PRESENT STATUS OF KASHMIR DISPUTE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00937A000200010047-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 16, 2000
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: August 26, 1952
• Content Type: MEMO

approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00937A000200010047-9
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SLCU FZITY IN L~ ORWLTION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGrNCY
ONCE OF NATIO!IAL ES7113ATFS
26 Ault 1952
STIFF riEiOR.AND1sM No. 265
SUBJECT: Present Status of Kashmir Dispute
L Cabinet ministers from India and Pakistan began meeting
in Geneva an 25 August with Dr. Frank Graham, UN Mediator for Kashmir,
in an attempt to resolve the remaining una reed points in the
program for demilitarization of Kasl'i>:1ir. The outstanding points
of disagreement are the quantum of forces to remain on either side
of the cease-fire line and the identity of the forces allowed to
make up this number.
2. Demilitarization is a necessary prelude to the conduct
of a plebiscite under UPS auspices, which both parties have accepted
in principled The outcome of the Geneva meetings, hoer, will be
conditioned less by strictly military problems than by India's estimate
of the outcome of a plebiscite.
3. The Indian government has been dragging l's feet on the
demilitarization issue largely because of its conviction that a
free plebiscite would result in accession of the entire area to
Pakistan. With the exception of part of the province of Jammu,, the
population of the area is predominantly Moslem. Me ile, Kashmir's
Prime 2.W ster Sheikh Abdullah sho is believed to fear that Pakistani
control over the area would destroy his political position--has pushed
through a radical land reform policy and has supported the abolition
of the Ilthdu monarchy, steps thich in time may give him the power
to persuade the Moslem Kashmiris to vote for joining their state to
India, However, despite the recent agreement between Nehru and Abdullah,
there is no reason to believe that the Indian Government is yet convinced
that Abdullah: (a) has consolidated his political position sufficiently
to be able to obtain a vote for India; or (b) can be trusted to use his
influence to gain a vote for joining India rather than to seek to achieve
Kaahmiri independence.
DQC ENT NO.
N HANGE IN CLASS. !
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70.2
DATE: REIIIEWER?
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 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00937A000200010047-9
ba AL. :he Geneva talks pence, thereforef India probably still
behaves that it would run a serious rink of losing the entire area in
an early plebiaciteo It is bable, therefor, that India will again
attempt to stall in negotiations on demilitarization on the assumption
that as>3r atop in the direction of agreeusgt with Pakistan would weakes
India's present position in Kastnnir0
54 On the other handy India would find it most difficult to
justify its reZaeal to accept the generous Pakistani oonoessions on
the demilitarization issue, either before world opinion or in the UN
Seatuarity Cou100i10 Norm warp the Indian goner t =at realitse that
failure of the Geneva talks will Increase the risk that Pakistan will
atte to exi:ell Ind a from Kashmir 1q force.. Thus, there is a slip
possibilit7 that India will agree to demilitarizAtion at the thzeve
meeting in the be&ief that subsequent negotiations on the terms of the
paeblaoite can be prolonged long enau& to Improve the chanaea of a
favorable vote for India4 India may also hope that negotiations on
the plebiscite would lead to some other solution such as partition of
the area, Whether or not India agrees on demmilitarizatiot at Genevan
the Kashmir dispute would remain far from settlement..
25X1A9a
Yaterial for this memorandum was prepared I 25X1 A9a
Approved For Release 2000/08/29: CIA-RDP79T00937A000200010047-9