AMBASSADOR RIDDLEBERGER'S VIEWS ON YUGOSLAVIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00937A000400010016-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 1, 2000
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: June 21, 1955
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 20 1 j00937A000400010016-0
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL 10TIMATES
21 June 1955
STAFF MEMORANDUM No. 29-55
SUBJECT: Ambassador Riddleberger's Views on Yugoslavia
1. There follows a brief summary of Ambassador Riddlebergerts
remarks last week before the NSC Planning Board and the Board of
National Estimates with respect to the Yugoslav situation. Although
Mr. Riddleberger went over a good deal of ground previously covered
in his cables and press interviews, these debriefings did develop
some poihts of probable interest to the Board,
2. Background of the Soviet-Yu slay Talks. Ambassador
Riddleberger was convinced the meeting was arranged late in the
game and at Soviet initiative. The tip-off was a difference in
Titots statements to Mr. Riddleberger on the timing of proposed
talks with the West on two occasions proceeding announcement of
the Soviet visit. There had been indications of a possible meeting
for many months, but the Ambassador had anticipated a lower level
gathering. The Soviet talks came after the satisfactory events of
1954, including signature of the Balkan Pact and the Trieste
settlement, which had been followed,, however, by the beginning of
talk about avoiding involvement in either Bloc beginning early
this year.
3. General Impressions of the Soviet Visit. Mr. Riddleberger
confirmed that the Yugoslavs were not -favor-a impressed by the
Belgrade visit on two main grounds. First, Ahrushchevts "country
cousin" approach made a bad impression on Yugoslav officials in
view of the formal atmosphere which has grown up around what might
be called Tito's "court", and second, they voiced some doubts about
the capacity of the Soviet leadership. While the Yugoslavs
questioned the Soviets' ability to negotiate with the West, Mr.
Riddleberger was not willing to go that far and noted the Yugoslavs
also displayed some lack of confidence. Most of all, the Yugoslavs
were struck by the gap which had grown between their thinking and
;, rCJMENT NO.._......-3-6
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. C.7
P DECLASSIFIEU
CLASS. CHANGE?TG: , TS S
NEXT: REVIEW DATE: