CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN SOUTH KOREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00937A000200010054-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 16, 2000
• Sequence Number: 54
• Publication Date: July 23, 1952
• Content Type: MEMO

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SECURITY INFORUNTION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
.OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIUNTES
23 July 192
STAFF UEUORANDULT NO* 259
SUBJECTs Current Political Situation in South Korea
10 President SyngmanRhee has won an almost complete victory in
his long and recently acute struggle for power with the in
the National Assembly, On 4 July the National Assembly., subjected to
intimidation and other forms of severe pressure from Rhea and the group
around him? and no longer hopeful of strong US.UN intervention to retain
constitutional procedures, adopted a noonpromisen constitutional amend.
mento The amendment includes Rhee's principal demands .. for popular
%moo' election of the President (thus assuring Rhea's re.election) and the
formation of a bicameral Assembly,,Y The new provisions allowing the
Assembly to overthrow the Cabinet by a,vote of non-confidence and re.
quiring the Prima Uinister's approvelg/ of ariappointnents to the
Cabinet are adbiguous and are unlikely to increase the power of the
Assembly*
keel
1./
El-
ections for the President and Vice President ewl for members of
the new "uppers' house are expected in mid.Augusto The present
Assenblymen will constitute the Hloweehouse. Their term expires
in 1956
3/ The Constitution has always required Assembly approval of the
President's designee for Prime Master, Constitutionally, however,
all executive powers mere vested in the President and then:rime
Minister" was .. and remains .. nothing more than the President's
Chief adninistrator*
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20 Met nonmithee elements have accepted the "compromises
resolution -of the political crisis as the best way out under the
circumstance* The opposition in the AseeMbly, although now rem
covering somewhat frmn ite recent experiences, has neither the
strength nor the will to create serious difficulties for Rhee in
the next few months,
30 The opposition and political neutram are new concentrating
on Ti FtnSok, Ramos Home lanister* Ti is distrusted in all Korean
political circles and is regarded as being primarilerresponsible for
the recent intimidation of the Assembly.
4* For the immediate future, political stability in South
Korea will be most influenced by the outcome of a developing
struggle for power among the Rhee group, Ti PonrSok is attempting
to run for VicemPresident in the forthcoming election* In view of
Rheees age and physical condition, Ti would almost certainlerbem
come acting President* before his hmyear term was over, This
would permit him to consolidate his control over South Korea, with
a consequent loss in popular support for the government, in combat
effectiveness of the armed forces, and in progress toward economic
development and constitutional government,
50 nes present entrenched position and his pretensions to
power apparently have given Rhee considerable concern, On 16 July
Rhea reportedly gave Ti a severe tonguemlashing?bofore the Assembled
Cabinet, making it plaint* Ti that Rhea, alone, was running South
Korea* On previous occasions Ti has bemused to undertake specific
political assignmerrbs for Rhee and then has been removed from the
government, If Rhee is again able to remove Ti from the government
and retains Chang Tack Sang or appoints another effective Prima
Uinistor, following the election, the prospects for a More efficient
and stable adminiatration of South Korea will be reasonably good* .
However, Rheees chances, even if he so wished, of being able to rid
himself of Ti and returning to a policy of moderation appear about
even*
WroStISTMSEETrI?tre""fficemPresident does net actually succeed
to the presidency in the event of the death or incapacity of the
incumbent President, The VicemPresident curries out the President's
functions until a new election can be held, in practice, hoWever,
Ti would probably be able to "act" until the end of the term or call
an election under conditions assuring his return to office,
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6, The foregoing discussion has been based on the assumption,
almost universal in Korea, that Rhee will be mg...elected President.
However, there have been recent indications that Rhee is depressed
about his health and is seriously considering retirement. If Rhee
should retire, another political crisis gill almost certainly
develop; the i PomoSok group will attempt to gain contra of
South Korea, arid bill probably succeed,
'no
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