PRODUCTION, RESERVES, AND EXPORTS OF SOVIET GOLD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 1998
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 10, 1957
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
PRODUCTION, RESERVES, AND EXPORTS OF SOVIET GOLD
CIA/RR IM-457
10 October 1957
WARNING
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING TEE
NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE
MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS.
793 AND 791E, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF
WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS
PROHIBITED BY LAW.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79TOO935AO00400340003-1
S-E-C-R-E-T
CONTENTS
Summary and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I. Introduction . . . . . . . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 3
II. Pattern of Gold Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
A. Motivation for Recent Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
B. Other Postwar Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
C. Prewar Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
III. Gold in Intra-Soviet Bloc Settlements . . . . . . . . . . . 11
IV. Gold and Its Internal Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A. Gold and the Ruble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
B. Domestic Industrial and Other Uses . . . . . . . . . . 14
V. The Gold Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A. History and Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
B. Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
VI. Gold Reserves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Appendixes
Appendix A. Statistical Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Appendix B. Source References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Tables
1. Soviet Gold. Sales and Balances of Trade, 1953-56 . . . . .8
2. Soviet Foreign Indebtedness, Selected Years, 1924-38. . . . 10
3. Reported Soviet Gold Loans, Selected Years, 1947-56 . . . . 12
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79TOO935AO00400340003-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
1+. Estimated Soviet Gold Production, 1927-55 . . . . 18
5. Estimated World Gold Production, 194.8
and 1950-56 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6. Estimated World Gold Holdings, December 1956 . . 22
Chart
Following Page
USSR: Gold Exports, Production, and Balance
of Trade, 1920-38 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
CIA/RR IM-1+57 S-E-C-R-E-T
(ORR Project 42.1657)
PRODUCTION, RESERVES, AND EXPORTS OF SOVIET GOLD*
Summary and Conclusions
The reappearance of the USSR as a substantial seller of gold in
Free World markets has given rise to speculation regarding the moti-
vation of such sales and the implications of Soviet gold policy in
general. It is fairly evident that the recent Soviet gold sales,
which are estimated to have totaled US $330 million** during January
1956 - April 1957, cannot be explained simply in terms of the normal
replenishment by the USSR of its foreign exchange reserves. The
size of the sales and the urgency with which they appear to have been
concluded in November and December 1956 suggest that their primary
motivation was a result of the political upheavals in Soviet-dominated
Europe. The fact that similar peak sales followed hard upon the June
1953 uprising in East Berlin provides a parallel not easily dismissed.
It is not unlikely that the economic assistance granted to the Euro-
pean Satellites in 1953 and 1956 might well have provided an unfore-
seen strain on Soviet foreign exchange reserves (traditionally kept at
a minimum level consonant with "maneuverability" in foreign trade),
which, when compounded by the large Soviet purchases of consumer goods
during 1953-54 and the abnormally heavy purchases of raw materials and
semiprocessed goods in the-sterling area during 1956, provided the
impetus for the flows of Soviet gold.
The apparent reluctance with which the USSR employs gold to
settle its international accounts demonstrates that, at least within
the limits prescribed by its export capability, the country strongly
prefers to balance imports with merchandise exports. Nevertheless,
Soviet gold resources are relied upon as an integral part of Soviet
foreign exchange reserves and operate as a fund out of which tempo-
rary disequilibriums in the Soviet balance of payments with the Free
World can be met. The prewar years show a striking correlation be-
tween Soviet gold exports and the deterioration of the Soviet balance
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent
the best judgment of ORR as of 1 September 1957.
** Dollar values in this memorandum are given in terms of current
US dollars.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
of trade. The absence of any such positive correlation in the post-
war period reflects, in part, a growing Soviet export capability
which perhaps has obviated the necessity for any large-scale gold
financing as a normal part of Soviet foreign trade.
Although gold is primarily regarded in the USSR as a means of
international payment, it clearly does have subsidiary domestic uses.
Presumably the Soviet ruble enjoys a 25-percent gold backing, and
appreciable quantities of gold are employed in industry and in the
fine arts.
Although considerations of doctrine do not prevent the USSR
from using gold either to settle moderate import surpluses or to ex-
tend economic assistance to friendly nations, it appears unlikely
that the country will resort to gold financing on any large and perm-
anent scale. If this assumption is correct, it is still necessary
to account in some way for the inordinately large gold reserve of
the USSR, estimated to be $4 billion, and for its annual gold pro-
duction, valued at approximately $175 million.
One possibility is that the USSR has thus far refrained from
any large-scale diminution of its sizable gold reserve because of
its belief in the inevitability of a major capitalist crisis during
which Soviet gold stocks could be employed with telling effect. It
has often been suggested that the USSR may dump gold on the world
market in an attempt to disrupt further already dislocated Free
World economies.
If the USSR does intend to employ its gold reserves as a weapon
of economic warfare, Soviet economic writers are obviously reluc-
tant to discuss the matter. It appears unlikely, however, that the
USSR seriously harbors any such plan. Any economic dislocations
which would result from Soviet dumping would be merely temporary,
at most, in view of existing national and international devices to
insulate Free World economies from such contingencies. Furthermore,
if such a policy were vigorously pursued, it could conceivably bol-
ster Free World economies through a reinforcement of foreign exchange
reserves and might serve to depress the price of gold to the great
disadvantage of the USSR, itself a major gold producer.
The rationale for the large gold reserves of the USSR might be
found in the peculiar, almost mercantilist preeminence which it
attributes to its store of precious metals, most particularly to its
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
gold reserve. This psychological attachment to gold, however, may
be motivated by several more practical considerations. In the light
of recent Satellite manifestations of political and economic inde-
pendence, it must be assumed that the emphasis on large state re-
serves as a protective buffer against the economic encroachments of
world capitalism has not measurably abated. Soviet gold reserves,
according to the Soviet economist Notkin, still "provide the in-
surance necessary to protect the USSR from major shifts in inter-
national market conditions, the possibility of partial or general
economic and financial blockade, the possibility of crop failure
within the country, and the possibility of direct armed assult upon
the USSR." l/* To a lesser extent, the gold reserves of the USSR
have provided useful grist for its propaganda machine. This iden-
tification of wealth with gold has enabled the USSR not only to
demonstrate its extreme solvency to hesitant Free World businessmen
but also to prove both to neutralist Asians and to faltering Satel-
lites the efficacy of the Communist system.
I. Introduction.
When we conquer on a world scale, I think we
shall use gold for the purpose of building public
lavatories in several of the large cities of the
world ... . But, however "just," useful, or hu-
mane it would be to utilize gold for this purpose,
we nevertheless say: Let us work for another de-
cade or so with the same intensity and with the
same success as we have been working in 1917-21,
only on a wider field, in order to reach the stage
when we can put gold to this use. Meanwhile, we
must save the gold in the RSFSR, sell it at the
highest price, buy goods with it at the lowest
price. "When. living among wolves, howl like the
wolves." /
* For. serially numbered source references, see Appendix B.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
Thus did Lenin serve notice that, until the triumph of socialism
had been achieved on a worldwide scale and as long as the interna-
tional economic relations of the USSR were conducted in a capitalist
environment, the USSR would utilize its gold resources in a manner
similar to that of its non-Communist neighbors.
The truly "capitalist" preeminence which the USSR has consist-
ently attributed to its gold resources shows that this Leninist
formula for Soviet gold policy has not been measurably altered in
the ensuing years -- the country exhibits an attachment to gold
which is almost mercantilist in concept and is virtually unequaled
among Free World nations. Some of the major determinants and impli-
cations of Soviet gold policy are explored in this memorandum.
II. Pattern of Gold Sales.
In recognition that "short-term discrepancies between income
and expenditure are not impossible even in the balance of payments
of the USSR," J Soviet gold resources are relied on as an integral
part of Soviet foreign exchange reserves and operate as a fund out of
whicn temporary disequilibriums in the Soviet balance of external
payments with the Free World can be met. Soviet sales of gold, how-
ever, remain an uncertain factor in Free World markets, as these
sales appear to be dependent upon the level of Soviet gold and for-
eign exchange reserves, Soviet willingness to employ gold as pay-
ment for net commodity imports, and the.extent to which the USSR
will assume the foreign exchange obligations of the European Satel-
lites.
The apparent reluctance with which the USSR has employed gold
to settle its international accounts shows that it prefers to bal-
ance imports with merchandise exports. This position was reaffirmed
in a recent textbook on foreign trade which states: "The Socialist
state aims at balancing imports with exports, since only such a
balance can, in the long run, provide a healthy basis for interna-
tional trade." However, "gold and foreign exchange have sometimes
been used if the need arose for urgent imports of certain commod-
ities and if export commodity resources could not be mobilized fast
enough for such imports." J
Soviet economic writers take great pains to state e. licitly
that Soviet gold sales are not automatic responses to balance of
payments deficits. Such sales, they explain, are necessarily
-4-
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
conditioned by one or both of the following circumstances: (1) the
use of gold for the settlement of Soviet international accounts may
be undesirable in those cases where the official price of gold in
Free World markets is considered below its "actual" value, as the
USSR believes to have been the case since World War II, or (2) when
conditions on the capitalist market are unfavorable for the USSR --
that is, an adverse turn in the Soviet terms of trade -- it may be
more advantageous for the USSR to cancel its obligations through
credits extended by individual capitalist countries and through cur-
rency obtained from the sale of gold rather than from the sale of
commodities. It is perhaps because the USSR has in the past been
forced too often to rely more upon its bountiful gold resources than
its much-vaunted export capability in the settlement of its inter-
national accounts that Soviet writers manifest so extreme a sensi-
tivity over the possible interpretation that all Soviet gold sales
are indicative of an unfavorable payments balance.
A. Motivation for Recent Sales.
The reappearance of the USSR as a substantial seller of gold
in international bullion markets has given rise to much speculation
regarding the motivation of such sales. It is now quite clear that
the heavy Soviet gold exports (reported to be $150 million in 1956
and estimated to be $180 million during January-April 1957 J) can-
not be explained simply in terms of the normal replenishment by the
USSR of its sterling reserves. Although sales in the first half of
1956 differed little from those during comparable periods in 195+
and 1955, the offerings during the last months of 1956 and the first
quarter of 1957 were reminiscent of the major sales during 1953?
The urgency with which the sales were concluded in November
and December 1956 suggests two major factors as the primary motiva-
tion of the sales: (1) the hard currency loans to the European
Satellites following recent political upheavals and (2) the abnor-
mally heavy Soviet purchases of raw materials and semiprocessed
goods in the sterling area during 1956.* T.T. Ivanov, Chief of
Soyuzpromexport, the organization responsible for foreign sales of
Soviet gold, had stated in early October that there would be no more
sales of gold by the USSR in 1956. 6/
Soviet purchases from the UK in 1956 registered an increase of
75 percent above the level of 1955, giving rise to a small (although
unique) trade deficit with the UK in 1956.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
Khrushchev's disclosure at the XXth Party Congress that the
USSR had thus far extended to countries of the Soviet Bloc credits
totaling $5.25 billion, along with, subsequent announcements of long-
term credit extensions of more than $1 billion (including $158 mil-
lion in gold and foreign exchange) to the European Satellites since
1 January 1956, heralded a new and well-publicized Soviet program of
economic aid to the European Satellites. The reason for this new
Soviet move is now fairly evident. The USSR had either to help alle-
viate the acute shortage of foreign exchange and consumer goods which
plagued the European Satellites or suffer a recurrence of the polit-
ical unrest to which that shortage had already contributed in East
Germany, Poland, and Hungary. The USSR may have felt it politically
expedient to appear more sympathetic to the economic needs of the
Satellites in view of its announced policy of economic assistance to
non-Communist countries.
On his arrival in London in early December 1956 to negotiate
for the sale of Soviet gold, Ivanov stated that the large-scale gold
sales were caused by events in Eastern Europe and that the USSR re-
quired currency to meet debts of the Satellite countries. '7/ This
statement is further evidence that the USSR is the "benefactor"
which made it possible for Hungary to meet its large commercial debts
in early 1957.
At the time of the Hungarian uprising it was estimated that
the outstanding commercial debts of Hungary to the Free World
amounted to at least $140 million. Hungarian bank officials were en-
countering increasing difficulties in obtaining foreign short-term
commercial credits, and most Western European export credit insurance
departments were plainly reluctant to offer cover on Hungarian trade.
8/
Since the October uprising, however, Hungary has found approx-
imately $56 million for trade debt repayments. Less than 10 percent
of these debts were reportedly paid from small Hungarian deposits in
various Western European banks, but more than 90 percent were liqui-
dated through payments made by the Banque Commerciale de L'Europe du
Nord. Considering the state of Hungarian export trade over this
period,* it may reasonably be assumed that the Banque Commerciale re-
ceived the money from the proceeds of the sales of Soviet gold. 10/
* Hungary registered an import surplus of almost $9 mill-'Lon during
the fourth quarter of 1956 compared with an export surplus of $87 mil-
lion for the comparable period of 1955. J
-6-
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
LL
O
L1l
U
0
O
I
a
0
O
~
a
w
m
a
I
s.iell?a sri 3ua.rfnj uuglyW
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
Soviet Gold Sales and Balances of Trade
1953-56
Million Current US $ a/
Year
Sales
of Gold
Free World UK
Other Sterling Area
1953
150
-107
+65
-56
1954
93
-147
+63
-73
1955
70
-46
+65
-28
1956
150
-57
-25
-23
a. Adjusted. for costs of transportation.
case followed hard upon manifestations of Satellite discontent,
is not easily to be dismissed. It is not unlikely that the eco-
nomic assistance granted to the European Satellites in 1953 and
1956 might well have provided an unforeseen strain on Soviet for-
eign currency reserves necessitating the urgent sale of gold.
C. Prewar Sales.
Gold shipments by the USSR in the prewar period appear to
have served the tradhtonal purpose of covering e deficit in its
international accounts. The correlation between the export of
Soviet gold and the deterioration of the Soviet balance of payments
on current account is shown in the accompanying chart.*
The large sales of Soviet gold during 1920-23 may be attrib-
uted primarily to the economic blockade imposed on the RSFSR as an
answer to the October Revolution and the peace treaty of Brest-
Litovsx. The blockade, coupled with the impossibility of rapidly
* Following p. 8. Soviet balances of trade in this chart are from
12/. Ruble values have been recalculated on the basis of 5.3 rubles
to US $. Gold exports are from L3/. For figures on Soviet gold
production, see Table 4, p. 18, below.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
Also *of significance in thiL connection has been the rather
abrupt change in the pattern of Soviet gold sales in late 1956. Most
of the Soviet gold sales before November 1956 were made, not in Lon-
don,* where the USSR has traditionally obtained the bulk of its ster-
ling or dollars at the official rate, but in commercial centers such
as Zurich, where the USSR obtained transferable sterling at a discount.
The sale of approximately $75 million worth of gold on the London
market (largely for dollars) in the period December 1956 - February
1957 is probably a reflection of insufficient short-term demand in
Zurich for gold in this quantity. London is by far the largest mar-
ket, and big sales would be more easily accommodated -there.
B. Other Postwar Sales.
It was not until 1953 that the USSR reemerged in the postwar
period as a major exporter of gold. The absence of any significant
sales during 19+6-53 might be attributed, at least in part, to the
depressed price of gold in the postwar years and the extensive exploi-
tation of Satellite resources and foreign reparations which, in the
form of unrequited imports, obviated the necessity for any large-scale
Soviet gold financing.
Perhaps the most plausible motivation for the large Soviet
gold sales in 1953-54, as shown in Table 1,** was the anticipation of
a need to purchase quantities of goods in the Free World in order to
implement the increased goals in consumer goods set for the Soviet
population by the Malenkov regime. Although the ambitious objectives
of the Malenkov import drive were soon proscribed by the accession to
power of Khrushchev, imports of consumer goods from the Free World
did show a spectacular, if short-lived, rise. Such imports of con-
sumer goods in 1954 were more than twice the level of 1952 and un-
doubtedly contributed to the peak Soviet import surplus with the Free
World in 1954. It was apparently in anticipation of this deficit
that the USSR decided to bolster its sterling balances in London by
selling gold.
To what extent the Soviet gold sales in 1953-54 were related
to the East German uprising in June 1953 is still unclear. The
parallel of Soviet gold sales in both 1953 and 1956, which in each
* Only 37 percent of Soviet gold sales were reportedly made in Lon-
don during 1956, a small amount in comparison with the percentages of
previous years. ll
** Table 1 follows on p. 8.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
expanding Soviet export capability, left the fledgling state with
only one alternative -- to pay for its needed imports in gold. The
largest banks in the UK, France, and the US, however, refused to
accept gold of Soviet origin either in coin or in ingots. The
Soviet gold which did manage to filter into Europe, first through
Estonia and then through Sweden and other countries, was exported
often at a discount of as much as 15 to 25 percent. The gold
blockade was lifted only after the conclusion by the RSFSR of a
trade agreement with the UK in March 1921, concurrent with the adop-
tion of the liberal New Economic Policy.
The determined Soviet quest for adequate gold and currency
reserves during the formative years of the Soviet state was frus-
trated by a chronic payments deficit on international account and an
inability to expand domestic gold production rapidly, as shown by
the repeated governmental and Party directives stating the necessity
of accumulating currency reserves and of achieving a favorable bal-
ance of trade.
The resolution of the XVth Party Conference, which was held
in 1926, noted that the Party directives of the previous Party con-
gresses regarding a favorable balance of foreign trade had not been
carried out and pointed out that "with all firmness the conference
emphasizes the necessity of such a quantitative relationship between
exports and imports and would definitely guarantee a favorable bal-
ance of trade and payments to an extent that would ensure the accumu-
lation of currency reserves." l1/
Instructions on accumulating currency reserves were also
given in December 1927 by the XVth Party Congress, which considered
this problem together with directives for the First Five Year Plan
(1928-32) and the Party's economic policy. The decision of the XVth
Party Congress on this problem stated:
On the basis of the general course of for-
eign trade (maximum trade relations in order to
strengthen our production base and grow more inde-
pendent of the capitalist world), it is necessary
to devise a plan for foreign trade which will
assure a favorable balance. An active balance
together with an increase in the domestic mining
of gold is the principal source for the accumu-
lation of currency reserves, which is especially
-9-
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
necessary in connection with the deterioration
of relations between the capitalist world and
the USSR and the possibility of a poor harvest
or crop failure. 15
The scarcity of exportable commodities was further aggra-
vated during the First Five Year Plan and the depression, when
prices of raw materials and agricultural products -- bulk of
Soviet exports -- drastically declined in the world market. So
urgent, however, was the need for imports to caxry out the First
Five Year Plan that imports were expanded in spite of the impossi-
bility of paying fully for them out of the receipts derived from
current export trade. Instead of the favorable balance of trade
so fervently called for by almost every Party pronouncement, the
actual developments in Soviet export and import trade resulted in
a persistently unfavorable trade balance between 192'7 and 1932
(1929 excluded) and contributed to the growing indebtedness of the
USSR shown in Table 2.
Soviet Foreign Indebtedness J
Selected Years, 1924--38
Million Current US
Year
Amount
Year
Amount
1924
80.5
1930
394.3
1925
l09.4
1931
721.6
1926
157.3
1934
232.0
1927
201.5
1935
71.6
1928
250.0
1936
44.3
1929
317.0
1938
0
Debts had to be paid, and a favorable balance of trade was
therefore essential. All previous efforts to augment the export
capability of the USSR had met with little success in the light of
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
the adverse terms of trade on the world market and the ambitious
growth rates of the domestic Five Year Plan. The solution now
was to be found in a drastic curtailunt of Soviet imports.
The conclusion of the First Five Year Plan, the Soviet
policy of restricting imports, the improvement in its terms of
trade, and the considerable increase in gold production which be-
came available for a rapid repayment of foreign indebtedness were
factors which contributed to a marked improvement in the Soviet
balance of payments. The USSR was able to achieve an active bal-
ance of trade for every year between 1933 and 1938 and accumulated
fairly substantial foreign exchange balances, particularly in
pounds sterling.
A variety of explanations has been offered for the appar-
ent anomaly of substantial Soviet gold exports in 1937 and 1938,
primarily to the UK, with which the USSR had enjoyed a relatively
large export surplus in both years. It has been suggested that
such sales stemmed from a Soviet desire to distribute resources
among foreign financial centers where they would be available,
in the event of an emergency, for the purchase of needed arms and
supplies. A more :plausible explanation may be found, however, in
the Soviet assertion that the sum of more than $500 million in
gold transferred to the USSR for safekeeping by the Spanish Re-
publican government in October 1936 was extensively drawn upon by
the Loyalist forces, the last such drawing having been effected
on 8 August 1938. 17/
III. Gold in Intra-Soviet Bloc Settlements.
Gold is not a significant factor with respect to intra-Soviet
Bloc settlements. Because-the total cost of Soviet deliveries to
each of the Satellites in the course of a year is planned to be
equal to the sum of deliveries made by each of these countries to
the USSR, the amounts credited by Gosbank to the clearing accounts
of banks of specified countries should be equal, at the end of the
year., to the amounts which each bank credited to the clearing
account of Gosbank. In such a way the total reciprocal claims
between countries, resulting from the exchange of goods between
them, are canceled out by bookkeeping entries, without the transfer
of gold or currency. If imbalances occur in payments balances among
the Satellites, a balance is achieved by credit extension or by
subsequent goods deliveries.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
Since World War II, however, gold has been increasingly used
by the USSR as a medium of economic assistance. Evidence of this
use of Soviet gold has been tae economic aid extended to "friendly"
countries in the form of gold or of gold and foreign currency loans,
as shown in Table 3.
Table 3
Reported Soviet Gold Loans a/
Selected Years, 1947-56
Million Current US
a.. 1$
b. Estimated.
c. An undisclosed portion of this
sum was in gold and the remainder in
freely convertible currency.
Country
Year
Amount
Poland
1941
28
Czechoslovakia
1948
120 b/
Finland
1954
10
1955
10
Yugoslavia
1956
30 c/
Poland
1956
13
IV. Gold and Its Internal Uses.
A. Gold and the Ruble.
During the period of "War Communism" (1918-21) the USSR ex-
perienced a severe inflation which wiped out the major part of the
value of the old Russian currency. This period was also marked by
an attempt to build up a new economic order in which money would be
superfluous, and a special commission of the Supreme Economic Coun-
cil was appointed to substitute a labor unit of account for the
capitalist monetary unit of account. 19/ By the end of this period,
however, the value of currency had fallen to about one three-hundred-
thousandth of the 1914 value, and the regime was threatened by a
total economic collapse. 20/
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
The introduction of the New Economic Policy placed the
whole question of money and gold in a different perspective. The
IXth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, held late in 1921, instructed
the Peoples Commissariat of Finance to assume the task of "re-
storing a sound monetary system of currency on a gold basis." 21
This raised the question of gold reserves.
In 1922 the USSR introduced a new Gosbank currency called
chervonets, which represented 119.4792 grains of fine gold and was
primarily for use in large transactions. Furthermore, it was
backed by gold, other precious metals, and stable foreign cur-
rencies to the extent of 25 percent of the value of notes in cir-
culation. However, the simultaneous circulation of two types of
currency, the new type gold-backed, led to a rapid depreciation of
the several types of paper rubles in circulation. By the end of
1923, paper rubles exchanged in the free market for chervonetls
rubles in the ratio of 3,075,000,000 to 1. As a result, a mone-
tary reform in early 192+ took the old paper rubles out of circu-
lation and substituted a new treasury ruble valued at one-tenth of
1 chervonets, but not backed by gold. 22
Since 192+ there have been two types of currency in the USSR:
the banknote (chervon.ets) and the treasury note. Gosbank prints
and distributes notes in denominations of 10 or more rubles. These
are the notes for which gold bacKing is required. In addition,
treasury notes in denominations of 1, 3, and 5 rubles and coins
are issued by the Ministry of Finance. Treasury notes have no re-
serve requirements but may be issued in an amount not larger than
the banknote issue. In practice, 92 percent of the currency in
circulation in mid-1956 is reported to have been banknotes. 23
Thus it may be argued that Soviet currency is legally based
on gold, but actually it is on an inconvertible paper standard. The
ruble has not been redeemable in gold since 1926, and the export and
import of Soviet currency has been forbidden. Furthermore, the gold
reserve is not and probably never was expected to serve as an auto-
matic device for controlling the amount of credit and keeping the
domestic price level in line with that of other nations, as it does
in capitalistic countries under the gold standard. Instead, the
ruble is an entirely internal currency. Although Gosbank fixes an
exchange value for the ruble in terms of foreign currencies, this
exchange rate is merely an accounting device for calculating foreign
trade transactions denominated in foreign currency and has no bearing
- 13 -
S -E-C R -E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
on the domestic purchasing price of the ruble. Currently the
ruble is valued by a decree at 0.222168 grams of fine gold, or the
equivalent of $0.25.
The legal requirement of gold backing for banknotes, how-
ever, does represent an important use for Soviet gold reserves.
New gold production is initially purchased by the Ministry of
Finance from the gold mining industry, and sufficient gold is then
sold to Gosbank to act as backing for new banknotes added to cir-
culation. The remainder is held by the Ministry of Finance. Cur-
rency in circulation thus does not depend on the amount of gold
held by Gosbank; rather, the amount of gold held by Gosbank depends
on the amount of currency in circulation.
Since 1937, no data have been published on Soviet bank and
treasury notes in circulation. The currency in circulation in
1948, however, has been estimated on the basis of related banking
and wage data to be about 30 billion rubles. 24+ Roughly $1.5 bil-
lion of gold and foreign exchange would have been required as
backing for the banknote part of this currency.
An appreciable quantity of gold is used in the USSR in in-
dustry and in the fine arts, and a small amount is hoarded, but
these amounts are difficult to estimate.
A Soviet publication gives complete instructions for
accounting for gold used for industrial purposes. These include:
Gold as a raw material and in semifinished
products (in ingots, strips, alloys, and solder);
in laboratory and plant equipment and articles of
all kinds; in electrolytes, reagents, salts; ...
in scrap, factory wastes, cutting, filing, spatters,
slag, etc. 25/
Attention is also called in this publication to a number of types
of gold used for jewelry and dentistry. In addition, a number of
forms are given which use as examples gold articles or ;pieces for
art or industrial use weighing up to 5,000 grams. 26 It may be con-
cluded, therefore, that gold is used for a sizable variety of artis-
tic and industrial purposes, sometimes in relatively large quantities.
-14+-
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
AccQrding to two US sources (one a competent economist who
has spent a number of years in Moscow and the other an interna-
tionally recognized expert on gold), Soviet uses of gold for jew-
elry, dental, military, and government (metals) purposes probably are
as substantial or nearly as substantial as in the Free World. 27/ A
recent report, for example, indicates that genuine gold is being
used to gild St. Basil's Cathedral. 28
Gold is also apparently used for hoarding. Gold now is
sold freely in "wafersized pieces" by state stores at a price last
reported of about 90 rubles per gram (about 2,800 rubles per troy
ounce*). At the official exchange rate, this amounts to more than
$700 per ounce. 29 It is reported that gold transactions in the
Moscow black market in 1944-47 were so obvious that the government
could not have been unaware of them. 30 Although gold is osten-
sibly sold for dental purposes and perhaps for the making of jew-
elry, the free sale at a high price would indicate that a major aim
of the government is to reduce purchasing power in the hands of con-
sumers.
V. The Gold Industry.
A. History and Development.
The determined Soviet quest for adequate gold and currency
reserves led to the rapid expansion of the Soviet gold industry,
and by 1933 the USSR had become the second largest gold producer in
the world (after the Union of South Africa).** Expansion was
initiated directly by Stalin in 1927, when an All-Union trust, Giav-
zoloto (Main Administration of the Gold and Platinum Industry), was
formed under his personal supervision. 31 The timing of this drive
to expand gold production was apparently associated with the need
for gold to help pay for essential imports under the early Five Year
Plans. As a result, the gold industry had a very high priority
throughout the rest of the prewar period.
During the First Five Year Plan a number of important under-
ground gold mines in the Urals, Kazakhstan, and the Transbaykal came
into production. Increased production in the early 1930's was largely
due to these new mines.
* Ounce figures are given in troy ounces of fine gold throughout
this memorandum.
* For estimated world gold production and world gold holdings, see
Tables 5 and 6, Appendix A, p. 22, below.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
The rapid increase in gold production in the middle and late
1930's, on the other hand, was primarily due to placer mining. Part
of this increase was the result of the success of the Soviet govern-
ment in inducing a large influx of private prospectors into the gold
industry. This encouragement of private enterprise is a reflection
of the priority accorded the gold industry in this period. This in-
crease is also attributable to the operations of Dal'stroy, an or-
ganization established in 1932 under the &D to exploit the mineral
resources of Northeast Siberia with forced labor. This organization
was completely separated from Glavzoloto.
Little is known about the wartime activities of the gold in-
dustry except that it was not proscribed as was gold mining in many
other parts of the world. It is probable, however, that a large
part of the Dal'stroy gold mining labor force was transferred to
construction and other types of mining. 32 Similarly, some of the
most important mines under Glavzoloto are reported to have been
closed. 33/
The USSR had good reason not to waste its manpower and ma-
chinery on gold production during the war. Its imports consisted
almost entirely of lend-lease goods. The limit of those deliveries
was set by the capacity of the Allied convoys and of the transport
facilities through Iran. Had the USSR attempted to buy :Large amounts
of other imports, the total quantity of goods reaching it could not
have been increased. Gold production, accordingly, could have served
little purpose in fighting the war.
The gold industry in the postwar period is believed never to
have regained its prewar level of output. This is probably one reason
for the virtually complete blackout on postwar information about the
gold industry, although a state secrecy law of June 1947 may also be
a factor. There have been no announcements of great successes or
even of increases in output above the level of the previous year.
Gold production in recent years is estimated to be about one-half the
1940 level, or about 5 million ounces.
B. Production.
The USSR has released no official statistics on its gold pro-
duction in terms of quantity since 1927. Production in that year
- 16 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
amounted to 809,987 ounces, as shown in Table 4.* Estimates made by
various authorities for 1927-40 were based largely on data which gave
the percent of change in production from previous years, as released
periodically by Soviet sources. These data indicated a Soviet gold
production in the late 1930's of about 5 million to 6 million ounces
a year.
These estimates, however, were almost certainly too low
because the percentage figures on which they were based only covered
production by Glavzoloto. The very existence of another major gold
producer, Dal'stray, was a closely guarded secret at the time the
estimates were made. Only in the postwar years has information
become available on I)al'stroy's operations.
In the middle and late 1930's, however, some statements on
the size of Soviet gold production by a Soviet official should have
indicated that the estimates of 5 million to 6 million ounces were
probably low. In 1935, Serebrovskiy, the head of Glavzoloto, stated
several times that the USSR would become the largest gold producer in
the world within a period of 2 to 5 years. 34 (South African pro-
duction had amounted to 10.48 million ounces in 1934.) In March 1937,
Serebrovskiy stated that gold production in 1936 had exceeded 10.6 mil-
lion ounces. 35 It is believed that Dal'stroy's gold production is
the main reason for the difference between this figure and the esti-
mate based on percentage data. Dal'stroy's gold production is esti-
mated to have reached a'level of about 5 million ounces by 1936 and to
have continued at this level until 1941. Total Soviet gold production,
accordingly, is estimated to have been in the vicinity of 10 million
ounces a year during 1936-40.
There are a number of reasons why gold production failed to
recover after World War II. In the first place, prewar production
costs were extremely high. Average cost was reported by first-hand
observers to have been 15 rubles per gram of fine gold in 1935-36. 36
If costs in the gold industry had increased in line with the increase
in prices of other Soviet. nonferrous metals between 1936 and x.949,
when a price reform was supposed to have brought costs and prices in
line, 37 the average costs of Soviet gold production in 1949 would
have been about 60 rubles per gram. On the world market a fine gram
of gold was worth only about $1.12, or less than 6 rubles at the
official exchange rate. In the second place, the purchasing power of
Table follows on p. 18.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
I n ^ ^ 1 n ^ n w n
r-I r1 H H rH r4 r1- r4 r-1 H r-I r-I r-1 r1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
00000000000000
00000000000000
I ^ 1 . h - n n ^ ^ ^ A ^ w
N N N N N N rr (0-) cr)._i- - .:1-
P-1
rd U
Q) 0
r-I 0 C-
C\j
H N H
?r1
Cn
b
a)
W
rni~ O\ OO\\OO\\OO\\0\\OQ\OON
r-I r-I r-I r'1 r--I r-I r-1 r-I r-I r-A r-I r-H r-I
cd
a
0
El
0
r))
rI
Q
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
1 ^ ^ w
m m rn cr1 r nl ..f - _:I, Lr\ Lr\ L\ Lr\
000000000000000
p C G\ a N- O O CC 00 00 0 00 CO 00 00
r-I H r-I N in ~- lam- 0 0 0 ON r1 CO
r-I r-I r-I r-I
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
r'>NU\000000
1 ^ 1 1 n n
r-I N Lr\ Lr\ U\ Lf\ Lr\.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HQ-0000000000000
CO goo C-0 D Lr1rnMCr)COO 0
I n 1 I n h 1 n n ^ n
r-I r-1 r-I N N nr) LC U\ Lr\_:t Lr\.~
C) r-I
N a) ON 0 r-4 M M rY1 M \,O rr CO ()\
O\ O\ ON 0\\ O\ 0\ a\ C\ 0\ O\ O\ O\ 0\ O\ O\
,5-1 r-I r-I r-I r-I r-1 14 r-1 r1 H H r-1 H r-i r-I r-?
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
rn
0
?
0
n
0
n
0
^
0
n
0
h
0
n
0
n
0
0
Lr\
ral
C\I
Cl H
a-:' r_-)
CO a
r-I
0
O
a)
a) a)
10 PL,
9) u-\
Cn
O
Hv
4~0 d 0
cd rH
+m) p
N
d
-rq
rl ca Co
F~
0
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
gold in world markets has declined as a result of inflation to
roughly one-half the prewar level. As a result, gold production
in the rest of the world (excluding the Union of South Africa,
where costs are reduced because uranium is obtained as a byprod-
uct) declined by about 4+0 percent from 1938 to 1955 in spite of
the introduction of gold mining subsidies by a number of countries.
Finally, Soviet gold. reserves at the end of World War II were al-
ready so substantial. that the incentive to produce at almost any
cost had disappeared..
In the postwar years, gold production by Glavzoloto is
estimated to have increased slowly from the wartime low, partly as
the result of miners returning from the wax and partly as the result
of increasing production of gold as a byproduct in the production
of copper, lead, and zinc. Gold production by Dal'stroy, on the
other hand, is estimated to have remained at a low level as the re-
sult of the postwar emphasis in this area on uranium and other new
strategic ores, the depletion of the richest deposits, and the
various forced labor amnesties after the death of Stalin.
VI. Gold Reserves.
Since World War II the consolidation of Soviet military power,
the rapid technological development of Soviet industry, and the
creation of a Communist trading area apparently made the prewar
quest for the security of large gold and currency reserves less im-
perative. "Under present conditions," states a recent Soviet text-
book, "when the economic and political might of the Soviet Union
is undergoing a gigantic growth, when it is no longer a socialist
state surrounded by antagonistic capitalist countries, when two
parallel world markets exist, and when the countries of the peoples
democracies, friendly to the USSR, have every year a greater share
of its trade, the significance and function of currency reserves
have changed." 38
In contrast with the constant urgings for a favorable trade
balance during the formative years of the Soviet state, the USSR
today shows a strong preference for balancing imports with merchan-
dise exports. The Soviet foreign trade Journal Vneshnyaya torgovlya
states that "In trade with all countries the USSR does not strive
to sell more commodities than is necessary for the payment of its
purchases and the covering of its other foreign trade obligations." 39/
- 19 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
The relatively minor contingencies which in the past have called
forth Soviet gold sales for required convertible currencies have led
to much Free World speculation as to the rationale behind the size
of Soviet currency reserves. Apparently, in spite of its sizable
gold holdings, the USSR has been wary of augmenting its foreign cur-
rency reserves beyond a minimum predetermined to afford it the flex-
ibility and maneuverability in foreign trade which it so highly
prizes. Deep-seated suspicion of Free World intentions and lack of
confidence ir the "constant currency chaos of the capitalist world"
appear to be the major factors which inhibit any intention on the
part of the USSR to expand its foreign currency reserves, Although
it is true that the gold portion of the foreign exchange reserve is
exposed to the danger of a drop in the world price of gold, any sig-
nificant decline appears remote in view of the current US policy with
respect to gold. It is, rather, the dangers implicit in large holdings
abroad of foreign currencies -- that is, the possibilities of devalua-
tion, blocked accounts, and the like -- from which the USSR would
appear to be relatively unprotected. From this stems the constant
admonition from Soviet economists that foreign currency reserves of
the USSR must not exceed a prescribed volume consonant with maneu-
verability in foreign trade.
The absence of official returns on gold movements, the difficul-
ties of estimating Soviet gold production, and the doubtful nature of
the data on the gold reserve of Gosbank as published irregularly
before World War II, all make tenuous any estimate of the current
level of Soviet gold reserves. Estimates have suggested, however,
that the current gold reserves of the USSR total approximately $4 bil-
lion. 40
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
S -E -C -R -E -T
APPENDIX A
STATISTICAL TABLES
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
Table 5
Estimated World Gold Production a
1948 and 1950-56
Million Current US $ at US $35 per Troy Ounce of Fine Gold
Area
1948
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
Union of South
Africa
405
408
403
414
418
463
511
556
USSR
140
140
140
175
175
175
175
175
Canada
124
155
154
157
142
153
159
154
us
71
80
66
67
69
65
66
64
All other b/
45
203
24
214
220
216
209
211
World total J
785
986
967
1,027
1,024
1,072
1,120
1,160
a. Ell
b. Excluding Communist China, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,, Hungary,
Rumania, and North Korea.
Estimated World Gold Holdings
December 1956
Million Current US
us
22,058
USSR
4,000
UK
1,800
Switzerland
1,676
Canada
1,103
West Germany
1,494
Belgium
928
Netherlands
844
Th F, EPU, and - BIS aJ
1,995
All other
5,702
World total
41)600
a. International Monetary Fund, European Payments
Union, and Bank for International Settlements.
b. Excluding Communist China, Bulgaria, Czecho-
slovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and North Korea.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CARPJP9TQp935A000400340003-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
S -E -C -R -E -T
APPENDIX B
SOURCE REFERENCES
Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated
"Eval.," have the following significance:
Source of Information Information
Doc. - Documentary
A - Completely reliable
B - Usually reliable
C - Fairly reliable
D - Not usually reliable
E - Not reliable
F - Cannot be judged
1 - Confirmed by other sources
2 - Probably true
3 - Possibly true
4 - Doubtful
5 - Probably false
6 - Cannot be judged
"Documentary" refers to original documents of foreign governments
and organizations; copies or translations of such documents by a
staff officer; or information extracted from such documents by a staff
officer, all of which may carry the field evaluation "Documentary."
Evaluations' not otherwise designated are those appearing on the
cited document; those designated "RR" are by the author of this report.
No "RR" evaluation is given when the author agrees with the evaluation
on the cited document.
1. Notkin, A. Ocherki teorii sots ialisticheskdgo';vosproizvodstva
(Essays in the Theory of Socialist Reproduction), Moscow, 194b,
p. 62. U. Eval. RR 3 .?
2. Lenin, V.I. Selected Works, vol 9, New York, 1943, p. 299.
U. Eval. RR 2.
3. Smirnov, A.M. Mezhdunarodnyye raschety i kreditnyye otno-
sheniya vo yneshney torgoyle SSSR (International Accounts and
Credit Relations in the Foreign Trade of the USSR), Moscow,
1953, p ? 95 ? U U. Eval. RR 2.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
1.. Smirnov, A.M., and Lyubimov, N.N. Vneshn a a torgovlya SSSR
29ign Trade of the USSR), Moscow, 1954, p. 18, 102. U.
'DD n
6.
7. Ibid.
8. The Times, London, 5 Max 57. U. Eval. RR 3.
9. CIA. FDD Translation no 636, Supplement to 1956 Hungarian
Statistical Handbook: Important Data on the Period Oct-Dec
1956, 26 Apr 57, p. 27. OFF USE. 'val. RR 2.
10. The Times, London, 11+ May 57. U. Eval. RR 2.
2 5 May 57 . U. Eval. RR 2.
11. Bank for International Settlements. Press Review, no 69,
8 Apr 57, p. 2. U. Eval. RR 2.
12. Bakulin, S., and Mishustin, D. Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR za
20 let, 1918-1937 (Foreign Trade of the USSR for 20 Years,
1918-37), Moscow, 1939. U. Eval. RR 2.
13. Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Research Memorandum, Soviet
Gold Reserves and Production, 27 Nov 53. C. Eval. RR 3.
11+ KPSSSR v resol tsiyakh i reshen.iyakh s"yezdov, konferentsiy
i plenumov (CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions of the Con-
gresses, Conferences, and Plenary Sessions of the Central
Committee), pt 1, Moscow, 1951+, p. 309. U. Eva:L. RR 2.
15. Ib id . , p. 456. u. Eval. RR 2.
16. Baykov, A. Soviet Foreign Trade, Princeton, 191+6, p. 50. U.
Eval. RR 2.
Prokopovicz, S.N. (edr). Quarterly Bulletin of Soviet-Russian
Economics, no 3, Jan 1+0, p. 75. U. Eval. RR 3.
17. Pravda, 5 Apr 57. U. Eval. RR 2.
18. CIA. CIA/RR IM-1+33, Soviet Economic Assistance to the Sino
Soviet Bloc, 20 Aug 5 . S NOFORN.
NIS 2 , USSR, sec 65, chap 6, Jan 57. S.
19. Arnold, A.Z. Banks, Credit, and Money in Soviet Russia, New
York, 1937, p. 107-110. U. Eval. RR 2.
20. Livshits, F.D. Bankovskaya statistika (Banking Statistics),
Moscow, 191+8, p. 3b4. U. Eval. RR 2.
21. Yurovskiy, L.N. Currency Problems and Policy of the Soviet
Union, London, 1925, p. 2. U. Eval. RR 1.
22. Arnold, op. cit. (19, above), p. 11+6-171+. U. Eva1. RR 1.
- 21+ -
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
25X1A5a1
25X9A1
24. Holzman, F.D. Soviet Taxation, Cambridge, 1955. U. Eval. xx J.
25. CIA. FDD. U-6432, 1 Sep 54, Accounting or t'recious Mecais in
Industrial Enterprises. U. Eval. RR 2.
26. p. 7. U. Eval. RR 2.
27.
28. New York Times, 7 Mar 54. U. Eval. ER 2.
29.
30.
31. Serebrovskiy, A.P. Na zolotom fronte (On the Gold Front), Mos-
cow, 1936, p. 227. U. Eval. RR 2.
32. International Monetary Fund Staff Memorandum, no 385, 3 Aug
49, Estimates of Soviet Gold Production, p. 10. C. Eval. RR 2.
33. Army, FEC. No 3 1 5, 7 Apr 149. S. Eval. RR 2.
Army, 7707 ECIC. RT-587-51, 28 Jun 51. S. Eval. RR 2.
34. Za industrializatsi , 1 May 35, p. 1. U. Eval. RR 3.
Ibid., 2 Nov 35, p. I. U. Eval. RR 3.
Ibid., 12 Dec 35, p. 3. U. Eval. RR 3.
35. Business Week, 13 Mar 37. U. Eval. RR 3.
36. CIA. OCI, Intelligence Digest, no 251824, nd. S. Eval. RR 2.
37.
38. Smirnov and Lyubimov, oa. Lit. (4, above), p. 101. U. Eval.
RR 2.
39. Z&XSA. a a for ovlya, no 4, 1952, p. 4. U. Eval. RR 2.
40.
41. International Monetary Fund. International Financial Statistics,
Jun 57, p. 21. U. Eval. RR 2.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1
S-E-C-R-E-T
NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS
NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000400340003-1