THE SOVIET SIXTH FIVE YEAR PLAN (1956-60)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 1998
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 16, 1956
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
THE SOVIET SIXTH FIVE YEAR PLAN (1956-60)
CIA/RR IM-426
16 March 1956
WARNING
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING T-.-1E
NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE
MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECSO
793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF
WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS
PROHIBITED BY LAW.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
153
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
FOREWORD
This memorandum on the Sixth Five Year Plan (1956-60) is based
upon an-analysis of the draft of the Plan which was released on
15 January 1956 and the materials of the 20th Party Congress on
14 February 1956. The primary emphasis of this memorandum is upon
an examination of the policies and programs contained. within the
Plan itself. A more detailed estimate of the probable economic
situation in 1960 and 1961 is made in ORR Project 10.803, which is
the ORB contribution to NIE 11-1+-56., Soviet Capabilities and Probable
Courses of Action. 1955-61 (to be published). Based upon detailed
examination of additional data., some of the preliminary estimates
in this memorandum may be changedxbut the primary evaluation of the
Plan is believed valid.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
CONTENTS
Page
Summary and Conclusions . .
I. Guiding Principles of the Plan . . . . . . . . . . . 3
II. Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
III: Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
A. Metallurgy and Industrial Materials . . . . . . . 9
B. Machinery and Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
C. Consumer Goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
IV. Transport and Communications . . . . , . . . . . . . 16
V. Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
VI. Population and Standard of Living . . . . . . . .. . . . 20
VII. Capital Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 23
VIII. Eastward Extension of Industry . . . . . .. . . . . . . 24,
1. Production of Energy and Fuels in the USSR., 19509 1955,
and 1960 Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Production of Metallurgical and Industrial Materials
in the USSR., 1950, 1955? and 1960 Plan . . . . . . . 9
Goals for Production of Nonferrous Metals in the USSR,
1955 and, 1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . it
4. Goals for Production of Machinery and Equipment
in the USSR., 1955 and 1960
5. Production of Selected Consumer Goods in the USSR.,
1950; 1955., and 1960 Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. Planned Increases in the Transport Program of the USSR,
lL
16
Increases in Agricultural Production in the USSR,
195 and l96OO Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
CIA/RR IM-426 S-E-C-R-E-T
(ORR Project 14.848)
THE SOVIET SIXTH FIVE YEAR PLAN (1956-6o)*
Summary and Conclusions
The Sixth Five Year Plan (1956-60) requires that the USSR utilize
its resources in a manner that will most efficiently develop an eco-
nomic program which will permit the USSR to enter into industrial
competition with the West and to strengthen its military capabilities.
To achieve these goals,.the USSR will (1) give priority to the
expansion of heavy industry; (2) expand the agricultural base;
(3) strengthen the military establishment; (4) attempt to content
the consumer, while increasing total sums directed to capital invest-
ment and the defense effort; (5) support a more elaborate intra-Bloc
division of labor among the countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc; and
(6) increase its ability to penetrate Free World markets.
A declining rate of additions to the labor force will require
drastic efforts to increase labor productivity in order to meet the
sizable production goals of the program. Increased replacement of
inefficient equipment, the adoption of the most advanced technical
improvements, and increased automation of processes will all be
necessary to this end. Should the goals for industrial labor produc-
tivity be unde.rfulfilled, extra workers will be assigned to industry,
.as in the past, from other sectors.
It is planned that industrial production in 1960 will be 65 per-
cent greater than in 1955 compared with the increase of 85 percent
realized in 1955 over 1950. The rate of increase is still quite high,
and it should be noted that the USSR surpassed the initial industrial
goals of the Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55) by a significant margin.
It is estimated that Soviet industrial production.in 1960 will be 39
percent of the US equivalent compared with 28 percent in 1955.
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this memorandum repre-
sent the best judgment of ORR as of 1 March 1956.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
The new Plan calls for a major effort to increase the power resources
of the country. Production of electric power is to be increased 88 per-
cent.
Steel production is to increase 51 percent. The increase in pro-
duction of machinery and metalworking products is to be 80 percent
compared with 120 percent for 1955 over 1950.
,The railroad system is to be substantially modernized by a new
dieselization and electrification program,and its capacity increased-
by more widespread introduction. of automatic block signaling equipment
and centralized traffic control.
Increased production of consumer goods will cause some moderate im-
provement in living standards. In addition,.a 1i-1-hour workweek is to be
Introduced by 1960, and the housing construction program is to be ex-
panded.
An ambitious agricultural program is planned,based.largely on ex-
panded grain production from the "new lands," increased harvests of
corn, and increased production of meat and dairy products.
Capital investment is to increase at a high rate. The 5-year total
is to be 990 billion rubles, 67.percent more than the total for 1951-55.
An important change in the pattern of investment will be the increased
replacement of inefficient equipment. Expanded introduction of auto-
mation and improved technical processes also are important characteristics
of the new.Plan.
.In general, the Fifth Five Year Plan was successfully fulfilled in
industry, but there were some shortfalls in the agricultural sector and
in the production of consumer goods. Despite a relatively low increase
in investment in the machine-construction industry, goals were over-
fulfilled in this vital sector. The expansion of power output did not
keep pace with the general increases in industrial production, however,
and the Sixth Five Year Plan stresses special effort-to remedy this
situation.
Notwithstanding a period of policy reexamination after Stalin's
death the Fifth Five Year Plan may be characterized as one continuing
primary emphasis upon expansion of heavy industry.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
Policy debate being resolved once more, the USSR considers the con-
tinued expansion of heavy industry as the most important guarantee of
economic strength in 1960 and as the basis for continuation of a fast
rate of growth after 1960. There is little reason to believe that
these plans will not be met unless the world situation. deteri.orates,
requiring an extensive Soviet mobilization in.the early part of the
period, or an internal economic or political crisis develops. If
neither of these situations occurs, even a significant failure to
.achieve industrial productivity goals could. be counteracted by above-
Plan-additions to the industrial labor force from an unallocated in-
crease.in the labor force or from other sectors of the economy. The
Plan projects a very low rate of increase in the industrial labor
force.the addition of somewhat less than a million workers above and
beyond the Plan would counteract the loss of production if the indus-
trial productivity increase were no more than in the Fifth Five Year
Plan (1i4 percent) compared with the planned increase of 50 percent.
As the Plan appears to contain a labor reserve, an addition of this
size to the labor force would not endanger its fulfillment in other
sectors.
.The Plan for agriculture appears overly ambitious and probably
will be underfulfilled, lead.ing.,in add.ition, to underfulfillment of
those plans for the light and food industryywhich depend upon Soviet
agriculture for raw materials. Unless material shortages develop or
manpower must be shifted to heavy industry,.the plans for consumer
durables appear feasible.
I. Guiding Principles of the Plano
The Sixth Five Year Plan is predicated on the main economic task
of the USSR,.which is defined as being' to overtake and surpass the
most developed capitalist countries as regards per capita: production."*
The goal is not only economic competition with the US;but also "the
further consolidation of the unbreakable defensive capacity for
the USSf." Relative to US industrial productio1, achievement of the
goals will increase the industrial production ofthe USSR from 28 per-
cent in 1955 to 39 percent in 1960. In the aggregate,the old"Stalin
goals for 1960-65,.established in 19146, are to b: increased as follows:
The Plan does not anticipate that this will occur by 1.960, however.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
S-E-C-R-E-T
Million Metric Tons*
Product
Stalin Goal
Sixth Five Year Plan Goal
Pig iron
50
53
Steel
60
68.3
Coal
500
593
oil
6o
135
More than in any preceding :plan, the keyword of the new Plan is
efficiency -- efficient use of the mineral and agricultural resources
of the USSR,. efficient use of the labor force, and efficient use of
"Socialist Accumulation," that share of the gross national product
which cannot be consumed but must be kept available for defense and
for investment, The USSR faces a high degree of simultaneous pressure
upon its resources. It is strengthening its military capabilities,
attempting to maximize its rate of economic growth., and endeavoring
to keep Soviet consumers moderately appeased. Under such circum-
stances the economic program for the next 5 years is taut, with little
slack to absorb planning mistakes, plan underfulfillment, or natural
catastrophes. It is a program which recognizes the possibility of
peaceful ttcoexistence" and strong economic competition with the West
but does not reject the possibility of war.
.The economic policy of the Plan reflects six basic principles,
.which, when applied to specific problem areas, determine its basic
characteristics., These six principles are as follows.
.1.. To Give Priority to the Expansion of Heavy Industry.
The extension :of a priority to the expansion of heavy
industry is not a new concept and has characterized the preceding
plans, It is, however, a reversal of the emphasis during ,the "new
course," at which time it was suggested by many Soviet economists
that from time to time light industry could be given equal or.higher
expansion rates than heavy industry. The concept has now been
explicitly rejected by the Central Committee.
Tonnages throughout this memorandum are given in metric tons.
- 4 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
S-E-C-R-E-T
2. To. Expand the Agricultural Basep.
The recent agricultural policy of the USSR and the new Plan
both reflect recognition that the increase in population has been creat-
ing great pressure on the food supply andon the supply of those products
of light industry which are based upon agriculture,
3- To Strengthen Military Capability,.
The Plan is explicit in requiring that the military capa-
bility of the USSR be strengthened. In addition to the implication
that the production of Increasingly complex military end items will
continue at a high level,, several programs of the new Plan have great
implications for.Soviet military strength. Greatly increased produc-
tion of instruments,,* as planned,, is essential both to the military
program and to improved technology in industry., A sixfold expansion
.of productive capacity for heat-resistant alloys increases strategic,
economic,, and military production capabilit~es,. as do the oxygen and
ammonia production programs. ..The eastward. expansion of industry into
the more interior areas of the USSR., Kazakhstan.. western Siberia, and
Central Asia will place an increasing share of the war-supporting
industry in the geographic area farthest from the Arctic,, Pacific,,and
.European bases of the Western nations Much of the new railroad.con-
struction.pr.ogram will have the effect of creating additional lines
.parallel to the Trans-Siberian Railroad from Moscow all the way to
Abakan,, about 550 miles west of Lake Baikal.
Despite the long-range hydroelectric program which involves
some long-term.capital commitments,, capital investment in general will
not be so involved in. long-term commitments as during 1951-55,, because
there is much less emphasis upon the building.of entire new plants
which would be several years under construction.
4. To Satisfy the Consumer
of Accumulation.
While Increasing the Rate
This principle embraces the competition between consump-
tion and investment. In the new Plan,, as in previous plans, investment
wins out. Accumulation for investment (and defense) still will be ac-
complished by setting the increases in per capita real wages substantially
The term instruments includes electronic and mechanical control
.systems.
- 5 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
lower than the increases in per capita production. Although production
of such consumer durables as washing, machines and television sets can
be rapidly expanded from the present small base, their importance in
total consumption will remain small in 1960. Food, cloth:Lng, and
housing will continue to be the predominating factors in the determina-
tion of the living standard, and these factors depend upon the weakest
sectors of the economy, agriculture and construction. The Plan calls
for smaller gains in real wages than those reported . for?l951-55, and
the doubtful prospects for the ambitious agricultural goals endanger
even these targets.
5. To Support Intra-Bloc Division of Labor-
The Sixth Five Year Plan specifically refers to the expan-
sion of a rational utilization of the economic resources and produc-
tion capacities of the countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc by means of
coordinated development, specialization and cooperation in production,
.and the exchange of information and experienced
6. To Penetrate Markets in Underdeveloped Countries.
The penetration of markets in underdeveloped countries is
not explicitly stated in the Plan but rather is implied in the Plan's
goal of economic competition with the West,and made explicit'by the
offers of Soviet leaders to assist in the industrialization of under-
developed countries. It is made meaningful by present efforts to
penetrate the economies of the underdeveloped countries. It has been
estimated that the USSR can increase greatly its effort in this direc-
tionwithout creating undue dependence on imported supplies, without
undue diversion of resources necessary to its own development program,
.and with net gains, both economic and political.
.II. Energy.
Despite the large existing energy base of the USSR, a continuing
emphasis upon the expansion of heavy industry necessitates the expan-
sion of goals for the production of fuels and energy which surpass
the expansion of the preceding 5 years not only in absolute amount but
in rate of expansion. Production of energy and fuels in the USSR for
1950,.1955, and the 1960 Plan is shown in Table l.*
# Table 1 follows on p. 7.
-6-
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 1
Production of Energy and Fuels in the USSR
1950, 1955, and 1960 Plan
Category
1950 1955
1960 Plan
Coal (million metric to
ns) 261
391
593
Oil (million metric ton
s) 38
71
135
.Electricity (billion
91
170
320
kilowatt-hours)
Thermopower
147
251
Hydropower
23
59
Nuclear power
Negligible
10
The Sixth Five Year Plan specifies that the coal industry is to
overcome the lagging of coal extraction behind the growing needs of
the economy. To this end, coal extraction in 1960 is to be 200 mil-
lion tons more than the 391 billion achieved in 1955. In view of
the tightening :Labor supply; the emphasis is upon minimizing addi-
tions to the:,labor force in the coal industry. Improved mechaniza-
tion and the increased use of strip mining are emphasized accordingly.
An effect of this emphasis will be to increase capital investment in
an effort to hold the present level of the labor force. Much of the
additional output will be at higher cost than existing output, as more
difficult extraction is encountered, such as the mining of narrow or
steeply pitching coal seams.
Despite the great emphasis of the Plan on the generation of hydro-
electric power, only 19 percent of the total electric power generated
in 1960 will be hydroelectric power, with most of the remainder being
thermoelectric power produced largely from coal sources. In 1960,
320 billion kilowatt-hours (kwh) are to be generated, of which 59 bil-
lion kwh are to be from hydroelectric stations, as against 170 billion
kwh in 19559 with 23 billion kwh from hydroelectric stations. It is
estimated that 10 billion kwh of the total will be generated by the
atomic power stations specified in the Plan.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
A striking feature of the power plans is the hydroelectric power
program, which is to increase the share of power now produced from
water energy. Extensive construction is to continue in European Russia
on the Volga, Kama, and Dnepr Rivers. A substantial long-range buildup,
however, is to be concentrated in the area east of the Urals. Although
the highlands south of the Siberian plain have long been known as the
greatest potential source of hydroelectric power in the USSR,.problems
of efficient transmission caused development to await the creation of
industrial centers in the nearby areas of Middle Asia. -The extensive
industrialization now planned for the area stretching from the Urals
to Lake Baikal makes development of this power potential practical and
essential. As a result,.the two largest hydroelectric stations in the
USSR, each with a capacity of 3.2 million kilowatts (kw), are to be
built at Bratsk, where the Angara River joins the Oka River,, and at
Krasnoyarsk on the Yenisey River. Neither of these projects will be
completed in 1960, although the first section of the Bratsk station
is to be operative then. Nevertheless, adequate power will be avail-
able in the area by 1960, on the basis of other smaller stations to
be completed.
This power program, demanding extensive investment in dams, sta-
tions, and transmission equipment, represents a long-term commitment
of investment capital. For this reason, it may be of intelligence
significance as a guide to indications. In the event of anticipation
of hostilities, work would likely be slowed down on projects not near
completion in order to permit the release of equipment and manpower
for more urgent tasks.
The USSR is to move further toward its dream of a unified power
grid by establishing a single European power grid, a unified Trans-
Caucasus grid, and a unified Novosibirsk-Irkutsk grid. Establishment
of such unified grids will permit more efficient power distribution
and greater ability to meet peak-load requirements.
.The USSR has insufficient rainfal:, and problems of seasonal water
flow limit the operating capacity of the hydrostations. Hydroelectric
power is not the panacea to the problems of a country industrializing
rapidly and pressing ever harder upon its power resources. Coal-
generated power becomes costly at any distance from the coalfields"
As a result, nuclear power stations will receive great emphasis as
possible answers to power problems in areas remote from coal and water
sources and to the need for base load stations capable of operating
at relatively steady year-round rates.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
Petroleum requirements in the USSR have been expanding rapidly
and will continue to expand as mechanized agriculture and aviation
continue their great growth, as the country embarks on its d.ieseliza-
tion program for the railroads, and as the use of petroleum products
as a chemical raw material increases. By 1960, output of petroleum
products is to increase 91 percent above the 1955 total, or to 135
million tons. Such rapid growth creates a transport problem which
is to be resolved by a sixfold growth in the pipeline transport. of
petroleum products. The need of the USSR for inexpensive fuel is to
be met partially by an increase in the output of natural gas to 388
percent of the 1955 level. Eventually natural gas will be used much
more extensively as a feed material to the chemical industry.
III. Industry..
Metallurgy' and Industrial Materials.
The 1960 goals of the metallurgy and industrial. materials
industries call for a lower rate of growth than that achieved during
1951--55, except for the chemical industry and the building materials
industry. Table 2 shows the trend in the production of metallurgical
and industrial materials in the USSR.
Table 2
.Production of Metallurgical and Industrial Materials in the USSR
1950, 1955, and 1960 Plan
Million Metric Tons
Material
1950
1955
1960 Plan
Pig iron
19
33
53
Steel
27
ii
68.3
Rolled metal
21
35
52.7
Cement
10
22
55
Mineral fertilizers
5.5
9.6
19.6
,The Sixth Five Year Plan projects a lower rate of increase
for the production.of crude steel than that achieved during 1951-55,
51 percent over 1955, a compared with the 66-percent increase achieved
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
in 1955 over 1950. Nevertheless, the 1960 goal of 68.3 million tons
of steel considerably exceeds the old Stalin goal of 60 million tons,
and the planned increase in annual production of 23,million tons
exceeds the 18-million-ton increase achieved in 1955 over 1950. In
the steel industry of the US, production is to increase 15 million
net tons per year by 1958. This expansion is roughly equal to the
Soviet planned expansion.
A notable feature of the new Plan is its stress. upon increasing
capacity for the annual output of stainless steel and heat-resistant
alloys by an additional 220 percent, of which the output of heat-resistant
alloys would increase by 500 percent. This is a significant expansion
in the type of material essential both to the military program and to
the production of equipment with high-temperature and corrosion-resistant
applications.
In the aggregate, projected increases in the annual production.
of nonferrous metals axe. to keep pace with the projected :increases in
industrial production. The planned increases, however, are less than
those planned in the Fifth Five Year Plan. Especially striking are the
reductions in the .planned increase for production.of lead and zinc.
-The greatest increase planned among the major nonferrous metals is
110 percent for aluminum Production of refined copper i.sto increase
60 percent, as compared with 90 percent in the Fifth Five Year Plan..
Growth in aluminum production is closely associated with growth in
power supply., as the aluminum industry has extensive power requirements
and reflects the relatively higher production cost of partially inter-
changeable copper.. Indigenous supplies of refined copper in the USSR
are insufficient,- imports play an important role, and the relatively
slow expansion in production which is planned is not likely to lead to
self-sufficiency. Achievement of the copper production plans will be
difficult, involving development of lower grade ore bodies in ..Kazakhstan.
Substitution of other products, such as aluminum,.for copper will con-
tinue wherever feasible. Goals for the production of nonferrous metals
in the USSR in 1955 and 1960 are shown in Table 3d*
The chemicals industry covers a wide range of products. One
group of products, plastics, has assumed increasing importance in the
worldwide search for metals or metal substitutes capable of perform.-
ing special tasks. Plastics have increasingly replaced metals in the.
struggle for cheaper materials, more convenient materials, or corrosion-
resistant materials. Output of plastics in the USSR will increase
greatly during 1,9559-60..
Table 3:follows on p. 11...
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
S-E-C: R-E-T
Table 3
,Goals for.Production of Nonferrous Metals in the USSR
1955 and 1960
Percent
1955 Plan as Increase
over 1950
1960 Plan as Increase
over 1955
Lead
170
1l2
Zinc
150
77
Aluminum
160
110
Copper, refined
9o
6o
Expansion.of the chemicals industry will continue at a fast
rate, especially in the field of synthetics.. Output of synthetic
rubber is to be 120 percent higher in 1960; synthetic alcohol, 90
percent; and.synthetic fibers, 400 percent.
.The agricultural program requires that the production of
mineral fertilizers be accelerated.,. with 1960 production to increase
104 percent above 1955- Production of the basic industrial chemicals.,
such as ammonia, sulfuric acid., caustic soda, and calcined soda., is to
increase at a rate slightly higher than the increase in industrial
production.
The new Plan establishes an extensive building program for
hydroelectric projects and for housing. As a result, although the
Plan deemphasizes the construction of new structures in industry.,
.the construction materials industry must continue to grow at a rapid
rate. Production of cement is to increase to 55 million tons in 1960,
roughly 2.5 times 1955 production. Special emphasis is given to pro-
duction of prefabricated building materials and to prestressed concrete
forms.
.In general.., an increased output of metals and industrial ma-
terials must be obtained primarily from construction of new producing
units and accompanying increases of the labor force. Increased pro-
duc.tivity.will be gained largely by reducing the proportion of workers
doing manual labor,, which is., for example, 44 percent in the coal
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
industry and 35 percent in ferrous metallurgy. Expansion of the fer-
rous and nonferrous metallurgy industries and the chemicals industry
in the area between the Urals and Lake Baikal will require new.enter-
prises and major additions to the labor force.
..New production capacity must be commissioned for the planned
production-of 16.8 million tons of pig iron., 15.8 million tons of steel,
16.3 million tons of rolled metal... and 84 million tons of iron ore.
.New producing units are required to produce 58 percent of the planned
additional output of refined copper, 80 percent of the aluminum, 66
percent of the lead, 1.0 percent of the nickel, 66 percent of the
ammonia, 47 percent of the caustic soda, 70 percent of the soda ash,
.and 76-percent of the automobile tires.
Major technological improvements will be especially significant
in the ferrous metals. and chemicals industries. Although the level of
technology in the Soviet steel industry already approaches that of the
US, approximately 33 percent of the scheduled increase in production is
to result from increased productivity of existing plants. A significant
part of this increase will be effected by more extensive use of oxygen
enrichment,, particularly in open-hearth furnaces.
.In the US chemicals industry, many of the most significant new
technical developments increasing production efficiency have been in
the field of intermediate products in the synthetic organics field.
.The USSR has not gone so far in this field., because of its predominant
interest in expanding production of basic chemicals essential to the
general buildup of heavy industry. In the future, this emphasis may
be expected to shift more in favor of synthetic organics and improved
technology in that field.
B. Machinery and Equipment.
After years of emphasis on the production of machinery and
equipment, the production volume has become so sizable that the annual
rate of increase has begun to drop off. -This is true generally of the
new Plan, even though in most cases the expansion of annual production
to be reached by 1960 exceeds that of any other 5-year period, in abso-
lute terms. Soviet production of machine tools exceeded US production
in 1955 in number. Production of metal-forming machines, on the other
hand, was significantly below US levels, a major use of such machines
in the US being the production of consumer durables.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
S -E-C -R-E-T
Three major programs of the Sixth Five Year Plan are responsible
for significant increases in the planned rate of growth for instruments,,*
tractors,, and diesel and electric locomotives.. The programs are auto-
mation., intensified mechanization.of agriculture., and the dieselization
and electrification program for the railroad system.
.Significant improvements in technology are scheduled to have
great impact upon the machinery.and equipment sector, Renovation of
old plants and equipment, automatization of processes, and reductions
in the weight of end items are urged in an attempt to reduce production
costs, increase labor productivity, and stretch the supply of metal,
New producing units are required to fulfill the following planned in-
creases: hydraulic turbines, L-6 percent, transformers, 36 percent;
metal-cutting machine tools, 35 percent; tractors, 31 percent; passenger
railroad cars, 11 percent; and chemical equipment,.65 percent. In
general, the major emphasis within this category of industry is upon
increasing production from existing production units,
Goals for the production of machinery and equipment in the USSR,
for 1955 and 1960 are. shown in Table La
C. Consumer Goods.
As a category of industry in the USSR., consumer goods includes
the light and food industries. It is also meaningful to split the cate-
gory into consumer durables and consumer nondurables, as these two
classifications exhibit quite different growth characteristics. Con-
sumer durables have been a very small component of the Soviet metal-
working industry and are capable of great increases in growth rate
because of the small current scale of production. This is true of
television sets., refrigerators., sewing machines, and washing machines.
Consumer nondurables, consisting largely of clothing and food products,
have been much more essential to the Soviet consumer. Essentially the
production of consumer nondurables has been closely related to Soviet
agriculture, on which depends not only the supply of.vital foodstuffs
but also the wool and cotton for clothing. Growth rates for nondurables
* Increased production of instruments is required not only for the
automation program but also for complex military end. items and in-
creased research and development.
-** Table 4 follows on p. 14.
- 13 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
Table 4
Goals for Production of Machinery and Equipment in the USSR
1955-Wad 1960
percent
1955 Plan as Increase
1960 Plan as Increase
,Product; over 1950
over 1955
Machine -building and 120 a/
metalworking equipment
80
Instruments 170
247
Machine tools, metal- 160 J
cutting
91
Machines, forging, and 700 c/
presses
91
Equipment, chemical 230
84
Equipment, metallurgical / 85
63
Equipment, petroleum of 250
,148
Equipment, rolling 100
82
Ships, seagoing freighters 190
30
and tankers
Motor vehicles 20
46
Tractors (in units) 50 a
97
a Actual 1955 output as increase over 1950
b. Specified as large in Fifth Five Year Plan, not so stated in the
Sixth
c. Specified as heavy forging machines and presses in the Fifth Five
Year Plan, not so stated in the Sixth.
d. Increase reported on value basis in Fifth Five Year Plan, on a ton-
nage basis in the Sixth,
have been much lower than for consumer durables. Table 5* shows the
production of selected consumer goods in the USSR in 1950, 1955, and
.the 1960 Plan.
The targets for the output of consumer durables are within
Soviet capabilities and will not of themselves endanger the increase
in output of producer goods. Historically,. however, the production of
Table 5 follows on p. 15.
- 14 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
S-E-C-R-E-T
consumer durables has suffered whenever industry has run short of ma-
terial, every other branch of industry having prior claim in allocation.
Table 5
Production of Selected Consumer Goods in the USSR
19502 1955, and 1960 Plan
Commodity and Unit 1950 1955 1960 Plan
Radio and television sets 1.1 4.0 10.2
(million units)
Watches and. clocks 7.6 19.7 33.6
(million units)
.Cotton fabrics (million meters) 3;899 59904 79270
Woolen.fabrics (million meters) .155 251 363
.Footwear (million pairs) 226 299 455
Industrial meat processing 1.3 2.2 3.95
:(million tons) a
Butter and dairy products 8.5 13.5 25.2
(million tons, ,milk basis)
Vegetable oil (million tons) 0..8 1.1 1.84
'Fish haul (million tons) 1.7 2.7 4.2
a,. Data apply to processing done by state enterprises.
Some private processing is done but is not represented in
these figures.
.b. Data apply to state production only.
Achievement of the plan for consumer nondurables is largely
contingent upon accomplishment of the ambitious agricultural program.
In general, the consumer goods program of the Sixth Five Year
Plan appears to call for modest gains in the standard of living of the
Soviet consumer.. 'Rates of increase for consumer goods in general will
not be as high as those reached in 1953-55. The primacy of heavy indus-
try in the allocation.of investment and materials has been reaffirmed
in the new.Plan. Of somewhat more effect upon the individual Soviet
citizen will be the new housing program and the 41-hour week to be put
into effect by 1960....
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
S-E-C-R-E-T
IV. Transport and Communications.
In general,.the transport program of the Soviet Sixth Five Year
Plan calls for growth in carrying capacity commensurate with the
growth of industrial production; for a lesser share of the total
product to be carried by rail in 1960; for improved transport between
European USSR and the Far East; and for a substantial improvement '
of transport facilities in western Siberia and Kazakhstan, in support
of the industrial and agricultural programs in that area.
In communications, the Plan calls for an accelerated program.in-
stalling cable lines and increasing the capacity of automatic tele-
phone exchanges. A 10,000-kilometer network of radio relay lines is
to be put into operation.
The Plan establishes goals in the field of transport which continue
the rate of increase displayed in the Fifth Five Year Plan. Railroad
freight turnover, river cargo turnover, air cargo turnover,, aid pipeline
transport are all to expand at approximately the same rate as that
planned for 1951-55. The 1960 goal for sea cargo tonnage is 2.1 times
the tonnage carried in 1955; the Fifth Five Year Plan called for a 55
to 60 percent increase. Motor freight turnover is to double in the
new Plan, as compared with a planned 80 to 85 percent increase in
1951-55.. Planned increases in the transport program of the USSR in
1955 and 1960 are shown in Table 6.
Table 6
Planned Increases in the Transport Program of the USSR
1955 and 1960
Category
1955 over 1950
1960 over 1955
Raillroad.freight turnover
35 to 40
42
River freight turnover
75 to 80
80
Sea cargo turnover
55 to 60
110
Motor freight turnover
80 to 85
100
Air freight turnover
100
100
Pipeline transport
400
500
-16 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
In the USSR the railroads carry approximately 85 percent of all
freight turnover Expansion of other types of transport at rates
faster than expansion of rail freight turnover will reduce this per-
centage somewhat by 1960.
.The Sixth Five Year Plan calls for the construction of 6,500 kilo-
meters (km) of new lines, twice as much as constructed during 1951-55-
Much of this increase is directed to the improvement of rail service.
in the "new lands1' area, to improvement of rail transport between the
Kuznets Basin and the Urals, and to the eventual establishment of a new
rail link to Communist China by building,a line eastward from Alma-Ata
feeding toward.the Chinese Sinkiang railroad project.
In addition, -the Plan directs extensive replacement of rails, ex-
tension of. the automatic block system and other safety devices, com-
plete conversion to automatic coupling, and:widely increased use of
4-axle freight cars. An extensive program is to be established for
beginning conversion to diesel and electric locomotion, with diesels
to be hauling from 40 to 45 percent of total rail freight in 1960.
During the Plan period, . production. of steam. locomotives will be dis-
continued..
.In river transport the prime emphasis is upon greater efficiency
of operation,. to be obtained largely by measures designed to expedite
two-way traffic on rivers and canals and by-improvement of port facili-
ties
The aims of the program for sea transport are to develop seaports,
.to improve handling; facilities at the ports, and to expand the sea fleet.
.Sea cargo turnover in 1960 is planned to double the 1955 turnover.
This will give: the Soviet merchant marine greatly increased potential
for carrying East-West trade, for carrying intra-Bloc trade, and for
commerce with the Far East.
,The pipeline expansion program assumes great importance for move-
ment of petroleum products to refining and consuming centers.. The
Plan establishes no unusual emphasis on expanded air freight opera-
tions. It does state, however, that new models of passenger planes
will be introduced into service which will be faster and. will have
larger seating capacity.. It is possible that a twin-jet model will be
used on some flights,
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
In motor transport., there is no evidence of intent to start a major
roadbuilding program. Apparently., motor transport is still to be pri-
marily of a short-haul nature despite a planned doubling of freight
turnover. The Plan lays great stress upon more efficient utilization
of vehicles and increased centralization of the vehicle park.
V. Agriculture.
The Sixth Five Year-Plan continues the broad attack.on three
closely related factors which have historically held back Soviet
agricultural growth -- limited natural resources., past underinvest-
went.,and organizational difficulties. In general., the directives
call for a continuation. of the policies adopted since 1953. These
include the development and completion-of the "new lands" and corn
programs., a rise in capital investment with a change in its composi-
tion, and the simultaneous extension of incentives to and controls
over collective farmers. On the basis of these programs., output is
to increase sharply., and Ebrushchev has even declared that some of
the targets can be met by the midpoint of the planning period. Despite
Khrushchevts optimism., the goals of the program appear overoptimistic.
The planned increases in agricultural production in the USSR in 1955
and 1960 are shown in Table 7,
Table 7
Increases in Agricultural Production in the USSR
1955 and 1960 Plan
Plan
1955 over 1950
1960 over 1955
Grains
29 a/
80
Flax fiber
49
35
Raw cotton
9
56
Sugar beets.
47
54
Meat
(slaughter weight).
0
.100
Milk
1
~
95
Eggs.
5
154
Wool
42
82
a. DistDrted to unknown extent by inclusion of unripened
corn.
b. State production.. Past and future gains may be ;partly
at the expense of private production..
- 18 -
S -E-C -R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
 a
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
The attack on resource limitations is embodied both in the "new
lands" program, now nearly completed, which extends grain cultivation
into an area of high drought risky and the corn scheme,, which also
encounters serious climatic difficulties. The Plan reaffirms both.
programs, envisioning neither an expansion nor a contraction of their
previous scopeq In combination,.they seek to achieve adequate supplies
of bread grains and a sharp improvement in fodder supplies, which in
turn will support higher levels of livestock and improve the quality of
the Soviet diet.
.Investment has been raised and redirected in support of these
programs and of traditional types of cultivation. Expenditures on
mineral fertilizers are to rise., and large investments will be made
in increasing livestock numbers, providing them with shelter, and
mechanizing livestock operations, which presently are performed
.largely. by hand,.. Except for expenditures for equipment`tIie capital
expenditures for resettlement in the "new lands may be expeoted'to
decline after 1956. Investment in production of tractors and com-
bines will continue to rise, with average annual deliveries during
the Plan at about 2.:5 times the 1953 rate. An important change is
planned in the composition of the tractor park -- production of
smaller, wheeled tractors for use in cultivating will increase much
faster than the large, general-purpose tractors employed in grain
production. The stress on corn, technical crops., vegetables, and
potatoes is responsible for plans to increase the share of cultivator
tractors to 58 percent of the 1960 tractor park in physical terms and
36 percent in horsepower terms as opposed to 46 percent andy24 per-
cent, respectively, in 1955,
.The Plan relies on increased labor productivity to achieve its
ambitious agricultural goals. Labor quality will be improved by ex-
panded training programs and the assignment of more graduate specialists
to agriculture, twice as many as planned for the preceding 5 years.
The total number of workers., however, is to remain relatively steady.,
although hopes have been voiced that eventually the traditional trans-
fer of labor from agriculture to industry can be resumed. In the
meantime,:the productivity of state farm workers is to increase by
70 percent and of collective farmers by 100 percent during the Sixth
Five Year Plan, although the Fifth Five Year, Plan goal of 40 percent
for all agriculture was not meta. Failures corresponding to output
underfulfillments are expected.
- 19 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
Mechanizing livestock operations and the farming of corn and non,
grain crops is one aspect of these productivity plans. Another aspect
is the income incentives offered to collective farmers for greater
efforts on communal tasks. A third is the more effective political
controls exerted by the greatly strengthened Party apparatus in the
countryside. Certain elements of the Plan and of contemporary Soviet
pronouncements hint that in the future this third aspect may become
increasingly important and that the perennial campaign to reduce or
eliminate the private plot and the free market., which compete with
collective employment as alternative means of livelihood. nay be en-
larged. Such developments will, according to Party dogma,, produce an
increase in agricultural labor productivity., although in the past these
efforts have frequently had an opposite result in the short run,
VI. Population and Standard of Lives.
During 1951-55 the population of the USSR grew by 16.3.million to
a total of nearly 220 million., or a gain of approximately B percent.
.The population of the US in 1955 was approximately 165 million. By
the end of 1960 the population of the USSR will be nearly 236 million.,
a gain of a further. 7 percent.
According to the Sixth Five Year Plan, there will be 55 million
"workers and employees" in 1960, an increase of nearly 15 -percent
above the total for 1955. The category "workers and employees" in-
cludes both the nonagricultural labor force and the labor force em-
ployed in state agriculture. State agriculture employed an estimated
5.5 million at the end of 1955
During the period 1.951-55 the nonagricultural labor ?force grew by
an estimated 15 percent. During 1956-60 the planned increase appears
to be about 14 percent; however, the Plan calls for a growth in the
industrial labor force of only 11 percent. Comparison of these data
indicates a high rate of growth planned for aggregate nonagricultural
employment other than industrial employment. Nevertheless, the Plan
does not specifically indicate substantial increases in labor force
planned for construction.. transport, or other nonagricultural sectors)
hence it is likely that an unallocated labor reserve is included in
the aggregate figure for this category. Employment of this labor in
industry would enable fulfillment of the production plans despite
significant nonfulfillment of labor productivity plans.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
The Sixth Five Year Plan establishes output goals in industry for
1960 which in terms of percentage are much higher than planned addi-
tions to the labor force, They must be met by either sharply increas-
ing the productivity per worker or on a selective basis,, by the trans-
?fer of labor from less essential sectors to priority sectors. .Produq=+
tivity per worker in industry is to increase 50 percent., as compared
with the planned increase of 65 percent for industrial production;.
.Productivity is to increase 52 percent in building,, 34 percent in rail
transport, 40 percent in sea transport, 70 percent in state agriculture.,
and 100 percent in the collective farms. According to Khrushchev in
his February 1956 speech,, although Soviet agriculture probably will never
reach the productivity of US agriculture there is much need for improve-
menta A comparison of the planned increases for agricultural pro?
ductivity with scheduled. increases in agricultural production indicates
that there will be little increase in. the agricultural labor force
during 1956-60., the major resettlement effort being largely completed.
:'T'here may be,, however,, transfers of labor from the collective farms to
state agriculture. The number and quality of supervisory and tech-
nical personnel may be expected to increase..
.On the whole,, with the exception of agriculture,,.the goals for in-
creased labor productivity are similar to those of the Fifth Five Year
Plan.*.3n the new Plan., however,.there is increased emphasis upon in-
creasing .. output per producing machine, as the result of the replacement
of inefficient machines, the use of advanced technological improvements.,
.and the increased specialization of producing enterprises. Automation
in the sense of mechanized production control. systems is but a part of
this whole effort. Recent Soviet speeches appear to use automation in
a somewhat more ambiguous sense as a colorful word signifying this whole
new effort..
The new drive for increased productivity has major implications for
capital investment because a larger share of future increases in the
volume of production will result from the modernization or increased
capacity of existing plants. A larger share of capital investment
will go to equipment.
As usual,, the increase in wages and in the income of collective
farmers is to lag behind the increase in the value of output per
worker or collective farmer., This witrh.eld income goes to the state
to finance investment and defense, Productivity is to increase 50 per-
cent and real wages 30 percent per worker in industry. In the Fifth
Five Year Plan,, increases of 50 percent in productivity and 35 percent
The goals are similar only in terms of annual labor productivity.
The planned reduction of the work week by 1960 would.requir.e a 70 per-
cent increase in industrial :production per man-hour over 1955.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
in real wages were planned,* In the new Plan, the collective farm
member is to produce 100 percent more, but his income is to increase
40 percent. This is a somewhat less favorable share of the increased
output than is allowed the wage earner.
Although the rise in living standards will be moderate in. the
1956-60 period., two new programs will be of great psychological impor-
tance.to the average Russian. These are the 41-hoer week and the new
housing program.
The 41-hour week was launched as a goal of the S.xth.Five Year Plan
in I rushchev's speech before the Party Congress on 14 February 1956?.
It is to be introduced on a gradual basis starting in 1957, and the
program is to be completed by 1960. Assuming progressive introduction
of the program at a steady rate, the net impact on the average hours
per worker-year during 1956760 would be a 6-percent reduction. At the
present time., it is difficult to see how this reduction can be accom-
plished and the plan for industrial production be met unless either
the plan.for increased labor productivity is overfulfill,-d,or,.as would
be more likely, additions to the industrial labor force are larger than
planned.
Construction of state housing in 1956-60 is planned to almost double
that during 1951-55, This program will improve urban housing conditions
to a limited extent. It is estimated that living space per urban
dweller will increase from 4 square meters in 1955 to 5 square meters in
.1960., both because of the increased space and also because of the slower
urban population growth planned. Housing conditions on the collective
farms are to be improved by an intensified program of private construc-
tion, performed largely by special housing brigades on the collectives
and financed ultimately by the collective farm member assisted by special
banks or credit arrangements.
The Plan projects further expansion of the social security and
medical programs. In education, two major goals are the extension of
10-year schools to the towns and rural areas., conversion from 7- to
10-year schools having been accomplished already in city areas; and
intensified specialized advanced training to increase the numbers of
skilled workers, technicians., and scientists in support of the accele-
rated emphasis upon technology.
* An actual increase in real wages of 39 percent has been claimed;
industrial labor productivity increased 44 percent during 1951-55.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
VII. Capital Investment.
The Sixth Five Year Plan stipulates. only that capital investment
over the entire period will be 990 billion rubles, 67 percent more
than invested during 1951-55, inconstant rubles.. It seems probable
that about 65 percent of the total capital investment., or approxi-.
mately,640 billion rubles, will. be invested in industry. This is the
share of capital investment which the 1956 budget allocates to indus-
try and is roughly the share which industry received during 1951-55.
During 1956-60, total investment in machinery and equipment will in-
crease 80 percentAbove the total for 1951-55.. As total capital in-
vestment is to increase 67 percent, the higher rate of increase for
machinery and equipment implies that investment in construction will
increase at a rate less than 67 percent and that investment in ma-
chinery and equipment will be a larger share of the total. In sup-
port of the new emphasis upon reduction of production costs and in-
creased output from existing plants, the construction of new plants
will be deemphasi.zed, investment at existing.enterprises emphasized,
and the share of industrial investment going to equipment will in-
crease from about 33 percent in 1951-55 to nearer 36 percent in. 1956.-60.
Two aspects of investment at existing enterprises are the replace-
ment of worn equipment with equipment of the same capacity., which will
produce-At.-lower costs, and the increasing of actual capacity through
the installation of new, more productive processes or by extension of
existing plants. The enlargement of the capacity of existing plants
is much less expensive, unless expansion is excessive, than the con-
struction of whole new plants on new sites, and this appears to'be a
major element.of consideration, especially when Soviet construction
costs are so high in relation to Soviet equipment costs..
On the. whole, the new patterns of investment appear rational.
Whether the industrial productivity goals will be achieved is yet
problematical, because few things are more difficult to predict than
the degree to which new technology can be introduced or the effect
of such new technology.: To a substantial degree the new program goes
beyond a program for simple capital replacement, which could be
scheduled and predetermined as to effect. Much of the program depends
upon the introduction., on a large scale.,of relatively advanced tech-
nology, a very complex engineering problem. Nevertheless. the program
must be followed if the productive resources of the USSR are to be
used to the fullest extent.
-23-
S -E -C -R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
Aside from the problems of technological progress, the building,
equipping, and modernizing of plants, as planned in the investment
program, are: within the present ability of the USSR, unless an un-
foreseen crisis results. The Plan correctly assigns a heavier share
of investment to equipment than in the past, in support of the pro-
posed plans for technological improvement and increased labor pro-
ductivity. Two possible developments bear special attention, however,
and may endanger achievement of the productivity goals for industry in
general. The first development would be an undersupply of instruments
to industry such as could result should military requirements be larger
than planned. The second would be an underestimation of capital invest-
ment in the machine construction industry itself, as the targets of the
new Plan rely predominantly upon increasing output from existing plants.
A substantial part of the new investment is directed toward invest-
ment in energy and raw materials, and in the area east of the Urals.
Investment in machine construction appears to be increasing at a low
rate in relation to the production goals. The machine construction
industry is relying in many cases upon substantial production increases
from relatively small capital investment in support of the introduction
of new technology and capital replacement in existing plants. Should
this be too optimistic, heavy additional capital expenditure would be
,required for the construction of additional new plants. In general,
however, the capital investment program should.be fulfilled substantially.
VIII. Eastward Extension of Industry.
In the Sixth Five Year Plan, which emphasizes the development of
natural resources and energy sources, a substantial effort is directed
toward the development of natural resources east of the Urals. Al-
though the movement of industry eastward is not new, the years 1956-
60 will see a new intensification of this effort. The agricultural
development of the "new lands" as a byproduct will help to prepare a
food base for an enlarged urban population in years to come.
The new hydroelectric power development is concentrated in the area
east of the Urals. Kkx?ushchev stated in his address to the 20th Congress
of the Communist Party. ."Within the next 10 years we must make Siberia
a leading producer of coal and electricity in the Soviet Union and the
principal center of industries consuming a great deal of fuel and
power -- especially industries producing aluminum, magnesium., and
titanium as well as Z cente7 of the electrometallurgical,coke by-
products, and electrochemical industries." The Plan is a, long-term
24
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
S-E-C, R-E-T
.one, foreseeing the creation in Siberia within 10 or 15 years of a
metallurgical center producing 15 million to 20 million tons of pig
iron annually..
During 1956-.60, half of the capital investment in. the USSR is to
be invested in areas east of and including.the Urals. There is to be
greatly increased construction activity in Kazakhstan. In Petropavlovsk
a foundry., an ore-concentrating combine., and a rolling equipment plant
are to be constructed. An aluminum plant,. a ferrous metallurgical
plant., and a plant for the construction of agricultural combines are
to be built at.Pavlodar. Two large blast furnaces and a continuous
sheet rolling mill are to be constructed at Karaganda. In addition,
several chemicals plants and engineering plants will be constructed.
in Kazakhstan..
In Siberia, 3 new aluminum plants will be constructed as well as
oil refineries, 5 new machine-tool construction plants, 6.metal
forming: equipment plants, 8 .construction and transport equipment
plants, 1 electric locomotive plant.? and several chemicals plants.
A substantial nucleus of an aircraft industry in Siberia probably
will be further enlarged if increased supplies of aluminum, fuels,
titanium, magnesium., synthetic rubbery and other basic materials are
available from new plants going up in the area.
Major new railroads which are projected will improve transport
facilities within the new industrial areas. The new line from Magnito-
gorsk westward to Abdulino will improve transport between both the
Urals and Karaganda and the areas in the west. The new lines Krasnoufimsk-
Kurgany Omsk-Barnauly and Stalinsk-Abakan will improve transport capa-
bilities within the area and eventually will help relieve pressure upon
the Trans Siberian.Rail.roady which they and other existing lines parallel.
Continuing, long-term development of the areas east of the Urals
is a major assignment of the State Planning Commission. and assumes great
importance not only fromeconomic considerations but also from the point
of view of defense.
.-?25 -
S-E-C R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5
S-E-C-R-E-T
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400030003-5