THE DANGER OF WAR IN THE EVENT OF REVOLT IN POLAND AND EAST GERMANY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00937A000500020001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 18, 1956
• Content Type: MEMO

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C E 11 T R A L INT ELLI G E N C E A G E N C Y
STAFF MEMO. 97-56
18 December 1956
SUBJECT s The Danger of War in the Event of Revolt in Poland and
East Germany
1. The idea that the outbreak of open resistance to the Soviet--
controlled regime in East Germany would bring with it grave danger of
general iar appears to have won wide acceptance. We believe that this
concept deserves closer examination. In accord with our belief that current
prospectE. in East Germany izust be viewed in the context of possible develop-
ments in Poland,, this memorandum discusses a). the current situation in
Poland, b) the prospedta for revolt in East Germany given alternative
developments in Poland,, and c) the hypothesis that there would be acute
danger of war if an East German revolt did occur.
Tne Con~~,zz,# :yP,~.
2. Thera are signs that the temperature of Polish political life is
rising rapidly., Recent violent incidents indicate that considerable
numbers of people are not amenable to the regime's arguments regarding
the necessity 'or the Polish-Soviet alliance and the dangers of anti-Soviet
provocations? Soviet intervention in Hungary remains an extremely live
issue, inflaming Polish opinion and perhaps shaming many Poles who are
proud of their tradit3.cnal nationalism against hopeless odds,,
3. The activities of "hooligan" elements are not a sufficient explan-
ation of recent incidents. Regime spokesmen are probably justified in
hinting darkly that pro-Soviet elements ousted from the Party leadership
in October are seeking to provoke Soviet intervention. Some of the Party
intelligentsia,, fervent in their belief in "humanitarian socialism" as
Poland's message to the world, continue to distrust Gomulka, Party dis.si~
plane remains weeks provincial organs continue indiscriminate shakeups
despite WarsawAs warnings, and journalists returned from Budapest, finding
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their articles censored, are touring the country to address mass meetings.
Meanwhile, the basically anti--Communist majority is prolb,nbly divided as
to -whether the time is ripe for proceeding to "the second stage" of the
Polish revolution.
4. The Soviet Union continues to exercise unprecedented restraint in
the face of grave provocation, inclixding such incidents as Polish departures
from Bloc unity at the UN and in the controversy with Tito; the new freedm
for religious education in the schools; the fragmentation of the youth or--
ganization and the re eetion of Party control over it; the similar indepen-
dence of trade unions Fran Party control; and outspoken press attacks on
Stfulirasm coupled with statements clearly imploring that the USSR still adheres
to Stalinism. The Soviet leaders may be directing the maneuvers of the
Natolingraup, but the Soviet public position is solid support for Gomulka,
who is evidently still regarded as the best guarantor of Soviet interests.
Soviet press coverage of Poland, however, is devoted not to GomulkaAa pro-
gram or his accom i ishnents but to his difficulties with anti-Soviet and
anti-Party elements and to deplorable weakness in the security organs,
Without specifically referring to Poland, ZLUIzAg on 12 December criticized
articles in the Corrmmmnist press which deviate from iirxism and help reaction.
While this propaganda does not point to an early Soviet intervention, it
does seem to leave Poland on probation,
5. Gomulka will almost certainly continue to give first priority to
Polish-Soviet relations? He will also considerably increase his tine of
repressive methods penalties for party indisci.plire, more extensive cersolp s' iT:
closer control over public mentinrs, etc. - if persuasion produces no
better results than at _)resent~ the outbreak of anti-regime violence on
a large scale, which wonild almost certainly precipitate Soviet intervention
remains unlikely at present, mainly because Gomulka has not yet exhausted
the credit he on :n October and therefore insufficient unity exists for
mass action against the regime, So long as Hungarian resistance continues,
however, various disaffected groups are likely to have a fertile field of
popular unrest in which to work, and the situation will remain potentially
explosive.
Est Ge
6 Except in the event of a prior Polish revolt, an Fast German up-
rising is unlikely. Although discontent is at a high pitch, especially
among students and workers, and is being sustained although probably not
increased by the continued Hungarian crisis., it is being met firmly by a
united party. The Party split which played such a key role in Poland and
Hungary appears unlikely, given the highly .uinerable position of the SED
In the country. Official propaganda has impressed upon SED members and
the police that the first act of the Hungarian rebels was to lynch Communists
and policement. The presence of nearly half a million Soviet soldiers, the
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belief that Western aid would not be forthcoming, and memories of June
1953, will probably act as effective deterrents,,
7. A Polish uprising involving Soviet forces would increase the
chances of an East German revolt by raising emotional tensions and improving
East German estimates of the chances of success,, This would bo particularly
true in areas vacated by Soviet troops required in Poland. On the other
hand, the Germans might conclude from their experiences in 1953 and from
the current Hunrarian resistance that passive forms of struggle., including
the general strike would be most effective. A general strike would always
carry the danger of a wider outbreak of violence,
S. There appears to be a widely held view among Western leaders and
the press that a revolt in East Germany would lead to World War Ill. In
our opinion, this possibility has been overstressed and it is more probable
that the potential danger in this situation would be contained. 7 he USSR
Mould certainly have every interest in preventing a broader conflict from
developing. West Germany, NATO, and the US have formally stated that they
would not in,rvene with force In the Satellite area. Spontaneous efforts
by West Germans on any significant scale to aid the East Germans would
be unlikely and could be contained by the Federal Republic. The risks
would of course increase if there should be protracted fighting in East
German-
y., but resistance could probably not be prolonged against the very
large Soviet forces which would be available,
9. The risks of Western involvement would arise almost entirely from
the special situation of Berlin;, The population in the western sectors
would give aid and sanctuary to East Germans and Soviet forces would
probably be unable to seal off the entire periphery of the western sectors.
In this situation, the US.? would probably cut rail and road corriunications
from West Germany on the plea of insecurity in the area. We do not consider
it likely that the Soviets would interfere with access by air or would occupy
the Western sectors of Berlin. Their aim would be to avoid a direct challenge
to the Western Powers and to suppress resistance quickly,, We estimate they
would succeed in this,
iO, The real risks of war if such a situation developed in East
Germany would arise from the possibility that the Western Powers, perhaps
under pressure of public opinion, might alter their present policy on the
matter,, If having giver. implicit assurances of non-intervention, they
nevertheless took steps toward intervening the risks of war by miscalculation
would be very grefst4, If such a change in the Western attitude did not occur,,
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however. the USSR would almost certainly s^ek to avoid direct provocation
and would probe-bly he capable of suppressing resistance within a short
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