COMMUNISM REAPPRAISED IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT SOVIET BEHAVIOR*

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00937A000400010010-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 17, 2000
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: June 29, 1955
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
DOCUMENT NO. - 16., i - _~.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
DECLAS$tFIE0
STAFF MEMORANWM Q A 33955
29 June 1955 25X1
SUBJECT: Co m unis*nReappraised in the Light of Recent Soviet Bshavior*
,,An obliging bear is more dangerous than an eneiv"
Old Russian proverb quoted by Lenin in his
"Left Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder"
The Problems Coithrnnist Mutation?
1. In trying to, estimate the meaning for international Communism of recent
Soviet ,policies, especially the explicit acceptance of Yugoslavia's "rightist
deviationism", the question once again arises whether this new Soviet approach
signifi'ss more than a tactical change., Has there occurred a Communist mutation?
Is the USSR no longer an ideological center, taut a national state in the sense
that it would A ..t its aspirations to physical. 'Accurity of its present
boundaries and economic expansion? Or is the Soviet state still primarily the
base of world. Communism?
The Meaning of Ideology in the USSR
2e In order to spBwer these questions, crucial for long-range estimation,
the significance of the role of ideology in a "socialist" state.must first be
considered. For, if we assume that Communist doctrine is merely window 25X1
dressing used by the Soviet leaders to rationalize Russian power politics, there
would be no need for a re-appraisal of the impact of Communist doctrine on
Soviet li . As a result of years of study and interrogations'
ame to the conclusion that enormous
stress in put on ideology both as a doctrine and as a practical instrument" and
that "the operating ideology of the oviet leadership at given point
time is kept remarkably consistent." 25X1
"the ruling elite takes ideology, an n , p os p , 58MOUBly TOO a aegree
that is difficult for a mid-twentieth century Westerner to comprehend. While
the Soviet leaders manipulate ideology, they are also manipulated by it."
Rostow, in his "Dynamics of Soviet Society", emphasizes that "the Soviet
leaders were trained in a Marxist vocabulary; they think, talk, especially about
the world abroad,, in terms of economic interests, class groups, and class
struggles.., It is very doubtful, therefore, that they understand the ethical
foundation of Western societies or the concept of politics as the arena for the
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settlement of ;. differences>among individuals and groups." He concludes that
"men do tend to be taken in by their on magic? and part of their magic consists
in the coneeptq ,they. ._use to describe and interpret the world around them.;. In
this scene, it is likely that Marxist ideology is still alive and vital in the
higher reaches of the Snvlet regime."
3. Leninist;tactiss have. always served as a convenient smoke screen behind
which the true intentions, Sof Communists could be. hidden. With "ebbs and flows"
of Communist fcrtunes occurring repeatedly thrpughout decades, tactical changesa--
including superf vial ,modi:ficati ens of the da na--h vie generally confused,
people or diverted their :attention from Communist reOlities. But chanf;e6 of the.
dogma were concerned ;chiefly with the "auperat,ructure" of state and society; the
basic structure: of, Marxism,- and Leninism has remained -sacrosanct. However, this
does not exclude.; suchterpretations as are considered necessary for adjust-
ments to new world co .d1tions o Moreover? innnotiility would deny the validity of
the dialectical process,.' as it is applied by Marxists, to the interpretation of
history and the forecasting of future developn*t.'Since Marxian dialectics
essentially connotaa a permanent struggle betw ,ep :old and new social forces and
ideas, fought :for .the achievement of a new "synthesis", so the practical
application of. the, doctri a allows for a greats.variety of approaches. The e
are no indications either: inside the Bloc or outside among the Communist Parties
that this basic. concept has changed.
Present Party Position On Doctrine
ha On the. contrary, there is new evidence that even now efforts are. being
made in the USSR to tighten doctrinal attitudes and sharpen organizational
weapons within the Marxist-Leninist framework, in this connection, the issues
No. 6 of KOMMUNIST and NO-, 7 of P1 LIFE, official party organs, published at
the occasion of Lenin's birthday anniversary, are, most revealing. KOMMUNIST
upbraided "right deviationists" in Hungary and Communist China who "belittled
the leading role of the working class and of the Party in the government, and
who were aiming- at squeezing the Party out of the leadership of the country.."
Both periodicals. abound with references to Lenin.'s emphasis .on the "necessity
for a merciless:struggle" against distorters of Marxism. The "revolutionary"
character of Marxism, presented at times in almost violent Zhdanovist terms,
,and actual references to Zhdanov, is stressed in sentences such as the following
one in PARTY LIFE:
"The idea of internationalism is an inseparable, integral part of
Marxist-Leninist doctrine concerning the world-wide historic mission
of the proletariat which is called on, in union with all workers,
to carry out-by revolutionary means the exchange of the old capitalist
system, which is outliving its day, for a Communist system."
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KONMTINIST actually returns to the 19146/18 formula by recalling that the leaders
of the communist Parties of France,, Italy and'other countries made statements
to the effect that "the.people of these countries will never allow themselves
to be dragged into an imperialist war against the camp of socialism but, on the
other hand, willa everything they can to support and strengthen friendly ties
with the peoples. of the USSR and other socialist states."
PARTY LIFE, by implication, disagrees with t formula which allowed !'local
particularities" of sa-i.elI?ites and appears to renege on the recogriton of
Yugoslavia's approach is 4ism: "The coup fe4 ff popular democrac~r??
r$ties and traditions
e
ul
i
a
c
c p
have their own. ; mai iana;l$ storic, econom
the path' laid
ialism
o
c
di
B u t they' all a r e g i j l jy .one path in t h e builia 9
00 v et II ions And this ath , " '
out by Marxism.;and, I . iinism and traversed b
e nin" ne is amen by
is the onl true .att.a s erpre on o
i j'f T p ga s ;media: and continued emph ; :s on 'anti American themes m Even
Friendly disposition and
f
h
i'
.
t
e
while the Soviet;,le;iders ,are making a show o
cont Hue to hew to a tightened party, ,; ?
di
o
reasonablenesso- rratiist :press and ra
an some signs of a virulent;
h
h
i
or
s
c
line which is far; .from "relaxed" and wh
rinciples and practices;
ini
t
Le
i
p
s
n
ve
Zhds ovist appli.cf tt'orz of the more aggress
while on the othfsr hsnd implicitly repudiating Stalinism-.
Soviet Acco att-.0n to Titoism and the Satellt , ... ; ,
a
ationism" probably is
ht d
"
,
ev
rig
5e Sovi,~t accommodation to Yugoslav
tactical mean ure.des ;ned ,to prevent Yugoslavia frombecoming too ccllo erttoo .
West and to neuter, the Hart of the Soviets; rather,
it of
oader
?'?
represents a tyerip;?rar* iistment essentialL toy the pursu
while
Tito's reg:I.mes at pre a ,. is evolutionary rail er than revolutionary
bristling with Marx st: lingo, it is a brand ofd revisionism that both Lenin and
An applicas i o~z a
d
t
the Sovie
o
f~
4
re
Stalin pursued with de,a ly ha
alm~ost
USSR
The
formula to the, a aple' democracies is highl , unli3 Y.
"fherc
certainly woul'cl root vo1 t tarily relinquish control of its cordon sari tLte-
~i`ndi ual s atellit es on die
may be minor cancpasaigp to bolster the ego of } at
ground of theia ,"nstip peculiarities" but wort' lions will not be It, madQ
risk of seriously inAu intg'Soviet control in tha ate lice area. Nor is it
in Fr the illusion that the
likely that t* ateli.i peoples will rema
y was j them* Even if the
romisE
f
o
a p
Khrushchev Titt.- agree ent. holds much o
Cominform should bey .dissolved, other organizat1i -ns can easily take over its
functions. The organization created by the Warsaw Treaty, while ostensibly
(a)
agreement between "independent" nations, will probably sis loosened and f ?eedom
to make it appear that So rf et control in Eastern Et
of action for individual satellites restored, and (b) to establish, in fact, an -
organization which can centrally control the poliacal, economic, and military
aspects. in the $atellites
* Italics mine:
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mho
Repercussions in the International Communist Movement
6. The Communist Parties outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc are in the process
of adapting themselves to the new Moscow approach. if they could do so after
the Nazi-Soviet Pact, they can easily do so now. The. French CP, after a period
of significant silence, has apparently tightened its grip on its ideological
and organizational activities. The CP-controlled .CGT, the major French trade
union, has turned down internal coexistence with more moderate factions. The
Italian CP has taken a. more amorphous stand as a result of the Soviet-Yugoslav
accord, Vidalia Trieste dissent and, most of all, the split among the leaders
and Togliatti's serious illness. But Longo, Togliatti's likely successor, is
a hard-line man and will almost certainly restore much of the Party's "good
government" which had made the CPI the best Communist organization outside the
Bloc. The non-European CPs probably always have had more sympathies for Tito
than their continental comrades., In fact, the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement,
ostensibly indicating more freedom for national Parties, may well enhance
loyalties of Middle Eastern, African and Asian Communists to Moscow, and a
dissolution of the Cominform may further help this trend. The international
Communist front organizations are trying to implement the Soviet line by
re-invigorating and widening "united front" taoties slated to oppose govern-
ments which doo not uncritically accept the Soviet concept of coexistence.
The Crucial Soviet Dilemma of a Genuine Settlement
7. Nevertheless, in implementing their new approach, the Soviet leaders.
are facing a crucial dilemmaa Stalin's ooncept.of the USSR as the base of
world revolutions, surrounded by a hostile, enciling capitalist world, has
proved an invaluable rationale for justifying internally the maintenance of
massive armed forces, and security organs, the tpolation of the USSR from the,
capitalist world,. and the postponement of improvement in the living standard
of the Soviet people.. But. it has also constituted a limitation on Soviet
flexibility in the ' handling of international arf airs.,' particularly at a time
when such flexibility appears necessary from the Soviet point of view. The
results of Stalinist rigidity in inter national. r4ations, the appearance of
nuclear weapons and the internal problems in the US6* and the East European
area must have awakened the post-Stalin leaders to, the fact that such rigidity
could eventually lead to,general war, and Anus . jeopardi..z.e the gains or tine.
Bolshevik revolution before Communism was strong:enot4gh to challenge the
non-Communist world o, Therefore, the stability. of Soviet power -? the base; of
the International Communist movement ..o should be given priority at this time
over the spread of Communism elsewhereo But, at'the same time the concept of
the USSR as the encircled' target of capitalist-enem. es also (and intentionally
so) operates to prevent the establishment of genuine :peace. The Soviet leaders,`:
as Communists,, would find it extremely difficult to accept a basic settlement.
because the nature of such settlement would alter the foundations upon which
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their (I rule is built * in a world without tension, the Marxist goal would
dissipate and-revolution would stagnate; dialectics would become as useless
as the class struggle,-and Soviet methods of implementing Communism would
become Fabian -- an:vnthinkable paradox. How the Soviet leaders will attempt
to cope with :tbie dilemma,'; may well furnish us with the clearest indications of
-their intentions,.
Practical Aspects Not Specified by Doctrine
$. It is . true :that there are practical problems of Soviet policy and
behavior which ars...not expressly covered in the doctrine,, thus requiring
interpretation_by the leading man or group.. For:example, there is the unsolved
question of leadership; *.-the USSR, namely, its forni: and provisions for suc-
cession. There is tthe: problem of the positions' of the armed forces, the nature
of its command, and: the. extent of its political influence, There are questions
of economic policy which cannot be determined by specific doctrinal lines
Other such problems include the intricate relationship between the USSR on the
one hand, and Communist China and the East European satellites on the other
hand. It is .difficult, if: not impossible, to forecast Soviet approaches.:.to
these problems.on the "basis of specific tenets of the doctrine.. They will
probably be handled by. the..-Soviet leaders in accordance to what they believe to
be prevailing conditions though they might make some reference to the. scriptures,
if applicable (for example; the functions of Soviet. army as the instrument
of the Party);.In some., cases, ideological justifications will undoubtedly be
formulated ex post facto.:Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that while
detailed issues or. a 'Psuperstructural"" nature 'w.11 altwatiys be decided
opportunistically,),the , basic body of Communist thought is broad enough for
important decisionsto'.be.made within the framework of Communist thinking and
psychology. There. have been voices claiming that a "mellowing process'$ in
Communism is inevitable. and that this will eventually lead to a state of
genuine coexistence' and. the end of the cold war.,' But it seems unlikely that
such a mellow w,ng can _be ':expected to take place'. soon:: enough to be considered in
contemporary plAriningoi
9. The conclusions to be drawn from these con3iderations are:
a. Soviet-Cormtui ist tactics are unlikely to stem from a genuine
desire to, firnly.'cement ~eace and prosperit r.:..In a relatively
The 1.rei,iises for a "basic settlement'. would be the renunciati c--a by the
uom unist states of ;a): ideologr as en instrument of international subversion,
(b) the objective of evcnfual world conquest, and (c) the totalitarian form
of government as an instrument for the ideological mission. Such a settlement
would not mean the arrival of the millenium: its isrocognized that conflicts
of interest will always exist between national.::s'h ates. It does r vans however,
that naticnal policy objectives would be mart ':limited and the finding of a
common platform for negotiations would become more feasible.
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peaceful world with free eorrmunications, international Communism
would perforce stagnate,,, and evolutionary raeasures for social
welfare would demonstrate that Marxism is an antiquated, no longer
applicable, doctrine of the 19th century. If Narxism would
collapse, Leninism would follow it down to burial in historical
archieves. Such a prospect in as unacceptable to Soviet leaders
as it would be for a believer to deny the existence of God. Thus
present concessions connote an effort to find a temporary compromise
solution in order to pacify the Free World and to gain time for the
consolidation of the "Socialist Camp".
b. Communism has remained an essentially conspiratorial secular
religion. Its international organization will almost.certainLy
continue to hew to the Party line and help to advance Moscow's
objectives; more peaceful methods in international relations are not
a reflection of an ideological change but a purely tactical maneuver
on a grand scale; and the US, strongest Western power, will remain
the chief target of Communist deception or subversion.
c. There is no evidence that the USER will permit its ideological
#rnr;ework to be disrmantled. It still is the base of international Com-
munism; Communist China, though acting as an independent partner, has
recognized Soviet ideological leadership on many occasions. The
Foundations of 1Iarxism-Li nism apparently remain firmly established
but it is possible that greater latitude will be employed in developing
new methods to achieve the ultimate objectives of Coranunism. Whether
such new methods can affect the basic ideology in the long rune cannot
now be foreseen, but it seems safe to estimate that such changes,,
if any, will almost certainly not occur within the next decade or two.
PM
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