from within the diked area this year. Aside from this
more or less normal loss and the use of a detention basin, which
probably involved the flooding of some crops, the damage along the
Yellow River appears to be no more than nominal.
By 18 August the flood situation along the Yangtze, the Huai,
and the Yellow Rivers appeared stabilized. As of 30 August, both
the Yangtze and the Yellow Rivers were still at flood stage. As
late as 23 August, rain along the headwaters of the Yangtze caused
a new crest to approach the middle reaches of the river. 455
IV. Effects of Floods on 1954 Crop Production.
The present assessment of crop acreage inundated and resultant
crop production lost must be on a tentative basis.* There are
several factors over and above the.relatively unsatisfactory data
now available which will ultimately determine the magnitude of the
flood losses. The first factor of importance is the still existing
flood stage along the Yellow River. The Yellow is extremely un
stable, and a dike breach is a possibility even in the absence of
further increases in the water level. Second, the magnitude of the
flood damage will be increased if the surface water in flooded. areas
prevents the planting of winter crops. Whether this happens will
depend :Largely on the rate of fall of the river which caused the
original flooding, and this -- in turn -- is affected by additional
rain over the drainage basin of the river. The water level in the
Yangtze fell for a week, 18 to 25 August, and still went down less
than a third of a meter. 47 On 25 August it stood more than a
meter above the 1931 record height. A third factor of importance
is the extent of the storm damage away from the areas actually
flooded. The actual effect of these three factors. cannot now be
* The American Consul General in Hong Kong thinks it is doubtful
whether the Chinese Communists are more than roughly aware of the
extent of the damages (13 August). 46
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determined. At present, only estimates that will delineate the broad
outlines of the actual flood damage can be Made-
Background information useful in this evaluation includes data on
those areas which appear to have suffered from~the severest floods.
The provinces damaged by 1954 floods in Communist China are described
in Table 2.
Provinces Damaged by 19,154 Floods
in Communist China ~+8
Thousand Hectares
PS ovincee
Land Area
Cultivated Land
East- China.
Ki.angsu
10,882
51,632
Anhwei
14,472
4,955
)532
H4 man
18,49
'3942
Hupeh
19,261
Him an
21,706
,8o3
K.angsi
18,117
4,558
1-12.54o
1
29,171
.~ Land under cultivation in 1947.
Another f ac?jor relevant to the final estimate of crop losses
through flood damage is the average production. of food per ]hectare.
This was secured by averaging 7 summer crop yields* for the 7 prov-
inces. Average food production for these summer crops was
R .ce, corn, millet, kaoliang, Soya beans, ~eai uts,. and sweet 'pota-
toes. The sweet potatoes were placed on a grFin-equivalent basis
'by multiplying 'cy 0.3. A weighted average wa6 used.
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approximately 1.5 tons per hectare in the 1931-49 period. There is
very little reason to believe that this average yield is not repre-
sentative of the present one.
It is possible to utilize a range.of independent estimates to
indicate upper and lower limits. On 8 August in the Jen Min Jih Pao
appeared an official statement claiming that "unaffected by Yangtze
(and) Hwai juag floods (are) areas (that) make up 94 percent of
(the) country's cultivated land." At the other extreme, Armed
Forces Far East in Tokyo has estimated that 17 percent of Communist
China's cultivated land has been affected. 50 The total cultivated
acreage in Communist China. is approximately 95 million hectares. 51
A range of estimates of hectares flooded is therefore established
as between the 6 million hectares admitted by the Chinese Communists
and the 16 million hectares estimated by Armed Forces Far East.
Armed Forces Far East has likewise estimated the crop loss for the
year as being 27 million tons. Application of the Communist figure
on hectares to the average yield of summer crops would predicate a
crop loss of 9 million tons.
By careful assessment of the available material the following
preliminary estimate of the hectares of cropland flooded appears
the most realistic at this time: the Yangtze Basin, 6 to 8 mil-
lion hectares; the Huai Basin, 2 million hectares; the Yellow
River Basin, negligible.
These estimates are based on the conclusion that the 1954 Yangtze
flood is of approximately the same magnitude and severity as the 1931
Yangtze flood and on reports that the Chinese Communists have not
been able to control the. Yangtze flood in the Tungting Lake area and
from. this point downriver to the sea.* The assessment of the area
flooded. in. the Huai Basin is based on the conclusion that the govern-
ment has succeeded in protecting the greater part of the area east.
of the Grand Canal.. in Northern Anhwei and Kiangsu. It is also :prob-
able that the area. north and east of Fou-Yang in northern Anhwei has
escaped flooding on the scale of the 1931 floods. In general, it is
estimated that the flooding in the Huai Basin is. approximately 40 per-
cent as severe as it was in 1931.
*.. Protection of certain urban areas may be an exception to this
generalized statement.
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On the basic of 1.5 tons of production pe hectare the estimated.
crop loss would be 12 to 15 million tons. Thos loss is approximately
10 percent of Communist China's food crop production.*
As the upper North China plain and Manchuria appear on the way to
a much better c:'op production year than was t*e case in 1953, the
total. 1954 food production in Communist China will probably be 7 to
10 million tons (from 5 to 7 percent) below that of 1953. Such a
loss in China r,.presents a major disaster.
* The best crop production year under the Co*unists was 1952. In
that year, food crop production, as reported by the Hong Kong Consul
General, was 139,104,000 tons. 52
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APPENDIX
SOURCES
Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated
"Eval.," have the following significance:
Source of Information
Information
Doc. - Documentary
1 -
Confirmed by other
sources
A - Completely reliable
2 -
Probably true
B - Usually reliable
3 -
Possibly true
C - Fairly reliable
4 -
Doubtful
D Not usually reliable
5
Probably false
E - Not reliable
F - Cannot be judged
6 - Cannot be judged
"Documentary" refers to original documents of foreign governments
and organizations; copies or translations of such documents by a
staff officer; or information extracted from such documents by a
staff officer, all of which may carry the field evaluation "Docu-
mentary."
Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on the
cited document; those designated "RR" are by the author of this re-
port. No "RR" evaluation is given when the author agrees with the
evaluation on the cited document.
1. United Nations, Methods and Problems of Flood Control
in Asia and. the Far East, Flood Control Series No. 2,
p. 5, 195.1. U.
2. Ibid.
3. American Consul General, Hong Kong Despatch No. 1282,
19 Jan 1954. C. Eval. RR 2.
4. Ibid.
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5. Ibid., go. 17, 6 Jul 1954. U. Eval. RR 2.
6. Weekl Economic Information Repo t onChina, No. 3,
7 Jul L954, p. 1. C. Eval. RR 2.
11CIA FDD, China Abstracts, 15 Jun 19541 p. A-23. C. Eval. RR 2.
7. CIA FDD, China Abstracts, 5 May 1.954,1p. A-19. C.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., 20 Apr 1954, p. A-28. C. Eva. RR 2.
10. Ibid., L5 Jun 1954, p- A-23. C. Eva. RR 2.
25X1 Aa
13.
14. Ibid., 26 Aug 1954, pp. AAA-25-26. U (for official use only).
Eval. :fit 2.
15. Ibid., 22 Jul 1954, p. AAA-22. U (fol official use only).
Eval. J ZR 2.
i6. Survey- )f Hong Kong Press, 12 May 1954, pp. 2-3.
17.
18. Ibid., :20 Jul 195
Eval. :3R 2.
15 9. Ibid.) :23 Jul 1954,
20.
21.
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p. AAA-30. U fez' official use only).
pp. AAA-39-40 U1 Evai. RR 2.
Ibid?
Ibid., 30 Jun 1954, p. AAA-15. U (for official use only).
Evai. J3R 2.
22. CIA FDD, China Abstracts, 6 Jul 1954,''ip. A-14. C.
25 ,88iR
23.
24. American Consul General, Hong Kong Telegram No.
25.X31 1954. C. Eval. RR 2.
'-1?
322,
26. Ibid., :L8 Aug 1954, p. AAA-38. U (fol official use
oval . J tR 2.
only).
27. Ibid., ;3 Aug 1954, p. AAA-20. U (for joff'icial use only).
28. Americaai Consul General, Hong Kong De 4patch No. 2289,
1 May :-952. U. Eval. RR 2.
kvai. PR 2.
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29.
*Q I
25X1A8a
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.jU. !Did.., 9.Aug 1954, p. AAA-26. U (for official use only).
Eval. RR 2.
31. American Consul General, Hong Kong Telegram No. 322,
op. cit.
32. "China Floods Seen Near Record Worst," Christian Science
Monitor, 9 Aug 1954. U. Eval. RR 2. 'r-Japanese Legislators Fly Over Yangtze Flood Area
2 A ton Post, anal Tl.m s herald. 8. Aug 1gr,k- U. .EvaL. RR 2.
38. Ibid., 17 Aug 1954, p. AAA-37. U (for official use only).
Eval. RR 2.
39. Ibid., 18 Aug 1954, p. AAA-37- U (for official use only).
Eval. RR 2.
4O. ibid., 12 Aug 1954, p. AAA-24. U (for official use only).
Eval. RR 2.
41. American Consul General, Hong Kong Telegram No. 322,
') c?k 1 QA a
35.:
36.
37.
Ibid., 11 Aug 1954, p. AAA-25.
g (for official use only)
Eval.
RR 2.
.
Ibid.,
18 Aug 1954, p. AAA-37.
U (for official
Eval.
Ibid.
RR 2.
use only).
Ibid.,
11 Aug 1954, p. AAA-25.
U (for official
Eva1. RR 2.
use only).
43. Ibid., 18 Aug 1954,' p. AAA-38. U (for official use only).
Eval. RR 2.
44. ibid., 13 Aug 1954, p. AAA-25. U (for official use on:I_y).
Eval. RR 2.
45. Ibid., 24 Aug 1954, p. AAA-27. U (for official use only).
EvL. RR 2.
46. American Consul General, Hong.Kong Telegram No. 322,,
')rac4 nQ.i.
47.
48. NIS 39, Section 61, Figure 61-17. C. Eval. RR L.
49. Ibid., p. 1.
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50. Army, FECOM, Telecon Item No. 7611, 13 Aug 1954.
510 P. ovinci.a1 Ma s of the Peoples Rej:)ubli!c of China,,
ReeveraE of plates 8 and 9, Shanghai, 11953. U. Eve,l. RR 2.
52. American Consul General, Hong Kong Despatch No. 7,
2 Jul ,.954, p. 4. U. Eval. RR 2.
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