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December 9, 2016
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July 12, 2000
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July 8, 1952
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Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00937A000200010060-4 qmwwlkb SECURITY. I ORMATION plants available. 8 July 1952 STAID" !4 MORANWM NO. 254 SUBJECT; The Yalu Bombings I. On 23 June the four principal hydroelectric systems of North Korea (Suiho, Kyosen, Chosens and Flasen) were attacked by 342 UN fighter-bombers. These raids, together with follow-up attacks, knocked out an estimated 90 percent of North Korea; a s former power capacity. (See Annex for detailed evaluation of damage inflicted.) 2. Power for North Korea must not be supplied by one insig- nificant hydroelectric plant and several small Independent thermal plants. Pyongyang radio broadcasts have been sporadic since the bomlbi.nge, and it is probable that oomzminlc tion facilities as well as most mining and industrial activities in North Korea have boon seriously affected by the almost complete power blackout. 3. The effect of the bombings upon Manchurian industry is even more serious, since there was already a power shortage in Manchurian Dairen and Port Arthur,, with some of the largest indus- trial plants in China, have been obtaining powerr from the Suiho plant since the power plant at Dairen was dismantled and ret~ved to the USSR. Mukden, Antung, and Anshan also probably received some power from Suiho o !;w The damage probably does not directly affect the USSR's power supply in the Par, Eft, since there are probably no mjor power lines in existence between North Korea and Vladivostok. Coimnnist operation of the airfield at Antung will probably not be materially affected, for the field has two or three stand-by power *USAF Declass/Release Instructions On File* CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY c F'ICE OF NATIONAL ESTI TES DOCUMENT NO . .... ......... ........ ......_......._.,......, CIA HAS DETERMINED THAT THIS DOCUMENT MAY BE DECLASSIFIED SUBJECT TO REVIEW BY: .................. _...........r....~.. Al! ~ORITY: HR 70-2 AUTRevl"ELro~F~pr F~~~a/08/29 : CIA-Rd ;Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00937A000200010060-4 S. The Failure of the Communist Air Forces to React 5* There is no agreed explanation of the failure of the Communists to offer air opposition to the UK attacks. Possible explanations in the order of probability, are: ae The raids escaped detection and co: ova The tact that the rig abers cme at low altitude and struck fifteen targets simultaneously lends come credence to this vies. b. The en is conservin his aircraft fora future o 1Ve o recent rease e er a sorties-Mown by the CCAF from the already low level of the first half of the year may indicate that the Correau:1sts are &ttanpting to bring their aircraft to a high state of readiness and,, at the same time,, to conserve their fuel stockpiles. The CCAF may have rei wined uncommitted in order to maintain this high state of preparedness and to save aircraft from possible loss. a. The raid caught the Communists in the midst of a a Bing opera onn e corimunlef ands a s can Manchuria mast' have been awned by fledgling Chinese and/or Soviet pilots newly moved into the area. The risk of large-scale loss may have kept the air force on the ground. do The reement believed signed bV Peiping and Moscow ' ~ or a a. r assistance fom- n s ve ran out in erar 1952. - would explain the sharp decline In _0amnRuaist air opposition since the first of the year. ec The CCAF was uninstructed fbr such an emergency and oou no e the UfftW17-e 031 er au o es. This s regar a as o able Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00937A000200010060-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00937A000200010060-4 nt ng were dummies. This a f o The 200 "plants" Been at ? fed as almostce C. ? Communist Reactions 6. North Korean reaction was it>nnediate. While avoiding direct reference to the Yalu bombings, General Nam Ii clearly` had then in mind when he angri3y denounced the US at Panmunjom the day following the raid, stating that US operations "outside the conference tent" were an act of provocation. Nan U'e added statement that such acts could not force a change in the Communist position at the armistice talks huLe seta pattern for Comir nisi propaganda reaction. 7. P e i p i n g I s reaction to the bombings has been angVY and intense,, suggesting that Cona'a ,st China was hard hit b r this sudden loss of power. After an initial fog-day period of Ignoring the bombing, Chinese Communist broadcasts have since discussed the raids at great length; pointing out that the Americana, having been defeated in Korea, have taken a number of steps (e.g., germ warfare, PCM atrotc- ities, etc.) designed to wreck the negotiations and undermine peace in Asia and that the Yalu raids are only the latest step in this ,series. Peiping evidently intends to make the taalu bombings another cause celebre, since it is already organizing "maaas protests." There have been no implied threats of retaliation; Peiping has thus far stated only that the Communists cannot be coerced and that US crimes will not go unpunished. 8. Moscow first mentioned the attacks three days after they occurred in a Home Service radio broadcast which stated that "a power station" on the Yalu had been bombed,, and that a hospital near- bsr had also been hit. Subsequent Moscow broadcasts have thus far been merely news items reports and have all played drawn the signifi- cance both of the plaints and the bombings* The Soviet press has confined itself to reprinting non-Comuniat reactions throughout the world which were critical of the bombings The USSR has not mentioned the Yalu bombings at the UN Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00937A000200010060-4 , ,Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00937A000200010060-4 D. Non-Communist Reactions since the Bombings 9. Non-Communist opinion has varied concerning the wisdom of the bombings and whether or not they were ezecuted within existing UN policy in Korea. However, there has been general criticism of the US for not consulting other powers before taking action which might expand the Far Eastern war. This latter criticism has been voiced by Eden, Nehru, and Yoshida. X E.. Probable Consequences of the Yalu Bombings r+rsrr~ws w erwr nn..-w.. 10, These raids will seriously curtail industry in North Korea and Manchuria, and will, at least temporarily, directly affect Commu- nist military capabilities in Korea. 110 The bombings will probably not, in themselves, lead to a CCAF retaliatory offensive, or seriously alter existing Communist military plans for Korea. 12a Communist propaganda will continue its program of linking the Yalu bombings to germ warfare and other US "atrocities," and will attempt to exploit widespread non-Communist uneasiness over the alleged US proclivity to act unilaterally. 13. The effect of the Yalu bombing upon the armistice talks is difficult to assesses The success of the raids may have increased US bargaining pressure, but this may have been somewhat offset by the added rift the Yalu incident has brought in US relations with the non-Communist world. The net effect,, therefore, may be small, and existing Communist policies vis-a-vis an armistice ieay not be radically changed as a result alone of the Yalu raids. 25X1A9a Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00937A000200010060-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00937A000200010060-4 USAF AND USN ,,VALUATIONS OF DAMAGE INFLICTED ON ELECTRIC PCB GENERATING INSTAI,IATIONS IN NORTH KO3EA (25 JUNE) 1, SUIHO USAF: power plant appears to be out of operation; 2 large transformers and, generating plant demolished; consid- erable damage inflicted to transformer switch yards; approximately 50 bomb craters in immediate vicinity, of plant. USAF: 2 penstocks, transformers, and switchyard damaged; 308 object believed to be turbine blown from power house into river; 3 anti-aircraft artillery (AA) positions damaged. USNt unserviceable, 60% destroyed; turbine building 30 structural damage; transformer and switching equipment destroyed; major damage to switch yard, penstock, and other damage obscured py smoke. No n 2 USAF major damage to transformer; control house damaged; power house damaged; 2 hits on turbine building; switch house destroyed; hits on high voltage lines; direct hits on penstocks causing heavy flow of water; surge tank damaged 6 gun positions silenced, USN-. control house gutted with 30% structural damage; tur- bine building probably 25% superficial damage with possible minor damage to turbines; minor damage to 1 penstock; probably 75% damage to transformer and switch yard. No. 3 USAF: power house believed destroyed; major damage to trans- former; firee in switch yard; 2 penstocks broken; Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00937A000200010060-4 SECRET ,,,,,Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00937A000200010060-4 sEci r major damage to control house; AA positions in area strafed, damage unknown. USN: unserviceable with turbine building 60% destroyed; estimate major damage to all turbines; control build- ing gutted with 50% structural damage; transformer and switch yard destroyed; 911 penstocks damaged. No. 4 USAF: transformers and electrical gallery destroyed; pen- stock and power house damaged; unknown damage to kA positions. USN: 75% destruction; turbine building gutted with 75% structural damage; probable major damage to turbine units; 20% structural and 100% superficial damge to control house; transformer and switching group par- tially destroyed; 2 penstocks cut. 3. CHOSEN USAF; 1 power house possibly destroyed; 1 automatic weap:na (AW) position possibly destroyed; 1 transformer damaged. U5N: no apparent damage to pow o~-P house; 1 penstock cut; light dsmutge to transformer and switch yard. No. 2 USAF: 7 hits on power house; 2 building: destroyed; 1 trans- former damaged. USM: power house slight exterior damage; interior damage by fire, extent undetermined; 2 penstocks cut; slight damage to transformer and switch yard. No a 3 USAF: 1 surge tank destroyed; 1 power house destroyed; fires in switch yard and transformer area; 2 sluice gates broken; I pumping station damaged; 10 direct hits on power plant and 2 direct hits on generator building, USN; power house major damage; penstocks transformer,, and switch yard destroyed. Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : IDP79T00937A000200010060-4 ,.Approved For Release 2000/08/29ttRDP79T00937A000200010060-4 !Lo 4 U8k : generator house cohpletely destroyed; 50% destruction to transformer yard; minor damage-to buildings of the. northwest generator house; 2 buildings destroyed and 1 buildings sustAlined superficial damage in the hous. ing area'of the east generator house; 1 power plant destroyed USN: power house and transformer destroyed,,-'switch yard damaged; peri'stocks damaged. US F: power house destroyed; major damage to transformer yard;: 3 penstocks dutb USN: turbine t1id.1ding destroyed; probable major damage to turbine -equipment; control building probable super tidial:damage from near misses; transformer and switch- ing equipment 75% destroyed,. Igo -.2 USAF: unknown damage to penstocks; power house. roof caged in; transformer yard destroyed; 9 AW positions silenced. USN: turbine building and control house and transformer destroyed; probable major damage to turbines.; 50 structural, damage to spillway building adjacent to plant. Noe 3 USAF: transformer yard appear destroyed; 1 power plant re- ported destroyed,, USN inoperative; control building gutted; 30% structural damage; transformer and switching equipment all prob- ably destroyed; penstocks damaged0 too,4 USAF:, superficial, damage to the generator building but no .apparent structural. damage; other buildings showed considerable structural damage; 2'. direct hits on power plant. USM: heavy damage with-smoke preventing assessment. Approved For Release 2000/08/ A-RDP79T00937A000200010060-4