CONSEQUENCES OF A UN MILITARY TAKE-OVER THE SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00937A000200010065-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2012
• Sequence Number: 65
• Publication Date: July 3, 1952
• Content Type: MEMO

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SECURITY INFOR"I TION
C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
3 July 1952
STAFF TTEM,'iORAND1JM NO. 249
SUBJECT: Consecmencea of a UN Military Take-Over the South
Korean Government
T. CONDITIONS INFLUENCING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE UN ACTION
1o The manner in which a UN take-over of South Korea is
accomplished will have a very important effect on the consequences
of such UN action, If the UN take-over is accomplished peacefully
and has the prior approval of key UN participating countries,
prospects for obtaining domestic and international support for
the UN move will be good. If the take-over is to be accomplished
in such a manner, however, strict secrecy will have to be maintained
until the very moment of UN action; any leak would provide the 1?aee
forces with an opportunity to mobilize its "people's representatives,"
Youth Corps elements, and strong-arm groups to demonstrate and
perhaps physically interfere with the implementation of UN martial
lawn
2. The effectiveness of the UN Justification accompanying
and immediately following the take-over, will also be an important
element conditioning domestic and international reaction to the UN
move The most effective explanations will be those emphasizing
the necessity of protecting the security of UN forces in Korea and
the decision of the UN to safeguard the constitution of a UN.created
government.
DOCUMENT Nd.
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QATE. REVIEWER
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3o The manner of implementation of the UN take-over will
also have an important bearing on the consequences of the UN move,
The following measures mill probably be necessary if the takeover
is to be successfully accomplished;
(a) Use of both UN and ROK troops to enforce security
and martial law,
(b) The earliest possible restoration of democratic
processes,, in particularly providing the National
Assembly freedom to meet without interference
and releasing arrested (Assemblymen,
II. CONSEMENCES IN SOUTH KOREA
1 Assembly actions during the spring of 1952 have
demonstrated sufficient Rhee opposition to elect a new President0
The current conflict has increased the hostility towards Rhee and
there is little doubt that,, once the UN shoved its intention to
protect the Assembly,, Rhee would be voted out0 The Assembly would
probably proceed to elect a member of the present opposition as
President, The Assembly's candidate might be Chang I-Von (former
Premier and Ambassador to the US), Chang Taek Song; (present Premier)
or Shin Ikhi (present chairman of the Assembly), The Assembly might
also pass a constitutional amendment providing for a parliamentary form
of government.
50 Factionalism on old and new issues would continue within the
Assembly and the establishment of a parliamentary form of government
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might disturb continuity of administr Lion. However, many of Korea's
more able administrators would probably return tt o the government and
the present corrupt clique headed by Vi Bum Sub; and Louise Im would
probably be replaced,, On balance, the MK Govornmont's administrative
efficiency would not deteriorate below Its present level and might
gradually improve.
6,, Rhea elements would not succeed "in rallying significant
support against the take-over, and a new administration with interim
TIN support would be able to check countermoves by the Rhea forces.
(a) Rhea's support in the Assemibly largely results from
intimidation. His organized popular following, which
at times is made to appear formidable, is largely the
product of his. govern :nt powers. Although his name
is wall-known in the provinces, he can only elicit
popular response so long as he maintains his present
provincial officials and the national police. Without
government support, the large pro+R'hoe orgsmi_zations
appear to be too undisciplined and factions], to
serve as effective and reliable inst.- ments for a
Rhoe countermove. fibeets greatest effective strength
comas from his control of'the national pollee, the
military police, military elements not under UN
command, and various terroist and "strong arm." groups.
(b) The opposition has a majority in the Assembly, end
many cabinet members probably are opposed to Rhea's
recent actions. Fthee has alienated most of the
professional, intellectual, student, business, and
political groups outside his small clique of supporters.
There have been several reliable indications that the
three m ilitntry chiefs of staff and their subordinate
officers wou11d support action to restore constitutional
processes in the -Interests of maintaining the integrity
of the armed forces. hus, if the Assembly elected
a new President, and UN forces supported his take-over,
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the Democratic Nationalist Party (the major political
party now in opposition to the Rhee government) would
retain control over the armed forces and would have
little difficulty in reorientating the police and
the provincial governments. Adverse popular reaction
would be negligible and the government would have
a broader base of support among the conservative
f'ctions'which dominote South Korean political,
economic, and intellectual life.
7, The ROK armed forces would cooperate in the UN action and
their morale would l,e maintained, if not improved. There now exists
strong sentiment against the Rhee clique among most military leadore
(See Tab). In addition, there are indications that Rhee maneuvers,
which tend to involve the Department of National Defense in politics,
is having an adverse effect on the morale of ROK combat troops.
Most ROK officers respect their US counter-parts and would probably
support a UN move to restore constitutional government in Pusan.
III. INT N ac iAL ;1 AC "ONS
A. Communist Bloc
8. We do not believe that the UN take-over of South Korea would
result in significant Communist military reactions, unleses as seems
unlilcely,, the ROK forces actively interfered with the imposition of
UN martial lcr. In such an event, Communists would probably exploit
this opportunity by taking the offensive,
9. The Communists would probably continue their stalling tactics
in Panmunjom until the success or failure of the UN action became
clear. If the UN initiative resulted.in a weakened UN military and/or
political position, Coammmist pressure would probably be exerted in
an effort to gain an armistice on more fnvorable terms than the UN
is presently offering.
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10. Communist propar-anda would attempt to exploit Korean
nationalism in an effort to turn South Korean popular sentiment against
the UN. Communist propaFcanda would also attempt to exploit any
differences which developed among UN members over the implementation
of the UN take-over,
B. Non-Communist Arens
ll. Except perhaps for Nationalist China., Rhce's regime has
little prestige and support in the non-Communist world. If, there..
fore, a take-over were accomplished under optimum conditions of
timing, concerted UN approval and participation.. UN justification
of the action taken, and successful follow-up (including the most
respectful treatment of Rhee), non-Communist world reaction would
probably be favorable. Reactions would probably be most favorable
among the governments of Japan and Western Europe. Although there might
be some tongue-in-cheek criticism of such "drastic" action, the UN
action would probably also be supported by neutralist governments
in Asia,, and by neutralist p-rliamentary and popular opinion in
1Jestern Europe,
12. If the UN initiative were carried oit under less than
optimum cond z tions, reactions in Western Europe and Japan would probably
still be largely favorable. Neutralist elements in Asia and Europe
would probably be critical of such action, but this criticism would
probably not be sufficient to affect adversely existing US relations
with any states of the non-Communist world,
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BACKGROUND OF THE KOREAN CRISIS
1. On 25 May martial law was imposed in Pusan and other areas
of the Republic of Korea. President Syngman Rhee has stated that
the purpose of the martial law was to protect the government and
UN forces from the threat of guerrilla activity (which has recently
increased to some extent) and/or to protect the government from ahuge "communist plot" centered in the National Assembly. In fact,
however., the declaration of martial law was an outgrowth of several
months of deteriorating relations between Rhee and the National
Assembly as a consequence of the Assembly's refusing to pass Rhee-
sponsored constitutional amendments which were designed to streng-
then the Executive Branch at the expense of the Assembly. Presi-
dential elections were scheduled for late June or early July and
the most important of Rheels amendments was one that would take
the power to elect the President out of the Assembly (where Rhee
opposition forces have become a majority) and replace it by popular
election (in which Rhee's local political machines could deliver
the election to him),,'
2. The imposition of martial law was quickly followed by the
arrest and/or intimidation of opposition Assembly men with the ob-
ject of preventing the Assembly from achieving a quorum. Later,
Rhee, by pressure tactics, managed to obtain Assembly passage of
an unconstitutional measure extending his tenure indefinitely. On
the basis of claims of corruption and subversion in the Assembly
(a claim denied by all UN and US officials in Korea) and of wide-
spread popular demands (the US Embassy has reported that the so-
called "will of the people" on this issue has been entirely manu-
factured by Home Minister Ti Bum SukQs political organizations),
Rhee has declared that he will dissolve the Assembly. Although
such a move would be entirely. unconstitutional, although official
protests from the US (including a personal letter from President
Truman) and other UN nations have been made, and although efforts
.are still being made by the US Ambassador and the ROK Prime Minister
to effect a compromise, Rhea appears to be determined to undertake
this action regardless of the consequences. Tight censorship has
been imposed in South Korea, but news of developments in Pusan has
reached ROK military forces at the front. There are indications that
morale among ROK officers, who. are largely opposed to Rhee, has been
adversely affected,
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