THE DANGER OF WAR IN THE EVENT OF REVOLT IN POLAND AND EAST GERMANY

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00937A000500020001-5
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RIPPUB
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S
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4
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
February 13, 2001
Sequence Number: 
1
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Publication Date: 
December 18, 1956
Content Type: 
MEMO
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Approved For Re,ase 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T0g37A000500020001-5 C E 11 T R A L INT ELLI G E N C E A G E N C Y STAFF MEMO. 97-56 18 December 1956 SUBJECT s The Danger of War in the Event of Revolt in Poland and East Germany 1. The idea that the outbreak of open resistance to the Soviet-- controlled regime in East Germany would bring with it grave danger of general iar appears to have won wide acceptance. We believe that this concept deserves closer examination. In accord with our belief that current prospectE. in East Germany izust be viewed in the context of possible develop- ments in Poland,, this memorandum discusses a). the current situation in Poland, b) the prospedta for revolt in East Germany given alternative developments in Poland,, and c) the hypothesis that there would be acute danger of war if an East German revolt did occur. Tne Con~~,zz,# :yP,~. 2. Thera are signs that the temperature of Polish political life is rising rapidly., Recent violent incidents indicate that considerable numbers of people are not amenable to the regime's arguments regarding the necessity 'or the Polish-Soviet alliance and the dangers of anti-Soviet provocations? Soviet intervention in Hungary remains an extremely live issue, inflaming Polish opinion and perhaps shaming many Poles who are proud of their tradit3.cnal nationalism against hopeless odds,, 3. The activities of "hooligan" elements are not a sufficient explan- ation of recent incidents. Regime spokesmen are probably justified in hinting darkly that pro-Soviet elements ousted from the Party leadership in October are seeking to provoke Soviet intervention. Some of the Party intelligentsia,, fervent in their belief in "humanitarian socialism" as Poland's message to the world, continue to distrust Gomulka, Party dis.si~ plane remains weeks provincial organs continue indiscriminate shakeups despite WarsawAs warnings, and journalists returned from Budapest, finding ENT NO. -1 `G.ASS. tJ DECLAS DATE: AUTH: HA 70-2 NEXT REVIEW DATE- CLASS. CHANG0 Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00937A000500020001-5 Approved For Rase 2001/03/09: CIA-RDP79Tf, 37A000500020001-5 their articles censored, are touring the country to address mass meetings. Meanwhile, the basically anti--Communist majority is prolb,nbly divided as to -whether the time is ripe for proceeding to "the second stage" of the Polish revolution. 4. The Soviet Union continues to exercise unprecedented restraint in the face of grave provocation, inclixding such incidents as Polish departures from Bloc unity at the UN and in the controversy with Tito; the new freedm for religious education in the schools; the fragmentation of the youth or-- ganization and the re eetion of Party control over it; the similar indepen- dence of trade unions Fran Party control; and outspoken press attacks on Stfulirasm coupled with statements clearly imploring that the USSR still adheres to Stalinism. The Soviet leaders may be directing the maneuvers of the Natolingraup, but the Soviet public position is solid support for Gomulka, who is evidently still regarded as the best guarantor of Soviet interests. Soviet press coverage of Poland, however, is devoted not to GomulkaAa pro- gram or his accom i ishnents but to his difficulties with anti-Soviet and anti-Party elements and to deplorable weakness in the security organs, Without specifically referring to Poland, ZLUIzAg on 12 December criticized articles in the Corrmmmnist press which deviate from iirxism and help reaction. While this propaganda does not point to an early Soviet intervention, it does seem to leave Poland on probation, 5. Gomulka will almost certainly continue to give first priority to Polish-Soviet relations? He will also considerably increase his tine of repressive methods penalties for party indisci.plire, more extensive cersolp s' iT: closer control over public mentinrs, etc. - if persuasion produces no better results than at _)resent~ the outbreak of anti-regime violence on a large scale, which wonild almost certainly precipitate Soviet intervention remains unlikely at present, mainly because Gomulka has not yet exhausted the credit he on :n October and therefore insufficient unity exists for mass action against the regime, So long as Hungarian resistance continues, however, various disaffected groups are likely to have a fertile field of popular unrest in which to work, and the situation will remain potentially explosive. Est Ge 6 Except in the event of a prior Polish revolt, an Fast German up- rising is unlikely. Although discontent is at a high pitch, especially among students and workers, and is being sustained although probably not increased by the continued Hungarian crisis., it is being met firmly by a united party. The Party split which played such a key role in Poland and Hungary appears unlikely, given the highly .uinerable position of the SED In the country. Official propaganda has impressed upon SED members and the police that the first act of the Hungarian rebels was to lynch Communists and policement. The presence of nearly half a million Soviet soldiers, the 01-ZIRE`f Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00937A000500020001-5 Approved For Rase 2001/03/09: CIA-RDP79T( 37A000500020001-5 CONFIDENTIAL belief that Western aid would not be forthcoming, and memories of June 1953, will probably act as effective deterrents,, 7. A Polish uprising involving Soviet forces would increase the chances of an East German revolt by raising emotional tensions and improving East German estimates of the chances of success,, This would bo particularly true in areas vacated by Soviet troops required in Poland. On the other hand, the Germans might conclude from their experiences in 1953 and from the current Hunrarian resistance that passive forms of struggle., including the general strike would be most effective. A general strike would always carry the danger of a wider outbreak of violence, S. There appears to be a widely held view among Western leaders and the press that a revolt in East Germany would lead to World War Ill. In our opinion, this possibility has been overstressed and it is more probable that the potential danger in this situation would be contained. 7 he USSR Mould certainly have every interest in preventing a broader conflict from developing. West Germany, NATO, and the US have formally stated that they would not in,rvene with force In the Satellite area. Spontaneous efforts by West Germans on any significant scale to aid the East Germans would be unlikely and could be contained by the Federal Republic. The risks would of course increase if there should be protracted fighting in East German- y., but resistance could probably not be prolonged against the very large Soviet forces which would be available, 9. The risks of Western involvement would arise almost entirely from the special situation of Berlin;, The population in the western sectors would give aid and sanctuary to East Germans and Soviet forces would probably be unable to seal off the entire periphery of the western sectors. In this situation, the US.? would probably cut rail and road corriunications from West Germany on the plea of insecurity in the area. We do not consider it likely that the Soviets would interfere with access by air or would occupy the Western sectors of Berlin. Their aim would be to avoid a direct challenge to the Western Powers and to suppress resistance quickly,, We estimate they would succeed in this, iO, The real risks of war if such a situation developed in East Germany would arise from the possibility that the Western Powers, perhaps under pressure of public opinion, might alter their present policy on the matter,, If having giver. implicit assurances of non-intervention, they nevertheless took steps toward intervening the risks of war by miscalculation would be very grefst4, If such a change in the Western attitude did not occur,, C DZIFIEDZINTIAL Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00937A000500020001-5 Approved For ReJpase 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79TOq 37A000500020001-5 CONTIMSHTIAL however. the USSR would almost certainly s^ek to avoid direct provocation and would probe-bly he capable of suppressing resistance within a short 25X1A9a 6 YNDMINTIAL Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00937A000500020001-5