(CLASSIFIED) CONSULTANTS MEETINGS OF 13-14 OCTOBER 1955

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00937A000400020009-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 1999
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: November 3, 1955
• Content Type: MEMO

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MAN n[ NO. 78.55
3 go mobw 1955
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ti N 702
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the moti9stiama of ,By I, out Soviet Uey Ia U rist thane ones
(a) ftsl4 a death sea the 8a/iiat l ds rsbf jo s reedoa to "ester
cibillt (b) sMaa~riti ~ae am l.siex's that the o14 e
had l.d late a blind alley; (a1 IN Newt aoa1esr d-alarms; U-)
eceOer a swains within the I KI eat (e) a emisulatica that sortw
poUd a Mat1d bring mater dividea".
25X1 _
2. no eonsaltmits armed that an the.. fIotaets the c ernatiag
to ia11aee ee VIVIS teeatt Soviet polWs but thews Mae lass oviemi-at
the relatives woi&t wihiab the earivm fbetdls Calrrlod
its Soviet deisiss. 0 gned that sealer MaWfkre do"w and
ecll 1! :1 - u res veep and Meese theefe t IMGa 25X1
iuu ' then the of wed in the estisete.
asmod that cez teia factaft bad been present foL- years. be
the 1qPwtawa of SWUats death and the il#t7
that the are arse a*aea of the of 25X1
nu al+ developments and eamwoft iaulties0 t the
TIer nue3ftr war that the t? bad of dur thbecom no e, caucused e loot two yeears, lb felt that The Soviet
a reasonably' have encluAedm an the basis of aftU-
=ft by sg that the US Mss sulmmly vet as altemtive
policy CC var. Thus the MM *Okt veil. have ewsl6wed it necessary
to ciiy,* the and the , and cause a cctios of Us Pwor is
Burftw m If anything i euld be inclined to twesse the
t
rbowe of the s le+ar so a deteeraimant at the Vresont
line of BOVIOt policy. fat that the mast ieewtant f ctor
is the Soviet calculation Western strength and unity mdg!at
be UWaLwAl by a m)ftm Soviet .
25X1
3o The consultants Lend the y rcblaes of recenaiuse the
PrOOMb conciliatory tivad at Bawl" in MWOM with the evidences
of In" ev"Ole Soviet ,cyr else re?
the qowIbLUty that the uee Ye
eftw. voice in policy mad . with the statslant
In M l1-13-55 that the Soviet a ffit ht have to tam into account
advene ie reactions if they reverted to a tan policy after
POWUIMS a MUMUCS licy AV MW tin.25X1
24o bell that the Wesent tion In ZUXOLW ye
dictated by Goviet iyatiae of onwgift arises in the l East
and. by the Intestlau to the US isolated ftee its zwop"n allies
in such QI s. Be fish that the would es;wty end
PWbW +e 'fates little QIdMW h it would plan to >msui; ulat~ra
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to the disadvarxts s of the use so ~ai'tieulsr be folG+eaar as i vitabl.
-erns" is ~adoahima vbess Us try,, dpee,t1 thaeoU its Vitt iMab
a23y, sea Lest It "just by Letting the mu well flora MU.v r- I
dodsw 'hat the tl Maki . visit a Par stern Crisis of xmzm~
WjWM tthst the Wn obi t W ISM as 5X1
fa vom V wt they 'will aria about. is eeeted Vat the as 1at
lemons eea d seek to avoid aeeu ubm arises if it d. that the
1$ zssolre thee- atdtaua~ae ue~y.
5. lhaare yes a awme" d seiner swoug the oolsau,L is to
believe thet the Wmemat Soviet peLicy tooted last fn an wxbomftd
puvbm of tie, soete ; ew pseheps as 2mg as flee or teme yesne.
25X1
behead the Smut phew last tear tart years. In h e
":::Itbe Sowi.t l+ea xr v d jea and ss their gins it VW
$vot'ned aek in the nom' t ufAm ad they vva]A be +aeaable to eke
25X1 was of was saf policy amain fen a an* e1r of years me* they had
aped a"" that at 10 limo i st tits
1Q ,e or fnoe a ateoge In Soviet pull y after about
25X1 fYtea t6t the pmt poltexy is 60914"d
to disarm and the Vest. At saw point the Soviet lead=*
sy ale that they have aobimed option results. At aveh
a juwtwe# is it not vm~iveb r that the vouli be xW=Oy
tockond to aoei" the am e meaI to a drive an the West=
60 ' Ce teas little aq rt tar the proposition that the
Sow** lmdws had beecen one comeawd with the UM as a Great
25X1 poww tit 'with the ce or Coo umiaet as a remInUmmy
adeitted the posaibti ty of seams snot evo3 ion
app~tvniti~es
but be the Somist 2=ftm vorlld mob a] off
for fta i~en 11t~g Cam. E- I ... obi that the 25X1 ~mm West is ~ daalsng with a aattvre 1 iat diploen ey ubiub
by no =me ' the couUwaA operation of the C St
25X1
00* . iita .ats that it vo A be ilataotmtee a1Ad ecn.
dis'Ei a b between t pat+mr go&U and idsologieeal
fusing t0 w" -
Pals. no Soviet boe'lisve in the pow of the stet, but they
also lave a s lified, ideol,,egA,aa1~?y Collared view at their ultiaete
ahjaeotivvs.
25X1 To belies d that at the ACta =Wft of the feareUpn
der, ~Mm et lmad+ 'would seek to tae to t)wGw ear
that Wrognm toted alai.4", oetieaat Q d not be acs at the
four-yaw 2.vel4 lie also with SIM 23-55, ft- L 25X6 the !estimates
Am=
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8. W th Z'ec,eat to the !dale out, JI bed the- 25X1
e~itdat. the Banat point at vier as s %IwN Loa
s tan *amp* bl a3so in the P r nu*. an largely aeee tp of bsaiwrd a tr*ea w epee sabIMMIMW
of been Is
v raian
~t Sorb
iu those ardaa. ~~ it is aav the
A%vb li * that 44111"A me the UM till, be s slab] a to the
Yhioh ilndi0erre 11 esa 'to abjtstt ~~e111it
25X1 o addled t h a t as. o v , l e n d e r s not recopSm the
ar Ax"-L :seii 'wee" sad tbat thery MEN"
have &Wiftd to run the sialft or snob as ? amity. 25X1
that the ads of the i= is to eahblieb is elals to is
big lmr aneidtelat3,oee at the I35 Wat. We t that the Soviet
25X1 lesrdeors waft csioulsts Vn- mw is the *ddle West wld
ellp to addwre this end. obw~vrd that it taw owwe is WIMI
to the SOVI $ yodI't o? " tt ta. 25X1
Mt e o- j
us vo i be forced into a '+o~? -Aran role
bra
25X1 ea a~sod the eammle Usitatjo. en the tales
abiliy
an aMwe cc am a. r he to the i he e of Od and
Asi
25X1 ixaaort at the estmot
be "80011100d* ens mum ixPesa d with the economic, ampbilities
at the iwti it is mae+e able then the U9 to mm tplctly
ant ondgtr.
a n~sarxar
In- was SOMMI c ac,, Vita saw disant fr s II
faith the heats at BI62~ 11.11?55s "Sous mw .1
atioss a
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AVxt= of tl 1. AnMawto I . a
that ilea a elf t a bas b
aft r Ountab3sa Uffi .t In *Ierw of 1 polit Control.
jwuwea that faaaa~+ae in the
um would To uvg po1itieal . espt#
the softest UMM CGUII GO A -
tioaa plan =A thm tb a roaft2ooks in the ' of its affective
aaaaasi that the ematiaaat,in s
Svwl*b ability cqP* asarit~at that threst pond by f Mters. At
fte MM t1 was he believed that the 8ovL*U we= yrdbaW iffite
the tAwnt to their paaaa1iti1 dol. posed by tb* inspogte .
1U a a steed Oat the large vitbout am rs. Be noted that the p btra bem awAjrjjwS its
seawlty l a mind my be achUmIng effta2sr d v
twwww 7"" of t in ufftmA CC adevgi
faaaam ce the of the ate, a substantial. amity
cusuaft few as . 29 also a' in s metia g an ftaters
f&VWJM
reawds s sairlse et as of an the i =wb awe ]AM* that the a attwA by V as ce vsb3aaa: than
who understud the W political zyxtefjo AU the
001294MInts agreed that the pbrasirs of the eat!lmtive jweblm vas
god that It is ing to ludicate that Soviet
uasf
ascow2tance of i iou aaaas a vwAld ]=A to a LUS awe
s a s > s b 1 thas C tiama i n a at, asst eI7
* as as these in Snd .
39, ul is stint the a
in ~ 5ar l @as S ti tion.~ 25X1
that the to OhVIAM have l am" an the V
ImpUcaftens of Tito' ae the places. eseetCeaa a at
POSOMIt uy am eatieste
that '> is a t am* d
:ISUVBMd tMt tale Vast$ tea of SaVi.Qt- 25X1
?
yvjpsUv.ft-SWtc " t Is t ant Will. require
future ostiaa.
- V14 ft
1 Ibe1?_ Vsd t the
clasw tias since be b*U*VMd Tito to be than ears. 3a t
XtwGMW
Fite Vas sates. in iaaalg to fur the SOVIOU G"
vluug to lp in > . Soviets in tam maaky wish to
lime TUG, as a brIdAp fear' a the moist JWUW in the West.
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the likelihood of effective SOVIOt thew of
a ca ter to vis-a-vis xugwlav cowiffmaists a Titoiasts
sli.Te~ We also noted that ' iatsess sacs st
iti in 1a since such Stic ban on
`Moss sal s ae on the west to sn. dim 25X1
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V
cONFJDINTIAL
IV. DEVELOP-! IN THE MiDIULE FAST
25X6 in 25X1
opinion Fgyptiau public opinion may nev ess ores the
to act against its better judgment. If there develops?a struggle
between Egypt and Israel,, the pressures in Iraq at the lower
levels of the population will be so intense that it will be
extremely difficult to keep Iraq off Israel's back. The elite
Iraqi may not agree with the masses but probably will be forced to
.go along with the anti-Israeli waar.
25X1 15, wondered if the traditional inter-Arab rivalries
would not rged during a time of Egyptian-Israeli conflict.
25X1 Loubted that even an Egyptian war against Israel could
overenaww the antagonisms within the Arab world. He admitted that
in the event of such a war the Arab states would be likely to
participate, with varying degrees of enthusiasm. However, Arab
rivalries would become most evident if the war went badly for Egypt.
In these circumstances the Iraqi might argue that their best contri-
bution to stabilising the situation would be to form a greater Syria.
16. The consultants were pessimistic about a peaceful resolution
of the I yption-Israeli difficulties. It was agreed that the Soviet
leaders have succeeded in opening a new area of conflict between the
US and the USSR, and that recent Soviet policy poses an extraordinarily
delicate and intricate problem for the US. said that if the 25X1
Israeli attack Egypt the USSR might achieve prestige gains by appealing
25X1 to the UN for an international force to put dose the aggression.,
oted that win or lose the Arabs will remember that they
received is from the Soviet Bloc and that the US armed Israel.
The consultants speculated that possibly an international "honest
broker" could be found to influence Israel against a belligerent
course of action. suggested that the USSR might indicate its
willingness to wit o arms from the Arabs in return for the
dismantling of US bases abroad*
25X1
6.,
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cu
25X1
25X1
V. NIE 100-745: WILD SITUATION AND LONGER TERM TRENDS (Staff Draft)
17. The consultants commented favorably an the Staff Draft as
a 'hole. However# there were numerous criticisms, regarding scope
and detail. In particular the consultants believed that the paper
tried to project too far into the future, ._AU agreed that more
attention should be paid to China and Indochina. believed25x1
that the draft over-estimated Bloc flexibility in fairly stable
areas such as Western Europe. He advocated toning down the paper's
concentration on Bloc policies in stable areas of the world. The
Bloc is unlikely to engage us in areas where the US is strong, but
around the periphery where we are weak. What, for example, is
going to be Soviet policy toward an aspiring world power like India?
Will not the leaders of India and Yugoslavia seek to take advantage
of the Soviet soft policy to go along on their ownL;:~agreed 25X1
that the draft should place much more emphasis on ively
backward world areas and on countries with neutralist ambitions.
also believed that the role of the neutral and backward states
should e further explored. The crisis is not yet upon us in Africa.
Should not the emtimate tell us more. about this area so that we can be
prepared? He would .also like to see concentration on the probable
our allies and what it will take to keep NATO a going concern.
ded that an omission was the possible effect of the erosion
es on the Satellites. doubted this since the now Soviet
policy is for export only. ? not anticipate internal diffi-
culties in the USSR if the Soviet leadership eventually decided to
reverse its policy. The change could be blamed on US
intransigencee thought that increased Soviet efforts to
"use" the UN might a developed somewhat.
25X1
18. protested that-the draft gives
the r thoutuncertainty and changes
elt that there should be more on the Soviet tactic of manip-
a little crises, especially in the Far East, so as to maximize
gains while inhibiting US action and contributing to a deterioration
of NATO or a dissipation of NATO resources. He added that in Europe
the USSR has little more that it can afford to give away, but grave
problems remain unresolved. The people-of Europe are likely to
become very much aware that on really big problems Soviet policy
continues to be inflexible.
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UUIVI-IUULII 1 It%L *010
Mow
lg egarded Indochina as an irresistible
opportunity for Communist Mna, and were very pessimistic regarding
the survival of South Vietnam. Both were agreed that the draft
should indicate that there is much greater Chinese interest in
Vietnam ( and a hi her degree of danger there) than in the offshore
islands. elieved.that the growing magnitude of the China
problem reqqxres re attention in the draft on Communist intentions
toward Southeast Asia.
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