(CLASSIFIED) CONSULTANTS MEETINGS OF 13-14 OCTOBER 1955

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00937A000400020009-7
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
8
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
February 8, 1999
Sequence Number: 
9
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Publication Date: 
November 3, 1955
Content Type: 
MEMO
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Approved For Release 2006/11/05: CIA-RDP79T00937AO00400020009-7 MAN n[ NO. 78.55 3 go mobw 1955 0=321AL IITILLISSICS AGlIC! crr= w IEZAL xamum oommam"s xwuxP of13*k0st 955 t~'tAO'1'8 ftra or 1iusn" motes em" 25X1 J 0"a 11" at gowl" 11.0 me ?i mro s ttm of the ant Vi" P*IUW 1A '''~ R.,. Jpo1-. to :eeere 444"1" 03mumimum cc so . 'fie xmtsft LI *DlWMD 400 pmftmph 2# SM OR" VW sve~itt ~~~?55, "s~w3ot lb~~ p,~Y by aitia~ far tisawe+Aon Gilead 5X1 _ ... No C E IN CLASS. 4 0 DECL UMEN? NO. _ a, / CLASS. CHANGED NEXT REyVII sic yEW/~DATE: ti N 702 Approved For Release 2006/11/05: CIA-RDP79T00937AO00400020009-7 Approved For Release 2006/11/05: CIA-RDP79T00937AO00400020009-7 the moti9stiama of ,By I, out Soviet Uey Ia U rist thane ones (a) ftsl4 a death sea the 8a/iiat l ds rsbf jo s reedoa to "ester cibillt (b) sMaa~riti ~ae am l.siex's that the o14 e had l.d late a blind alley; (a1 IN Newt aoa1esr d-alarms; U-) eceOer a swains within the I KI eat (e) a emisulatica that sortw poUd a Mat1d bring mater dividea". 25X1 _ 2. no eonsaltmits armed that an the.. fIotaets the c ernatiag to ia11aee ee VIVIS teeatt Soviet polWs but thews Mae lass oviemi-at the relatives woi&t wihiab the earivm fbetdls Calrrlod its Soviet deisiss. 0 gned that sealer MaWfkre do"w and ecll 1! :1 - u res veep and Meese theefe t IMGa 25X1 iuu ' then the of wed in the estisete. asmod that cez teia factaft bad been present foL- years. be the 1qPwtawa of SWUats death and the il#t7 that the are arse a*aea of the of 25X1 nu al+ developments and eamwoft iaulties0 t the TIer nue3ftr war that the t? bad of dur thbecom no e, caucused e loot two yeears, lb felt that The Soviet a reasonably' have encluAedm an the basis of aftU- =ft by sg that the US Mss sulmmly vet as altemtive policy CC var. Thus the MM *Okt veil. have ewsl6wed it necessary to ciiy,* the and the , and cause a cctios of Us Pwor is Burftw m If anything i euld be inclined to twesse the t rbowe of the s le+ar so a deteeraimant at the Vresont line of BOVIOt policy. fat that the mast ieewtant f ctor is the Soviet calculation Western strength and unity mdg!at be UWaLwAl by a m)ftm Soviet . 25X1 3o The consultants Lend the y rcblaes of recenaiuse the PrOOMb conciliatory tivad at Bawl" in MWOM with the evidences of In" ev"Ole Soviet ,cyr else re? the qowIbLUty that the uee Ye eftw. voice in policy mad . with the statslant In M l1-13-55 that the Soviet a ffit ht have to tam into account advene ie reactions if they reverted to a tan policy after POWUIMS a MUMUCS licy AV MW tin.25X1 24o bell that the Wesent tion In ZUXOLW ye dictated by Goviet iyatiae of onwgift arises in the l East and. by the Intestlau to the US isolated ftee its zwop"n allies in such QI s. Be fish that the would es;wty end PWbW +e 'fates little QIdMW h it would plan to >msui; ulat~ra Approved For Release 2006/ VIOMU000400020009-7 Approved For Release 2006/11/05: CIA-RDP79T00937A000400020009-7 to the disadvarxts s of the use so ~ai'tieulsr be folG+eaar as i vitabl. -erns" is ~adoahima vbess Us try,, dpee,t1 thaeoU its Vitt iMab a23y, sea Lest It "just by Letting the mu well flora MU.v r- I dodsw 'hat the tl Maki . visit a Par stern Crisis of xmzm~ WjWM tthst the Wn obi t W ISM as 5X1 fa vom V wt they 'will aria about. is eeeted Vat the as 1at lemons eea d seek to avoid aeeu ubm arises if it d. that the 1$ zssolre thee- atdtaua~ae ue~y. 5. lhaare yes a awme" d seiner swoug the oolsau,L is to believe thet the Wmemat Soviet peLicy tooted last fn an wxbomftd puvbm of tie, soete ; ew pseheps as 2mg as flee or teme yesne. 25X1 behead the Smut phew last tear tart years. In h e ":::Itbe Sowi.t l+ea xr v d jea and ss their gins it VW $vot'ned aek in the nom' t ufAm ad they vva]A be +aeaable to eke 25X1 was of was saf policy amain fen a an* e1r of years me* they had aped a"" that at 10 limo i st tits 1Q ,e or fnoe a ateoge In Soviet pull y after about 25X1 fYtea t6t the pmt poltexy is 60914"d to disarm and the Vest. At saw point the Soviet lead=* sy ale that they have aobimed option results. At aveh a juwtwe# is it not vm~iveb r that the vouli be xW=Oy tockond to aoei" the am e meaI to a drive an the West= 60 ' Ce teas little aq rt tar the proposition that the Sow** lmdws had beecen one comeawd with the UM as a Great 25X1 poww tit 'with the ce or Coo umiaet as a remInUmmy adeitted the posaibti ty of seams snot evo3 ion app~tvniti~es but be the Somist 2=ftm vorlld mob a] off for fta i~en 11t~g Cam. E- I ... obi that the 25X1 ~mm West is ~ daalsng with a aattvre 1 iat diploen ey ubiub by no =me ' the couUwaA operation of the C St 25X1 00* . iita .ats that it vo A be ilataotmtee a1Ad ecn. dis'Ei a b between t pat+mr go&U and idsologieeal fusing t0 w" - Pals. no Soviet boe'lisve in the pow of the stet, but they also lave a s lified, ideol,,egA,aa1~?y Collared view at their ultiaete ahjaeotivvs. 25X1 To belies d that at the ACta =Wft of the feareUpn der, ~Mm et lmad+ 'would seek to tae to t)wGw ear that Wrognm toted alai.4", oetieaat Q d not be acs at the four-yaw 2.vel4 lie also with SIM 23-55, ft- L 25X6 the !estimates Am= Approved For Release 2006/11/05: CIA-RDP79T00937AO00400020009-7 Approved For Release 2006/11/05: CIA-RDP79T00937AO00400020009-7 8. W th Z'ec,eat to the !dale out, JI bed the- 25X1 e~itdat. the Banat point at vier as s %IwN Loa s tan *amp* bl a3so in the P r nu*. an largely aeee tp of bsaiwrd a tr*ea w epee sabIMMIMW of been Is v raian ~t Sorb iu those ardaa. ~~ it is aav the A%vb li * that 44111"A me the UM till, be s slab] a to the Yhioh ilndi0erre 11 esa 'to abjtstt ~~e111it 25X1 o addled t h a t as. o v , l e n d e r s not recopSm the ar Ax"-L :seii 'wee" sad tbat thery MEN" have &Wiftd to run the sialft or snob as ? amity. 25X1 that the ads of the i= is to eahblieb is elals to is big lmr aneidtelat3,oee at the I35 Wat. We t that the Soviet 25X1 lesrdeors waft csioulsts Vn- mw is the *ddle West wld ellp to addwre this end. obw~vrd that it taw owwe is WIMI to the SOVI $ yodI't o? " tt ta. 25X1 Mt e o- j us vo i be forced into a '+o~? -Aran role bra 25X1 ea a~sod the eammle Usitatjo. en the tales abiliy an aMwe cc am a. r he to the i he e of Od and Asi 25X1 ixaaort at the estmot be "80011100d* ens mum ixPesa d with the economic, ampbilities at the iwti it is mae+e able then the U9 to mm tplctly ant ondgtr. a n~sarxar In- was SOMMI c ac,, Vita saw disant fr s II faith the heats at BI62~ 11.11?55s "Sous mw .1 atioss a Approved For Release M-W79TOO937A000400020009-7 Approved For Release 2006/11/05: CIA-RDP79T00937AO00400020009-7 AVxt= of tl 1. AnMawto I . a that ilea a elf t a bas b aft r Ountab3sa Uffi .t In *Ierw of 1 polit Control. jwuwea that faaaa~+ae in the um would To uvg po1itieal . espt# the softest UMM CGUII GO A - tioaa plan =A thm tb a roaft2ooks in the ' of its affective aaaaasi that the ematiaaat,in s Svwl*b ability cqP* asarit~at that threst pond by f Mters. At fte MM t1 was he believed that the 8ovL*U we= yrdbaW iffite the tAwnt to their paaaa1iti1 dol. posed by tb* inspogte . 1U a a steed Oat the large vitbout am rs. Be noted that the p btra bem awAjrjjwS its seawlty l a mind my be achUmIng effta2sr d v twwww 7"" of t in ufftmA CC adevgi faaaam ce the of the ate, a substantial. amity cusuaft few as . 29 also a' in s metia g an ftaters f&VWJM reawds s sairlse et as of an the i =wb awe ]AM* that the a attwA by V as ce vsb3aaa: than who understud the W political zyxtefjo AU the 001294MInts agreed that the pbrasirs of the eat!lmtive jweblm vas god that It is ing to ludicate that Soviet uasf ascow2tance of i iou aaaas a vwAld ]=A to a LUS awe s a s > s b 1 thas C tiama i n a at, asst eI7 * as as these in Snd . 39, ul is stint the a in ~ 5ar l @as S ti tion.~ 25X1 that the to OhVIAM have l am" an the V ImpUcaftens of Tito' ae the places. eseetCeaa a at POSOMIt uy am eatieste that '> is a t am* d :ISUVBMd tMt tale Vast$ tea of SaVi.Qt- 25X1 ? yvjpsUv.ft-SWtc " t Is t ant Will. require future ostiaa. - V14 ft 1 Ibe1?_ Vsd t the clasw tias since be b*U*VMd Tito to be than ears. 3a t XtwGMW Fite Vas sates. in iaaalg to fur the SOVIOU G" vluug to lp in > . Soviets in tam maaky wish to lime TUG, as a brIdAp fear' a the moist JWUW in the West. Approved For Release 2006/11/05: CIA-RDP79T00937A000400020009-7 the likelihood of effective SOVIOt thew of a ca ter to vis-a-vis xugwlav cowiffmaists a Titoiasts sli.Te~ We also noted that ' iatsess sacs st iti in 1a since such Stic ban on `Moss sal s ae on the west to sn. dim 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/11/05: CIA-RDP79T00937A000400020009-7 V cONFJDINTIAL IV. DEVELOP-! IN THE MiDIULE FAST 25X6 in 25X1 opinion Fgyptiau public opinion may nev ess ores the to act against its better judgment. If there develops?a struggle between Egypt and Israel,, the pressures in Iraq at the lower levels of the population will be so intense that it will be extremely difficult to keep Iraq off Israel's back. The elite Iraqi may not agree with the masses but probably will be forced to .go along with the anti-Israeli waar. 25X1 15, wondered if the traditional inter-Arab rivalries would not rged during a time of Egyptian-Israeli conflict. 25X1 Loubted that even an Egyptian war against Israel could overenaww the antagonisms within the Arab world. He admitted that in the event of such a war the Arab states would be likely to participate, with varying degrees of enthusiasm. However, Arab rivalries would become most evident if the war went badly for Egypt. In these circumstances the Iraqi might argue that their best contri- bution to stabilising the situation would be to form a greater Syria. 16. The consultants were pessimistic about a peaceful resolution of the I yption-Israeli difficulties. It was agreed that the Soviet leaders have succeeded in opening a new area of conflict between the US and the USSR, and that recent Soviet policy poses an extraordinarily delicate and intricate problem for the US. said that if the 25X1 Israeli attack Egypt the USSR might achieve prestige gains by appealing 25X1 to the UN for an international force to put dose the aggression., oted that win or lose the Arabs will remember that they received is from the Soviet Bloc and that the US armed Israel. The consultants speculated that possibly an international "honest broker" could be found to influence Israel against a belligerent course of action. suggested that the USSR might indicate its willingness to wit o arms from the Arabs in return for the dismantling of US bases abroad* 25X1 6., Approved For Release 2006/1 1/ Approved For Release 2006/11/05: CIA-RDP79T00937A000400020009-7 cu 25X1 25X1 V. NIE 100-745: WILD SITUATION AND LONGER TERM TRENDS (Staff Draft) 17. The consultants commented favorably an the Staff Draft as a 'hole. However# there were numerous criticisms, regarding scope and detail. In particular the consultants believed that the paper tried to project too far into the future, ._AU agreed that more attention should be paid to China and Indochina. believed25x1 that the draft over-estimated Bloc flexibility in fairly stable areas such as Western Europe. He advocated toning down the paper's concentration on Bloc policies in stable areas of the world. The Bloc is unlikely to engage us in areas where the US is strong, but around the periphery where we are weak. What, for example, is going to be Soviet policy toward an aspiring world power like India? Will not the leaders of India and Yugoslavia seek to take advantage of the Soviet soft policy to go along on their ownL;:~agreed 25X1 that the draft should place much more emphasis on ively backward world areas and on countries with neutralist ambitions. also believed that the role of the neutral and backward states should e further explored. The crisis is not yet upon us in Africa. Should not the emtimate tell us more. about this area so that we can be prepared? He would .also like to see concentration on the probable our allies and what it will take to keep NATO a going concern. ded that an omission was the possible effect of the erosion es on the Satellites. doubted this since the now Soviet policy is for export only. ? not anticipate internal diffi- culties in the USSR if the Soviet leadership eventually decided to reverse its policy. The change could be blamed on US intransigencee thought that increased Soviet efforts to "use" the UN might a developed somewhat. 25X1 18. protested that-the draft gives the r thoutuncertainty and changes elt that there should be more on the Soviet tactic of manip- a little crises, especially in the Far East, so as to maximize gains while inhibiting US action and contributing to a deterioration of NATO or a dissipation of NATO resources. He added that in Europe the USSR has little more that it can afford to give away, but grave problems remain unresolved. The people-of Europe are likely to become very much aware that on really big problems Soviet policy continues to be inflexible. Approved For Release 2006/11/05: CIA-RDP79T00937A000400020009-7 Approved For Release 200NA, .;s , .F pf JWJ00937AOQ0400020009-7 UUIVI-IUULII 1 It%L *010 Mow lg egarded Indochina as an irresistible opportunity for Communist Mna, and were very pessimistic regarding the survival of South Vietnam. Both were agreed that the draft should indicate that there is much greater Chinese interest in Vietnam ( and a hi her degree of danger there) than in the offshore islands. elieved.that the growing magnitude of the China problem reqqxres re attention in the draft on Communist intentions toward Southeast Asia. Approved For Release 2006/11/05: CIA-RDP79T00937A000400020009-7