REVISION SUGGESTED BY (Classified)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00937A000200010031-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2000
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: September 29, 1952
• Content Type: MEMO

'proved For Release 2000/0
-SHOPM
SECURITY INFORMATION
CENT R AL IN IGENeE
~ NT NO. `
~IAT~~WASS. [I
U J DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S ?
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AIJTH: HR 70-2
DATE:IZC. REVIEWER: 019360
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
29 September 1952
STAFF MEMORAND1JM NO. 275
SUBJECT: Revision suggested by
NOTE s Since I may be away when S M No, 275 is discusseds
and since I favor drastic revision of the Memo, I
venture to suggest the following revisiono I feel
very strongly that the present paragraph 3 should not
be includede
SUGGESTED DRAFT
to The author of this paper reaches the conclusion that
while Soviet Russia is "plarming a warn, the Kremlin will
probably not deliberately precipitate general war during the
next decade if the Western powers preserve a firm policy and
adequate defenses The author believes that an outbreak of
major conflict during this period is unlikely, and he indicates
that, consequently, the tempo of Western rearmament should be
set with more concern for the longterm economic stability of
the West4
2? We agree that the Kremlin probably will not deliberately
initiate general war in the near future, though we are unable to
extend this estimate to cover a decade We believe, however, that
DOCUMENT NQ. i9 continuing danger of general war result
r-1 ,--. ._:' " .... DOCtlM N
 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00937A000200010031-6
CONFIDENTIAL
S
Kremlin action or series of actions not intended to have that
result, or from actions which, in the Kremlines view, entail the
risk but not the certainty of war, 'e cannot agree that general
war is improbable simply because the Kremlin is unlikely deliberately
to initiate ito
3o With respect to the correct tempo of Western rearmament
we would observe that the Kremlin has open to it many aggressive
courses of action short of a deliberate initiation of general warn
We believe that the Kremlin?s decision to adopts or not to adopts,
an aggressive course of action will be influenced and possibly
determined by the degree of military readiness of the West. Hence
the tempo of Western rearmament cannot be made to depend, wholly
on an estimate of Kremlin intentions respecting general Ware
Approved For Release 2000/0AO D M1`a0200010031-6