TROUBLE SPOTS IN BURMESE-COMMUNIST CHINESE RELATIONS*

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00937A000500020030-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 12, 2001
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: August 27, 1956
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved FofrNWO,Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP7 0937A000500020030-3
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
C'"ICE CV NATItIOL ZOTIKMMS
UMENT NO. 2-46
N0 %AWE IN CLASS. Q
CLAW. cwANe3E Ts .S( 27 August 1956
AUTH: i1R 7
DATE: REVIEWER: -0
STAFF' NE UM NOo 76-56
GU s Trouble Spots in Bu see sat Chinese 1 3atie ss
1* In recent weeks Burmese leaders have expressed concern
publicly over Burry ? s relations with the Bloc in general and with
Communist China in paarticulaaro They have raised the perennial
Bursa-China border conflict *nd have expressed concern over Chinese
Communist political and military activity in the disputed bend
asares. They ?save evidenced extreme frriteaticin at the C1 ese
CommIst Ea assye a financial support of the Co reset-dcminaate
National United Front (Nib`) which registered Important gains during
the recent elections for Burma's Chamber of Deputies, and they
have stated dissatisfaction with the extensive barter deals Burma
bass concluded with the USSR triad Ccaemunisat Chinas
24 Bed in July, TZE NATICff, a leading Rangoon pars
published a series of stories maiming that several hundred m
later several the wand -u fully armed Chinese Cos ist troops bad
invaded Burma along the disputed border and bad established them.
selves in positions up to 60 miles inside Burmese territory, Although
the Burmese goverment has attempted to give the impression that it
doss not vent to intake International issue of the border situation,, it
is reasonably well established that the basis for the stories
sensationalized In THE NATI were "leaked" to the Wass by Burmese
g overnment officials. This suggests that the Burmese leaders am
attempting to asccomplish by publicity vbst they have fair to accomplish
by diplomacy; naran1y, a negotiated formal demarcation of the Chinese-
Burmese border.
3. Since former Prime b1inister U Nuts trip to Peiping in
December 1951+, the Burmese government has tried repeatedly to got
ftiping to enter into negotiations to settle the bed problem.
Although Peiping has consistently agreed that the issue am be settled
by peaceful regctiationas, the .regime has just are consistently refused
to enter into negotiaationsa ]e, Chinese Communist military
The substance of this randum has been discussed with OCX,
Approved For Rele __~_ - DP79T00937A000500020030-3
 Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDPW00937A000500020030-3
SIMM
and political activity in the disputed boarder regimens has increased
in size and escape during the pant year o The Chinese Cc maunists
have is roved trails and roads into the area from Yuman and. have
;sent political agents into the region to vin over the local hill tribes
and chiefs, Although the military situation in the disputed border
area is unclear, it is known that small units of Chinese Communist
troops have been in the area since 2953 and that these units have
been recently reinforced. A number of armed clashes betumen Burmese
and Chinese Countmist units bbve been reported, but the only Incident
thus far sa knowtlerdged by the Burmese get occurred in November
1955 during a Burmese army "flag march" in the disputed border ares.
Additional incidents are likely because of the close pratlmity of
Burmese and Ch4xaese Caaamaamiast. trOOps in the area e
4. Peiping ? s position, as exprensed by the PSt a S DA= and
Radio Peiping, is that "Chinese frcutier army units have been in
their present position" all alcrg, that the area is "an unsettled
zone" and, consequently, there can be *no such question as crossi
into the territory of Burma." Although the Chinese Cor n' fists may
be atte> ing to intimidate the Burmese governments or to divert
plawsed Burmess army opmtIons against Comisunist insurgents, it is
more likely that Peiping is seeking to consolidate its administrative
and ztlitaary control i the disputed boarder areas so as to cwt
Burma with a de facto situation in any future border negotiations.
fte Burmese go a scat, aware of what is happening, is unable at this
time to establish administrative control in many parts of the disputed
territe'y, and is uauwi1l ing directly to provoke or to antagonize
Peiping. While Burma ban protested to Peiping and has recalled its
Ambassador for consultations, the Burmese government thus far has
shame no disposition to seek outside assistance.
5, Peiping would probably por'efeer a fuzzy border which would.
facilitate subversion and ttafiltr,tion and provide a evord to hold
ccrrtinu l,y over Burmse heads. However p coasid~eri l iping's current
arias o peaceful cowl ce vith neighboring Asian states, it
is likely that Peiping viii ultimaate].y agree to the toranastioas c
soap kind of Joint boar ccmnffiesion. If any megoxtiaticns do
materialises, they are likely to be protracted or incoaselusiveo
6. Another irritant in Burmese-Chinese relations is the financial
aid funneled to the Burmese Coaawaunists through the Chinese Gist
Embassy in Rangoon. In the past, Burmese leaders have given no sign
of great concerns over this breach of male of the five principles of
"peaceful coexi.stence? weer, during the 1956 elections, CCcm%unist
Chins reportedly coaatributed heavily to the pro-Co maunist National
United P rout (MV) which registered disturbing gams in popular vote
and in the Mmkber of Deputies. bmediately after the elections, U Nu
aaud Prises Mii inter Bea Swes publicly denounced foreign Interference
in Bur's internal affairs, referring to it as a ewer type of
imperialism vhich conquers by subverelono
Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00937A000500020030-3
SHUT
 Approved Fo~,Release 2001/Qw& CIA-RDP79_Tp0937A000500020030-3
`+r
CONFIDENTIAL
7. l'ss relations with sunisat s, are a1o s tr:+t sss':a
a result of COMMIErt Chi a a recent & Toro to me l rice In t.rdi tic aar-1
Burmese s kets m- offers cede ps saible, In , by sflai'._ s of
rice to COmmmist Iq a nte,
a?oault of ? s extensive b t ? c ? t :ate to the B7.c , s ss lc a
tion of supply and demmd,, and au curd sales a, em,*u at with
ma for two mill.iasen tons of rice over a five year prxj ( ,,, by mid
1956 Burm's surplus rice ly van exhsasus ` . Subs qw ly,, O wilt
China noved into the temporary aaelluras t o to .atg .rAft 2CO'.000
tons of rice and selling 60,to0 togas to Bata , both p?r d l
sales which ftrm could fulfill f lack of supp y0
8. irritant in general. se. Bloc relntia i the i ilm?e
of the barter deals with the Bloc to live ugh to &,=egg a '' pes'iotua
Initially the se leaders had. welcos sd the barter a ex ;s as
the solution to existing and tuts rice surpluses sue, is a tion,
had believed than to be sbrad business deals bmause the B1 age,
to as prt Burns ? s high lice for rice. Mover, the W or co ntries
inflated their ?i ces in return so that, an bay , acs d, to
U Mz, Bmvm last 10 to 30 pericent its batter trade m :sago, lea s
has found, it difTic;ult to satisfy its sit needs f om .oc ?ao ee; .
9o As a result these dwnlqMnts., Be bra, A y Prj=
ester KYRv Yams and U Nu have all expmqsed their desire to
reduce lbw ? s barter cast s and to m r ilre bar t raft jr
the future. Although this r nt a rience in barter trade will
probably cause lase hers to be a ci rou pect ip ent
into future economic deals with the USM as ul oat stt CW s, a
will probably att=Wt to repAlete existing barftr eK'uts
in order to retain a safety 1.v in t e event of : 'ezture rice
surpluses aud to avoid political lieaticrns. 8 v , : will
probably try to reduce or Wstpme rice deliveries to tbe, Bloc duri ,
the present rice ewrtage.
3.06 Although these three trouble sus in
sC!c asp;
Chinese relations - border di s, 'erea a in lvn ? s
internal affairs and barter trade -- are tte s Sri a s concern
inside Burnes e g a ci clams, the D se govwcumt in not liik .:lky
to Pftvdt thews differences to lead to a sign fit ab t in its
general in tuna]. orientation. While their ac 'ion of
experience in dealing with Cornuydst Chinn lead se l dera
to ca0 meturi g of opinion and r
? of trustv fifftr of conwast
Ghi> s strensth,, l ty, and historic fflganslotdat t> ciesa.
will pnkably continue to be asaar factors in Burmog retaining a foreign
lacy ChMM rlSe by neutralism, peaceful o Late er and M CM.
ps ovspcsss-tia s " O sat ver, this expcarie es easy stinxhto
the Burnes ut to flavor the US by seeking InereasetL .deem aid.
25X1A9a
Approved For Release 2001/03/01 _: o CIA-RD
OR?