STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF CHINESE COMMUNIST ROAD DEVELOPMENT IN YUNNAN PROVINCE 1954

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00935A000300150001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 9, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 28, 1955
• Content Type: IM

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NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE
OF CHINESE COMMUNIST ROAD DEVELOPMENT
IN YUNNAN PROVINCE
1954
CIA/RR IM-408
28 February 1955
WARNING
THIS.MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE
MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, usc,.SECS.
793 AND 79L., THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF
WHICH-IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS
PROHIBITED BY LAW.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS
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FOREWORD
The general purpose of this memorandum is to indicate the signifi-
cance of Communist China?s enhanced transport capability in southwest
''Ztnnan by revealing the increasing vulnerability of neighboring Laos,
Burma, and Thailand to Communist penetration.
This memorandum has been coordinated within CIA, but not with
other IAC agencies.
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CONTENTS
Page
Summary . . . . o . . .
I. Extent of Road Development in Yunnan . . a o l
II. Significance of Road Development in Yunnan
A. Economic . . , ,
B. Military-Political . . . . . . a . . .
1. Thailand
2. Laos
3. Burma
III. Conclusions ...
Appendix A. Details of Road Construction and Improvement
in Yffnnan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Appendix B. Source References. . . . . . .
Map
Yunnan Road Development . ,
..............~..fl 5
,.o. o.~~o..o.. 6
Appendixes
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13
. . Inside Back Cover
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CIA/RR IM-1+08
(ORR Project 43.627A)
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STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE
OF CHINESE CONIST ROAD DEVELOPMENT
IN U AN PROVINCE*
195+
Summary
The Chinese~C ommunists have made substantial progress toward the
development of an effective road network in southern Ykinnan Province.
This network will facilitate the internal economic development and
administrative control of the area by the Chinese Communists.. The
number and alignment of new or improved roads radiating from K'un-ming
toward the neighboring countries of Burma, Thailand, and Indochina
suggest that this network also will play an important part in Com-
munist China's efforts to increase its influence in southeastern
Asia,
1. Extent of Road Development in Yftnnan.
The scope of the Yunnan road program and its importance in Chinese
Communist planning is indicated by several announcements made during
1951+ in the Chinese press. According to one such announcement the
road network of Yunnan was expanded by about 50 percent during 1953
alone. The construction in 1953 of 12 new highways totaling 1,215
miles brought Yunnan,'s aggregate road network to 3,535 miles, and
860 more miles of roadways were improved or repaired. l/** Moreover,
road construction apparently is to continue in Yunnan and adjacent
provinces, inasmuch as another press release indicates that, in
addition to actual construction, 13 new highways were surveyed in
Southwest China during 1953. 2/ It is particularly noteworthy that
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this memorandum
represent the best judgment of ORR as of 9 January 1955-
** Footnote references in arabic numerals are to sources listed in
Appendix B.
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more than one-fifth of the total amount exp nded by the central govern-
meat in 1953 'or-highway construction was sent on the road network of
Yunnan. 3J The allocation to one province 4f such a large proportion of
the total effort is a significant indicatioii of Yunnan's `__mportance in
Chinese Communist planning.
The completion of new construction and .he improvements undertaken
during the pact several years (which reportOdly are being carried out
to some exten-; with the advice of Soviet military and technical
representatives 4/) will provide the Chineso Communists w'.;_th four
principal through routes from K'un-ming to he Burmese and Indochinese
borders, as well as a substantial number ofalternate roads to the
frontiers which branch off from the throughiroutes in the border areas.
The westernmost of these through routes is 4he Burma Road,* which
leads west from K'un-ming and then southwes4 to the Burmese border.
Two, possibly there, new or improved roads l ranch off fr. ors the Burma
Road in weste_-n unnan and extend to the Burmese frontier north of
the Burma Road, where they connect with Burmese routes leading to the
Ledo Road and the navigable Irrawaddy Rived A second. through route
to the border area roughly parallels the Bu ma Road to the south to
connect with it Burmese route to Lashio, the northern terminus of a
rail line fron Mandalay.
The third through route, to which the Chinese Communists apparently
have devoted at sizable effort, extends fromjK'un-ming southwest to
Ta-lo on the Burmese border, where it is linked by a Burmese road to
the road networks of both Burma and Thailand. As in the case of the
Burma Road, several alternate routes to the 'frontier branch off on
both sides of the main route in the border rea, in this case pro-
viding alternate routes both to Burma and I dochina and through them
to Thailand. Further east, another princip l road axis leads south
from K'un-mini; to the Indochinese border, following the general route
of the former K'un-ming a? Hanoi - Haiphong 'ail line. Beyond the
Chinese railh,.ad at Meng-tzu, there rep orte.ly,are two road routes
available to northwest Tonkin, both of whic* have been used to trans-
port Chinese aid to the Viet Minh.
# See the maD, inside back cover.
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In addition to this pattern of through routes to the frontier,; each
with alternate roads in the border area, there exists (or is under con-
struction) a series of lateral roads interconnecting tho- principal
transport axes and towns in the area. These lateral routes roughly
parallel the Chinese border at various distances within Chinese
territory.
A detailed description of the new and improved roads under con-
struction is contained in Appendix A. It should be noted here, however,
that much of this information originated with untested sources and.
cannot be evaluated in detail. Nevertheless, the number and diversity
of these reports, together with the claims which the Chinese C om unists
themselves have made concerning the progress of highway construction
in Yunnan, clearly indicate that a sizable road development program
has been under way in southern China for some time.
II. Significance of Road Development in Yunnan,
For purely internal reasons, it is probably an objective of some
importance to the Chinese Communists to establish an extensive road
network in southern Yunnan, an area which previously had only
primitive cornmu.nications and which has never been fully integrated
with the rest of China. Such a network presumably will facilitate
the diffusion of Communist ideology s.nd permit a more effective
central political and administrative control of this border region
and its large non-Chinese tribal population. An improved transport
network in the area also is essential to any a y preci.able local,
economic expansion and to the i-ntegrat.on of Y. nnan's economy the national. economy. Internal economq`Lc considerations a with
are not paramount, however, because, although finnan is richrintl`y
mineral resources, 5/ the principal new roads have been extended
beyond the major areas of current mineral exploitation in the
central and eastern portions of the province into regions which
are, in general, sparsely populated agricultural districts. 6/
Despite the internal considerations which might justify the expanded
road network and regardless of the actual motivation for its con-
struction, the network is of considerable strategic significance
because it materially increases Chinese Communist capabilities for
further economic, political, and military penetration across China?s
borders into Southeast Asia.
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A. Economic.
The roads linking Communist China w
of its southe:^n neighbors provide a means
th the transport systems
commercial penetration,
trade with these countries,
immediate prospect of sub-
oads, there is some
since they afford land routes for increasin
especially Burma. Although there is little
stantial volumes of trade passing over the
indication that Burma constitutes a currentleconomic target of Com-
munist China. On 3 November 1954 a trade protocol was signed by
Burma and Communist China in implementationiof their trade agreement
of April 1954, and, at the same time, a contract was signed for the
purchase of 130,000 metric tons of Burmese *fce by Communist China,
thus alleviating by about 25 percent the un~old surplus in Burma. J
Subsequently, U Nu, Burma's Prime Minister,jpublicly announced that
Chinese terms under the contract exceeded B
This statement implies that important conce
List China during the negotiations, refle
mur
.
political reasons,,to expand trade between he two countries in the
hope of orienting Burma's trade toward the ommunist bloc. The
willingness of the Chinese Communists, who Ore major rice exporters,
to buy a considerable quantity of Burmese r,ce is in itself a
notable concession, since the rice may have to be re-exported at a
loss. It is also possible that it refl.ectsat least in part the
effects of th,, recent floods in Communist CIkina or a Chinese
intention to .chip rice to the Viet Minh to alleviate famine con-
ditions in North Vietnam. In any event., th~ conclusion of the
3 November trade protocol with Burma probably constitutes a
significant step in Chinese efforts to exte*d Communist influence
in Southeast Asia.
It is noteworthy that the trade protocol included an
agreement to expand overland trade between the two countries, 9/
thus affording the Chinese Communists s.cces~ to northeastern
Burma, an area, in which China is already attempting to increase its
influence. It might also be noted that the', establishment of
improved land transport connections with Burma will provide the
Chinese Commuaists with access to certain critical raw materials
such as rubber by way of lines of communication which would not be
subject to a naval blockade.
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rmese expectations. 8/
sions were made by C om-
ting China's desire, for
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B. Military-Political.
The-improvement of roads leading -bathe border of Communist
China obviously increases Chinese capabilities for direct military
action against Burma, Thailand, and Lads, particularly since the
Chinese roads will now connect directly or indirectly with the trans-
port networks of these countries. Of more immediate significance,
however, is the potential use of these roads for the development and
support from secure Chinese base areas of insurgent groups operating
in and across the border area. This-situation would be similar to
the general pattern which prevailed in Indochina where Chinese Com-
munist military and logistic support across- the frontier roads made
possible the development of Viet Minh guerrilla units into a com-
paratively well-armed fighting force and was a major factor in the
French defeat and subsequent partition of Vietnam.
1. Thailand.
25X1X4
Communist-sponsored nationalist movements of varying
degrees of organization and strength now exist ;s potential threats
to the established governments of all three neighboring countries
south of Y finnan. One potential threat to Thailand emanates from
the Thai Autonomous Area, which. was activated during 1953 in
Communist China in the area of Ch'e-li, on the new K'un-ming -
Ta-lo road. Although the establishment of the Thai Autonomous
Area was only one of a number of similar actions which will
increase Chinese administrative control over essentially non.-
Chinese people in remote areas, it nevertheless may foreshadow a
future Chinese Communist effort to create a greater Thai state
embracing all people of Thai stock, possibly also including
ethnically related groups in Laos and. Burma. 10/
Meanwhile, Pridi Phanomyong, a former Thai premier
associated with the Free Thai. movement, recently emerged under
Chinese Communist sponsorship in Peking after prolonged concealment
to urge rebellion in Thailand. 11/ Little is known concerning
Pridi's activities, but it has been reported that he has subsequently
established headquarters in the Ch'e-li area in southern Yunnan, where
he is said to be recruiting and arming with Chinese assistance several
thousand members of the Thai people in the Yunnan border area to
"liberate" at least northern Thailand. 12/ His success to date is
uncertain, but the present popular
dissatisfaction with the central Thai government would make the people
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of northern Thailand receptive to a Free Thai movement. 13/ Although
there is no firm evidence linking the reported activities of Pridi with
the establishment of the Thai Autonomous Ares., they both represent
externally spcusored means of applying -ncreased pressure on the
present Thai E;overnment, if given substantial Chinese Communist support
in the future.
The Viet Minh, backed by Chinese!, Communist military aid,
have continued. since the Indochina cease-fir'e, to recruit, arm, and
train a force of indigenous Laotians for the; Pathet Lao mcvement.- As
early as AuguE.t 1954, the French complained to the International
Commission supervising the Indochina truce that the Viet I'inh were
transferring Esms to Pathet Lao forces In violation of the Geneva
agreement. 14/' In the following month the Laotian goverment accused
the Viet Minh of recruiting some 3,000 men for training and political 25X1X6e1
/ ~a.-.,..... .....,,.
. .. I ._ _ - _ - - 1
5
25X1X6 the Viet Minh con-
tinued as latE as January 1955 to transport materiel, including
weapons and uniforms, to the Pathet Lao regxaoupment,areas in;northern
Laos. 16/ This is a clear indication of a C,'ommunist intention to
control ultimE.tely the kingdom of Laos.
Any extension of Communist control into Laos would further
increase the Communist threat to Thailand. !The threat stems not only
from the advantageous geographic position of Laos but also from the
presence of more than 5 million ethnic 'Laotians in northee.st Thailand
and. large groups of Thai people in northern l,Laos . This intermingling
of ethnic groups in the trans Mekong area provides a potential means
25X1X7 for Communist infiltration of Thailand from Laotian territory. That
the Communists may attempt to exploit tae e hnic affinity of these
25X1 X7?
which indicates that a Thai Li er i.on Committee as
already been established by a former close associate of Pridi's in
northern Laos, in one of the provinces specified by the Geneva truce
agreement as n. regroupment area for the Pathet Lao military forces. 17/
3. Burma.
Its Burma, meanwhile, where various dissident indigenous
forces, both Communist and non-Communist, hove long been active, there
is also a threat of increased Communist pre sure. Chinese Communist
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agents in northern Burma, which is only loosely administered by the
Burmese government, have for some time been attempting to win the
adherence and sympathy of local tribespeople and minority groups and
to capitalize on existing frictions between these groups and the
central government. The Chinese Communists, for example, reportedly
have distributed cloth, salt, and other products to the local
inhabitants and are alleged recently to have offered assistance to
.the villagers of one area in dealing with their agricultural
problems. 18/ Chinese Communist troops are said to make occasional
forays across the border and reportedly occupy several Burmese
border towns, evidently with the sanction of local tribal
authorities. 19/ Large areas of the Kachin and Wa States, in fact,
have been disputed territory for many years and are shown on recent
Chinese Communist administrative maps as part of China, which may be
reason to expect further Chinese incursions into northern Burma in
the future.
Chinese Communist control of sizable areas of northern
Burma could greatly facilitate the growth of Burmese Communist rebel
forces, whose influence heretofore has been largely confined to the
central part of the country. It could prompt the Burmese Communist
Party to establish a, secure northern base area along the Chinese
border, where close contact could be maintained with. the Chinese
Communists,tofacilitate the acquisition of both.politidal..,p;
military aid. There is, in fact, some evidence that substantial
arms aid has already been promised by the Chinese Communists,
although there is no indication as yet that appreciable quantities
of arms or ammunition have actually been supplied to the Burmese. 20/
III. Conclusions.
Whether or not the Communists have any immediate plans fo:ei
increased military or paramilitary activity in Southeast Asia, the
existence of an improved road network in Yunnan will clearly enhance
Communist China's long-range capabilities to extend its political
and economic influence to the south as well as to support logistically
from a secure Chinese Communist base area the various indigenous
insurgent groups in the region.
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DETAILS OF ROAD CONSTRUCTION AND IMPROVEMENT
IN YUNNAN
The Chinese Communist press has announced that 12 new highways
totaling 1,215 miles were constructed in Yunnan in 1953,1rin.ging
Yunnan-Is aggregate highway network to 3,535 miles, and 860 more
miles of roadways were improved or repaired. 21/ In addition to
actual construction, 13 new highways were surveyed during 1953..22/
The completion of the roads under construction will provide the
Chinese Communists with four principal through routes from Kun-
ming to the Burmese and Indochinese borders, as well as a number of
alternate roads to the frontier which branch off from the through
routes near the border. In addition to the recently repaired Burma
Road, 23/ which has been in service for some time, there are 3 new
motor roads known to be open or under construction and reportedly
at least 2 other routes being built toward the Chinese-Burmese
frontier. Perhaps the most important new road extension, the
K?un-ming - Ta.-lo route, is now nearing completion. This road., which
leads from K'un-ming southwest through Yuan-Chiang, Ssu-mao, and
Chle-li to connect with the road networks of Burma and Thailand by
way of the partly motorable 24/ Burmese road to Keng-tung, was
announced by the Chinese Communists in June 1954 to be open as far
as Fo-hai and was reported elsewhere to have reached Ta-lo on the
Burmese border. 25/
Although Chinese Communist press announcements refer to Ta.-lo
as the terminus of the new road, there is some evidence that a
further extension southward is under construction in Burmese
territory. Two reports, dated November 1953 and January 1954,
referred to work on the Burmese section of the road, although the
exact location was not specified. 26/
In November 1953, large.-scale construction was reported under
way between Ta.-ya-k'ou, a ferry point on the Mekong River, and
Meng-lien, suggesting the establishment of a new route between
Ssu-mao on the K`un-ming - Ta-lo road and Meng-ma, a Chinese border
town on a second route leading to Keng-tong, Burma. At the same
time, another road was being built east from Meng-lien to Meng-man
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for military -transport, indicating an eventual connection to the
K'un-ming - Ta-lo route at Fo. hai. 27/ Com'letion of construction on
these two roads would provide an alternate means of access from Ssu-
mao on the ne?,r.K'un-ming - Ta-lo route to the Chinese frontier area,
with a lateral connection just inside the Yunnan border,
Construction probably is nearing ccmplefion on two other Chinese
routes leading across Yunnan to the Burmeseborder, where they will
connect with Burmese routes to the Ledo Road. Each of the new Chinese
roads begins at T'eng-ch'ung (which is in turn connected to the Burma
Road by two routes). One, under construction in May 1953, follows an
old road leading northwestward toward the Lpdo Road at Myitkyina, 28/
which is alsc the northern terminus of a Bu$'mese rail line from Rangoon
and Mandalay. The second, completed as far as Man-chang-kai by the end
of 1953 and row considered to be open, runs;' southwestward toward the
Ledo Road at Bhamo, 29/ on. the navigab:_e Irrawaddy River. Moreover,
in the fall c,f 1953, according to an unconfirmed report, the Chinese
began surveying a road south from T'eng-ch'uung to Muse, 30/ just
inside Burmec.e territory. The reported alignment of this road
indicates thE,t it would roughly parallel the Burma Road to the
frontier. 31j
Another 'sans-Yunnan road will parallels the Burma Road to the
southwest, running close to the old Mi.tu Y Lashio railroad.
Reportedly under construction by 100,000 cl.vilian laborers in March
1952, the new road will lead southwest fror.Hsiang-yfin through Nan-
chien and Yu:i-hsien, by Mien-ning, and. through Keng-ma and Meng-ting
to Kunlong i-aside the Burmese border. 32/ lApparently it was being
laid on a pr=_viously established route which continues past Kunlong
southwest to Lashio, the northeast terminu~ of a rail line from
Mandalay. Tie Nan-chien - Mien-ping section of the road was
announced by Communist China to be open tot traffic in May 1951+. 33/
In addition to the routes leading to t.e Burma frontier, there
has also been evidence of considerable Chi'.ese road construction
activity directed toward Laos and Tonkin in Indochina. Chinese
defense plans in early 1953 reportedly inc.uded the construction
of a motoratle road from Puerh on the Kunming - Ta-lo route to
Chen Yueh, from which alternate roads were; under construction south
to the border towns of Meng-p'eng and Menge-la in the latter part
of 1953. At out the same time, the al cerna{''te s were being connected
at their termini by an improved road extending along the China-,Laos
border. 34/ Earlier evidence indicates construction south of.
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Meng-p'eng to Muong Sing in northern Laos, along a fair-weather pack
track which reportedly was to be made motorable. 35/ Work on the
alternate extensions south of Chen Yueh consisted largely of cutting
down undergrowth and leveling the surface of old trails, whic.h.were
widened to approximately 10 feet. 36/
Chen Yueh is also the terminus of a path reportedly being cleared
south of Chiang-ch'eng (Meng Lieh) in March 1953. At the same time,
a path was opened between Chiang-ch'eng and Lai Chau, a relay base in.
Tonkin for Chinese food aid to the Viet Minh. 37/ Moreover, Chiang
ch'eng evidently is the terminus of another road being built south
from Mo-chiang, which may be part of the route reported to be extended.
"from China" to Phong Saly in Laos during early 1954- 38/
Farther east in China, improvements are reported to have been
completed on the road running south from Meng.tzu, a Chinese railhead
on the former K'un-ming - Haiphong rail line, to Ho-k'ou, the Chinese
border point opposite Lao Kay in Tonkin. 39/ This same road,
approximately 11.5 feet wide and reportedly entirely hard-surfaced
as of December 1953, has been used to some extent for the movement
of Chinese aid to the Viet Minh in Indochina. The route apparently
parallels the old railroad bed to the Tonkin border, but the
information above may actually reflect construction activity in
preparation for restoring the rail line which was erroneously reported
as road improvement. Another road, under construction at the end of
1953, is now in use from Ko-chiu to Chin.p'ing (Chin-ho) inside the
Chinese border. 40,j This new route, which provides an alternate means
of access from Meng-tzu to northern Tonkin, probably extends as far
south as the Chinese border town of Meng-la on the Nam Na River, where
it connects with a road to Lai Chau. 41/ During the Dien Bien Phu
campaign in Indochina, considerable quantities of rice were delivered
to the Viet Minh from this area.
A road evidently paralleling the operating western spur of the
Kunming - Haiphong rail line 42/ was reported under construction
in April 1953 from.Meng-tzu to Shih.p'ing. 43/ Apparently completed
as far as Chien-shui by September of that year, this route probably
is now open and usable. 444/ An eastward road extension from Yuan.
chiang, open to Shih-p'ing early in 1953, connects the new route to
the K'un.ming - Ta-lo road. 45/
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With the important exception of the Yunnan-Tibet road, now prob-
ably completeei between Yung='ping and Yen-thing, 46/ other road
development activity in southwest Yunnan has been directed. toward
interconnecting the more important towns in the area and providing
connections from them to both the Burma Road and the new K'un-ming -
Ta-lo highway. A new macadam road, for exaziiple, has been constructed
south from Mi-tu near the Burma Road it. central Yunnan to Ning-erh
(Puerh) on the K'un-ming - Ta-lo route, viaChing-tung and Chen-
yuan. 47/ Ning-erh also is the terminus ofIIan alternate road recently
built south from Pao-shan through Shun-ning and Yun-hsien~ 48/
Although this alternate road was reported open in the autumn of 1952,
bridge construction was considered rudimentary. 49/
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APPENDIX B
SOURCE REFERENCES
The reports
cannot be confirmed from other sources and therefore cannot be
evaluated in detail. It seems clear, however, that the reports of
road construction in the frontier regions of Yunnan are sufficiently
numerous to indicate that considerable activity has actually taken
place. Moreover, repeated items in the Chinese Communist press
proudly announcing the construction of numerous roads in Y nnan
confirm, to some extent, other data and support the conclusion that
road development in this area is an important objective of Chinese
planning.
Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated
"Eval.," have the following significance:
Source of Information
Doc. -Documentary
A - Completely reliable
B - Usually reliable
C - Fairly reliable
D - Not usually reliable
E - Not reliable
F - Cannot be judged
1 - Confirmed by other sources
2 - Probably true
3 - Possibly true
4 - Doubtful
5 - Probably false
6 - Cannot be judged
"Documentary" refers to original documents of foreign govern-
ments and organizations; copies or translations of such documents
by a staff officer; or information extracted from such documents
by a staff officer, all of which may carry the field evaluation
"'Documentary,",
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Evaluations not otherwise designated are] those appearing on the
cited document; those designated "RR" a:-e by the author of this
report. No "FR" evaluation is given when the author agrees with the
evaluation on the cited document.
2.
25X1 Ate-. 4.
5.
6.
FOIAb3b1 7.
.8.
FOIAb3b1 9-
1.1.
25X1 A2g-12
1-3
1-4.
1.6 .
17.
2.8.
19.
20.
21.
22.
25X1 A2.g- 23.
25X1 X7 24.
8
S E-C-R?-E-T
CIA FLD, Summary No. 156, 22 Jul' 195.4, "'Veekly Economic
Information Report on China," No. 1'. C. Eval. RR 2.
Army, LO Hong Kong, R-101-54, 29 Apr 195i-. U. Eval. RR 2.
CIA FLED, Su miar No,. 156, op. cit.
NIS 35, Section 63, "Minerals and Metals,' Dec 1951.
C. Eval.RR2.
NIS 3;-IV, Section 25, "Urban Areas," Jul 1951.
C. Eval. RR 2.
State, Rangoon Cable No. 401,
23 Nov! 1954. c.
State, OIR Report No. 673
, ProbablePevelopments in Thailand,
4 Nov 1954. S. Eval. RR 2,
Christian Science Monitor, 21 Sep 19$4. U. Eval. RR 2.
State, Chiengmai Despatch No. 7, 6 Olt 1954. C. Eval. RR 2.
ONI, Pacific Command, Weekly Intelligence Digest, No. 35-54,
27 Au;; 1954. S. Eval. RR 2.
Army, MAAG, Saigon Cable No. MG-3196A, 10 Sep 1954, S.
Eval. RR 2.
State, Vientiane Cable No. 236, 9 Jail 1955. S. E`ral. RR 2.
State, Bangkok Cable No. 1003, 5 Nov 1954. S. Eval. RR 3.
State, Chiengmai Despatch No. 21, 21 Nov 1954. S. Eval. RR
3
Ibid.
Army, jAA, Rangoon Cable No. 172, 15 Oct 1954.
S, US OFFICIALS ONLY. Eval. RR 2.
CIA FDI), Summary No. 156, op.. cit.
Army, LO Hong Kong, R-101-574-,--2-9 Apr 1954. U. Eval. RR 2.
?
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25. State, Bangkok Despatch No. 100, 29 Aug 1954. C.
Eval. RR 2.
26. State, Chiengmai Despatch No. 21, 21 Nov 1954. S. Eval. RR 3.
Ibid., No. 31, 4 Jan 1954. S. Eval. RR 3.
,.- 27 .
.-28.
.-29.
30.
31.
_32.
- 33?
34.
35?
.., 36 .
-.37.
38.
39
40.
-41.
- -48 . _
49. Ibid.
15
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