SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SINO-SOVIET COMMUNIQUES OF 11 OCTOBER 1954

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00937A000300030031-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: October 14, 1954
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2006/11/05: CIA-RDP79T00937A0003000
C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C'E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
14 October 1954
STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 73-514
SUBJECT: Significance of the Sino-Soviet Communiques of 11 October 19511
le The Sino-Soviet agreements published in the 11 October
communiques appear to be a formalization of recently evident
developments in both Sino-Soviet relations and Communist Far Eastern
policy' On the one hand, the communiques constitute an acknowledged
adjustment of Sinn-Soviet relations to the realities of communist
China's power position. On the other, they are a formal reflection
of a basic decision on the part of Moscow and Peiping, already
evidenced in their closing out of the Korean and Indochinese wars,
to lessen the dangers of expanded hostilities, and to concentrate
on internal buildup and an essentially political offensive against
the non-Communist Far East, Japan in particular.*
2. S
Wapp ino.Soviet relations. The concluding of new, published
agreements at this time is in line with previous Sino- Soviet
practice, in that earlier accords were announced in 1950, following
the Communist regime's civil war victory in China, and in 1953,
# We recognize that the Chinese Communists will not fail to support
subversion and armed rebellion in Asia where expedient.
Approved For Release 2006/11/05.: CIA-RDP79T00937A000300030031-2
 Approved For Release 2006/11/05: CIA-RDP79T00937AO00300030031-2
following the Korean Armlvtice; also, the USSR and Communist China
have in every instance appeared to negotiate on a great power to
great power basis.
3. However, these most recent agreements are unique in that
their content and broad scope represent a formal acknowledgment of
a higher, and publioally equal, Chinese status within the Sino-
Soviet partnership,, This higher Chinese status has been implicit
since the death of Stalin in many Soviet actions,, The new
agreements, reached in Peiping during the ceremonial visit of
Khrushchev and other of the highest Soviet officials, make this
existing point more explicitly,, "Equality" is repeatedly stressed.
The content of earlier Soviet statements is repeated to the effect
that Communist China is now one of the worldgs "big five," and is
entitled to all the priveleges and powers relating thereto. More-
over, the text places its blessing on Peipinges recent "five-point"
gambit with respect to Chinaea relations with-non-Communist Asian
countries,, The Soviet withdrawal from Port Arthur also testifies to
Chines higher status, for even though Soviet withdrawal was promised
earlier, the USSR is here giving up control of territory which has had
great historic and strategic value for Russian governments. Lastly,
the transferring to Peiping of Soviet interests in four joint-stock
companies differs from seemingly similar Soviet actions in Eastern
Europe in the past year, in that the USSR is giving up its interests
Approved For Release 2006/11/05: CIA-RDP79T00937A000300030031-2
 Approved For Release 2006/11/05: CIA-RDP79T00937AO00300030031-2
in all and not just some of the known companies of this type;
furthermore, these particular China companies (rare metals, oil,
airways, and ship repair) are believed to have been instruments of
Soviet political influence.
bo Both the wording and the method of announcing of the communiques
suggest a conscious effort to give the Sino-,Soviet partnership, to
outer view, an appearance of monolithic sweetness and light. The
text stresses this theme throughout, stating in particular that the
heretofore close cooperation of Moscow and Peiping has moved on to
an even greater collaboration., one of "complete unity of view." The
publishing of these agreements shortly after Khrushchevaa arrival
appears designed to carry the impression that they were quickly and
easily arrived at, and were not, as in previous cases, agreed to
only after long, known negotiations. Whether or not these most
recent agreements closed differences which may have existed in Sino-
Soviet relations, they do appear a reflection of Communist sensitiveness
and desire to allay indications gained by the outer world at Geneva
and subsequently of minor tactical differences between Moscow and Peiping.
5o Although we have no evidence that Peiping has been prodding
Moscow for increased political and economic support, the content and
procedure of the communiques suggest that this may have been the cased
The Chinese are believed to have been less than delighted with the
existing level of Soviet economic aid. This probable dissatisfaction,
m3a
Approved For Release 2006/11/05: CIA-RDP79T00937A000300030031-2
 Approved For Release 2006/11/05: CIA-RDP79T00937AO00300030031-2
Nwe
SWR
added to more recent Chinese Communist assertiveness in international
affairs since Geneva, may have created pressures on Moscow to make
certain of the concessions to the Chinese reflected in the communiques.
In this respect,, it is conceivable that a by-product of the Chinese
Communist campaigns against Taiwan and the offshore islands may have
been that of increasing Peiping's bargaining position with its senior
partner,
6 Lstly, the agreements on the Lanchow-Ala Ata Railroad,
the Mongolian Railroad, and increased Soviet economic assistance
to China confirm a number of existing long-range efforts on the
part of Peiping and Moscow to strengthen the Sino'Sov*iet strategic
position in the heart of Asia.
7e Cuuni.et Far East ern police. Since Korea and especially
since Geneva, Moscow and Peiping have been attempting to expand
Communist influence in the Far East by primarily political instead
of military means, apparently in the belief that such a course would
in time gain them their objectives without risking war with the US
in the process. This evident change in Communist policy is formalized
by the Soviet withdrawal from Fort Arthur, and by the' explicit
statement in the text of a changed situation in the Far East caused by
China9a increased defense potential and by the end of the Korean
and Indochinese warso
Approved For Release 2006/11/05: CIA-RDP79T00937A000300030031-2
 Approved For Release 2006/11/05: CIA-RDP79TOO937AO00300030031-2
sw~ NW
8 This change of tactics is highlighted in the text with
respect to Japan, reflecting an evident Sino-Soviet policy of the
last year of concern for Japan's potential strength, but of anticipation
that Japan's present orientation can be undermined by Commun'st bloc
inducements. As contrasted with 1980 Sino'Soviet alliance, ai;'ed
specifically at Japan, the text berates the US while holding out the
economic and diplomatic (green) olive branch to Tokyo,, The with-
drawal from Port Arthur has especial significance in this regard, in
that it is in a sense a "best offer" to Japan second only to an
impossible blotting out of the anti-Japanese text of the 1950
alliance, and is a sort of apology for the 1952 Soviet
decision to hang on to Port Arthur because of the still existing
"Japanese threato* The new approach is designed to exploit Japan's
unique fear of nuclear war by promising settlements if Japan will out
its ties with the USo**
9b Lastly, the text's treatment of Taiwan appears to have
major significance,, The text attempts to embarrass the US by
The wording and out-of-context nature of the short paragraph in the text
on the "anxiety among the peoples of Asia and the Far East" caused by
Japan's position, suggest that this paragraph may have been inserted
to mollify Peipingo
Acting Prime Minister Ogata, 12 October, called this Communist offer
a "peace offensive"maneuver, stating that Japan had no intention
of altering its orientation,,
-5-
Approved For Release 2006/11/05: CIA-RDP79TOO937AO00300030031-2
 Approved For Release 2006/11/05: CIA-RDP79T00937AO00300030031-2
reiterating Communist claims that the US is "occupying" part of
Communist China's rightful territory and is preventing Peiping from
"lawfully" assuming China's seat in the UN. It is probable that
subsequent Communist diplomacy and propaganda will attempt to
exploit the seeming difference between Soviet withdrawal from Port
Arthur and continued US commitments to Taiwan. The text is especially
significant in that it does not mention "liberation" of Taiwan, in
so doing reflecting an apparent reluctance on the part of the USSR
fully to underwrite Peiping's previously stated ambitions in this
respecto The wording of the text and of the most recent Chinese
Communist propaganda broadcasts concerning Taiwan suggest the possi-
bility that Communist China does not itself intend, or has been
so advised, not to carry out its announced threats with respect to
the "liberation" of Taiwan0
Approved For Release 2006/11/05: CIA-RDP79T00937AO00300030031-2