PROBABLE SHORT TERM COMMUNIST COURSES OF ACTION IN THE POST-GENEVA PERIOD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00937A000300030047-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: July 29, 1954
• Content Type: MEMO

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. ",",-F .11` I D 140. 59-54
13JECT a I Tob b Short Tko- l:"i Ccaikinrni it amour " Of d_3:~: C s n
." e Po Gene ' Per: od
c r e;
o bel:5 v8 that t o :limnist accc'pfiia?~c1-3
t tuts a major ah t it v:i..et lic s but,
is consistent with our p,revla'-av ` ei of th :.-a policies the Ua R
been p s i for sore the pr1..rripa]: Soiiaet strategic m
has been the weakening and c utu si. disc i4)tion of the _. 3-{le-d anti-
Con.nu .st alliance, Thrr origom of this policy pr olWo-ly back to
the check which Cor;imunt.st ac,- ession encountered tzz Kor' a. In 125D-
and the steps talln the arouse d !,'e stem Power?, to build a heavily-
armed and closely- a of alliance,, These v lc +ument. apparently led
the Oorrtunist leaders to conclude that if they continued on their
provocative court e3 they would not only risk a general conflict Vat
soon be Beech with a military combination highly dangerous to their
sva rityQ They reacted in tern; s of their tray. tionK: , 71.ita ~
political concepts: a dangerous opponent must be attacked on his
political Blanks and re v.r in order to tndorr r and split up the
uses of his povr,,
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3MW
20 The first indication of a developing change in Soviet policy
was Probably the 11alik proposal of June 1951 for tie talks in Korea.
The USSR also avoided further aggressive moves on the pattern of the
Berlin blockade and Korea, and began to adopt a more "conciliatory"
line which held out hope to the hard-pressed Western states that the
burdens of reatzinament could be escaped through, negotiated nett nts,
Stalin's death apparently facilitated this shift, and was employed
to encourage Western hopes of a genuine change in Soviet lipo rya At
the same tame, the Co mmmist leaders apparently believed that the
continuation of "national liberation movements" in colonial areas,
such as the armed insurrections in Southeast Asia, was not incompatible
with the main line of their policy, Not only did theme actions tax
Western resources, but they were themselves the source of divisions.
among the Western allies, and between them and the free nations of
Asia. There was, however, a shift in emphasis to political rather
than military action in Indonesia, Burma, Waya and the Philippines,
and eventually in Indochina,
3, When direct negotiations on Europe Were ultimately resumed
in 1953 the USSR felt no necessity to make genuine concessions. To
have done so would have meant to sacrifice positions of real power
In Germany and Austria. It wea apparently thought sufficient to slow
Western re nt and to promote disunity by keeping alive the hope
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N
of successful negotiation. At this bastion the deteriorating
3 ah position in Indochina opened a vadge which the USSR exploited
at Geneva.
4. Cwt Alm at LWtm_M.9 In view of the considerable Viet
Minh military successes betweon the Berlin and Genera meetings, the
Cc mumists do not seen to havo capitalized as fu3)y on their Indochina
military opportunities as Would have been possible. By further
deleting tactics at Geneva, they might have hoped to seise the whole
of Indochina in a relatively short time. In addition, by causing
T ndes.?Franoe to fail in his cheanatic bid for peace, U W might have
intensified the internal cries in Framcea
5. That the Caen umist leaders chose to sacrifice these isanediate
gains was probably due at lest in part to their fear that continued
war in Iona would greatly increase the rink of US intereantion0
At a minimum they probably co7sidered that to inflict a costly and
huani L'I.ating defeat in Indochim would lead to aol.id3 fissatioa of an
anti. C t Alliance in. Asomast Asia, perhaps even ineltx ng
raw Asian states* Hut their decision was probably also in large
pmt due to a conviction that the course they did choose would bring
them still greater advantages then conqu g an of Indodhina, the
nniug of which they probab3,v regard as only temporarily postponed
in ate caw. fiat more inpo ant advantage mut have been the creation
of a favorable situetton in iC ch they could sneoesafuliyr page their
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main strategic aim of splitting the Western Powers, The C is
probably calculated that a cromise ova settlement would enhance
their reputation for moderation and thus sharpen the divisions among
non.-Communist countries over the policies to be pursued from this
point forwrard,
II, PROBAELE POST-GENEVA CQZIUNIST COURSES OF ACTION
6, lnsz , In view of the success of their tactics in
Indoehin4 we believe that the Ceesmmists are unlikely to follow up
the Geneva settlnmant by major new aggressive "pressures" elsewhere,
although existing pressure points in such areas as Southeast Asia
will continue to be exploited, The Kremlin probably recognizes that
such now "pressures" might stiffen rather than weaken the Western
alliance. Instead we believe that, for the short term'future at least,
the USSR will. seek to capitalize on the favorable ataoosphere created
by Geneva through intensi.f ed efforts at negotiation designed tot
(a) forestall EDC and Garman rearmament; (b) forestall creation of
a SEATO alliance or of a US-backed Middle East defense grouping; and
(a) further split the chief Western allies, It apparently hopes
to profit more from a further relaxation than from a sharpening of
East-West tensions,
7. Soviet propaganda and diplomacy since Geneva iztdicate that
the Soviet leaders are eager to press their advantage and maintain
4a.
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the mon sntum of negotiations on at least of teak about negotiationo
Ca aunist propaganda is bearing doun hard on the themes of nuclear
onerg7 control and dis is the Molotov European collective
security plan' admission of Cor st China to the UN, even Korean
unification. The Soviet note of 25 duly states that Geneva gave
"fresh proof of the fruitfulnevs of efforts directed at normalising
international relations, at resolving Important probe not on]y
in Asia but in Europe as hello''
8o Western Euro c The soviet cell for a new allr.European
^~.rwue.~r.a
conference i ates that the USSRs which still regards prevention
of West German re nt as a objective,, is seeking to
forestall the TTSUK drive for EDC ratification by creating the
Inpression that,, in the light of Geneva, a successful East-West
conference on Europe in also possible, The Soviet 7aaders t baw
recognized that in allowing an ochiua sett nt they risked
brInging about a situation more favorable to French ratification of
EDC o Their proposal for a now Europee conference seens calculated
to minimize that risk. The USSR probably hopes that the T ochina
cease fire will "induce" a mood in Pram receptive to Soviet European
proposals, and win attempt to concentrate on Fray 0
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9o I7tothor or not the inLtwi Soviet proposal Is re jee d,, ge
believe that the USSR will fallow it 'with f m-thw p is aid at
meeting; Pfewh apposition to E;C, West German dead es for reun .fication,,
aid Brit h doubts on German re nt by offering the alternati
of a disarmed and neut lined rm r hold down by all uropeen
collecti eourity guaranteee#, The Kremlin also vM further develop
the line that rejection of its propo wni lead to aux " a ,a "
between the USSR and East Germ:~ and "end foxr" hopes of
peaceful r+eua ioationo Hmv er,, we no evidence that the tSSR
'will basically revise the position it took at Derlin4 tie still
believe that it will not accept free aUc.German elections or d.thdra'r
its tamps from East Gex' W until it feels conf nt that all qwmw
would thus nose under its effea-tiw control
IN Along with gr+e ntir West German rearenment, the Soviets
aim at disrugibing the Western 7-1li n by enter the European
m a rs of NATO into an alternative cal stive security o
set forth in the Soviet notes of 31 1,42h and 25 July, this aches
ul,d require the abandonment )f NATO comitmentg.. derv r West GermMy
to the NATO Alliance, and end In the 'wit UMI of tL5 forces fxrom
Europe and isolates of the US., b ,s taw Kremlin hazy its
such ar ping 5uccesa es, it aap r regards the Molotov plan as
I useful gambit for appealing to Europe a. opinion. As in the case
of the Danish-t SR trade talks in 2bmw,, the IBM
continue exploit the d i m? ye pobilities of Esvill 81W
st--West trade
negotiatdo p
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no The USSR hoes been rae'cb g efforta to tie F gwjd more cxloee] '
to the Bloc; in the recent Fir .sh-Set trade negotiations, it
nought to secu aoMM political commib*n from the Finn,asa However,
e no indications that unusual Soviet ptasure is lilmaly to be
applied,
l2m The Far F4Wt. The prineipa1 irr is Coimnunist effort
in the Far Eaat is likely to to prevent the als'vel t of ax
We 'rn red collective c1 fens arrar> nt in the area,
Partie1 ]y' one which would find the Colombo powers joined with
Fr>, e* Brtaift, and the US. The Caam twists will feed Asian neutreltpt
son nt by ising "Asia solidarity, and the prospects for
peaceful co-existence via negotiated settl , as d ,astrated
by Goer (, Peiping may propocs an Asian "collective security" pact
as a count to Mol otov's European security plan, or a aeries of
bilateral pacts along the lines of Chou alrla. a s "Five Pri miples" a
3,3e At the same time Pei.-ding is likely to attempt to frighten
prospective Asian m rbers of a SEATO by threats as to the cro s
Of Joining such organization. Cast successes in Indochina
allo give new impetus to gIM-111a warfare and dare acti, Itiea
In Southeast Asian areas where they now extata In particular, there
Is likely to be a stepping up in Communist pshological warfare
and perhaps also subversive ac'ivities in fide to serve as a
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raminder to Asian rmutr t : hat al i t with the US invites
Con mri$t aggression. We believe it unlikely, hmiever, that the
Coamnunists will make any m j. nou aggmssim moves in
Soffit Asia, lest they solidify anti-Ccumaist opposition and
undermi their own efforts to encoumsm neutralism0
1 b In the xake of GsmTm,, the Cats will probably
intensify their long sta ndi efforts to pr emote frictions between
the US and other non-C states over Asian issues, and create
situsti a in which Cc=md8t China can appear to *w1d. Asian
solidarity against US "war.: ." ea desigm. The stion of Coiinj.st
Ch se a sion to the UN -111 almost ce tly be v ously
exploited for this pro
15. In addition, Peipim7, xi l probably attempt to make the
status of 151"n a =3or issuer over the next Y OW. With its fly
in North Korea and Tonkin nco secured by at a arrangements, it
x-n feel that the risks iu 1ved in a more aggressive policy have
been ado Toile a Chines:: Communist i ion remalm unlikely,
Peiping mw feel that "mi taa?y inoidentsn in the Tait area can
be exploited to create apprebrnsion in the nor Cemmnaiat world
concerning US poly in the Par East0
l6c In we eath hate that for the next year or so the 'Indoddm
CCUMMIiSI-A Will not deliberat y break the armistice ant by
mUng large ftale attaeft -joss the ova dimmawtion lines,
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V t,~-
We belies that the Comunists will not give up their objective of
securing will. lndocliina, but vd ] l pursue their objective by pares
i tary, political and psychc ogical. =aroma The Viet flir h will
probably bee no opportunity to interpret the loaeelyy-drawn armistioe
to its image; eubive wad local guerrilla. actions against
the Fore a and Vieta sm authorities will probably- continua m Hmever,
we believe that Soffit and/or Chime Cc um ist control over the
Viet ninh will reana.in effective eno to Insure that no local.
devel is will contravene the broader Moscow and Peiping desire
that pv re3y* local gains must ba subordinated to their general
strategic aims
17 The C 3,et probably regard the situation in Korea as
stabilized for the present, ari believe that their prospectet in
Korea will not be worsened by the indefinite continuance of this
stalemate. To score a propag.:da point agaimt the ITS, haver, t
MW a "new" proposals for z ificati on and advocate the resumption
of negotiations,
18. do not believe that the .Cats will f ,t up their
Geneva success with azV ineret d pressures on JM a? Instead they
probab expect Japanese neutralist sentiment to be - strengthened, and
will approach Japes, with attrt: ;tine economic indueements in order to
encourage such neutralland Be ping and Moscow mey even offer Japan
a favorable peace treater in or ler to mDrmelize relatims, although
territorial issues will. prove ?.n obstacle to this coined
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19, The Riddle East, We belies that Geneva a2d post-Geneva
de lope n#a will not of t he ,Av a have much significant effect on
the scale and nature of Coast activities in the Middle East,
The USSR is alreactr pursuing a more active poli(*r in the area than
it has in the past' but this pt:)liey appears to be privar.ly in
respor to US efforbs to strengthen Middle East defenses, This
Soviet, actiii $ n a'ked by offers of economic assistance and
other friendly gestures as wel`L as ' propoganda and diplomatic
pressures asm' t potential participants in a US-backed defense
grouping will probably be inteiaified to the extent that the US
vad its allies appear to be zing progress to=rd bolstering
the Western position in the
20. However, the indiaat.'Lons are that in the short term at least
the USSR will use in ucementa more than threats, The USSR still
appears to have no sense of urgency about achieving actual Commmmist
control over the areas While ?t might be tempted to turn to the
Middle East as offering fruitful opportunities for presze on its
Western adversaries, it is dif i oult to see bow it could underta3 e
air drastic action without alienating the neutralist opinion it is
sockLtg to cultivate in the Middle East as well as in other areaan
a ca rated vitk OCX
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