THE ISRAELI-SYRIAN CRISIS

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00937A000100010043-3
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 9, 2002
Sequence Number: 
43
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 11, 1951
Content Type: 
MEMO
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00937A000100010043-3.pdf172.21 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2006/11/11: CIA-RDP79T00937AO00100010043-3 4 ~l JEL CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESMUTES 11 April 1951 E RAND 5$ OF INF 7ATIWQ NO L.">CUMENT NO. 5 M . NCB CHANGE IN CLASS. C) National Estimates Boexd CL DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: NEXT REVIEW DATE: TS S C SB $ The Israeli.Syriau Crisis AUTH: HR 70-2 DATE; F LREVIEWER: It is uv1ila a:ly that the cu rjrent Hialeah incident involving az'ssed clashes between Israel and Syria . will doerelap Into mNlor hostilities between the two countries, although further isolated clashes along the border will, probably occur before the tense situation is brought under control. The incident, does, however, re? hasiae that fact that almost no progress has been made in improving Israeli-Arab relations in the two years since Israel eoreluded armistice agree ants with its four Arab neighbors. 'Under the iaau=r'able pressure of a ra;spid],y expnndiug population, Israel continues to adopt policies which, however progres- sive and worthy in th.selves, have the effect of dispossessing large groups of local Arabs. The latter inevitably turn for protection to the neighboring Arab governments which, because of the pressures of anti rZionimm flare compelled to comae to their .aid. The Ruleh incident is not unique; similar clashes have occurred repeatedly during the past two years, particularly in the yerusalenm, Hebron, and Gat areas. It is of particular interest, hOwwever, not only because it is more serious than. the others but because it epitomises the entire Palestine problem. The fundm ie tall issues in this incident, as well as the tactics employed by Israelis and Arabs, are almost identi- ca]. to the issues and tactics of the Palestine War in 1948. F ui thea%- more, the Security Council, to which the issue has already been referred by both Israel and Syria, and the UN-directed Mixed Armisties Coosd.s- sion (MAC) in the area are ones again confronted with the thankless task of, in theory, mediating the issue and, in practice, perouadin Syria to accept as gracefully as possible what in any event Israel is determined to carry out -4? in this case, the reclamation project in the demilitarized sons south of Lake Ruleh. The present incident had its origin about two months ago when Israel started work on a reclamation scheme in the area south of Lake Huleh near the Syrian border. Although the area affected is in Israeli territory, it is inhabited by Arabs. Furthermore, as it is a demilitarized Approved For Release 2006/11/11: CIA-RDP79T00937A000100010043-3 .Approved For Release 2006/11/11: CIA-RDP79T00937AO00100010043-3 .0 1 zone under the Israeli.Syrian Armistice and its ultimate disposition is theoretically still in doubt, no unusual activity, is permitted therein except by agreement between the two countries. The reclamation work was, therefore, strongly opposed not only by the local Arabs, whose land it immediately affected, but also by the Syrians, who asserted that Israel was violating the Armistice agreement* About a mmth ago local Arabs began sporadically to shoot from the Syrian side of the border at the Israeli reclamation workers in the Ihtleh area, The Israelis soon returned the fire with both rifles and mortars and continued their work. In spite of the local tension, the two governments appeared to be showing considerable restraint and it was generally expected that the MAC would be able to bring the situation under control, However, Israel refused to accede to the MAC request that it tearaporari]y suspend work an the drainage scheme, and shortly thereafter the situation was exacerbated by Israel's action in rounding up all the local Arabs and removing them fry the area, At this stage in d is Syria was at least morally strong position? Israol had not only vi violated the Aamisti ! In a ce agreement but had also defied a specific injunction of the MAC? Howe ver, Syria undermined its own position by permitting Syrian Arabs to occur Arab village of El Hemma within the Israeli demilitaz'ized cone? A the groM of Israelis armed with automatic weapons subsequently tried to occupy El Hama and fired on both the Arabs in the village end at a nearby border post within Syrian troops territory, The Syrian troops ops eventually returned the fire, killed seven Israelis, wounded another, and captured one.. The following day, eight Israeli aircraft bombed -and strafed El I3amma and police and army posts in Syrian territory, Israeli forces also completely destroyed two other Arab villages in the Israeli demilitarized zone; the Arab inhabitants of the villages had in the meantime fled to Syrian territory, Israelis, Syrian, and even Jordan forces have been concentrated in the areas and Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan have indicated they win wipport Syria against further Israeli aggression, it is unl,ikerly, however that Israel will be willing at this time to re-embark on fullecale war with its neighbors. The most probable development is that Israel, will agree temporarily to suspend its reclamation work and that an attemspt will be made to mediate the Issue in the MAC. }Iowever-, unless Syria can be persuaded to acquiesce in Israeles.reclamation plans, fut hostili- ties are inevitable, for Israel will certainly refuse to abandon them. If a compromise is reached, it will probably be an the basis of adequate compensation to the local Arabs whose interests in the issue are the ones most directly affected, '2.. 4WREW Approved For Release 2006/11/11 : CIA-RDP79T00937A000100010043-3