SOVIET INTENTIONS IN EAST-WEST CONTACTS.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00937A000400020015-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 1999
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: October 11, 1955
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGET'CE AGEP3CY
OFFTC~ QF NAT301'1AL ESTI~~ETTES
u oatober 1955
STAFF ~~G~iANDIIN! N~?, 72-55
SUBJECTs Soviet Yntentiorus~ in East--~iest Contacts
to The Sov3.ot stress upon increased East-~~est contacts which
began soon after Stalin~e death with public acknowledgements of the
achievements of western science and technology was given new impeta~
at Geneva. One of the Geneva conference directives emphasised the
necessity for freer oontacts ~d exahan~res and the mutual. advantages
to be dnrivedp Soviet lenders have since provided numerous concrete
examples of their willingness to sponsor such exchanges frith mar~r
countriea8 and particularly with the United Statase The USSR
apparently Plans a series of esoahanges to follow the recant visit
of their agricultural delegation to the USa
~~, This desire to increase contacts raises the question of what
,the USSR hopes to gain fraao thmna The Soviet leaders probably estimate
that #,he advantages of increased East-West contacts will outweigh the
possible disadvantagess particularly the danger that Bloc cititaeena
visiting the West will realiz? the inadequacies and falsshaads of the
official Soviet view of the Weat9 and Lose confidence in the Soviet
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~.,
regiame and its policies, It is th~~ purpose of this paper to discnea~
the advaatages which we believe the Soviets expect to gain0
1?tA t~ IA,L-TL+'C~i"'I~AL
.~
3. Increased Soviet trav~al and freer contacts with the US gill
add substantially to the USSR~s technical information, and thins evo3-
tually to its economic strength. The Soviet agaricultural delegation
to the US, by first hand observation of t~ farming techniques, gained
information which will aid it in improving Soviet agratechnique and
thereby Soviet economic growth, The delegation was also able to acaquire
livestock, additional farm publicationsa and several types of farm.
machinerye The Srn-iet delegatioa consisted of men well qualified bath
to benefit Prom their tour and to apply their newly acquired knowledge
in the USSRa The composition of Future delegations both in the field
of agriculture and in other fields in which US technical know parr is
mare advanced than that of the USSR, such as the bossing construction
tour currently in progress, will also be chosen ~~ aa~der to gain the
~ technical and material advantage to the US5R~
PO
4p The USSR can also be expected to exploit in fu7.l m?asure the
propaganda potential Prom East-west oontaotso The USSR will point
to these contacts and requests far e~achanges as proof of the peace-
Pulness and sincerity of Soviet intentions? Ar~r hesitancy an the
part of the US to cooperate Sys or any insistence upon fulfillment
5!'S
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of onerous legal requirements by Soviet visitors, such as fingerprint-
ing, can be expected to be sited as exaffiples of 05 obstructionismo
The Soviet propaganda line an "internationalism" is already moving
from the old, narrower "proletarian internationalism" to a new coa~aept
of "Soviet internationalism" which involves the "propagation of ideas
of fri?ndship betwe?n nations, regardless of their social systems"a
5m The 'ITS: R porababl~ also hopes to create conftzsian regsrding
ultimate Soviet ob3ectives through contacts between ostensibly well-
meaning, Friendly, and garacioua Soviets and '~S officials, professional,
and business men. They may eur~ect to re-establish in part the acceg-
tance of Soviet Russi$ which obtained in many circles during the ].ate
?30a and war years by stressing such themes as the desire fcr pe8ae~
the need far more widespread trade, the potential of peaceful use opt
nuclear power! etc., and by emphasising thane elements of Cammnnist
ideology and the Soviet systean which on the aurfaue appear to be caon-
patible with Western values Tl~e Soviets probably estimate that they
have a good chance of gaining such acceptance .from a selected nuatber
of legislators, scholars, ,~usinc~as, and professional mend Far ezemple,
it was noted it a recent issue of "Problems of History" (the ~aurn~t7.
published by the Institute of History of the A+cadon~ of Sciences oi'
the IISSR) that "there are max-y non-Marxist h3storiane is capitali$t
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aountries ~rha are doing fruitful tixork~, and that ~Sov$et schcalars are
reads to eac~rate with these historians in Dreier to develop histarical
science and to contribute to the p~x~4gre8s of science and cu~.ture ~'
,point efforta~~ xt was carefully nrtad, however, that certain "react-
ianary bourgeois historians" eau]d not be included 1?*ithin the pate of
this Saint effort, which would include Joint publication broad?ned
personal contacts, mail correspondence, and frequent exchange of pro-
fessars far lecturing and research,
x,x~E.zc~
~obaba.~
64 The ~aviet leaders/also antioip~.te acquiring adc3itiana3.
intelligence t~irough incr?ased East-Nast contacts, although their
probably do net expect to obtain by this means positive alassified
iaatelligence on DS strategic capabilities and intentians4 'fhsir
principal goa~.~; ~.-ill probabl~r gat {a) to ac~uira greater insight into
US political attitudes end overal.7. L~ industrial and technical. oapabilities~
and ~b~ to cultivate a+ssociaticns in the '~S which could les.~'. either
to the direct acc~uisit3an of intelligence, or to ct?aating a backlog
of potential cut-Data, contacts, etc, far future exploitation bra t~
So~riet cavort organization,
CO~GL~C~IIt~
7~ ilhi:l? the Soviets probably intend max~nmm exploitation of the
advantages inherent in increased personal contacts with the 1West,
they will almost aext~in3.3- hake steps to prevent thy West from abta~.ning
reciprocal mdvantageso Thy wi31 preserve the appearancse of reaiproeity~
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'bat will nevertheless impose careftil. though not obviously aontralled
restrictions on Western travellers, permitting them, for the moat part,
to see what the Soviets went them to secs, and 'bo contact rarerfuLty
selectad Soviet citizens. The soviet citizens pyrmitted to go abroad
will also be selected and controlled.
8. The Soviets will probably also urge more widespread e~oahanges
of information in order to preserve the "spirit of Geneva" and the
appearance of recjprocity, but probably frith the primary purpose of
ecc!uiring more docuraonts fro4n the US. However, they will oontinae
to ezercise olose control over exchange of do,suments, as well as
censor hip over such other information media as the press, radio, oral
private correspondence. As in the cas? of personal excshangesy the
Soviets wall probably expect to derive political and propaganda
advantages from ostensibly freor interchanges of information, while
at the same t9a~e derxvin~ to the i~5 equal opportunities for either
disseminating or acquir3.ng information. ~~ ~
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